State of Tennessee v. Rickey Alvis Bell, Jr.
In this capital case, the jury convicted the Defendant, Rickey Alvis Bell, Jr., of two alternative counts of first degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated sexual battery. The jury sentenced the Defendant to death for the first degree murder based on four aggravating circumstances. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the Defendant’s convictions. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the record did not support two of the aggravating circumstances but nonetheless affirmed the death sentence. We now address the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to strike the death notice on the ground that he is intellectually disabled; (2) whether Tennessee’s statute prohibiting the execution of intellectually disabled persons is unconstitutional; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s two motions for mistrial; (4) whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow the Defendant to adduce evidence that the victim’s husband was having an extramarital affair at the time the victim was murdered; (5) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions; and (6) our mandatory review of the Defendant’s death sentence. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and death sentence. |
Tipton | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Freddie Lee Johnson
The Defendant, Freddie Lee Johnson, appeals his conviction for first degree felony murder, arguing: (1) the State failed to establish a sufficient chain of custody for a latent fingerprint lifted from the crime scene; (2) the Defendant’s right to confrontation was violated when the trial court allowed testimony that the Defendant’s fingerprint was lifted from an area in the crime scene that “raised a red flag”; (3) the Defendant’s right to present a defense was violated when the trial court prohibited trial counsel from arguing an alternative location for the Defendant’s fingerprint; (4) the trial court erred by failing to grant a mistrial when a witness testified that the latent print was lifted from a cup; (5) the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the indictment pursuant to State v. Ferguson; (6) the trial court erred by allowing the victim’s daughter to testify about comments made by the victim about the Defendant; (7) the trial court violated the Defendant’s right to present a defense by refusing to allow the defense to introduce a prior statement from an unavailable witness; (8) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument; (9) the trial court erred in its instruction to the jury on flight; (10) the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce into evidence portions of the Defendant’s police interview; and (11) the trial court erred by ruling that the State could use the Defendant’s prior theft convictions for impeachment. Following a careful review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions but remand for correction of the judgments. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Estate of Warren Elrod
This appeal involves a non-probate asset, an individual retirement account. The decedent’s listed beneficiary on the asset predeceased him. The biological son of the decedent moved to collect the proceeds of the asset as the sole heir at law. Two stepchildren sought to be declared the decedent’s “children” in order that they might share in the account with the biological son. The decedent’s will provided for all three individuals to share equally in his real and personal property. The probate court found the term “children” in the retirement account agreement was ambiguous and determined the decedent considered all three individuals to be his “children.” Accordingly, the court ordered that the asset should be distributed equally to Sherry Diane Souder, Terry Ray Palmer, and Gregory Lynn Elrod as “children” of the decedent. The biological son appeals. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rickey Alvis Bell, Jr. - Concurring In Part and Dissenting In Part
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Tipton | Supreme Court | |
William DeMorato v. Cherokee Insurance Co.
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. After finding that William DeMorato ("Employee") suffered a bilateral carpal tunnel injury in the course and scope of his employment with Trans Carriers, Inc. ("Employer"), the trial court awarded permanent partial disability benefits of 15% to each arm and temporary total disability benefits of $104,948.02. After Employer filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, however, the trial court concluded that Employee was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits. Employee argues that the trial court erred in finding that he was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits. Employer argues that the trial court erred in finding that Employee suffered a compensable injury. We affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Madison | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Ralph Alexander v. A & A Express LLC
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee, Ralph Alexander, suffered an injury to his right shoulder during the course and scope of his employment with employer, A&A Express, LLC ("A&A"). He was ultimately treated surgically. Mr. Alexander was released from treatment with a permanent partial anatomical impairment but no permanent restrictions. He was initially returned to work at A&A, but later laid off due to lack of work. Mr. Alexander has not returned to work at A&A or been employed since then. Mr. Alexander claimed at trial that he was permanently totally disabled, which A&A denied. The trial court found that Mr. Alexander was not permanently totally disabled. The court found that Mr. Alexander had a vocational disability of 84% to the body as a whole, but limited his award to 42% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 50-6-241. The trial court also awarded Mr. Alexander $525.66 in unpaid medical mileage. Mr. Alexander appeals, contending that the trial court erred in failing to find him permanently totally disabled. Mr. Alexander contends, alternatively, that the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel should find that the statutory cap of six times the anatomical impairment does not apply pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 50-6-242, or that the Panel should remand the case to the trial court for such a determination. Finally, Mr. Alexander contends that the trial court should not have accorded a presumption of correctness to the medical impairment rating which resulted from the Medical Impairment Review evaluation pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 50-6-204(d)(5). Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s determination. |
Chester | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Dung Tran
Appellant, Dung Tran, was convicted of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; vandalism valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; burglary, a Class D felony; and unlawful possession of burglary tools, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced appellant to eight years as a Range II, multiple offender for each conviction of theft, vandalism, and burglary and to eleven months, twenty-nine days for the possession of burglary tools conviction. The sentences were aligned concurrently for an effective sentence of eight years. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his theft and vandalism convictions. Following our thorough review of the record, the parties' arguments, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Louis Still
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Louis Still, of operating a motor vehicle after having been declared a motor vehicle habitual offender, a Class E felony, and the trial court sentenced him to four years to be served as one month in confinement and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction because the State's key witness, the arresting officer, was not credible. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Brooks
A Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Michael Brooks, charging him with two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the commission of a felony. Two co-defendants were also indicted with Defendant, but Defendant was tried by himself. After the jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery, one count of assault, and aggravated burglary. He was acquitted of the other charges. The trial court imposed a sentence of eighteen years for especially aggravated kidnapping, four years for each count of facilitation of aggravated robbery, eleven months and twenty-nine days for assault, and four years for aggravated burglary. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently for an effective eighteen-year sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping and that his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Anderson (In Re: David W. Camp)
Appellant, David W. Camp, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s finding of criminal contempt for his failure to appear at a scheduled court appearance for Mr. Camp’s client, Christopher Anderson, the defendant in this case. The trial court summarily convicted Appellant under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a), finding that Appellant was in direct contempt of court and that Appellant’s conduct was in the presence of the court. The trial court relied upon text messages received from Appellant explaining his whereabouts at the time of the scheduled court appearance. We conclude that the trial court’s finding that Appellant’s conduct was in the presence of the court is error, and therefore, we remand this case for a hearing in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b). |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Treavor E. Warren v. Margie H. Warren
The Final Decree of Divorce from which the pro se incarcerated appellant, Treavor E. Warren, seeks to appeal was entered on December 19, 2014. The Notice of Appeal was not timely filed even if the date affixed to the Notice by the appellant (January 30, 2015) is considered. See Tenn. R. App. P. 20(g). Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Benjamin Foust
The Defendant, Benjamin Foust, was indicted and, following a jury trial, convicted of ten counts of felony first degree murder, two counts of premeditated first degree murder, four counts of especially aggravated robbery, three counts of aggravated arson, and two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202, -13-403, -14-302, -17-1307(b). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of two consecutive life sentences plus 105 years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by allowing the State to admit, as substantive evidence, the prior statement of a co-defendant in violation of Tennessee Rules of Evidence 613 and 803(26); (2) that the trial court erred by failing to merge all of the Defendant‘s convictions for aggravated arson; (3) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant‘s convictions; (4) that the trial court erred by not allowing the Defendant to stipulate that he had been convicted of prior felonies without disclosing that the convictions were for crimes of force and violence; (5) that the trial court erred by admitting an autopsy photograph of the charred body of one of the victims; (6) that the State improperly vouched for the credibility of a co-defendant who testified against the Defendant at trial; (7) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding the inferences that could be drawn from the possession of recently stolen property; and (8) that the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive sentences.1 Following our review, we conclude that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce, as substantive evidence, the prior statement of a co-defendant in its entirety, and that this error was not harmless. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand this case for a new trial. We also conclude that the evidence was insufficient to sustain one of the Defendant‘s convictions for aggravated arson. With respect to that conviction, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the charge. We will address the remainder of the Defendant‘s arguments so as not to pretermit his remaining issues. See State v. Parris, 236 S.W.3d 173, 189 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007) (following a similar procedure) |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Brittany D.
In this termination of parental rights case, the minor child was taken into custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) in February 2014 shortly after Mother’s return to jail following the child’s birth during a furlough. In June 2014, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights alleging that she was mentally incompetent to parent the child under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(8) and that she had abandoned the child pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(1) and Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv). Following a trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights upon both grounds pled by DCS. Although on appeal we conclude that the abandonment ground was not proven by clear and convincing evidence, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
In re: Kelsey L., et al.
The Juvenile Court for Rutherford County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Joshua L. (“Father”) to the minor children Kelsey L. and Karlie L. (“the Children”) after finding and holding that grounds to terminate had been proven by clear and convincing evidence and that it also had been proven by clear and convincing evidence that the termination was in the Children’s best interest. Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to the Children raising a single issue regarding the Juvenile Court’s finding as to best interest. We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s findings made by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights to the Children and that it was in the Children’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. We, therefore, affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Leon Graves
The defendant, David Leon Graves, was convicted by a Wilson County Criminal Court jury of two counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony; one count of assault, a Class B misdemeanor; and one count of reckless endangerment, a Class E felony. He was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years and twenty years, respectively, for the attempted murder convictions, six months for the assault conviction, and two years for the reckless endangerment conviction. The trial court ordered the twenty-year sentence served consecutively to the twenty-five-year sentence, for an effective term of forty-five years in the Department of Correction. The defendant raises six issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing evidence of statements the defendant made while hospitalized; (3) whether the trial court erred by admitting a photograph of the victim’s injuries; (4) whether the trial court erred by not allowing evidence about a prior frivolous 9-1-1 call made by the defendant’s girlfriend; (5) whether the defendant’s convictions and sentences violate principles of double jeopardy; and (6) whether the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Lewis Tuttle
Following the execution of a search warrant for his property and residence, the Defendant-Appellant, Jerry Lewis Tuttle, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury in case number 21695 for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of not less than one-half ounce nor more than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was also indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury in case number 22091 for conspiracy to possess marijuana in an amount over 300 pounds with intent to sell or deliver within 1000 feet of a school, conspiracy to commit money laundering, money laundering, possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, and acquiring or receiving property subject to judicial forfeiture pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-703. The Defendant-Appellant filed motions to suppress the evidence seized and to dismiss the forfeiture count, which were denied by the trial court following a hearing. At trial, the Defendant-Appellant was convicted in case number 21695 of the lesser included offense of simple possession of cocaine and the charged offense of possession of marijuana with intent to sell; the count charging him with being a felon in possession of a firearm was dismissed. In case number 22091, the Defendant-Appellant was convicted of the lesser included offense of conspiracy to possess marijuana in an amount over 300 pounds with intent to sell or deliver as well as the charged offenses of conspiracy to commit money laundering, money laundering, and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony. Following a bench trial on the judicial forfeiture count, the trial court denied the forfeiture of several items seized but ordered the forfeiture of other items, including the $1,098,050 that is at issue on appeal. After a sentencing hearing on the other counts, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifty years with a release eligibility of thirty-five percent. On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant argues: (1) that the search of his property violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures because the affidavit in support of the search warrant did not provide probable cause for the issuing judge to believe that evidence of a crime would be found on his property and in his home; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conspiracy convictions; and (3) he is entitled to the return of the $1,098,050 because the cash seized was obtained by him more than five years prior to the seizure and because the seizing agent failed to deliver a notice of seizure to him at the time the cash was seized. Upon review, we reverse the Defendant-Appellant’s convictions. However, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in regard to the forfeiture proceedings. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Lewis Tuttle - dissenting in part and concurring in part
I concur with the majority’s opinion in its affirmation of the trial court’s forfeiture order. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the affidavit supporting the search warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause. Instead, I would affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to suppress and would conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s convictions. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Vernon Elliott Lockhart
A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Vernon Elliott Lockhart, of one count of conspiracy to sell 300 pounds or more of marijuana within a drug-free school zone, a Class A felony; one count of possession of 300 pounds or more of marijuana with intent to deliver within a drug-free school zone, a Class A felony; ten counts of money laundering, a Class B felony; one count of possession of ten pounds or more of marijuana with intent to deliver within a drug-free school zone, a Class C felony; and one count of facilitation of possession of ten pounds or more of marijuana with intent to deliver, a Class E felony. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective ninety-four-year sentence. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress evidence obtained from the wiretaps of various cellular telephones; that the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress evidence based upon the unlawful attachment of GPS tracking devices on two vehicles and the unlawful GPS tracking of a co-defendant’s cellular telephone; that the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress evidence seized pursuant to an unlawful search warrant for his home; that the trial court incorrectly ruled that a detective could testify as an expert in the identification and interpretation of drug ledgers; that the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of a State witness; that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; that his effective sentence is excessive; and that cumulative error warrants a new trial. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the appellant’s money laundering convictions in counts 14, 16, and 31. Therefore, those convictions are reversed, and the charges are dismissed. We also conclude that the trial court mistakenly sentenced the appellant in count 36 to the charged offense of possession of ten pounds or more of marijuana with intent to deliver rather than the convicted offense of facilitation, modify the appellant’s sentence for the conviction from four to two years, and remand the case to the trial court for correction of the judgment. The appellant’s remaining convictions and effective ninety-four-year sentence are affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Adrian Wilkerson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Adrian Wilkerson, appeals pro se from the summary dismissal of his 2014 petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 1996 convictions of first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000. Because the petition was filed more than a decade beyond the applicable statute of limitations, because this is the petitioner’s second successive petition for post-conviction relief, and because the petitioner failed to either allege or prove a statutory exception to the timely filing or a due process tolling of the statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tracy Lynn Carman-Thacker
The Defendant, Tracy Lynn Carman-Thacker, was convicted in a bench trial in the Coffee County Circuit Court of twelve counts of unlawful possession of a firearm while subject to an order of protection and twelve counts of violating an order of protection by possessing a firearm, all Class A misdemeanors. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-113 (2014) (violation of an order of protection or restraining order), 39-17-1307 (Supp. 2012) (amended 2014) (unlawful carrying or possession of a weapon). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the evidence found during a search of her house and that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions. We vacate the Defendant’s convictions and dismiss the charges. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Walter Francis Fitzpatrick, III
The Defendant-Appellant, Walter Francis Fitzpatrick, III, was indicted by the McMinn County Grand Jury for harassment, aggravated perjury, stalking, and extortion. The trial court granted the defense's motion for judgment of acquittal as to the stalking charge after the close of the State's proof at trial, and it was dismissed. The jury convicted Fitzpatrick of aggravated perjury and extortion, Class D felonies, but found Fitzpatrick not guilty of harassment, a Class A misdemeanor. T.C.A. §§ 39-16-703; 39-14-112; 39-17-308. The trial court sentenced Fitzpatrick to concurrent sentences of three years with a release eligibility of thirty percent for his aggravated perjury and extortion convictions and ordered these sentences to be served consecutively to his misdemeanor convictions in Monroe County for disrupting a meeting and resisting arrest in case number 10-213, resisting arrest in case number 11-018, and tampering with government records in case number 12-108.1 On appeal, Fitzpatrick argues: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction over his case because a grand jury member voting to indict him was disqualified by reason of interest, and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Virginia H. Sanders v. Commissioner of Department of Labor and Workforce Development, et al.
Appellant employee appeals from the denial of her claim for unemployment compensation. Because there is substantial and material evidence in the record to establish that the employee was discharged for work-related misconduct, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Chris Victory v. Bob Duckwiler, et al.
The employee alleged that he sustained a compensable injury to his lower back. His employer initially accepted the claim but later denied it. The trial court found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury. It further found that the testimony of Employee's evaluating physician overcame the presumption of correctness attached to a Medical Impairment Registry (“MIR”) evaluation by clear and convincing evidence. The employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennesssee Supreme Court Rule 51. We conclude that the trial court erred by finding that the MIR presumption had been overcome, and we modify the judgment accordingly. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects. |
Wilson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Paul V. Permenter v. Briggs and Stratton Corporation
An employee alleged that he developed cubital tunnel syndrome and carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of his work activities. His employer provided medical treatment for the former condition but denied liability for both conditions at trial. The trial court found that the cubital tunnel syndrome was compensable but the carpal tunnel syndrome was not. It further found that Employee had a meaningful return to work, thus limiting his recovery to one and one-half times the anatomical impairment. The employee has appealed, asserting that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings regarding his carpal tunnel syndrome and return to work. The employer contends that the evidence preponderates against the finding that the cubital tunnel syndrome was compensable. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the judgment. |
Dyer | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony B. Whitaker
Following a jury trial, Anthony B. Whitaker (“the Defendant”) was convicted of aggravated statutory rape. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it did not give the jury a missing witness instruction. Additionally, the Defendant claims that the language in the presentment was deficient because the presentment did not include “recklessly” as a culpable mental state. After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals |