Sidney Cason v. Mike Parris, Warden
Petitioner, Sidney T. Cason, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because we determine that Petitioner has failed to file a timely notice of appeal or provide reason as to why the timely filing of the notice of appeal should be waived, the appeal is dismissed. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robin Flores v. Keith Celebrezze
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, from the Trial Court=s denial of a post-judgment motion to recuse in a breach of contract case. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by the Defendant, Keith Celebrezze (ADefendant@), we affirm the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Robert John Skowronski v. Donna Rae Wade
This case involves the modification of a permanent parenting plan naming Mother the primary residential parent. Father petitioned to be named the primary residential parent after Mother moved with the child out-of-state without providing prior notice. After a one-day hearing, the trial court found a material change in circumstance and that naming Father the primary residential parent was in the best interest of the child. Although conceding she failed to give notice of the move, Mother argues there was no material change in circumstance and a change in primary residential parent was not in the best interest of the child. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
3659 Mendenhall, Inc., et al v. City of Memphis, et al.
This is a declaratory judgment action. Appellant's application for a permit to erect a sign was denied by Appellee, the Memphis and Shelby County Office of Construction Code Enforcement. Appellant petitioned the trial court to declare that Code Enforcement was estopped from denying the permit. As grounds for estoppel, Appellant cites a letter issued to the Appellant five years earlier by an assistant county attorney when Appellant sought advice on erecting multiple signs at its location. After a hearing, the trial court granted the Appellees' motion for involuntary dismissal. We affirm and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Warren Bruce Maples v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Co., et al.
In this appeal, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, breach of contract by the insurance carrier. Pursuant to settled law in this state, the plaintiff had one year plus sixty days to institute suit on the policy. This action was filed one year and 134 days after the fire loss. The trial court found the lawsuit was not timely filed. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Michelle Rye, et al v. Women Center of Memphis, MPLLC, et al.
We granted permission to appeal in this healthcare liability action to reconsider the summary judgment standard adopted in Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008). The Court of Appeals concluded that the Hannan standard requires reversal of the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment to the defendants on certain of the plaintiffs’ claims. We hereby overrule Hannan and return to a summary judgment standard consistent with Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We hold, therefore, that a moving party may satisfy its initial burden of production and shift the burden of production to the nonmoving party by demonstrating that the nonmoving party’s evidence is insufficient as a matter of law at the summary judgment stage to establish the nonmoving party’s claim or defense. Applying our holding to the record in this case, we conclude that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all the plaintiffs’ claims at issue in this appeal. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the trial court for entry of summary judgment on these issues and for any other proceedings that may be necessary. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Michelle Rye, et al v. Women Center of Memphis, MPLLC, et al - Concurring
I was not serving on the Supreme Court in 2008 when Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008) was argued. Had I participated in the Hannan decision, I would have joined in the majority opinion. However, after observing the application of the unique Hannan standard over the past seven years, I conclude that the Hannan standard is unworkable and should be replaced. Although it is often easier to maintain the status quo rather than admit that a mistake was made, we do not have this option. We must change course when we realize we are headed in the wrong direction. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Michelle Rye, et al v. Women Center of Memphis, MPLLC, et al - Concurring
I concur in all respects with the excellent opinion in this case authored by Justice Clark. I write separately solely to address from a somewhat different perspective some of the points raised by the dissent. The dissent claims that Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008) simply “refined” the summary judgment standard adopted by this Court dating back to 1993 in Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993). Based in part upon my first-hand experiences in the trenches as a trial court judge, I beg to differ. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Michelle Rye, et al v. Women Center of Memphis, MPLLC, et al - Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part
The majority opinion accurately recounts the development of this area of the law but ultimately concludes that the summary judgment standard first articulated in Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993), and later refined in Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008), and other decisions of this Court, must now be overruled. In my view, the principles articulated in Hannan, when interpreted in light of the history of summary judgment in Tennessee, set forth the preferable standard for shifting the burden of proof at summary judgment—one that is fully consistent with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56. By granting Rule 11 review in a case which pre-dated the passage of a statute purporting to set a new standard for summary judgment, by rejecting the well-established doctrine of stare decisis, and by acquiescing to the standard proposed by the General Assembly, my colleagues have preempted the future consideration of an important constitutional issue—whether the General Assembly, by its enactment of Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-16-101 (Supp. 2014), has violated the separation-of-powers doctrine. In the interest of consistent, predictable procedural guidelines of adjudication, I would hold that Byrd, Hannan, and their progeny should be reaffirmed as the standard for summary judgment in Tennessee and should be applied to the facts before us. Moreover, in my assessment, even the federal standard, as adopted in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), does not warrant dismissal on all of the claims. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Ronald Leslie McKnight v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Ronald Leslie McKnight, appeals the denial of his bid for post-conviction relief from his 2011 Davidson County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated burglary, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Harold Flynn Et Al. v. Citizens National Bank
This appeal involves a long-term ground lease and leasehold financing. After numerous assignments to successor tenants and several foreclosures, Citizens National Bank (“the Bank”) became the successor tenant under the ground lease. After a fire at the property, the Bank notified the landlord that it intended to surrender the leased property and cease paying rent, according to its interpretation of a separate agreement executed by the parties. The landlord denied that the Bank was entitled to unilaterally surrender the leased property and cease paying rent. The landlord filed a detainer warrant in general sessions court and, after an adverse ruling, appealed to circuit court. The circuit court concluded that the separate agreement did not limit the Bank's liability under the ground lease, as the Bank claimed. Accordingly, the circuit court entered a judgment against the Bank for approximately $130,000 for unpaid rent, taxes, and attorney's fees. The Bank appeals, challenging the circuit court's interpretation of the separate agreement and its award of damages beyond the sum of $25,000. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antoine Tony Blugh
The Defendant-Appellant, Antoine Tony Blugh, was charged by presentment in count 1 of violating the Sex Offender Registration Act by establishing a residence within 1000 feet of a public park, in count 2 of violating the Sex Offender Registration Act by failing to timely register within forty-eight hours of changing his residence, in count 3 of an enhanced violation of the Sex Offender Registration Act by establishing a residence within 1000 feet of a public park after already having been convicted of a prior sex offender registry violation, and in count 4 of an enhanced violation of the Sex Offender Registration Act by failing to timely register after already having been convicted of a prior sex offender registry violation, all of which were Class E felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 40-39-211, -208. Prior to trial, Blugh filed a motion to dismiss the presentment, which the court denied. At trial, the jury acquitted Blugh in counts 1 and 3 but convicted him of count 2, and, following the second part of the bifurcated trial, convicted him of the enhanced violation in count 4. After merging count 2 with count 4, the trial court imposed a sentence of two years and six months, with a mandatory minimum sentence length of 180 days‟ imprisonment. See id. § 40-39-208(d). On appeal, Blugh argues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the presentment; (2) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury as to the applicable law regarding his status as a sexual offender in Tennessee; and (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because there was a fatal variance between the crimes alleged in the presentment and the evidence presented at trial. Upon review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marvin Matthews v. Henry Steward, Warden
The Petitioner, Marvin Matthews, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Maurice Currie
The defendant, Maurice Currie, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. He asserts that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his motion because Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure does not place a time limit on the filing of a claim and the court improperly treated the motion as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. After review, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stacey Philander Baldon
The defendant, Stacey Philander Baldon, appeals the summary denial of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence. Because the petitioner stated a colorable claim for relief under Rule 36.1, which the State concedes, the trial court erred by summarily denying the motion. In consequence, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stacey Philander Baldon-Concurring
I concur with the results of the majority, but from a somewhat different view. I agree the arrival of Rule 36.1 has produced an anathema. I further agree that the trial court misapprehended Defendant’s claim as one that would result in permissive sentence alignment. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Casey Dupra Drennon
The appellant, Casey Dupra Drennon, pled guilty in the Rutherford County Circuit Court to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and received a seven-year sentence with credit for 149 days already served and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation and ordering that he serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Scott Edward Robins
The Appellant, Scott Edward Robins, pled guilty in the Marshall County Circuit Court to the initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced the Appellant to eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jimmy Ray King v. State of Tennessee
Eleven years after he entered a guilty plea to second degree murder, the Petitioner, Jimmy Ray King, filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis based on newly discovered evidence. The State filed a motion to dismiss the petition as barred by the statute of limitations, which was granted by the coram nobis court. In this appeal, the sole issue presented for our review is whether due process required tolling of the statute of limitations. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee. |
Grundy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Elizabeth Eberbach v. Christopher Eberbach
This post-divorce case involves issues concerning reimbursement for the parties’ children’s uncovered medical expenses and an award of attorney’s fees in favor of Mother. Father/Appellant contends that he is not responsible for the uncovered medical expenses on grounds that Mother/Appellee failed to timely send him copies of the bills as required under the permanent parenting plan. Father also contests the award of attorney’s fees and costs. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Garner v. Coffee County Bank
Plaintiff and his former wife purchased a house together in 2002. The former wife moved out of the house with all of her belongings in 2009, and the house suffered damage from a fire in 2010. The former wife was a named insured on the house, and each of the insurance checks issued to cover property loss and living expenses was made payable to both Plaintiff and his former wife. The president of the bank that held a mortgage on the house had a separate business relationship with the former wife. According to Plaintiff, the bank president informed him that he could not have any of the insurance proceeds unless one-half was given to the former wife, which proceeds were used to pay down the former wife’s separate and unrelated loan. The bank ultimately foreclosed on the house because the loan became delinquent. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the bank and president asserting conversion, wrongful foreclosure, and other related causes of action. The bank and the president filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff did not file his opposition within the time prescribed by the procedural rules, and the trial court granted the bank and the president’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in some respects and reverse the judgment in other respects. Plaintiff’s deposition transcript that the trial court considered in ruling on the motion for summary judgment raised genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment on several of the causes of action alleged. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Bruce Turner v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Bruce Turner, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 conviction for rape of a child and his twenty-five-year sentence. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brittany Hatcher Loewen v. Jeffrey Wade Loewen
This is a divorce case. Wife/Appellant appeals the trial court’s award of transitional alimony in the amount of $1,625.00 per month for three years. Because the record contains neither a transcript of the proceedings, nor a Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 statement of evidence, we have no basis on which to review the ruling of the trial court. Affirmed and remanded. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In re: A.J.
This is the second appeal from a finding of criminal contempt. Appellant and his wife originally filed a petition to have the Appellees’ daughter adjudicated dependent and neglected. The trial court entered an order, in which the parties could not contact each other or each other’s families. Appellant made contact with Appellees’ daughters on multiple occasions via text message and once in person. The Appellees filed a petition for contempt against Appellant, and the trial court found the Appellant guilty of four counts of criminal contempt and sentenced Appellant to the maximum punishment allowed for each contempt conviction with the sentences to run consecutively. On the first appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions of criminal contempt but vacated the sentence and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to resentence the Appellant and explain its reasons for the sentence it imposed. On remand, the trial court found the Appellant guilty of twenty eight counts of criminal contempt. The trial court imposed twenty-four hour sentences for each count except one, for which the trial court imposed a five-day sentence. Appellant appeals from the convictions, the sentence, and the trial court’s denial of a motion to recuse. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Michael Hooten v. State of Tennessee
The pro se Petitioner, Christopher Michael Hooten, appeals as of right from the Maury County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his petition presented a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and, therefore, that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing the petition. The State concedes that the Petitioner presented a colorable claim for relief. Following our review, we agree with the parties and remand for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals |