State of Tennessee v. James Pennock
The Defendant-Appellant, James Pennock, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of three counts of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to establish the Defendant's identity as the person who committed the offenses; (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding eyewitness identification testimony; and (3) the trial court erred in allowing the co-defendant, Nora Gibson, to testify without proper notice provided to the Defendant. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Thomas Edward Kotewa v. Brenda Jones, Warden
Pro se petitioner, Thomas Edward Kotewa, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief by the Lauderdale County Circuit Court. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues that the habeas corpus court erred in denying his petition because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to accept his plea of guilty. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marquize Berry
The defendant, Marquize Berry, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of attempted second degree murder, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm but order certain clerical amendments to the judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marquize Berry-Concurring In Part, Dissenting In Part
I concur in the excellent lead opinion by Judge Witt. I write separately, however, because I do not agree that the judgment form for Count 3 needs to be corrected. In this case, the learned trial judge entered a judgment on Count 3 to effectuate the jury‟s finding of guilty of a violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(b)(1), the offense of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. When an offender does not have a prior felony, the punishment for violation of this statute is at least a mandatory minimum six-year sentence in the department of correction. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-24-1324(h)(1). |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Derishon Wadlington
The defendant, Derishon Wadlington, was detained in a Union City Walmart store, after being observed attempting to leave the premises without paying for a belt, which she had in her possession. Union City police officers were called and, taking the defendant into custody, found a small clear bag containing a green leafy substance in her purse. At the jail, her purse was inventoried and found to contain a large clear bag containing a white powder, which was determined to be cocaine. She filed a motion to suppress the evidence, which was granted after the trial court determined that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant. The State appealed. Following our review, we conclude that the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant, and, thus, the subsequent search of her purse was lawful. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s suppression of the evidence and remand the matter to the trial court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Derishon Wadlington-Dissenting
I respectfully dissent. First, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial judge determined that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Defendant. The majority quoted the trial court’s ruling, which I interpret bases the decision on the fact that the officers took Defendant into custodial arrest in violation of a statute that mandated the issuance of a citation in lieu of custodial arrest. The trial court’s reasoning was that since custodial arrest was invalid, the resulting search was invalid, and thus all evidence found in Defendant’s purse must be suppressed. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Pamela Barkley, et al. v. Shelby County Board of Education
Action under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act to recover for injuries sustained in a slip and fall at a school operated by the Shelby County Board of Education. In a bench trial, the court held the school board 60% liable and plaintiff 40% liable and awarded plaintiffs damages totaling $29,400. The Board of Education appeals the holdings that it was negligent, that its immunity was removed, and that the plaintiff was less than 50% at fault for her injury. While the evidence does not preponderate against the finding that plaintiff fell on water in the school hallway, there is no evidence that the Board had notice of the water; consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the case. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles B. Davis
A Davidson County jury convicted Defendant, Charles B. Davis, of one count of theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000, one count of theft of property valued under $500, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. In addition, the Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated burglary but was acquitted of an additional count of aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range II, persistent offender. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to Counts 2 and 5 as there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for theft of property and employing a firearm during a dangerous felony and (2) the trial erred when it denied his motion for new trial because the trial court failed to properly function as the thirteenth juror as the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Agustine R. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights appeal brought by the father. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to support termination of the father’s parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to remit child support and failure to comply with the permanency plans. The court also found that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. The father appeals. We affirm.
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Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus Traveno Cox, Jr.
The Defendant-Appellant, Marcus Traveno Cox, Jr., was indicted by a Marshall County Grand Jury for one count of solicitaion of aggravated perjury and one count of improper influence of a juror, Class A misdemeanors. Cox entered an open plea of guilty to solicitation of aggravated perjury, and count two was dismissed. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed the maximum sentence of 11 months and 29 days in the county jail, to be served consecutively to his sentences in another case. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in sentencing Cox. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Kenneth Lawson
The defendant, William Kenneth Lawson, appeals the revocation of his probationary sentence. He pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and violation of his habitual traffic offender status. As a result, he was sentenced to an effective term of eight years on supervised probation. Subsequently, a violation warrant was issued alleging that the defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation agreement by being arrested on new charges. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered revocation of the probation and that the defendant serve the remainder of his sentence in incarceration. On appeal, the defendant contends that there is not sufficient evidence in the record to support the court’s finding that a violation occurred. Following review of the record, we conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to revoke probation. As such, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James R. Bristow
Defendant, James Bristow, was charged by indictment with vehicular homicide by intoxication, vehicular homicide by recklessness, driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), and DUI per se. Defendant pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication with an agreed nine-year sentence, and the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The remaining counts were dismissed in accordance with the agreement. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve his nine-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that he should have received an alternative sentence. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Clay | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Terrence Moore Robinson, Jr. v. Susan Kathleen Robinson
In this post-divorce action, Mother appealed from the trial court’s decision to change the designation of primary residential parent to Father. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that a material change in circumstances had occurred based on the child’s recent athletic development and its impact on his social development. The trial court also found that making Father the primary residential parent was in the best interests of the child. In making the best interests determination, the trial court made particular note that the parties’ fifteen-year-old son preferred to live with Father. Mother appealed, arguing that there was no material change in circumstances and that the trial court erred by failing to consider the importance of continuity and by allowing the preference of the child to control the outcome of the best interests determination. Because we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings and that there is no error in the trial court’s conclusions, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Wendell Thorpe
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Jeremy Wendell Thorpe, was found guilty as charged of aggravated arson, a Class A felony, and vandalism of a structure of a value of sixty thousand ($60,000.00) dollars or more, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of seventeen years for the aggravated arson conviction and nine years for the vandalism conviction. In his appeal of right, Defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for aggravated arson. Specifically, Defendant argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he “knowingly” committed the offense. An integral part of this issue is Defendant’s assertion that aggravated arson requires a “result-of-conduct” knowing mens rea. Defendant asserts there are conflicting opinions of this Court as to this issue. The State initially argues that Defendant’s motion for new trial was filed one day late, and that as a result, the notice of appeal was not timely filed. The State urges this Court to dismiss Defendant’s appeal. In a reply brief, Defendant concedes his motion for new trial was filed late by one day and although the notice of appeal was also late, the timely filing of the notice of appeal should be waived. The State declined to address Defendant’s argument that aggravated arson is a “result-of-conduct” offense. Defendant does not challenge the vandalism conviction. After a through review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we conclude that the State’s argument that the notice of appeal was filed late is void of merit. Notwithstanding the fact the State waived argument on the “knowing” mens rea definition for aggravated arson, we conclude that aggravated arson is not a result-of-conduct offense. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ashley Marie Witwer
Appellant, Ashley Marie Witwer, brings a certified question of law regarding whether the retroactive application of the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification and Tracking Act of 2004, as amended in 2012, to her conviction for promoting prostitution is an unconstitutional ex post facto law. After careful review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we determine that the law is constitutional. Accordingly, the judgment of the criminal court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Harvey Taylor v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Harvey Taylor, pled guilty to rape on August 20, 2009. On October 11, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, citing newly discovered evidence. The coram nobis court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition. The State filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition was untimely. Counsel then filed a motion to withdraw. The coram nobis court granted both the motion to withdraw and the motion to dismiss. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the coram nobis court erred in allowing his original counsel to withdraw without responding to the State’s motion to dismiss and by dismissing his petition as untimely without holding an evidentiary hearing to determine whether due process required tolling of the statute of limitations. Upon our review of the record, we determine that Petitioner’s claims, if true, would not entitle him to coram nobis relief and would not warrant tolling the statute of limitations. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Autwell v. Back Yard Burgers, Inc., et al.
The employee was injured in a motor vehicle accident while driving from doing a personal task in Alabama to a meeting for his employer in Mississippi. The employer denied his workers’ compensation claim, so the employee filed this lawsuit. The trial court awarded benefits based on a finding that the claimant was a “traveling employee.” Its holding also implied, in the alternative, that the employee was on a “special errand” for the employer. The employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We conclude that the injury did not arise from or in the course of the employment, and therefore, reverse the award of benefits to the employee |
Shelby | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Louis Dancy v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Louis Dancy, appeals the post-conviction court‟s denial of relief from his conviction for second degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Melissa L. Taylor Et al. v. James T. George, II et al.
The plaintiff filed this action seeking to enforce a judgment for child support and alimony entered in South Carolina and subsequently domesticated in Tennessee. One defendant serves as the trustee of a testamentary trust while the other defendant is a trust beneficiary and the judgment debtor. Before this action proceeded to trial, the trustee distributed all of the respective trust assets to the beneficiary/debtor. As the trial court determined that there was insufficient evidence of a fraudulent conveyance or civil conspiracy, it dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against the trustee. The trial court upheld the plaintiff’s judgment against the beneficiary/debtor and awarded pre- and post-judgment interest thereon. The plaintiff appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Calvin Eugene Bryant v. State of Tennessee - CONCUR IN PART AND DISSENT IN PART
I concur with the majority that a conviction on a greater offense does not preclude a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for the failure to request jury instructions on lesser included offenses. Although a small number of recent opinions by the Court of Criminal Appeals have held otherwise, most panels have endorsed the traditional view that the trial court has the obligation to provide instructions on the charged offense and all lesser included offenses warranted by the proof at trial, and that defense counsel, absent a reasonably based strategy, has the duty to seek instructions on all lesser included offenses. In contrast to the majority, I believe that trial counsel in this instance provided constitutionally inadequate representation by failing to request an instruction on facilitation as a lesser included offense of the sale of ecstasy within a school zone. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent to the extent that I would grant a new trial. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Calvin Eugene Bryant v. State of Tennessee - CONCUR IN PART AND CONCUR IN RESULT
I concur with the lead opinion’s conclusion that trial counsel’s failure to request an instruction on facilitation did not amount to deficient performance. Because the petitioner has failed to establish deficient performance, I also agree with the lead opinion’s conclusion that the petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Having so concluded, I decline to join Section B of the lead opinion, which addresses the prejudice prong of the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. I reserve decision on the issue of the proper prejudice analysis for an appeal in which it is squarely presented. Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996) (recognizing that a court need not address both prongs of a petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim when the court concludes that the petitioner has failed to establish either deficient performance or prejudice). |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Wells
The defendant, Anthony Wells, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of voluntary manslaughter, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive, and that the trial court erred by refusing to admit certain hearsay statements. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Howard Hawk Willis
A Washington County jury convicted appellant, Howard Hawk Willis, of two counts of premeditated first degree murder and one count of felony murder in the perpetration of a kidnapping. Following the penalty phase, the jury sentenced appellant to death on each conviction. The trial court merged the felony murder conviction into one of the convictions for premeditated first degree murder. On appeal, appellant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred in finding that appellant implicitly waived and forfeited his right to counsel and requiring him to proceed pro se at trial; (2) the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress his statements; (3) the searches of the residence and the storage unit were unconstitutional; (4) the trial court erred in denying appellant’s multiple motions to continue the trial; (5) the trial court erred in staying appellant’s funding and other privileges used in preparation for trial after this court granted an interlocutory appeal; (6) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (7) the trial court erred in denying appellant’s ex parte motions for expert services for a crime scene expert and a false confession expert; (8) the trial court failed to apply a higher standard of due process in all aspects of the case; (9) the trial court erred in admitting certain photographs; (10) the prosecutor made improper statements during closing arguments in both phases of the trial; (11) the trial court erred in instructing the jury during the guilt phase; (12) the aggravating ircumstances upon which the State relied were not stated in the indictment; (13) the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to preclude for-cause removal of jurors who were not death qualified; (14) Tennessee’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional; (15) the trial court erred in failing to advise appellant with respect to his testimony during the penalty phase; (16) the trial court failed to make an adequate inquiry into appellant’s competency to waive is right to present mitigating evidence; (17) the trial court erred in instructing the jury during the penalty phase; (18) the trial court erred in admitting victim impact evidence; (19) the proportionality review is unconstitutional; and (20) cumulative error warrants reversal. Following our thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eric Bike v. Johnson & Johnson Health Care Systems, Inc., et al.
An employee injured his knee while stepping off of a pallet. The trial court found that the injury was idiopathic and denied the employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The employee appealed. We reverse the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Calvin Eugene Bryant v. State of Tennessee
In this post-conviction appeal, we address two issues: 1) whether trial counsel provided ineffective representation by failing to request a jury instruction on facilitation as a lesser-included offense; and 2) whether a trial counsel‟s failure to request a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense is never prejudicial to a defendant convicted of a greater offense. The defendant was charged with selling illegal drugs to a police informant. The defendant‟s trial counsel argued that he was entrapped by the informant. A jury instruction on facilitation as a lesser-included offense was neither requested by the defendant‟s trial counsel nor given by the trial court. The defendant was convicted of selling illegal drugs. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his convictions. The defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective representation by not requesting a jury instruction on facilitation of the sale of a controlled substance. The post-conviction court denied relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding that 1) trial counsel was not deficient in failing to request a jury instruction on facilitation; and 2) when convicted of a greater charge, a defendant can never show that the absence of a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense was prejudicial to the defendant. We hold that the evidence in this case failed to warrant a jury instruction on facilitation. Accordingly, trial counsel‟s failure to request a facilitation instruction was not deficient performance. Further, we hold that under certain facts and circumstances, a trial counsel‟s failure to request a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense can be prejudicial to a defendant and entitle him or her to post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Our decision in State v. Davis, 266 S.W.3d 896, 910 (Tenn. 2008), approving sequential jury instructions, doesnot obviate an attorney's responsibility to request lesser-included offense instructions when warranted by the proof. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, as modified. 1 We heard oral argument on this case on May 29, 2014, at the American Legion Auxiliary Volunteer GirlsState held at Lipscomb University in Nashville, Tennessee, as a part of the Court‟s S.C.A.L.E.S. (Supreme Court Advancing Legal Education for Students) project. |
Davidson | Supreme Court |