Magdi Mikheil et al v. Nashville General Hospital at Meharry et al.
In this health care liability action, the plaintiffs disagree with a number of the trial court’s rulings upon which it based its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The trial court excluded the plaintiffs’ life care planner due to their failure to provide a complete disclosure of the life care planner’s opinions in a timely manner. The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs’ sole standard of care expert, a neurosurgeon, was not competent to testify as to the standard of care of the defendant nurse practitioner. Furthermore, the trial court precluded the plaintiffs’ standard of care expert from testifying at all due to the plaintiffs’ repeated failure to comply with the court’s orders regarding discovery. We find no abuse of discretion with respect to the trial court’s decisions and affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Richmond v. Vanguard Healthcare Services, LLC et al.
The former administrator of an assisted living facility appeals the summary dismissal of his claim for retaliatory discharge under the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304, and common law. Plaintiff contends he was fired in retaliation for initiating an internal investigation and submitting an internal report to his supervisors concerning an incident that arose when the son of an elderly resident observed an old bandage stuck to the bottom of his mother’s foot, which was revealed when her sock was removed in order to check the dressing for a wound on her ankle. Defendants contend Plaintiff’s claims are legally deficient because there was no neglect or illegal activity to report, and that Plaintiff grossly overreacted after being informed that an old bandage was found on the ball of a resident’s foot in a sock when the resident’s wound, which was on her ankle, was properly dressed and bandaged. Defendants also rely on the fact that Plaintiff did not file a qualifying internal or external report of neglect until after he was fired. The trial court summarily dismissed the TPPA claim stating “leaving a bandage in a sock, where a patient’s wound is in fact otherwise sufficiently bandaged, is not illegal activity as defined by the statute. Leaving the bandage in the sock is not ‘abuse and neglect’ as defined in the statute.” The court dismissed the common law whistleblower claim because Plaintiff did not show that Defendants engaged “in illegal conduct or in any way . . . posed a threat to an important public policy of the State when all that was done was to leave an old bandage in a patient’s sock.” Plaintiff appeals the summary dismissal of his claims under the TPPA and common law. We affirm. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Richmond v. Vanguard Healthcare Services, LLC et al - Dissenting
The majority Opinion concludes that a reasonable juror (1) could not find that Mr. Richmond had reasonable cause to believe the presence of the soiled bandage was connected to “illegal activity,” as required by the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), and (2) could not find that Mr. Richmond could demonstrate that his termination for reporting the incident violated any clear public policy under his common law claim. Because I conclude that a reasonable juror could conclude that Mr. Richmond had reasonable cause to believe that the presence of the soiled bandage stemmed from neglect of the patient, I must respectfully dissent. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
In re Donna R.
Father of a child who was determined to be dependent and neglected shortly after her birth had his parental rights terminated on the grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent – failure to support; failure to provide a suitable home and wanton disregard; failure to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plan; and persistence of conditions. Father appeals, asserting that the evidence does not sustain the trial court’s findings relative to those grounds as well as the holding that termination was in the child’s best interest. Father failed to appeal or argue one of the grounds for termination and, consequently, has waived that issue; the ground is thereby final and we decline to review the other grounds. Upon our review of the record, there is clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s rights is in the child’s best interest. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Regina K. Deal v. Robert C. Tatum
At issue is the ownership of real property. Plaintiff and Defendant divorced in 2001. In February 2005, they purchased a home as “tenants in common with right of survivorship.” Seven months later, in September 2005, Defendant transferred his interest in the property to Plaintiff by quitclaim deed. In March 2009, Plaintiff quitclaimed her interest in the property to Defendant. Neither quitclaim deed was recorded until a dispute arose in September 2014 following which Plaintiff commenced this action to set aside the 2009 quitclaim deed based on fraud. Plaintiff contends Defendant fraudulently induced her into conveying the property by assuring her that he would refinance the property and give Plaintiff her share of the equity within one year. Defendant insists he purchased the property outright for $9,000, a payment Plaintiff admits receiving. At trial, Defendant objected to evidence of a purported oral agreement based on the statute of frauds. The trial court ruled the defense had been waived and that evidence of an oral agreement was admissible based on equitable estoppel, an exception to the statute of frauds. At the conclusion of the trial, the court ordered that Plaintiff’s name be put back on the deed so that “both of you . . . own the property together.” Both parties appeal. The trial court summarized the testimony of the witnesses and discussed some relevant legal principles; however, it made few findings of fact, and the findings of fact and conclusions of law identified by the trial court fail to disclose the steps by which the trial court reached its decision. Although, we do not have a clear understanding of the basis for the trial court’s decision, it appears that the trial court’s ruling was based on equitable estoppel, which is significant because equitable estoppel is not a basis for affirmative relief. Because equitable estoppel is not a basis for the relief granted and the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01, we vacate the judgment and remand for the trial court to make findings of fact that include as much of the subsidiary facts as is necessary to disclose the steps by which the trial court reached its ultimate conclusion on each factual issue. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Burley Alberts
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, John Burley Alberts, was convicted of four counts of rape of a child, see Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-522, and received an effective sentence of one hundred years to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of the Defendant’s car, and (2) that evidence obtained from a laptop computer recovered from his car should have been suppressed because officers did not acquire a search warrant prior to performing a forensic analysis of the computer. Because we conclude that the search was valid under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and that the Defendant has waived review of the second issue, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sylvia Folger v. Robert Folger
This appeal arises from a divorce. Sylvia Folger (“Wife”) sued Robert Folger (“Husband”) for divorce in the Chancery Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the Trial Court, among other things, awarded Wife transitional alimony. On appeal, Wife raises a number of issues. Because of Wife's pronounced economic disadvantage relative to Husband, we modify the judgment of the Trial Court to increase the amount of Wife's transitional alimony, and remand this case for the Trial Court to award Wife attorney's fees as alimony in solido as well as her reasonable attorney's fees incurred on appeal. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Dale Qualls
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the election of offenses doctrine, articulated in Burlison v. State, 501 S.W.2d 801 (Tenn. 1973), and reaffirmed in State v. Shelton, 851 S.W.2d 134 (Tenn. 1993), requires the prosecution to identify a single incident of sexual battery in cases, such as this one, where the child victim testifies to repeated incidents of sexual contact occurring over a substantial period of time but does not furnish any specific details, dates, or distinguishing characteristics as to individual incidents of sexual battery. We hold, as have courts in other jurisdictions, that where a prosecution is based on such nonspecific or “generic” evidence, requiring the prosecution to elect a single specific incident is not possible. However, to prevent infringement upon the defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict, the trial court must give a modified unanimity instruction which informs the jury that it must unanimously agree the defendant committed all the acts described by the victim in order to convict the defendant. Although the trial court did not have the benefit of this decision and therefore did not provide the modified unanimity instruction to the jury in this case, we conclude, based on the record in this appeal, that the omission of this instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment vacating the defendant’s convictions of sexual battery by an authority figure and reinstate the trial court’s judgment approving the jury’s verdict. |
Hardeman | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Chuncy Lesolue Hollis
The defendant, Chuncy Lesolue Hollis, whose original first degree premeditated murder conviction was reversed by this court due to an error in jury instructions, was again convicted by a Gibson County jury in a second trial of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; that the trial court erred by issuing a jury instruction on flight and by not instructing the jury on cause of death, by allowing prior statements of witnesses to be introduced as substantive evidence, by allowing photographic lineups into evidence and by summarily dismissing his motion for judgment of acquittal and/or a new trial without holding a hearing; that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by the manner in which the prosecutor questioned witnesses and by the improper comments he made in opening statement and closing argument; and that the cumulative effect of various trial errors deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nolan Excell Pippen
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Nolan Excell Pippen, was convicted of public intoxication, a Class C misdemeanor; and simple possession of marijuana, third or subsequent offense, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-310, -418. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of two years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for public intoxication; and (2) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the marijuana found in his pocket during a search incident to his arrest for public intoxication. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction for public intoxication and that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s suppression motion. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and dismiss the charges against the Defendant. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nolan Excell Pippen - concurring and dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for public intoxication as indicted, but I would uphold his conviction for simple possession of marijuana. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Greg Layman v. Aaron Acor et al.
This action was originally filed in general sessions court against three defendants and resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff. Two of the co-defendants appealed to circuit court. The remaining co-defendant successfully sought to have the general sessions judgment set aside for insufficient service of process. Thereafter, the general sessions court transferred the claim against the one remaining co-defendant to circuit court to be consolidated with the pending appeal filed by the other co-defendants. The plaintiff subsequently voluntarily dismissed the action. One co-defendant filed a motion to alter or amend, asserting that the circuit court should not have allowed the plaintiff to voluntarily nonsuit the action. The circuit court denied the motion, and the co-defendant timely appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Mimi Hiatt v. Kevin L. Hiatt
This appeal concerns post-divorce matters. Mimi Hiatt (“Wife”) and Kevin L. Hiatt (“Husband”) divorced. Wife some years later filed a motion to modify the final decree of divorce in the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to increase Husband’s child support and alimony obligations. Husband, in turn, filed a motion to recover claimed overpayments he made on the marital residence because Wife had transferred it to a trust. The Trial Court found, among other things, that Wife was voluntarily underemployed and declined to increase her spousal support for that reason. The Trial Court also ruled that Wife’s divestment of the marital residence constituted a “sale” under the Marital Dissolution Agreement (“the MDA”) and awarded a judgment to Husband for payments he made on the mortgage after Wife’s transfer of the marital residence to the trust. Wife appeals to this Court. We hold that Wife’s transfer of the marital residence to a trust constituted a sale per the MDA, and we affirm the Trial Court in its award to Husband for overpayment. However, we find that Wife proved a substantial and material change in circumstances, and we remand for the Trial Court to determine an increase in Wife’s alimony in light of this change and all relevant factors. We find further that the Trial Court erred in declining to award Wife her attorney’s fees relative to alimony. As a final matter, we award Wife her attorney’s fees incurred on appeal related to the alimony issue, and remand for the Trial Court to determine Wife’s reasonable attorney’s fees related to the alimony issue on appeal. The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed, in part, and, reversed, in part. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenny Thomason
A Rutherford County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Kenny Thomason, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction, claiming that the State failed to prove premeditation or that he possessed the weapon that killed the victim; instead, he asserts that the victim possessed the weapon and that she was killed during a struggle. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Chauquinn Bernard v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Chauquinn Bernard, pleaded guilty to felony possession of marijuana pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-418(e) and received the agreed-upon sentence of four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served concurrently with a ten-year sentence for aggravated burglary that he was already serving. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and involuntariness of his guilty plea. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Chalmers G. Brown
The defendant, Chalmers G. Brown, appeals the trial court’s order granting his motion to correct an illegal sentence and entering corrected judgments, arguing that his convictions should have been vacated not merely corrected. After review, we reverse the trial court’s correction of the judgments against the defendant and reinstate the original judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Douglas Kincaid
Appellant stands convicted of possession with the intent to sell not less than one-half ounce but not more than ten pounds of marijuana, a Class E felony; possession with intent to sell a schedule IV controlled substance, a Class D felony; possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court imposed partially consecutive sentences, for an effective sentence of five years. On appeal, appellant argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his possession of tramadol conviction and his firearm conviction; (2) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the photographs and text messages from appellant's cellular telephone; and (3) the trial court erred in allowing witnesses to testify regarding appellant's oral statement to police. Following our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenny Thomason - dissent
I respectfully dissent from the majority view that the evidence supports a verdict of first degree premeditated murder. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Clifford Eric Marsh
The Defendant, Clifford Eric Marsh, pleaded guilty to fourth offense driving on a revoked license, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-50-504 (2012). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days’ confinement at 75% service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Spencer
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Robert Spencer, was convicted of one count of possession with intent to sell twenty-six grams or more of a substance containing cocaine and one count of possession with intent to deliver twenty-six grams or more of a substance containing cocaine, both Class B felonies. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(4), (c)(1), (i)(5). The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of fourteen years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred by allowing an investigator to testify about statements made by a “cooperating source”; and (3) that the trial court erred by failing to merge his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the Defendant's convictions. However, we merge the Defendant's convictions and remand the case to the trial court for entry of corrected judgment forms reflecting said merger. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Lee Morris
The Defendant-Appellant, Richard Lee Morris, was indicted by a Madison County Grand Jury for attempted rape and misdemeanor assault. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of the lesser included offense of sexual battery and the charged offense of assault. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-505, -101(a)(1) (Supp. 2013). The trial court sentenced Morris as a Range II, multiple offender to four years for the sexual battery conviction and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the assault conviction and ordered the sentences served consecutively. On appeal, Morris argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his assault conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerome Sanders
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Jerome Sanders, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to eighteen years to be served at eighty-five percent. On appeal, the appellant contends that the the trial court erred by refusing to suppress pretrial identifications of him made by the victim; that the trial court erred by failing to suppress his statement to police; that the trial court improperly questioned the victim, which commented on the evidence and bolstered the victim's credibility; that the trial court should have recused itself because the court's conduct and demeanor created judicial bias; that the trial court admitted evidence in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); that the trial court erred by admitting the co-defendant's statement into evidence; that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments; and that cumulative error warrants a new trial. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties' briefs, we conclude that trial court committed reversible error by potentially allowing the jury to hear improper propensity evidence in violation of Rule 404(b), Tennessee Rules of Evidence. Therefore, the appellant's conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial, at which another judge shall preside. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Juan E. Henderson
The Defendant, Juan E. Henderson, appeals as of right from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's revocation of probation and order that he serve the balance of his seven-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, he asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dr. Robin M. Stevenson v. American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania
This appeal involves a lawsuit filed by an insured against his insurer due to the insurer's failure to pay a claim for a theft loss. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding no coverage under the policy. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Church of God in Christ, Inc., et al v. L.M. Haley Ministries, Inc., et al. - DISSENT
ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., Dissenting. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals |