Lorenza Zackery v. State of Tennessee
Lorenza Zackery (“the Petitioner”) pleaded guilty to two counts of rape of a child. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis (“the Petition”) alleging “newly discovered evidence” in the form of an affidavit from the Petitioner stating that the victim testified in a 2009 juvenile court hearing that she had no sexual contact with the Petitioner until she was fifteen years old. The coram nobis court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that (1) due process requires that the statute of limitations be tolled; (2) the coram nobis court should have held an evidentiary hearing because the newly discovered evidence shows that the Petitioner was “factually innocent” of the crime of rape of a child; and (3) the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) when it failed to provide the Petitioner with a record of the juvenile hearing.[1] Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jared S. Aguilar v. State of Tennessee
Jared S. Aguilar (“the Petitioner”) filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when she (1) decided not to obtain the services of an expert witness for the defense without consulting the Petitioner and (2) ignored the Petitioner’s specific request that she cross-examine the State’s experts “on areas such as the contradicting of computer expert reports vs. the expert’s in-court testimony and whether [the Petitioner’s] estranged wife had ‘set him up.’” Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mary Hovatter v. JDAK, LLC, et al.
An employee developed carpal tunnel syndrome. Her employer provided medical treatment until the authorized treating physician opined the condition did not arise primarily from her work. The employer then denied the claim. At trial, the employee presented the testimony of an evaluating physician who opined her work was the primary cause of the condition. The trial court found the employee had successfully rebutted the opinion of the authorized treating physician, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(12)(C)(ii). It further found the condition arose primarily from her employment, as required by section 50-6-102(12)(A)(ii) and awarded benefits. The employer appeals. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm. |
Robertson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Johnny Braden v. M&W Transportation Co., Inc., et al.
Johnny Braden (“Employee”) suffered a compensable injury to his right elbow in April 2005 while working for M&W Transportation (“Employer”). Within six months of returning to work, Employee began experiencing pain in his right shoulder and numbness in his hand. He received treatment over the next two years and eventually was assigned a seven percent (7%) partial permanent disability rating. Three different insurance companies covered Employer during the time of Employee’s treatment. Each insurer disclaimed liability for the eventual disability. The trial court found the disability to be a direct and natural consequence of the original injury and assigned liability to the first insurer. The insurer appealed, asserting that liability for the shoulder and hand conditions should be assigned to the subsequent insurers based on the “last day worked rule.” Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Emma Jean Anderson v. James Kenneth Lowry, et al
This appeal originated from a boundary line dispute between adjacent landowners. In this boundary line dispute, the trial court: (1) determined the boundary line that divides the parties’ properties; (2) awarded treble damages to Appellee for timber that had been removed from the disputed property by the Appellant; (3) set aside the quitclaim deed recorded the day before the trial by Appellant as a fraudulent conveyance; and (4) awarded attorney fees to Appellee for the expenses incurred in prosecuting the petition to set aside the quitclaim deed as a fraudulent conveyance. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Deanne G. Roney v. Linda F. Nordhaus
This is an appeal from the entry of a five-year order of protection. The general sessions court entered an ex parte order of protection on behalf of the Appellee against the Appellant. After a hearing, the general sessions court entered a one-year order of protection. Appellant appealed this order to the Circuit Court for Smith County. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that Appellant had violated the previous order of protection and extended the order of protection to five years. Because the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion that Appellant violated a previous order of protection, we conclude the trial court did not meet the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 52.01. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
Carrie M. Thompson v. Stephen Matthew Thompson
Father appeals the parenting schedule that substantially restricts his parenting time. Without making any findings of fact, the trial court restricted Father’s parenting time to 48 hours per month, with no overnight visitation, until the child is three years old. Father contends the severe restrictions on his parenting time are not supported by the evidence. He further contends the trial court erred by severely limiting his parenting time without making any finding that he was guilty of conduct that affected his ability to parent pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-406(d). In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, the trial court is required, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01, to find the facts specially, state separately its conclusions of law, and enter judgment accordingly. The underlying rationale for this mandate is that it facilitates appellate review by affording a clear understanding of the basis of the trial court’s decision; in the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law, this court is left to wonder on what basis the court reached its ultimate decision. In this case, the trial court did not identify the legal principles it applied or the factual basis for its decision; therefore, it failed to satisfy the Rule 52.01 mandate. Because the trial judge has retired and both parties wish to avoid the cost of a new trial, the parties have requested that we conduct a de novo review of the record, and we have determined that the transcript of the evidence is sufficient for this court to conduct a de novo review to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies. See Gooding v. Gooding, __ S.W.3d __, No. M2014-01595-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 1947239, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2015). We find Father’s inappropriate statements and conduct concerning the child’s genitals are directly adverse to the best interests of the child. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-406(d). We also find that the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding of neglect and substantial nonperformance of Father’s parenting responsibilities to such a degree as to be adverse to the best interest of the child. See id. Accordingly, we affirm the parenting plan that substantially restricts Father’s parenting time. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Lakeilia Johnson v. New Wave, LLC et al.
Homeowner filed suit against Defendants alleging intentional misrepresentation as to contractor licensure, construction skills, and code compliance, breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-6-136 for misrepresentation of licensure in connection with a $27,500 contractor agreement for home improvements. The trial court concluded that Defendants committed intentional misrepresentation, breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-6-136. The trial court awarded Homeowner $18,100 in compensatory damages, $36,200 in punitive damages, and prejudgment interest at the rate of 5% per annum from the date the lawsuit was filed. Due to the lack of a transcript or a proper statement of the evidence, we must affirm. We also find this appeal is devoid of merit and so lacking in justiciable issues that it constitutes a frivolous appeal within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122. Accordingly, on remand the trial court shall award just damages for the expenses Homeowner incurred as a result of this appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Rainee M.
In this action, a minor child’s foster parents petitioned to adopt the child and terminate the parental rights of her biological father. A previous action seeking to terminate the father’s parental rights had been filed by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) in a different court. The prior case resulted in termination of the father’s parental rights, but the ruling was reversed on appeal. The foster parents filed the instant action during the pendency of the appeal in the first matter. The father filed a motion to dismiss the instant petition, which the trial court denied, proceeding to conduct a trial on the merits. Following the trial, the court took the matter under advisement and subsequently entered an order terminating the father’s parental rights. The father has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
James Anthony Moore v. Michael Gaut
Plaintiff James Anthony Moore was at Defendant Michael Gaut’s residence to do maintenance on his satellite dish when he was bitten by Defendant’s dog, a Great Dane. The dog was in Defendant’s fenced-in backyard, Plaintiff was on the other side of the fence, and the dog bit Plaintiff on his face. The trial court granted Defendant summary judgment based on its finding that there was no evidence that Plaintiff knew or should have known that the dog had any dangerous propensities. On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the large size of the Great Dane, a breed Plaintiff characterizes as being in a “suspect class,” should be enough, standing alone, to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff should have known the dog had dangerous propensities. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re Martavious B. et al.
This appeal arises from the termination of Father’s parental rights on two grounds, severe child abuse and persistence of conditions, and the finding that termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of his children. Father appeals the trial court’s findings of persistence of conditions and that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate his parental rights; however, Father does not appeal the trial court’s finding of severe child abuse. Because Father did not appeal the ground of severe child abuse, the trial court’s finding on that ground is final. Only one statutory ground need be found for termination; therefore, the dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in finding that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate Father’s parental rights. The evidence in the record clearly and convincingly established that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate Father’s parental rights. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Kolasinski v. Tennessee Department of Safety And Homeland Security, et al.
Police seized a vehicle and commenced forfeiture proceedings. The Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security mailed notices of the forfeiture proceedings to the driver and the owner of the vehicle, but the postal service returned the notices undelivered. When no petition was filed asserting a claim to the vehicle, the Department entered an order of forfeiture. After learning of the order of forfeiture, the owner of the vehicle filed a petition for judicial review, but because the petition was filed sixty-one days after the entry of the order of forfeiture, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cumecus R. Cates
Cumecus R. Cates (“the Defendant”) entered a global plea agreement to two Class B felony drug offenses and two Class C felony drug offenses and was sentenced to eight years for each Class B felony drug offense and three years for each Class C felony drug offense. Pursuant to the agreement, the three-year sentence in case number 68311 was aligned concurrently with the eight-year sentence in case number 68366, the three-year sentence in case number 68367 was aligned concurrently with the eight-year sentence in case number 68827, and the two eight-year sentences were aligned consecutively for an effective sentence of sixteen years. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a Rule 36.1 motion claiming that the concurrent alignment of one of his three-year sentences with one of his eight-year sentences was illegal because he was released on bail for the other felonies when he committed the second Class B felony. At the motion hearing, the State conceded a mandatory consecutive sentence was illegally aligned concurrently and that the Defendant was sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement. On motion of the State, the trial court vacated the judgments for the two Class C felonies. The trial court then determined that the illegal provisions of the now-vacated judgments were not material components of the plea because the Defendant's effective sentence of sixteen years remained after the convictions for the illegal sentences were vacated. Upon review, we reverse the trial court's order vacating the Defendant's judgments of conviction and remand the case for reinstatement of the judgments of conviction and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas George Headla
The Defendant, Thomas George Headla, pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court for Sevier County to driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2012) (amended 2013, 2015). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days suspended to probation after forty-eight hours in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant presents a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Melinda Kathleen Nichols Long v. Lionel Edson Long
Appellant filed a petition to modify alimony and child support. During the hearing on the petition, the trial court modified an award of separate property. Because the trial court issued a judgment outside of the relief requested by the parties, we reverse and vacate. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jarquese Antonio Askew
Defendant, Jarquese Antonio Askew, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in a three-count indictment with first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. Prior to trial, Defendant filed a “Motion to Recuse Prosecuting Attorney.” Following a hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion. A jury convicted Defendant of the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of voluntary manslaughter in Count 1 and criminally negligent homicide in Count 2, and Defendant was convicted as charged in Count 3 of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged Count 2 into Count 1 and sentenced Defendant to three years in Count 1 and 17 years in Count 3, to be served concurrently. In this appeal as of right, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion to disqualify the prosecutor, and Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Having carefully reviewed the record before us and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Randall K. Madison v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Randall K. Madison, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following merger of alternative offenses, the petitioner stands convicted of twelve counts of rape and one count of forgery. For these convictions he received an effective sentence of thirty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that it was error to deny his petition for relief because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Following a thorough review of the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gerald Dewayne Triplett
Defendant, Gerald Dewayne Triplett, appeals his conviction for one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) that the trial court erred in its evidentiary rulings with regard to hearsay statements and impeachment of a witness with a prior inconsistent statement; (2) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (3) that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. Based upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael V. Morris v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Michael V. Morris, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that due process requires that the statute of limitations for filing his petition be tolled because Sutton v. Carpenter, 745 F. 3d 787 (6th Cir. 2014), which he interprets as establishing that he has the right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, was not released until after the time limit for filing the petition had expired. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition as time-barred pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Margaret Laverne Riddle
A Blount County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Margaret Laverne Riddle, of one count of vehicular homicide. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court's denial of her motions to suppress the results of a blood alcohol test, arguing that (1) the State did not have valid consent to obtain the sample and (2) her due process rights were violated by the destruction of the blood sample before she was indicted and could have the sample tested. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Curtis Colston
Pursuant to his plea agreement, the Defendant-Appellant, Curtis Colston, entered a guilty plea to aggravated assault and received a sentence of six years, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. In this appeal, Colston argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for an alternative sentence. Upon our review, we affirm the sentence and remand for entry of a corrected judgment. |
Grundy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kimberly Ann Phillips
The Defendant-Appellant, Kimberly Ann Phillips, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation and reinstatement of her effective eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion because no “substantial” violation of her probation had occurred. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dewayne Pickins
Dewayne Pickins (“the Defendant”) was indicted with one count each of aggravated assault, attempted aggravated assault, and violating an order of protection. Prior to trial, the State voluntarily dismissed the charge of violating an order of protection. At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, the trial court granted the Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to the aggravated assault charge. The jury convicted the Defendant of attempted aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted aggravated assault and (2) the trial court erred in refusing to allow the Defendant to cross-examine the victim about her prior convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of conviction of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher M. Black v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner received an effective sentence of fifty years in the Department of Correction. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentence. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied following a hearing. On appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to hire a DNA expert to analyze the evidence against the Petitioner. Following our review, we affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction court. Thereafter, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted the Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal and remanded the matter to the post-conviction court for the entry of a supplemental order denying the petition. The post-conviction court complied with the remand order and filed a supplemental order with this court. Upon reconsideration of the Petitioner’s case, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ryan D. Buford
The defendant, Ryan D. Buford, appeals his jury convictions for first degree (felony) murder, especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. The defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police. He also urges us to conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the testimony of a co-defendant was insufficiently corroborated. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress and that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions, and we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |