Tracy Diane Bolton v. William Jeff Bolton
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Maury | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lee Blunkall
A Marshall County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Christopher Lee Blunkall, of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to thirty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of testimony regarding the reaction of the victim’s family while the victim was missing, and the length of the sentence imposed. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. George Geovonni Thomas
A Knox County jury found the Defendant, George Geovonni Thomas, guilty of thirty-eight criminal charges, including first degree murder, aggravated rape, especially aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated kidnapping. The jury imposed sentences of life in prison for the first-degree murder convictions. The trial court imposed sentences for the remaining convictions for an effective sentence of two consecutive life sentences plus twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals asserting that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his statements; (2) the trial court improperly admitted an “unreliable unrecorded statement attributed by law enforcement to [the Defendant];” (3) the criminal responsibility statute is void for vagueness; (4) the trial court erred when it retroactively applied the Dorantes evidentiary standard pertaining to circumstantial evidence; (5) the presentment was insufficient for failure to charge criminal responsibility; and (6) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Letalvis Cobbins, et al. In Re: Gary Christian, et al.
Petitioners, the parents of the victims in the underlying criminal cases, sought to intervene in those proceedings for the purpose of challenging the trial court’s order to seal portions of an investigative file of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation that was identified during the motions for new trial in the underlying cases. Because we conclude that Petitioners have no statutory or constitutional right to access the sealed confidential information in the file, we affirm the trial court’s denial of their request to unseal. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Allen Gooch v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, James Allen Gooch, challenges the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, raising seven grounds to support his claim. Additionally, he claims that cumulative error necessitates reversal of the post-conviction court. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas William Brown
Appellant, Thomas William Brown, was convicted by a jury of attempted aggravated burglary and sentenced to four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court should have suppressed his statements to the police immediately after his arrest, that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence, that the trial court erred by allowing the State to present evidence that witnesses identified appellant’s shirt in a “show up” procedure, that the trial court erred by allowing the CAD Operational Report into evidence during the State’s rebuttal proof, and that the trial court erred by denying a special jury instruction request. Following our careful review of the evidence, we have concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support appellant’s conviction for attempted aggravated burglary and therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court. Appellant’s charge is dismissed. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Derrick Dewayne Lyons
A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Derrick Dewayne Lyons, of attempted voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, theft of property valued over $1,000.00, and evading arrest in a motor vehicle. For these convictions, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant claims that: (1) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to amend the indictment on the morning of trial; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the State committed “prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct” during its closing argument; (4) the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury on “mistake of fact” and “use of force”; and (5) the trial court erred when it failed to excuse a juror for cause. After a review of the record and the foregoing authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments and the Defendant’s convictions. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Yoni Sales Barahona v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Yoni Sales Barahona, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Davidson County. He was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the appellate level. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Tyrell Cross
The Defendant, Joshua Tyrell Cross, pleaded guilty to attempted rape, and the trial court sentenced him to thirty-one days of time served followed by eight years of probation. The Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) his judgment is void because the information charging him with attempted rape failed to allege each of the required elements of the offense; (2) the factual basis submitted in support of the Defendant’s conviction is insufficient because it did not contain the required culpable mental state; (3) his judgment of conviction should be reversed because there is no record that he was arraigned or that he waived arraignment; and (4) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remand the case for a preliminary hearing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for a preliminary hearing on the original charges. |
Scott | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jennifer Furnas Coleman v. Marty Alan Coleman
This is an appeal of attorney’s fees in a post-divorce matter. The mother filed a petition to modify the permanent parenting plan suspend the father’s parenting time with the parties’ two minor children. The mother incurred around $16,000.00 in legal expenses litigating her petition and then changed attorneys. The parties eventually settled the petition with respect to the visitation issues, reserved the issue of attorney’s fees. Finding that the mother’s legal expenses of over $350,000.00 were not reasonable, the Master recommended that the father only be required to reimburse the mother for approximately $124,000.00. The trial court the award further, awarding the mother approximately $42,000.00. Mother appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion because all of her attorney’s fees were reasonable. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Joy Littleton, et al v. TIS Insurance Services, Inc.
During a prior lawsuit, a construction company – in exchange for a covenant not to execute against the company’s assets – assigned to the entity that obtained a judgment against it the company’s insurance coverage claims. The plaintiffs in the previous action thereafter assigned those rights to the current plaintiffs to allow them to step into the shoes of the construction company and bring suit against the insurance broker. The trial court entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of the insurance broker on the ground that the current plaintiffs would not be entitled to recover any compensatory damages at trial. The plaintiffs appeal. We reverse. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Juastin Rashad Forrest v. Todd Wiggins, Warden
The petitioner, Justin Rashad Forrest, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner contends that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because his state sentence is void because the trial courtlacked jurisdiction to impose concurrentstate and federal sentences. He also contends that the State breached the plea agreement that called for concurrent federal and state sentences and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel that prevented him from entering a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. After thoroughly reviewing the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dewayne Lee Williams
The Defendant, Dewayne Lee Williams, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for his convictions for aggravated burglary and vandalism and ordering his effective three-year sentence into execution. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion because insufficient evidence exists to support the revocation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Aalyah P.
The Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, and we therefore have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Consequently, this appeal is dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Robert C.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellant/Father’s parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment; (2) substantial non-compliance with the permanency plan; and (3) persistence of conditions. Because the grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights are met by clear and convincing evidence, and there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child, we affirm and remand. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Diana L. Powell, et al v. Penny D. Clark
This appeal involves a limitation of liability in an insurance policy. Appellant Allstate Insurance Company seeks reduction of its uninsured motorist liability by amounts paid by Appellee insured’s automobile insurance carrier. In light of the legislative intent that offsets should be limited to monies received from legally responsible parties or entities, and the limiting language used in the Allstate policy, we conclude that the trial court correctly denied the offset in this case. Affirmed and remanded. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Linzey Danielle Smith-Dissenting
I respectfully disagree in the reasoning and result reached in the majority opinion. The majority opinion concludes that our supreme court’s holding in Brotherton is dispositive and requires that this court affirm the defendant’s conviction. However, in my view, Brotherton is clearly distinguishable from the instant case. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Linzey Danielle Smith
Defendant, Linzey Danielle Smith, entered a plea of guilty to the offense of driving while her blood or breath alcohol concentration was 0.08% or more (DUI) in violation of T.C.A. § 55-10-401(2), but explicitly reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(A). The certified question of law limits this court to the following narrow issue: whether probable cause that Defendant had committed the Class C misdemeanor offense described in T.C.A. § 55-8-123(1) (a driver must maintain a vehicle entirely within a single lane “as nearly as practicable”) authorized a stop of Defendant’s vehicle by a state trooper or, alternatively, whether the trooper had reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that Defendant had committed or was about to commit the Class C misdemeanor offense set forth in T.C.A. § 55-8-123(1). Based upon the General Assembly’s classification as a criminal offense the failure of a driver to maintain her vehicle totally within a single lane of traffic “as nearly as practicable” and guidance from our supreme court’s decision in State v. Brotherton, 323 S.W.3d 866 (Tenn. 2010), we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carolyn Ann Farley v. Roger Dale Farley, Sr.
In this post-divorce action, Father filed a petition to modify the permanent parenting plan to make him the primary residential parent. The trial court found a material change of circumstance but concluded that it was not in the child’s best interest to change the primary residential parent. We find no error in the trial court’s decision and affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Frederick Zahn v. Margaret Zahn Logan
In this post-divorce action, Father filed a petition to modify the permanent parenting plan to make him the primary residential parent. The trial court found a material change of circumstance but concluded that it was not in the child’s best interest to change the primary residential parent. We find no error in the trial court’s decision and affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Suntrust Bank v. Walter Joseph Burke a/k/a Walter Joseph Burke, Jr.
This is a garnishment case. Appellee bank served a writ of garnishment on the Appellant realty company for the wages of Appellee’s debtor, Walter Burke. Appellant answered the garnishment stating that Mr. Burke was an independent contractor, and that Appellant owed him no funds at the time of the garnishment. During the six-month period after the garnishment was served, Appellant paid Mr. Burke commissions totaling $10,671.23, but paid no monies pursuant to the garnishment filed by Appellee. Appellee later filed a motion for judgment against Appellant for its failure to honor the garnishment for the statutory six-month period. Appellant responded to the motion, arguing that it was not subject to continuous garnishment because Tennessee Code Annotated Section 26-2-214 only applies to employers. The trial court held that the Appellant was subject to the six-month, continuous garnishment period and awarded Appellee bank judgment in the amount of $2,667.81, representing twenty-five percent of commissions paid to Mr. Burke. Appellant appeals. We reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Leon Williams v. Jannie Williams
In this post-divorce proceeding, Wife filed a petition for civil contempt to compel Husband to comply with the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”) by either refinancing, paying in full, or selling real property mortgaged in her name in order to remove her from any liability on the indebtedness. Husband responded by filing a series of petitions for contempt, contending, inter alia, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, unclean hands, breach of contract, and abuse of process for Wife’s alleged failure under the MDA to execute certain documents which would have facilitated Husband’s “assumption” of the existing mortgage. On the eve of the evidentiary hearing on Wife’s petition for contempt, Husband paid off the indebtedness. At the hearing that followed, the trial court ruled that the issue of Husband’s civilcontempt was moot due to the fact that he belatedlycomplied with the MDA; nevertheless, the court also ruled that Wife was entitled to recover her reasonable attorney’s fees, pursuant to the enforcement provision of the MDA, because she was the prevailing party. The enforcement provision of the MDA states: “In the event it becomes reasonably necessary for either party to institute legal proceedings to procure the enforcement of any provision of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall also be entitled to a judgment for reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred in prosecuting the action.” Husband appeals contending Wife was not the prevailing party because there was never a ruling on the merits of her claim, and, therefore, she is not entitled to recover any of her attorney’s fees; he also challenges numerous other rulings by the trial court. For her part, Wife seeks all of her attorney’s fees incurred in the trial court, as well as attorney’s fees related to this appeal. We affirm the trial court’s determination that Wife was the prevailing party because, as the trial court correctlyfound,it was reasonablynecessaryfor Wife to institute legal proceedings to enforce Husband’s compliance with the MDA, and even though there was no hearing or ruling on the merits of her enforcement claim, “but for” Wife’s petition, Husband would not have fulfilled his obligation under the MDA to remove Wife from all liability on the mortgage debt. See Fannon v. City of LaFollette, 329 S.W.3d 418 (Tenn. 2010). We also affirm the trial court’s discretionary decision to award Wife a portion of her attorney’s fees. As for Husband’s remaining issues, we find that these are moot or they have been waived. Finally, we have determined that Wife is entitled to her attorney’s fees on appeal because she is the prevailing party on appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Leon Williams v. Jannie Williams - Dissent
Because I disagree with the Court’s interpretation of the term “prevailing party” as used in the parties’ Martial Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”), I respectfully dissent. Citing Fannon v. City of LaFollette, 329 S.W.3d 418 (Tenn. 2010), the majority concludes “a party may be recognized as the prevailing party if that party achieves the primary benefit sought in instituting the legal proceeding and/or if the action modifies the opposing party’s behavior in a way that provides a direct benefit, regardless of the fact there was no hearing or judgment on the merits.” In my view, Fannon does not stand for such a proposition, and Fannon does not represent a departure from the interpretations of the term “prevailing party” by the United States Supreme Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Travelers Casualty And Surety Company of America v. City of South Pittsburg,Tennessee
In a suit arising out of a construction project at a wastewater treatment facility, the City of South Pittsburg brought an action against an engineering firm and a construction firm for breach of contract, negligence and professional negligence. The insurance company which issued a performance bond covering the project was added as a partyand moved for summary judgment on the ground that the City had not instituted a proceeding to recover under the bond within the two year period specified in the bond for doing so. The insurance company appeals the denial of its motion. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
Patrick Richard Moorcroft v. Flora Templeton Stuart v. Natalie Talmage Moorcroft
This case began as an action for legal separation between a husband and wife. The two quickly entered into an agreed temporary parenting plan providing for the custody of their children. However, the children’s maternal grandmother intervened, seeking registration and enforcement under the Tennessee Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act of a Kentucky grandparent visitation order. The circuit court granted registration and enforcement of the order. The parents appealed. Because we conclude that the grandmother was required to seek visitation under the Tennessee Grandparent Visitation Statute, we reverse the trial court’s decision. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals |