Opinions
Ronnie Mills v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Ronnie Mills, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that his pleas were unknowing and involuntary due to counsel’s misinforming him regarding the specific terms of his plea agreement with the State and counsel’s subsequent failure to get those terms in writing or object when the alleged agreement was not honored. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bernard Nelson
A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Bernard Nelson, of two counts of indecent exposure. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the State breached its duty to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence. The Defendant also contends that the convicting evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. We affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Boshears v. Cleave C. Brooks
This appeal arises from a negligence case brought after an automobile accident. James Boshears (“Boshears”) was a passenger in a vehicle driven by his girlfriend that was struck by a vehicle driven by Cleave C. Brooks (“Brooks”). Boshears sued Brooks in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”). Boshears alleged that Brooks was negligent in operating his vehicle. Brooks asserted that he suffered a stroke immediately prior to the accident, that he lost consciousness, and that, consequently, he could not be found negligent. The case was tried to a jury. The jury found that Brooks was not at fault. Boshears appealed to this Court. On appeal, Boshears argues that the Trial Court erred in charging the jury with sudden emergency when comparative fault was not raised by Brooks. Boshears also asserts that the Trial Court erred in charging the jury on both sudden emergency and loss of consciousness. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Howard Hawk Willis
This appeal arises from the murder of two teenagers, accompanied by the dismemberment of one of them. A jury convicted the defendant, Howard Hawk Willis, of two counts of premeditated first-degree murder and one count of felony murder in the perpetration of a kidnapping. The jury sentenced the defendant to death on each conviction. The defendant appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his convictions and sentences. On appeal, the defendant contends, inter alia, that certain incriminating statements he made to his ex-wife should have been excluded because she was acting as an agent of the State at the time the statements were made. He asserts that the admission into evidence of the statements violated his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. For purposes of the right against self-incrimination, we hold that this is a case of “misplaced trust” in a confidant and there was no violation of the Fifth Amendment. The defendant also argues that the admission of the statements violated his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. The incriminating statements to the ex-wife were made during in-person meetings with her at the jail and during recorded telephone calls from jail. As to statements made to the ex-wife prior to indictment, we hold that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached, so there was no violation regardless of whether the ex-wife was acting as an agent of the State. As to statements made in person to the ex-wife after indictment, the evidence shows only that the State willingly accepted information from a cooperating witness. We hold that, for a cooperating witness or informant to be deemed a “government agent” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the defendant must show that the principal—the State, personified by law enforcement officers—manifested assent, either explicitly or implicitly, to have the cooperating witness act as a government agent, and that the State had some level of control over the witness’s actions with respect to the defendant. Agency cannot be proven based solely on the actions of the alleged agent, so proof that the ex-wife repeatedly contacted law enforcement is not sufficient in and of itself to show that the State assented to have her act as its agent. Therefore, the admission into evidence of the statements made in person to the ex-wife after indictment did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. As to the incriminating statements made by telephone, we hold that, by placing the telephone calls to his ex-wife from jail with full knowledge that all calls were subject to monitoring and recording, the defendant implicitly consented to the monitoring and recording of his conversations and waived his Sixth Amendment rights. After full review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals upholding the defendant’s two convictions of first degree murder, and we affirm the sentences of death. |
Washington | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Howard Hawk Willis - Concurring
I concur fully with the Court’s opinion except for the analysis in Section II(E)(4) regarding the proportionality review. In 1997, this Court narrowed the scope of the proportionality review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39 13 206(c)(1)(D) by limiting its consideration to only those cases in which the death penalty had been sought. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 666 (Tenn. 1997). A majority of this Court reaffirmed this truncated approach in State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180, 217 (Tenn. 2013). In Pruitt, I joined Justice William C. Koch, Jr. in dissenting from the Court’s decision to continue following the Bland approach, as it improperly narrows the proportionality review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39 13 206(c)(1)(D). Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d at 230 (Koch and Lee, JJ., concurring and dissenting). We determined that the Court should return to its pre-Bland proportionality analysis by considering “all first degree murder cases in which life imprisonment or a sentence of death has been imposed” and focusing on whether the case under review more closely resembles cases that have resulted in the imposition of the death penalty than those that have not. Id. at 230-31 (Koch and Lee, JJ., concurring and dissenting). |
Washington | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Dennis Sprawling-Concurring
Although I concur with the majority's conclusion that the trial court did not err in suppressing the Defendant's blood test results and agree that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed, I write separately because I cannot agree with the inclusion of two sentences in the majority opinion concerning the adoption of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in Tennessee. The first sentence is: “We believe that Tennesseans have adjusted well for over three decades under our State's constitution without adoption of any good faith exception….” The second sentence is: “We should not alter Tennessee Law.” |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Barbara E. Catalano v. William R. Woodcock
In this post-divorce child support case, we granted interlocutory appeal to determine whether the Knox County Fourth Circuit Court (“trial court”) erred by finding that the mother was entitled to ongoing and/or retroactive child support from the father for the parties’ adult disabled child. In October 2001, the mother had been granted a default divorce judgment by the Rutherford County Circuit Court (“divorce court”) upon constructive notice by publication to the father. As to child support for the parties’ only child, who was then seventeen years old, the divorce court reserved the issue pending personal service of process upon the father. In March 2014, the State of Tennessee, acting on behalf of the mother, filed a petition to set child support. Prior to the petition’s filing, no child support obligation had been set. Following a hearing, the child support magistrate recommended that the trial court consider the reservation of child support to be a prior child support order and find that it could exercise jurisdiction to set child support. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dennis Sprawling
Defendant, Dennis Sprawling, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), one count of driving with a blood alcohol content of more that 0.20% (DUI per se), and one count of reckless driving. A separate count alleged that Defendant had previously been convicted of DUI. In this interlocutory appeal, the appellant, State of Tennessee appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's order granting a motion to suppress filed by Defendant. The State claims that the trial court erroneously suppressed Defendant's blood test results because the “arresting officer had both actual and implied consent” to draw a sample of Defendant's blood following Defendant's arrest for DUI. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Clarence Cook v. Mary Elizabeth Cook
This appeal stems from a final judgment of divorce entered in the Anderson County Chancery Court. Wife appeals several issues, including the propriety of the trial court’s decision to grant a divorce based on irreconcilable differences in the absence of an agreed written marital dissolution agreement. Upon review of the record transmitted to us on appeal, we agree that because there was no written marital dissolution agreement, the trial court erred in granting the divorce between the parties on the basis of irreconcilable differences. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s final judgment and remand for such further proceedings as are necessary and consistent with this Opinion. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Marcie Lynn Pursell v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Marcie Lynn Pursell, appeals from the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to have expert witness testimony excluded, failure to impeach expert witnesses with prior inconsistent statements, and for lack of experience. The decision of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Henry Midgett, III
The defendant, Charles Henry Midgett, III, pled guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated child abuse, a Class B felony. As part of the agreement, the defendant pled guilty as a Range I offender but waived the release eligibility within his range, and he agreed that the trial court would determine the length of the sentences, the release eligibility, and whether the sentences would run concurrently or consecutively. The trial court sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment for each count, to be served at forty-five percent. The sentences were to be served concurrently. The defendant appeals, asserting that the aggregate sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred in applying certain mitigating and enhancing factors. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm the sentences imposed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles William Reed
This direct appeal presents a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A). Defendant, Charles William Reed, properly reserved a certified question of law as part of his plea agreement in which he asks this Court whether there was sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Victoria Hope Mashburn v. Tyler David Mashburn
In this divorce action, Tyler David Mashburn (Father) argues that the trial court erred by including certain provisions in the permanent parenting plan, i.e., (1) a requirement that his residential parenting time with the parties’ son be supervised; (2) a provision prohibiting Father’s girlfriend from staying overnight during Father’s parenting time; (3) a provision that Father shall have no additional residential parenting time for holidays or vacations unless Victoria Hope Mashburn (Mother) agrees; and (4) a provision that all major decisions regarding the child shall be made exclusively by Mother. We modify the plan by deleting all of these provisions. Furthermore, we reverse the trial court’s decision to award Mother attorney’s fees of $5,000. |
Meigs | Court of Appeals | |
The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County v. The Civil Service Commission of The Metropolitan Government of Nashville And Davidson County, Tennessee, et al
An officer with the Davidson County Sheriff’s Department was terminated for dishonesty and related charges after he filed official reports alleging that he had been attacked by another officer and lost consciousness during training exercises. The Department investigated the officer’s claims and found that they were exaggerated and that his dealings with claims representatives and other personnel were hostile and dishonest. After a disciplinary hearing, the Department decided to terminate the officer. An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) determined that the officer should be reinstated with only a ten-day suspension. The Civil Service Commission adopted the ALJ’s initial order as its final order with a few changes. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) filed a petition for review in chancery court, and the court held that the decision of the Civil Service Commission that the officer had not committed the conduct at issue was not supported by substantial and material evidence. The chancery court reversed the decision of the Commission as to the officer committing the misconduct and remanded to the Commission for a determination of the appropriate disciplinary sanction. We affirm the decision of the chancery court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Lukas S.-M
This is an appeal from an order designating a primary residential parent, setting visitation, and requiring the child to be returned to Tennessee. The juvenile court found that Mother failed to comply with Tennessee’s parental relocation statute, and after conducting a best interest analysis, ordered that the child be returned to Tennessee. Mother appealed both the court’s application of the relocation statute and its determination of the child’s best interests. We vacate in part and affirm in part. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Andrea Kay Honeycutt Ex Rel. Minor Child, Alexander H. v. Jonathan Honeycutt
In this case, a wife, on behalf of herself and her children, obtained an ex parte temporary order of protection against her husband as permitted by Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-605(a). After a hearing, the circuit court extended the order of protection for forty-five days and assessed costs and attorneys’ fees against the husband. The husband appeals, arguing that the wife failed to prove her allegations of domestic abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. After reviewing the record, we affirm the decision of the circuit court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Allen Gibbs v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Michael Allen Gibbs, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree felony murder, aggravated burglary, and attempted especially aggravated robbery convictions. He asserts that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition because he received ineffective assistance of counsel in that counsel did not thoroughly advise him regarding a plea offer and the proof needed to convict him. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Haywood | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven William Miller
Defendant, Steven William Miller, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his original sentence in confinement. Upon our review of the record, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Defendant’s probation and ordering Defendant’s sentence into execution. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John F. Manning, Sr. v. Crystal Joan Manning, et al.
This appeal involves the interpretation of a marital dissolution agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, the husband and wife agreed to waive any interest in the other party's retirement account upon the dissolution of the marriage. The husband failed to effectuate the change to his retirement account. Upon his death, the wife refused to sign documentation waiving her right to the benefits. The administrator of the estate filed suit. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the wife. The administrator appeals. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and direct entry of summary judgment in favor of the administrator. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
John E. Houston v. Conagra Foods Packaged Foods LLC
John E. Houston (“Employee”) alleged he sustained a compensable injury to his back in June 2013. He initially sought medical treatment through his health insurer and told his doctors his injury occurred in the course of his employment at Conagra (“Employer”). When Employee submitted a claim for short-term disability benefits and FMLA leave through Employer, however, he stated his condition was not related to his employment. He ultimately had back surgery on August 22, 2013. On September 13, 2013, Employee gave notice of what he alleged to be a work-related injury to Employer by means of a letter from counsel. Employer denied the claim, based in part on the lack of timely notice. The trial court found Employee’s application for short-term disability benefits provided notice that Employer had an injured employee, and, had Employer conducted an investigation at that time, it would have become aware the injury was work related. The court determined notice, therefore, was timely. It awarded permanent partial disability benefits and entered judgment accordingly. Employer has appealed from that judgment. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse the judgment. |
Gibson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Chuck's Package Store et al. v. City of Morristown
This case originated when six retail wine and liquor stores filed suit against the City of Morristown seeking a refund of a portion of inspection fees that had been erroneously calculated by the City. The fees were assessed by the City on the purchases at wholesale of alcoholic beverages. The City failed to use the correct percentage mandated by Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-3-501 (2013). It is undisputed that the plaintiffs overpaid the City; since the plaintiffs were understandably unaware of the error, they failed to state that they were paying the fees under protest. The City moved to dismiss the case, citing the plaintiffs' failure to pay “under protest.” |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
In re Addison E., et al.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother's parental rights to two minor children. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of her rights on the statutory ground of severe child abuse. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Earl G. Donaldson v. Terri Allison Donaldson
In this divorce action, the trial court awarded alimony in futuro to Husband in the amount of $1,450.00 per month. Wife appeals, contending that the findings that Husband had a need for alimony and Wife had the ability to pay, as well as the nature, amount, and duration of the award, are not supported by the record. In making the award, the court did not find that rehabilitative, transitional, or short term alimony was inappropriate, and the findings of fact do not otherwise allow for a review of the award. We vacate the award and remand the case for further consideration of the nature, amount, and duration of the award of alimony. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Earl G. Donaldson v. Terri Allison Donaldson - Dissent
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion in this case. I instead would affirm the judgment of the trial court in its entirety. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Shannon Robert Gregory v. Kelly Ann Gregory
This is an appeal of a post-divorce order reinstating Father’s alimony obligation and denying Father’s petition to terminate child support. Father brought a petition to terminate his alimony and child support obligations after discovering that his ex-wife was living with a third party. Additionally, he argued that his twenty-one year old daughter was not severely disabled and his child support obligation should be terminated. The trial court suspended Father’s alimony obligation for the duration of his ex-wife’s cohabitation but reinstated the alimony obligation as the cohabitation had ceased by the time of trial. The trial court also determined that the child was severely disabled and ordered child support to continue. Father appealed. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals |