William E. Kantz, Jr. v. Herman C. Bell et al.
This dispute concerns a contract for the sale of real property. Believing the seller was impairing the buyer’s ability to close on time in order to sell the property under contract to someone else, the buyer filed this action to enjoin the seller from transferring the property to another and to require the seller to provide documentation necessary to close. The buyer also asserted claims for specific performance of the contract, breach of contract, and conspiracy against the seller, as well as claims for tortious interference with the contract and conspiracy against another defendant. The trial court found that the seller’s discussions with another potential buyer were merely to have a “back-up plan” in the event the buyer did not close; nevertheless, the court granted injunctive relief by extending the deadline to close the sale by thirty days and enjoined the seller from selling the property to another in the interim. One week later, the sale closed. The plaintiff then amended its complaint to limit its claims to breach of contract against the seller, and tortious interference with a contract and conspiracy against the seller and the party alleged to have tortiously interfered with the contract. The defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state claims for which relief could be granted pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). The trial court found that the seller did not breach the contract because the property was conveyed to the plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the contract and the delay in closing was not a breach of the contract. The court dismissed all other claims but for the conspiracy claims and declared the order a final appealable judgment pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 54.02. The plaintiff appealed. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John Wesley Green v. Champs-Elysees, Inc., et al.
This appeal arises from a post-judgment discovery dispute. While the plaintiff’s prior appeal from the trial court’s judgment was pending in this court, the plaintiff made a discovery request in the trial court seeking to obtain alleged ex parte communications pertaining to the plaintiff’s attorney, the plaintiff, or the case. The trial court conducted a hearing and entered an order denying the discovery request; this appeal followed. We have determined that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the plaintiff’s discovery requests; therefore, the order at issue in this appeal is void. Further, this court’s ruling in the prior appeal, which resolved all issues in the underlying case, is now a final judgment. The underlying case is concluded and, thus, no further proceedings are available other than the assessment and collection of costs. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Newgate Recovery, LLC v. Holrob-Harvey Road, LLC, et al
This appeal concerns a garnishment. Newgate Recovery, LLC (“Newgate”) brought a garnishment action in the Chancery Court for McMinn County (“the Trial Court”) against Manreet Singh (“Singh”) through Singh’s former employer R & R Group, Inc., d/b/a The Deerfield Inn (“Garnishee”). After Garnishee failed to respond to the garnishment, the Trial Court entered judgment against Garnishee in the amount of $1,283,066. Garnishee moved for relief from the judgment on the basis of insufficient service. The Trial Court granted Garnishee’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion and set aside the final judgment on the basis of excusable negligence and ineffective service of process. Newgate appeals, arguing, among other things, that Garnishee waived the issue of service of process and that Garnishee’s employees had colluded to avoid a valid judgment. We find and hold that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in granting Garnishee’s motion for relief from judgment. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Gene S. Rucker v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Gene S. Rucker, was convicted of aggravated arson and criminally negligent homicide, for which he was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-two years. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed his convictions and sentence. State v. Gene Shelton Rucker, Jr., No. E2002-02101-CCA-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2827004 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Dec. 9, 2004), perm. app. denied (Tenn. March 21, 2005). Subsequently the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied on the grounds that it was time barred. This Court affirmed the post-conviction court’s judgment denying relief. Gene S. Rucker v. State, No. E2007-00380-CCA-R3-PC, 2007 WL 2405133 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Aug. 24, 2007) no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 app. filed. On February 18, 2013, the Petitioner filed a motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. The postconviction court denied the motion to reopen, and the Petitioner appeals that decision. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jenica Deboer Hall v. Jeffrey Glen Hall
This post-divorce matter presents the primary issue of whether the trial court properly calculated, for child support purposes, the obligor parent’s income from self-employment. The trial court held that mortgage payments made by the obligor’s business with respect to a commercial building solely owned by the obligor should not be added to the obligor’s other income for the purpose of calculating child support. The obligee parent appeals that ruling to this Court. We affirm on that issue, concluding that such payments were already included in the obligor parent’s income calculation. We reverse the trial court’s finding concerning the obligor’s income, however, due to insufficient evidence regarding the nature of the depreciation deduction taken with respect to the commercial building. We remand for further proof regarding the depreciation deduction. The obligee parent also appeals the trial court’s failure to award attorney’s fees. Having concluded that the trial court must reconsider its determination of the obligor’s income, we also remand for the trial court to determine whether an award of attorney’s fees to the obligee parent is appropriate. We conclude that this is not an appropriate case for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
James Glenn Collins, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, James Glenn Collins, Jr., appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by dismissing his petition for having been untimely filed. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John R. Wills, Jr. v. The City of Memphis, et al.
Landowner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court of Shelby County, seeking review of the City of Memphis City Council’s decision to deny the landowner’s petition to subdivide his Belle Meade Subdivision lot into two lots. The trial court reversed the City Council’s decision, finding that the landowner had satisfied the requirements for subdivision under the Uniform Development Code, and remanded the case for rehearing before the City Council. On remand, the City Council’s review was limited to the record established at the previous hearing. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm in part and vacate in part, and remand to the trial court with instructions to remand to the City Council for reconsideration. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Danny Ray Smith
A Cumberland County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Danny Ray Smith, of one count of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years to be served at 100%. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to suppress his statement to police; (3) the trial court erred by allowing evidence of other sexual acts; (4) the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce into evidence drawings made by the victim before trial; (5) the trial court erred by allowing the State to lead the victim on direct examination; (6) the trial court erred by not forcing the State to give the defense a complete copy of the victim’s Department of Children’s Services records; and (7) the prosecutors’ closing arguments were improper. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the appellant’s conviction must be reversed because the trial court improperly allowed the State to present evidence of other sexual acts, the trial court improperly allowed the State to introduce into evidence drawings made by the victim, and the prosecutors gave improper closing arguments. Therefore, the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Micheal Lynn Horn
The Defendant, Michael Lynn Horn, was found guilty of attempted second-degree murder, reckless endangerment, and felony evading arrest. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve twenty years for the attempted second-degree murder conviction, four years for the felony evading arrest conviction, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the reckless endangerment conviction, for a total effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals asserting that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for attempted second degree murder and felony evading arrest; (2) his sentence is excessive; (3) the trial court improperly denied access to Tennessee Bureau of Investigation personnel records for the two victims; and (4) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to have a new attorney appointed for his appeal. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard W. Gibbs, Et Al. v. Clint Gilleland, et al.
Plaintiffs brought this action against Rutherford County when the county prohibited them from building a home on undeveloped property because the property was below the Base Flood Elevation requirements established by the county. Plaintiffs contend the county had an affirmative duty under Article XIX, Section 19, of the Rutherford County Zoning Resolution to notify them, prior to their purchase of the property, that the property was below the Base Flood Elevation requirements, and the county breached that duty. In response to the complaint, the county filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on the immunity provisions under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, specifically Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-205(1), (3)-(4). The trial court granted the county’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on governmental immunity. Having determined that the county’s alleged acts or omissions were discretionary, not operational, the county has immunity; thus, we affirm the dismissal of this action. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Milburn L. Edwards v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Milburn L. Edwards, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his second pro se petition for post-conviction relief. After reviewing the record in this case, we conclude that the summary dismissal of the petition was proper and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Orlando Fields v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Charles Orlando Fields, appeals the denial of his motion to reopen his post-conviction petition. Because he failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking review of a dismissal of a motion to reopen a post-conviction petition, we dismiss the appeal. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Phillip Harris
The Defendant-Appellant, Phillip Harris, was indicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court Grand Jury for six counts of attempted second degree murder and one count of unlawful employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony. Following a jury trial, Harris was convicted of one count of attempted second degree murder (count two), five counts of misdemeanor reckless endangerment (counts one, three, four, five, and six), and one count of unlawful employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony (count seven). The trial court sentenced Harris to twelve years for the attempted second degree murder conviction and to a mandatory consecutive sentence of six years for the unlawful employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony. The court also imposed sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the reckless endangerment convictions and ordered these sentences served concurrently with the sentence for attempted second degree murder. On appeal, Harris argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions, and (2) his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we affirm the convictions and remand for resentencing as to the conviction for attempted second degree murder. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Daryl Bobo
Appellant stands convicted of possession with intent to sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone, a Class A felony, and possession with intent to sell 0.5 ounce or more of marijuana in a drug-free school zone, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced appellant as a Range III, persistent offender to sixty years for his cocaine conviction and twelve years for his marijuana conviction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Cortez Chrystak
The Defendant, Kevin Cortez Chrystak, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s order affirming his conviction for violation of the implied consent statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-406. In the trial court, the Defendant raised a statutory interpretation argument concerning the mandatory blood draw provision of the implied consent law. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the mandatory provision is unconstitutional, violating his Fourth Amendment Rights, and that he did not violate the implied consent law when he presented for the mandatory blood draw. The Defendant has waived his constitutional argument on appeal. However, pursuant to principles of statutory construction, we agree with the Defendant that he did not violate the implied consent law when his blood was obtained via the mandatory provisions. Following our review, we reverse the order of the trial court upholding the implied consent violation and dismiss the charge. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Quincey Bernard Dotson
The defendant, Quincey Bernard Dotson, was convicted by a Madison County Criminal Court jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and sentenced to a term of ten years as a Range II offender in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s failure to apply any mitigating factors in determining his sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Smith
A Shelby County jury found the Defendant, Michael Smith, guilty of aggravated assault and evading arrest. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to ten years for the aggravated assault conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the evading arrest conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively. The Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court committed plain error by failing to compel an election in count one; (2) the indictment for aggravated assault fails to state an offense; (3) the trial court improperly allowed the victim to testify about the Defendant’s prior bad acts; (4) the trial court improperly denied the Defendant’s request for a mistrial after the State explored the Defendant’s conviction and defense in an unrelated case; (5) the trial court committed plain error when it failed to compel the State to provide the trial court an audio recording of the victim’s statement; (6) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on flight; (7) the trial court improperly ruled that the Defendant’s prior convictions could be used for impeachment purposes should he testify at trial; (8) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for evading arrest; (9) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the Defendant’s request to sit at counsel table; and (10) his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rodriquez Jones
Appellant, Rodriquez Jones, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the assistant district attorney general committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court; however, we must remand this matter to the trial court to correct the judgment form. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Morrow
Appellant pleaded guilty to failure to appear and unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver. Appellant later filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentences pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court summarily dismissed. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion without appointing counsel after he had stated a colorable claim for relief. The State concedes that this case should be remanded to the trial court because appellant stated a colorable claim for relief pursuant to Rule 36.1. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joe Ross v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Joe Ross, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner entered guilty pleas to five counts of aggravated robbery, four counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated rape, for which he received an effective sentence of 25 years confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his sentence is illegal on the face of the judgment because it does not include mandatory supervision for life. Because the Petitioner’s judgment does not reflect the statutory requirement of mandatory lifetime community supervision, we conclude that the judgment for aggravated rape is illegal and void. We vacate the Petitioner’s sentence for aggravated rape and remand to the habeas court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the illegal sentence was a bargained-for element of the Petitioner’s plea agreement. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gladys Ramirez v. Aaron M. Schwartz
This case arises from a personal injury lawsuit in which a plaintiff sought damages for injuries she sustained in a car accident. The defendant driver requested documents from plaintiff’s healthcare provider. The healthcare provider failed to produce all of the requested documents and was held in civil contempt. As sanctions, the trial court, inter alia, discharged the healthcare provider’s fees for medical services charged to the plaintiff and held the provider in violation of certain chiropractic regulations. On appeal, the healthcare provider asserts that the trial court lacks authority to discharge the healthcare provider’s fees or to find it in violation of the chiropractic regulations. We agree that the trial court erred, and we vacate that portion of the trial court’s order discharging the fees for medical services and finding a violation of the chiropractic regulations. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Jones Davis
The defendant appeals a jury verdict of guilty of aggravated burglary and theft, alleging the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law. The defendant also alleges the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jamar McField v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jamar McField, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 2009 Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convictions of felony murder and aggravated child abuse. In this appeal, the petitioner claims that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles T. Fletcher, Jr.
The Defendant-Appellant, Charles T. Fletcher, Jr., was charged with the offense of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(A)(iii). While in Johnson County General Sessions Court, the Defendant- Appellant executed a waiver of his right to counsel, a waiver of his right to a preliminary hearing, and a waiver of his right to be tried only upon presentment or indictment of a grand jury. In Johnson County Criminal Court, he repeatedly informed the trial court that he had waived his right to counsel, that he had represented himself in a criminal case before, and that he wished to represent himself in this case. On the day of trial, the Defendant-Appellant signed a waiver of his right to be tried only upon presentment or indictment of a grand jury. The same day, the prosecutor and the Defendant-Appellant signed an information charging the Defendant-Appellant with aggravated assault. A Johnson County Criminal Court jury subsequently convicted the Defendant-Appellant as charged, and the trial court imposed a three-year probationary sentence. In this appeal, the Defendant-Appellant argues: (1) he failed to knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel because (a) he was not informed of his charges, potential penalties, and rights and (b) because the trial court never inquired as to his competency to represent himself; (2) he failed to knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to be tried only upon presentment or indictment of a grand jury because he was unable to read the waiver, to have the assistance of counsel, or to have the court explain his right to presentment and indictment; (3) the trial court erred in failing to continue the case or to appoint counsel or advisory counsel when it became obvious that he could not properly represent himself; (4) the trial court erred in denying his motion to set aside the jury verdict; and (5) the cumulative errors caused by the absence of counsel and his inability to represent himself were so prejudicial as to deny his right to a fair trial and due process. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, vacate the Defendant-Appellant’s conviction, and remand the matter to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marvin Harold Dorton, II
The Defendant-Appellant, Marvin Harold Dorton, II, was charged with two counts of sale or delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance (counts 1 and 2), possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver (count 3), and possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver (count 4). A Greene County Criminal Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant as charged, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of six years for each of his convictions in counts 1 and 2, four years for his conviction in count 3, and six years for his conviction in count 4, for an effective sentence of six years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant argues: (1) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury in all four counts on the inference of casual exchange pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-419; (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury in counts 1 and 2 on the lesser included offense of casual exchange pursuant to Code section 39-17-418(a); (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions in counts 3 and 4 because the State failed to prove that he possessed the drugs found in a safe; and (4) his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we remand the case for entry of corrected judgments in counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 to reflect that the trial court resentenced the Defendant-Appellant on May 3, 2013, after the presentence investigation report was amended, even though the Defendant-Appellant’s sentence did not change from the original sentence imposed. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals |