State of Tennessee v. Anthony Antonio Cole
Anthony Antonio Cole (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence, driving without a license, violation of the financial responsibility law, violation of the registration law, and failure to yield the right of way. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve a total effective sentence of twelve months and twenty-nine days in confinement. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for driving under the influence, driving without a license, and failure to yield the right of way. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Norman Branch
A jury convicted the Defendant, Norman Branch, of theft of $500 or less and intentionally evading arrest in a motor vehicle. After a hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of six years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days, to be served in the workhouse. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends the following: (1) the trial court erred in allowing him to be impeached with twelve prior convictions; (2) the trial court erred in excluding certain of his testimony as inadmissible hearsay; (3) the evidence was not sufficient to support his evading arrest conviction; (4) the trial court provided an improper jury instruction on the evading arrest charge; (5) the trial court erred in sentencing him as a career offender; and (6) cumulative error entitles him to a new trial. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Davarius Datron Smith
The defendant, Davarius Datron Smith, was convicted of two counts of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; and reckless endangerment, a Class E felony. He was sentenced by the trial court to an effective eighteen-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that he was entitled to a mistrial because the State failed to produce notes taken by an investigator, made improper closing arguments, and asked leading questions of its witnesses; the trial court failed to instruct the jury regarding the State’s duty to preserve evidence and of a lesser-included offense of the indicted charges; and the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Teddy Wayne Wilcutt v. CAM Electric Systems, et al.
An employee sustained work-related injuries to his head, neck, and shoulders after being struck by a falling ladder. The trial court awarded the employee 60% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer appealed, arguing that the employee failed to prove causation. After carefully reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Obion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
In Re: Adoption of Joshua M. M. and Zachary M.
The appeal involves a petition for termination of parental rights and adoption. The children at issue were removed from their parents’ Wisconsin home in 2005 based on abuse and neglect. Since 2006, the children have been living with the petitioners, the paternal aunt and her husband. The petitioners filed the instant petition in Tennessee to terminate the parental rights of both the mother and the father and to adopt the children. After a trial, the trial court held that the petitioners had established three grounds for termination: (1) abandonment for failure to visit, (2) abandonment for failure to support, and (3) persistent conditions. It also found that termination of parental rights would be in the children’s best interest, and so terminated the parental rights of both biological parents. The parents now appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Adoption of Joshua M. M. and Zachary M. - Separate Concurrence
In concur fully in the termination of the parents’ parental rights on the ground of persistent conditions. I write separately to state my disagreement with the majority’s conclusion that consideration of the remaining termination grounds–abandonment by willful failure to visit and abandonment by willful failure to support–is somehow rendered unnecessary in light of the parents’ ostensible failure to challenge the finding of persistent conditions. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TIMOTHY HOWARD CUNNINGHAM
A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Timothy Howard Cunningham, of reckless endangerment by use of a deadly weapon, namely a motor vehicle. The trial court sentenced him to four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Barry Craig Taylor v. Sarah Ann McClintock
This appeal involves a Tennessee court’s jurisdiction to modify a parenting order entered by a court in another state. The parties were divorced in Florida, and the Florida court designated the mother as the primary residential parent of the parties’ only child. Soon thereafter, the father moved to Tennessee. Years later, after many parenting disputes, the Florida court entered an order granting the father “make-up” parenting time by allowing the child to live in Tennessee with the father for a defined period of time that exceeded six months. At the same time, the Florida court granted the mother permission to relocate to Alabama. After the child had lived with the father in Tennessee for over six months in accordance with the Florida order, the father filed a petition in the Tennessee trial court below, seeking to modify the Florida parenting plan to designate him as the primary residential parent. The trial court held that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Florida parenting order under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. The father now appeals. We reverse the Tennessee trial court’s holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the father’s Tennessee custodypetition, and remand for further proceedings. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald Terry v. Tennessee Dept. of Corrections et al.
An inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction filed this petition for common law writ of certiorari challenging his placement in involuntary administrative segregation.He contends his placement in administrative segregation is punitive,and violates his constitutional due process rights as well as Department rules. The respondents assert that his placement in administrative segregation was non-punitive because it was necessary for the safety of staff and other inmates; respondents also assert that a writ of certiorari is not the appropriate means to challenge a non-punitive action. Following a review of the record, the trial court dismissed the petition. Finding no error in the trial court’s determination that the inmate’s placement was non-punitive and that, as such, the common law writ of certiorari was not the proper means of challenging his status, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Town of Crossville Housing Authority v. John A. Murphy, Et Al.
The buyers of an apartment complex brought this action against the sellers for breach of contractand intentionalmisrepresentationafterdiscoveringthatseveralrepresentations made by the sellers in the transactional documents were false. The buyers challenge the propriety of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants. After review, we conclude that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s breach of contract claims, and that Paul Murphy and John Murphy are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s intentional misrepresentation claims. As to the remainder of the defendants, we conclude that summary judgment on the plaintiff’s intentional misrepresentation claims was improper because theydid not meet their initial burden of production on summaryjudgment. We affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.
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Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Laseter v. J. Martin Regan, Jr.
This appeal involves a defendant’s attempts to discover certain financial information from the plaintiff’s medical expert in order to facilitate an inquiry into potential bias. The trial court entered several orders requiring the expert witness to provide the requested financial information, which related to his income and compensation, but the expert witness repeatedly failed to comply with the trial court’s orders. The trial court also ruled that the defendant would be permitted to question the expert witness about certain financial information during cross-examination at trial, and the expert witness communicated to the trial judge that he would refuse to answer any such questions. The trial court eventually excluded the medical expert as a witness and allowed the plaintiff time to find a replacement expert. When the plaintiff failed to identify another expert witness within the time allowed, the trial court dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Adelyn B.
This case arises out of the Mother’s request to relocate with the parties’ minor child. The trial court determined it was in the best interest of the child to remain in Tennessee with Father pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-108(c). We affirm the trial court’s best interest finding, and remand for entry of a permanent parenting plan naming Father the child’s primary residential parent and setting a parenting schedule taking into account Mother’s move. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
KENNETH DEWAYNE JOHNSON v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
Petitioner, Kenneth Dewayne Johnson, pled guilty to aggravated assault in Davidson County on November 17, 2011. On June 10, 2013, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the foreman of the grand jury that issued the indictment was ineligible to serve for being a convicted felon. Petitioner also asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and entered an unknowing and involuntary plea. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. On August 16, 2013, Petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, filed a second petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the statute of limitations should be tolled in his case because the ineligibility of the grand jury foreman was not made public knowledge until after the statute of limitations had expired and was, therefore, a “later-arising” ground for relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that the ineligibility of the grand jury foreman did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction and that Petitioner was not denied effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner appealed. Upon a thorough review of the law and the facts in this case, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Lee Driskell
Robert Lee Driskill (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”) and one count of violating the implied consent law. Pursuant to the Defendant’s plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days’ incarceration, to be suspended on supervised probation after the service of forty-eight hours’ confinement. In conjunction with his guilty plea, the Defendant reserved the following certified question of law: “Whether the officer’s conduct violated the Defendant’s rights under Article I, Section 7 or the Fourth Amendment when the officer through activating blue lights caused the Defendant to stop his moving vehicle and encounter the officer.” Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we hold that the Defendant is entitled to no relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Danny Lee Greene v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Danny Lee Greene, appeals the Washington County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2007 conviction for second degree murder and his twenty-three-year sentence as a violent offender. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying him relief because (1) juror bias existed and (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
MYRON L. JOHNSON v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
The Appellant, Myron L. Johnson, appeals the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bryant Jennings v. City of Memphis
This case involves the eligibility of a Memphis police officer for automatic promotion to thirty-year Captain. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the officer. However, because the officer was a temporary employee prior to the cut-off date set forth in the automatic promotion provision, we find that he is not entitled to automatic promotion. We reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of the officer and we grant summary judgment in favor of the City of Memphis. The case is remanded for further proceedings, as may be necessary, consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jane Field v. The Ladies' Hermitage Association
This is the third round in a battle between these parties over the terms of a deed requiring certain payments to the heirs of the grantor. The property at issue is the historic Tulip Grove Mansion near The Hermitage, in Nashville, Tennessee. The deed conveying Tulip Grove to the Ladies’ Hermitage Association required payments to the heirs of the grantor of one-third “of all gate receipts received by [the LHA] from visitors to Tulip Grove House[.]” In a prior appeal, we held that “the term ‘gate receipts’ in the deed includes the rent paid to LHA for use of the property for special events.” The parties now dispute whether the LHA can deduct expenses from the special event rental fees prior to calculating the heirs’ one-third share. The chancellor held that such a deduction is permissible. We hold that it is not. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Arthur E. Wair, Jr.
This appeal arises from alleged violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act (“TAPA”). Arthur E. Wair, Jr. (“Decedent”) executed a last will and testament leaving his entire estate to his friend and accountant, Larry Mullins (“Mullins”). After Decedent died, his siblings Sidney Wair, Ralph Wair, and Juanita Jackson (“Plaintiffs”) sued Mullins in the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) not as a will contest but instead alleging that Mullins had exercised undue influence over their brother to manipulate him into executing the will all in violation of TAPA. Mullins filed a motion to dismiss, which the Trial Court granted. Plaintiffs appeal. We hold, inter alia, that any claim for abuse or neglect under TAPA was barred by the one-year statute of limitations for personal torts, and that Plaintiffs otherwise failed to state a claim under TAPA. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Doris Guyear, Heir of Leroy Guyear, Deceased v. Joey Blalock, Et AL.
The owner of a promissory note died, and his widow filed a complaint in the name of his estate to collect the unpaid balance, even though her late husband’s estate had never been opened. She subsequently amended her complaint to designate herself as the plaintiff in her capacity as her late husband’s wife and next friend. The obligors on the note filed a motion for dismissal, contending that the widow had not demonstrated that she was a proper plaintiff or that she had any right to collect on the note. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. We affirm. |
Grundy | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jawaune Massey
Jawaune Massey (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of first degree felony murder as to victim Nolan; one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of first degree felony murder as to victim Alexander; one count of especially aggravated robbery; one count of criminal conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery; one count of criminal conspiracy to possess more than 26 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver; one count of possessing more than 26 grams of cocaine for resale; and one count of maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances are used or sold. For these crimes, the Defendant was sentenced to serve an effective term of two consecutive life sentences. In these consolidated appeals, the Defendant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions. He also contends that the trial court (1) erred in consolidating offenses; (2) should have conducted a hearing to determine if a “stun belt” was a necessary restraint of the Defendant during trial; (3) should have instructed the jury that several witnesses were accomplices as a matter of law; and (4) should not have run his life sentences consecutively. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse on grounds of insufficient evidence the Defendant’s conviction of criminal conspiracy to possess more than 26 grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver and his conviction of maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances are used or sold. We affirm the remaining judgments. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
STEVEN JAMES MCCAIN v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
The petitioner, Steven James McCain, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 1998 Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, claiming that the State withheld material evidence at trial and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Middlebrook v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Charles Middlebrook, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2011 convictions upon guilty pleas for theft valued more than $1000 but less than $10,000 and assault and his Range III eight-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were involuntarily entered because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Joseph Ryan
Following a jury trial in Knox County Criminal Court, Defendant, James Joseph Ryan, was convicted of burglary of a business (an automobile dealership) and theft of property of more than $10,000.00 in value. He was sentenced as a Range II offender to an effective sentence of ten years. In this appeal, Defendant asserts that accomplice testimony was not corroborated, that the trial court erred by not finding a certain witness was an accomplice as a matter of law, and that the trial court erred by ordering Defendant to pay the court costs. After a thorough review we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wilma Griffin v. Campbell Clinic, P.A.
The plaintiff filed a civil action in the general sessions court asserting a health care liability claim against the defendant. Following a trial, the general sessions court entered judgment in the defendant’s favor. The next day, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal and deposited $211.50 with the general sessions court clerk, which represents the amount of the standard court cost of $150 for an appeal to the circuit court required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-21-401(b)(1)(C)(i) plus state and local litigation taxes. The circuit court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to file a bond “with good security . . . for the costs of the appeal” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that payment of the standard court cost is sufficient to perfect an appeal from the general sessions court to the circuit court. After a thorough review of the statutory scheme at issue, we conclude that the plaintiff’s cash bond was sufficient to perfect her appeal to the circuit court. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Supreme Court |