In Re Jonathan F.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The court-appointed Guardian ad Litem (“the Guardian”) for the minor child Jonathan F. (“the Child”) filed a petition 1 in the Juvenile Court for Sevier County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Amy F. (“Mother”) and Uriah F. (“Father”) to the Child. The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a response joining in the Guardian’s petition. After a trial, the Juvenile Court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights on a host of grounds. We vacate certain of the grounds as relates to Father. Otherwise, we affirm the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court as modified. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Martinez Dennis
Appellant, Martinez Dennis, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of felony murder during the perpetration of a robbery and was sentenced by the trial court to life in prison. In this appeal, he raises two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his custodial statement to law enforcement officers; and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Edward Meeks v. State of Tennessee
In 1994, a jury found the Petitioner, Charles Edward Meeks, guilty of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to serve a life sentence in prison. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. See State v. Charles Edward Meeks, No. 01C01-9506-CC-00170, 1995 WL 687695, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 21, 1995), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 6, 1996). In March 1997, the Petitioner filed a post conviction petition, and this Court affirmed the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. Charles Edward Meeks v. State, No. 01C01-9807-CC-00295, 1999 WL 173972, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, March 30, 1999), perm. app denied (Tenn. Oct. 11, 1999). On January 10, 2005, the Petitioner filed for a writ of error coram nobis alleging that he had discovered new evidence. The State filed a response to the petition requesting that the trial court dismiss the petition as untimely. The trial court agreed, and dismissed the petition on that basis. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Grundy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Susan Ellen Calfee Muhonen v. James Lucius Muhonen
This post-divorce parenting dispute arose when the father filed a petition to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan as to their two minor children. Concomitantly with entry of the final judgment for divorce, the trial court had entered a permanent parenting plan order on January 19, 2007, designating the mother as the primary residential parent and granting the father residential co-parenting time on alternating weekends and Wednesday evenings. This parenting plan was later modified by agreement in an order entered June 17, 2008. Nearly five years later on July 27, 2012, the father filed the instant petition to modify the permanent parenting plan. He alleged that a dangerous situation existed at the mother’s home and requested an emergency ex parte order naming him the primary residential parent, which the trial court immediately granted. Upon a hearing, the trial court entered an order, inter alia, confirming the father as the primary residential parent, pending further proceedings, on August 13, 2012. Following a final hearing conducted approximately one year later, the trial court found that a material change in circumstance had occurred since entry of the June 2008 permanent parenting plan and that it was in the children’s best interest for the father to be declared their primary residential parent with sole decision-making authority. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Clayton v. Roy Herron, et al
The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s pro se complaint for failure to state a claim. Due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s brief on appeal, we find that he waived consideration of any issues on appeal and hereby dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Antonio Bagwell
A Montgomery County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, James Antonio Bagwell, of two counts of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; two counts of aggravated assault while acting in concert with two or more other persons, a Class B felony; and one count of reckless endangerment by discharging a firearm into a habitation, a Class C felony. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received concurrent sentences of ten years for each Class B felony conviction and five years for the Class C felony conviction for a total effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; that the trial court committed plain error by failing to require that the State elect facts to support the attempted murder and aggravated assault charges; and that his effective sentence is excessive and should be served in an alternative to confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
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Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Estate of Marcia Hull v. Estate of George A. Culver, et al.
This is a declaratory judgment action in which Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment regarding the transfer of Marcia Hull’s monetary assets and jointly-held property to the Culver Estate. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jameca M. Tipler
The Defendant-Appellant, Jameca M. Tipler, was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury for attempted first degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, felony evading arrest, reckless endangerment, and felony vandalism. The jury convicted Tipler of all the charged offenses except the felony vandalism charge, which the jury determined was a misdemeanor. The trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction with the attempted first degree murder conviction and sentenced Tipler to an effective sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, Tipler argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, and misdemeanor vandalism, and (2) the jury charge and verdict form were erroneous because they did not require the jury to determine whether he was criminally responsible before determining whether he was guilty of the underlying charges, and the trial court erred by not including an instruction on the natural and probable consequences rule in its instruction on criminal responsibility. Upon review, we remand to the trial court for entry of a judgment reflecting the modified conviction for facilitation of attempted first degree murder, which should also reflect the merger of the modified conviction for facilitation of aggravated assault with the conviction for facilitation of attempted first degree murder, for entry of a judgment reflecting the indicted offense of reckless endangerment by discharging a firearm into a habitation and the modified conviction for facilitation of reckless endangerment by discharging a firearm into a habitation, and for resentencing. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard Blanchard v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Richard Blanchard, was convicted of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to an eleven-year sentence. This Court affirmed his conviction and sentence on appeal. State v. Richard Lowell Blanchard, No. M2010-1186-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 2533753, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 24, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 12, 2013). The Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the Petitioner relief. The Petitioner now appeals, maintaining that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Romalis Gray v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
This is an appeal from a final order dismissing the negligence action filed by the appellant.The final order was entered on July 10, 2014, and served on the parties by the trial court clerk on July 14, 2014. The Notice of Appeal was filed more than thirty (30) days from the effective date of entry of the final order, even considering the date upon which the pro se incarcerated appellant placed the Notice of Appeal in the mail for filing with the trial court clerk (September 10, 2014). See Tenn. R. App. P. 20(g). Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
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Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jacqueline Crank
The defendant, who was indicted for child neglect based upon her failure to obtain medical treatment for her daughter, challenged the constitutionality of the “spiritual treatment” exemption within the child abuse and neglect statute. The exemption, which is set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-15-402(c), precludes the prosecution of parents who “provide[] treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone in accordance with the tenets or practices of a recognized church or religious denomination by a duly accredited practitioner thereof in lieu of medical or surgical treatment.” The defendant moved to dismiss the charge against her,claiming that the exemption was unconstitutionallyvague and violated the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal Constitution, as well as the comparable provisions of the Tennessee Constitution. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the defendant did not qualify for the spiritual treatment exemption, found her guilty of child neglect, and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, all to be served on unsupervised probation. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction without addressing the merits of the constitutional claims. We hold that the spiritual treatment exemption is not unconstitutionally vague. Because the exemption may be elided without invalidating the remainder of the child abuse and neglect statute, the defendant’s remaining constitutional challenges, even if successful, would not afford her relief. As a result, we decline to address whether the exemption violates the Establishment or Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal Constitution or the corresponding provisions in article I, section 3 and article XI, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. |
Loudon | Supreme Court | |
Frances Rodgers, et al. v. Yarboro A. Sallee
The plaintiffs sued the defendant, their former attorney, to recover fees the plaintiffs had paid to the defendant, as well as punitive damages for alleged misrepresentations made by the defendant. The trial court granted a default judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendant thereafter filed a motion seeking to set aside the default judgment, alleging that she was not properly served with process. Before the trial court entered a written order regarding the defendant’s motion to set aside the default judgment, the defendant filed a motion seeking recusal of the trial judge. The trial court subsequently entered an order denying the defendant’s motion to set aside the default judgment, as well as an order dismissing various motions for sanctions, while the recusal motion was pending. The court thereafter entered an order granting the defendant’s motion for recusal. The defendant has appealed. We determine that the trial court erred in entering orders regarding contested matters while the motion seeking recusal was pending. We therefore vacate the trial court’s orders and remand the case for further proceedings regarding the defendant’s motion to set aside the default judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Preston McNees Specialty Woodworking, Inc., et al. v. The Daniel Co. (Danco), Inc.
This case involves the proper interpretation of a contract between a general contractor and a subcontractor. The trial court determined that the subcontractor was entitled to recover additional sums above the original contract price based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The general contractor timely appealed. Having determined that the scope of the parties’ contract covered the work in question and that the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply in this matter, we vacate the trial court’s judgment. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Everett Spencer Barnette v. State of Tennessee
The Defendant, Everett Spencer Barnette, appeals as of right from the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his nolo contendere pleas. The Defendant contends (1) that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel; and (2) that his pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and understandingly entered. Following our review, we conclude that the Defendant’s pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and understandingly entered. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Keith Edward Clements v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Keith Edward Clements, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his four aggravated burglary guilty plea convictions. On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, but for which he would have elected to take his case to trial. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thearon Antonio Grambling
A Blount County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Thearon Antonio Grambling, of statutory rape by an authority figure and incest; the victim of both offenses was his fifteenyear- old daughter. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of four years and six months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Dorothy Jean McMillin
This is an estate case. Appellant was the executor of his mother’s estate. Appellant’s siblings, Appellees herein, brought suit against the Appellant in the Knox County Chancery Court for depletion of the estate alleging he exercised undue influence over the decedent to obtain certain funds for himself and his wife. A jury awarded the estate $284,800, and that award is on appeal. While that appeal was pending, the Probate Division of the Knox County Chancery Court heard Appellees’ motion filed in the estate case to have the Appellant removed as executor of the estate. The Probate Division of Knox County Chancery Court granted the Appellees’ motion removing the Appellant. Appellant appeals, arguing that because the depletion case was on appeal, the Probate Division of the Knox County Chancery Court lacked jurisdiction to remove him as executor of the estate. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Sharon L. Allen v. Anderson County, Tennessee
This action concerns the sale of three properties Plaintiff purchased at a tax sale held by Anderson County. Plaintiff alleged that Anderson County breached its contract with her by failing to convey marketable title to the properties when the owners of the subject properties had not received proper notice of the tax sale. Anderson County filed a motion to dismiss, asserting, in pertinent part, that the statute of limitations had passed for filing such actions and that it had not breached a contract with Plaintiff. The court dismissed the action, finding that Plaintiff failed to establish that it had entered into a contract with Anderson County, that the statute of limitations for such actions had passed, and that Plaintiff lacked standing to attack the alleged insufficient notice provided to the original property owners. Plaintiff |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Dorothy Elizabeth Sprinkle McSpadden
Lloyde Susanne McSpadden Marcum (“Daughter”) appealed the judgment of the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) appointing Katie Loftin and Emily McSpadden (“Granddaughters”) as co-conservators of Dorothy Elizabeth Sprinkle McSpadden (“Mother”). Mother died during the pendency of this appeal. We find and hold that Mother’s death rendered this appeal moot. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal, decline to address whether the appeal is frivolous, and decline to award either party attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Laney T. Efferson, et al v. Barbara R. Stephens
Plaintiffs, two grandchildren of the decedent who are executors of their deceased mother‟s estate, brought this action on behalf of the decedent contending that Barbara Stephens, one of the decedent‟s three daughters, unduly influenced the decedent to name Ms. Stephens as the sole beneficiary of her estate, to the exclusion of her other children and grandchildren. The decedent died in 2009, this action was commenced in August 2012, and the decedent‟s will was admitted to probate in January 2013, without contest. Thereafter, Ms. Stephens filed a motion for summary judgment for lack of standing and two motions to dismiss under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) for lack of standing and lapse of the three-year statute of limitations. The trial court granted all three motions. Plaintiffs appeal contending, inter alia, they have standing because their mother‟s estate suffered a financial loss when Ms. Stephens deprived their mother, and her estate, of the substantial economic interests (her inheritance), and their claims are not time-barred, because the statute of limitations was tolled due to the decedent‟s incompetence under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106. Because the decedent‟s will was admitted to probate and Plaintiffs did not attempt to contest the validity of the decedent‟s will until after summary judgment was granted, it was undisputed, when the trial court ruled on this matter, that the decedent died testate, and Ms. Stephens was the sole beneficiary of the decedent‟s estate. Therefore, neither Plaintiffs, individually, nor their mother‟s estate suffered a “distinct and palpable injury” for which the court could grant relief; as a consequence, they do not have standing. See Lynch v. City of Jellico, 205 S.W.3d 384, 395 (Tenn. 2006). We, therefore, affirm the summary dismissal of this action. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of William Daniel Oakley
This appeal arises from the denial of a petition to establish a lost will. Following a bench trial in which the opportunity and motive of key witnesses to destroy the original will were at issue, the trial court failed to “find the facts specially” as mandated by Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The only findings of fact made by the trial court read: “The evidence in the case was relatively undisputed so this court will not reiterate a lot of the facts. The dispute between the parties is over how the evidence is to be interpreted.” Whether or not the evidence was “relatively undisputed” is debatable; nevertheless, we have concluded thatconflictinginferencescan be drawn from undisputed evidence concerning the dispositive issue, that being whether persons who had access to the original will had the motivation to destroy the original will. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the trial court to make findings, even on stipulated or undisputed facts. See Lovelace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 35 (Tenn. 2013). Because the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact to afford this court a clear understanding of the basis of its decision, and realizing that the credibility of two key witnesses who may have had the opportunity and motive to destroy the original will was at issue at trial, we are unable to conduct an effective de novo review. Under these circumstances, we would generally remand a case such as this to afford the trial court the opportunity to state its findings of fact and conclusions of law and enter judgment accordingly; however, the judge who tried this case retired in August of 2014. Therefore, we have no choice but to vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Malaysia C.
This is a termination of parental rights case brought by Appellees, who are the prospective adoptive parents. Although Mother/Appellant initially joined in the petition to terminate her parental rights and for adoption, she later withdrew her consent. Appellees moved forward with the termination of Mother’s parental rights on their own petition, which the trial court granted. Mother now appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support the child. Mother also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support both the ground for termination of Mother’s parental rights and the trial court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best interest, we affirm and remand. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Latonya Shanta Bowman
The Defendant, Latonya Shanta Bowman, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s order revoking her probation and ordering that she serve the remainder of her sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by revoking her probation “without considering alternative sentencing options.” Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bradley Douglas Parker
Defendant, Bradley Douglas Parker, was indicted by the Hickman County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony, and one count of aggravated child neglect, also a Class A felony. Both charges involved the same incident and victim. Subsequently, the State announced that it was unable to prove serious bodily injury of the victim and moved the trial court to dismiss the count of aggravated child abuse and to amend the count charging aggravated child neglect to charge the Class D felony offense of child neglect of a child less than eight years of age. Immediately, Defendant pled guilty to the Class D felony offense of child neglect. The parties agreed Defendant would be sentenced as a Range I standard offender, with the length and manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court following a sentencing hearing. The trial court imposed a sentence of three years to be served by split confinement comprised of thirty days’ incarceration in the county jail followed by three years’ probation. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court should have granted judicial diversion or in the alternative imposed a three-year sentence totally suspended to be served on probation. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marisa Shrum
The defendant, Marisa Ann Shrum, appeals the sentencing decision of the trial court following the revocation of her probationary sentence. The defendant pled guilty to two counts of prescription drug fraud and one count of failure to appear. Pursuant to the plea agreement, she received an effective sentence of five years, with sixty days to be served in confinement, sixty days to be served on consecutive weekends, and the balance on supervised probation. A violation report was subsequently filed and, following a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered that the balance of the sentence be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant does not contest the revocation of her probation, but she argues that the trial court erred in ordering total confinement. Following review of the record, we conclude no error occurred and affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals |