Donald Nichols v. Knox County, Tennessee
On August 13, 2010, following a violation of his probation, Donald Nichols began serving a sentence at the Knox County Detention Facility (KCDF). He was assigned to a second floor cell. The only bed available there was a top bunk. On August 20, 2010, Nichols was subjected to a physical examination by KCDF's medical staff. The staff detailed his medical history as pain in his lower back and extremities, as well as surgeries on his knee, foot, and ankle. On August 27, 2010, while he was asleep, Nichols rolled off his bed and hit the floor. As a result, his head was bloody, and he had intense pain in his neck and back. The on-duty nurse examined him and gave him ibuprofen for pain. In the weeks that followed, Nichols continued to have ongoing pain. He made multiple requests for medical assistance. He had an x-ray on November 5, 2010. That x-ray and a subsequent CT Scan and MRI revealed that he had several cervical fractures as a result of his fall. Through the efforts of his criminal attorney, Nichols was released from KCDF on November 10, 2010. Thereafter, in January 2011, he had surgery and incurred medical expenses of approximately $240,000. He filed a complaint against Knox County, alleging common law negligence. Nichols filed a motion for partial summary judgment. Knox County filed a motion for summary judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Ray Graves, Jr.
In 2013, the Defendant pleaded guilty in case number F-13761 to two counts of theft of property valued over $1,000, one count of theft of property valued between $500 and $1,000, and one count of simple possession of a controlled substance. The Defendant also pleaded guilty in case number F-14140 to one count of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine. For these convictions, the trial court imposed a six-year sentence in case number F-13761 and a two-year consecutive sentence in case number F-14140, for a total effective sentence of eight years, to be served on supervised probation. In 2014, the trial court issued a probation violation warrant and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a revocation of his probation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lea Ann Tatham v. Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc., et al.
This products liability case arises out of an accident which resulted from the failure of a tire purchased less than three months before the accident. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff’s vehicle was totaled. Subsequently, the entire vehicle, including the tire, was destroyed. This case presents the following issues for review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to dismiss this case as a sanction for spoliation of evidence; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying summary judgment to the Defendants on the issues of causation and whether the tire was defective or unreasonably dangerous; and (3) whether the trial court erred in denying summary judgment on the issue of the application of the apparent manufacturer doctrine. Upon a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court did not err with respect to any of these issues. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Ray Rowland
Ray Rowland (“the Defendant”) filed a Motion for Return of Property pursuant to Rule 41(g) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case and dismissed the Defendant’s motion. On appeal, we conclude that the trial court does have jurisdiction. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a hearing. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee vs. Yuell Frank Reeves
Yuell Frank Reeves (“the Defendant”) appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. In September 1990, the Defendant was sentenced to four years for burglary, an offense which the Defendant committed in May 1990 (“the May offense”). In November 1990, the Defendant pleaded guilty to two additional burglaries committed in June and July 1990 (“the June/July offenses”) and received an effective four-year sentence which was ordered to run concurrently with the four-year sentence for the May offense. Approximately twenty-four years later, the Defendant filed a Rule 36.1 motion seeking to set aside his plea alleging he was released on bail for the May offense when he committed the June/July offenses. The Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion, and the State concedes that the case should be remanded for a hearing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing the Rule 36.1 motion as to the May offense and reverse the judgment summarily dismissing the motion as to the June/July offenses and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Yuell Frank Reeves - concurring
I agree with the majority that the summary dismissal in case number 183558 (May 1990 offense) should be affirmed. Viewing appellant’s motion in the light most favorable to him, I also agree with the majority that appellant has presented a colorable Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 claim with respect to case numbers 183785 and 183905 (the June/July 1990 offenses) due to the trial court’s concurrent, rather than statutorily-mandated consecutive, sentence alignment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-20-111(b) (mandating consecutive sentence alignment when a defendant commits a felony while the defendant is released on bail and the defendant is convicted of both offenses). |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rocky Joe Houston v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Rocky Joe Houston, appeals as of right from the Roane County Criminal Court’s order summarily dismissing as untimely his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion to affirm the post-conviction court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court. |
Roane | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lea Ann Tatham v. Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc., et al - Concurring in Part, Concurring in the Judgment
The majority has resolved the summary judgment issue by applying the federal standard recently adopted by this Court in Rye v. Women’s Care Center of Memphis, MPLLC, No. W2013-00804-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. 2015). As explained in my dissent in Rye, I disagree with the adoption of the federal standard and would instead retain our former summary judgment standard. In this instance, however, I would reach the same conclusion as the majority pursuant to the former standard. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Brent Hicks
In February 2013, the Williamson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Brent Hicks, for theft of merchandise over $1,000, a Class D felony. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jason Martindill
Defendant, Jason Martindill, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the motion. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sarah Ward, et al v. Shelaena Ward
After her daughter was injured in an ATV accident, Plaintiff filed suit against her daughter’s step-grandmother, in whose home the daughter was staying on the night of the accident and who owned the ATV, alleging numerous causes of action sounding in negligence. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment; Plaintiffs appeal as to the claims for negligent entrustment and negligent supervision. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Leslie Dean Ritchie v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole, et al.
This appeal concerns the dismissal of an allegedly untimely petition for writ of certiorari due to the trial court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because the petitioner has alleged that he filed an administrative appeal, the disposition of which would render his petition timely, we reverse the dismissal of his petition. We remand this matter to the trial court for a determination regarding the timeliness of the petition following the conclusion of the administrative appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sharon Lynnette Howard v.Randall Lynn Howard
In this divorce action involving the dissolution of a marriage of relatively short duration, the husband appeals the trial court's distribution of the marital estate, particularly the award of the marital residence and a 1969 Ford Mustang automobile to the wife. In order to more nearly return the parties to the positions they were in prior to the marriage, we modify the distribution of the marital estate to award the 1969 Ford Mustang automobile to the husband. We also modify the trial court's judgment concerning the marital residence to extend the wife's deadline for refinancing the debts associated with the marital residence to one year following the issuance of mandate by this Court. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all other respects. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Gela Annette Fabrizio v. Keith Anthony Fabrizio, Sr.
This appeal arises from an action for divorce wherein the trial court awarded alimony to the plaintiff wife, whom the court determined to be economically disadvantaged due to her inability to maintain employment. The husband has appealed the spousal support award, asserting that the trial court erred in its analysis of the applicable statutory factors. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Robert L. Mitchell v. State of Tennessee
A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Robert L. Mitchell, of one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of assault. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirty-seven years of incarceration. This Court affirmed his convictions and sentence on appeal. State v. Robert L. Mitchell, No. M2005-01652-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 1506519, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 1, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 13, 2006). After unsuccessfully seeking post-conviction and habeas corpus relief, the Petitioner filed a second petition for habeas corpus relief that is the subject of this appeal. He challenged his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping, alleging first that the allegation of “force, threat, or fraud” in the indictment for especially aggravated kidnapping did not support his conviction and, second, the indictment failed to charge aggravating factors that he asserts were required to support his conviction based upon the fact that he was the parent of the victim. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the Petitioner’s petition, and he now appeals. On appeal, we conclude that the habeas corpus court did not err, and we therefore affirm its judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Monoleto D. Green v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Monoleto D. Green, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition for having been untimely filed. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Inger Brown v. Larry W. Shipe, Jr.
The issue presented in this case is whether the trial court erred in its calculation of child support when it omitted from the calculation support due from Larry W. Shipe, Jr. (Father) during a period of time when he was incarcerated. We hold that the Child Support Guidelines, Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.04(3)(a)(2)(ii)(I) (2008), which provide that “incarceration shall not provide grounds for reduction of any child support obligation,” mandate that incarceration does not absolve an individual from his/her obligation to pay child support. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for a recalculation of Father’s child support arrearage. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re Kiara S.
Rachel L.S. (“Mother”) and Brandon M.R. (“Step-father”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Paul P. (“Father”) to the minor child Kiara S. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Circuit Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”) entered its order dismissing the petition after finding and holding, inter alia, that Mother and Step-father had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Father's parental rights for abandonment by willful failure to visit or for abandonment by willful failure to support. Mother and Step-father appeal the dismissal of their petition. We find that the evidence in the record on appeal does not preponderate against the Trial Court's findings, and we affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Phyllis Thibodeau,et al v. St. Thomas Hospital
Plaintiffs, a husband and wife, filed suit against St. Thomas Hospital alleging claims for ordinary negligence and a derivative loss of consortium. The complaint alleged that St. Thomas was liable for injuries Plaintiffs sustained as a result of the hospital’s employees’ failure to properly support the wife as they attempted to transfer her from a bariatric stretcher to her automobile. St. Thomas moved to dismiss the claim on the grounds Plaintiffs failed to comply with the pre-suit notice and good faith certificate filing requirements of the health care liability statute set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-26-121 and -122. Plaintiffs responded that the complaint was not subject to the filing requirements because it sounded in ordinary negligence, not health care liability. The trial court held that Plaintiffs’ action is a health care liability action subject to the filing provisions of the health care liability statute and dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim with prejudice, finding it undisputed that Plaintiffs failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-26-121 and -122. Plaintiffs appeal. Having applied the clear language of the health care liability statute to Plaintiffs’ complaint, we conclude that the allegations contained therein meet the definition of a health care liability action as defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-101(a)(1) and that Plaintiffs were required to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-26-121 and -122. Therefore, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tim Elswick, et al v. Shelaena Ward
This case arises from a contract for home improvement services. After the work was completed and Homeowners failed to pay the contract price, Contractor filed a civil warrant and was awarded a judgment in general sessions court. Homeowners failed to timely appeal the judgment to circuit court. They subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari and supersedeas in circuit court contending Contractor was not duly licensed and the Home Improvement Contractor’s Act prevented Contractor from recovering on the contract. Homeowners subsequently filed a complaint asserting a claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The circuit court denied the petition for writ of certiorari and dismissed the complaint as res judicata. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Robert Bean, et al v. Wilson County School System, et al.
This case involves a residency dispute relevant to a child’s enrollment in a Wilson County public high school. After school officials determined that the child was not a resident of Wilson County, they informed her parents that the child could not attend high school in the county school system. The parents filed suit in chancery court seeking injunctive relief related to the child’s enrollment in school and participation in athletics. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that the child lived in Wilson County and enjoined the local board of education from interfering with the child’s enrollment. The trial court also declared that the child should be afforded the same opportunities as other students as it relates to participation in athletics. On appeal, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Coffee County Board of Education v. City of Tullahoma, et al.
The Coffee County Board of Education filed suit against the City of Manchester and the City of Tullahoma to recover certain tax revenue the Board alleges it was owed pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-4-306. The trial court held that the Board of Education lacked capacity to bring the suit and dismissed the petition. The Board of Education appeals asserting that the authority to sue to recover the funds is necessarily implied from the General Assembly’s grant of express powers and duties to the Board. We agree. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-203(b)(5), the General Assembly has granted the Board the power to “[e]mploy legal counsel to advise or represent the board.” We find that this provision vests the Board with the authority to file suit to recover the funds at issue. Therefore, we must reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the lawsuit. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Judy Muffley v. David George
This appeal arises from the grant of a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside a final judgment. The plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a motion to revive or renew a judgment against the defendant. Due to inclement weather, the plaintiff was unable to attend the hearing on her motion. The trial court dismissed her motion with prejudice and released the underlying judgment. Subsequently, the plaintiff obtained counsel and filed a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside the trial court’s order. The trial court granted her motion and reinstated the original judgment. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth D. Sanders
Petitioner, Kenneth D. Sanders, appeals the order of the trial court denying his motion to vacate his guilty plea and/or motion to alter and amend the judgment in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his guilty plea proceedings. The trial court treated the motion as a petition for post-conviction relief and found that it was filed beyond the statute of limitations. On appeal, Petitioner argues that: (1) Petitioner is actually innocent; (2) The District Court [sic] lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (3) The sentence is an illegal sentence; (4) Petitioner’s guilty plea was not knowingly and intelligently made; and (5) Petitioner was deprived of his rights guaranteed him by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Grundy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Elahu Hill, Jr.
In September 2014, the Madison County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Elahu Hill, Jr., for simple possession of marijuana, tampering with evidence, and violation of the open container law. Following a trial, the jury found the Defendant guilty of simple possession of marijuana and tampering with evidence, for which he received an effective five-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for tampering with evidence and that his five-year sentence for tampering with evidence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the Defendant's conviction and sentence for simple possession of marijuana. However, we reverse and vacate the Defendant's conviction for tampering with evidence because we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals |