Elizabeth Breckinridge Wheeler v. Joseph Robert Wheeler
Following a 26-year marriage, Wife was granted a divorce,designated the primary residential parent of their children and given sole decision making authority for the minor children’s education, health and medical care, and extracurricular activities; Husband was ordered to pay child support, pendente lite support of $7,000 per month, post-divorce support at the same rate as pendente lite support until the marital residence was sold, transitional alimony of $3,600 for 48 months commencing upon the sale of the marital residence, and $25,000 of Wife’s attorneys’ fees. The parties’ separate and marital assets were classified, and the marital assets and debts were divided. Husband appeals, challenging Wife’s designation as the sole decision making authority for the children’s educational and extracurricular activities, the amount of Wife’s income for purposes of child support, the awards for pendente lite support, the indefinite award of post-divorce support and the additional award of transitional alimony for 48 months. Husband also challenges the classification and division of the marital estate, including holding him liable for one-half of the $335,000 home equity line of credit debt, most of which was incurred during the pendency of the divorce, and the award of attorneys’ fees to Wife. We have determined that Wife is not entitled to receive post-divorce support of $7,000 per month in addition to the award of transitional alimony of $3,600 for a term of 48 months; therefore, we reverse the indefinite post-divorce support award of $7,000 per month. We also modify the award of transitional alimony of $3,600 per month, reducing the term from 48 months to 24 months with the term commencing upon the entry of the Final Decree of Divorce. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. As for Wife’s request to recover the attorneys’ fees she incurred on appeal, we respectfully deny that request. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Curteis Benjamin Arzon
The appellant, Curteis Benjamin Arzon, pled guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to two counts of aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced the appellant to four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for each offense. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eddie L. Readus v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Bedford County Circuit Court, seeking relief from his convictions for selling less than one-half gram of cocaine, delivering less than one-half gram of cocaine, possessing one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to sell, and possessing one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to deliver and resulting effective thirty-year sentence. In the petition, the Petitioner claimed that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court concluded that the Petitioner did not receive the ineffective assistance of counsel but ruled sua sponte that he was entitled to a delayed appeal in order for this court to determine whether his effective thirty-year sentence was excessive. After a review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition for post-conviction relief but reverse the court’s granting the Petitioner a delayed appeal. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Danny Ray Smith v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Danny Ray Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rommel Obligacion-Concurring
I concur with the majority opinion. However, I respectfully disagree with the standard of review followed by the majority regarding judicial diversion. I agree with the reasoning set forth in State v. Kiara Tashawn King, No. M2012-00236-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL793588, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 4, 2013), perm. app. granted (Tenn. Aug. 14, 2013), that after Bise, Caudle, and Pollard, portions of Parker, Electroplating, and their progeny in which this court reversed a trial court’s decision to deny judicial diversion merely because the trial court failed to expressly consider one or more of the seven legally-relevant factors (or merely because it failed to specify why some factors outweighed others) can no longer be considered governing law. |
Crockett | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lacey Jones v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Lacey Jones, of four counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated burglary, and two counts of aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the aggravated robbery convictions into the convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and ordered the Petitioner to serve an effective sentence of forty-two years. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. State v. Lacey Jones, No. W2004-01628-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 1848476, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug. 4, 2005), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2005). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rommel Obligacion
The Defendant, Rommel Obligacion, appeals from his jury convictions for three counts of felony reckless endangerment, contending that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court improperly denied his requests for probation and judicial diversion. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court failed to demonstrate on the record that it considered all the relevant judicial diversion factors, assigned weight to each factor, and explained how some factors outweighed others. This error, however, was harmless in light of the other findings made by the trial court. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Crockett | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bayrock Investment Co. v. Joseph D. Blankenship, M.D., et al.
This is a breach of contract case stemming from a commercial lease between Plaintiff Landlord and Defendant Tenants. Beginning in August 2011, Defendants failed to make rent payments in violation of their lease with Plaintiff. Plaintiff subsequently filed this lawsuit seeking damages specified in the lease. In response, Defendants raised the affirmative defense of unclean hands, contending that Plaintiff breached the lease first by objecting to and/or interfering with Defendants’ right under the lease to sublease the property without Plaintiff’s consent. The trial court granted summary judgment to Plaintiff, finding that Defendants failed to perform under the lease by failing to pay rent, and finding no genuine issue of material fact regarding any allegation that Plaintiff interfered with Defendant’s ability to sublease the property. The Defendants argue that summary judgment was inappropriate because there exists a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Bayrock breached the lease first by interfering with Defendants’ right to sublease. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Plaintiff. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Stanley Walker v. Bradley County Government, et al.
This appeal arises out of an inmate’s allegedly improper early release from jail. Stanley Walker (“Walker”), alleging that he was improperly released early from jail because the authorities did not want to pay for his medical care, sued Bradley County and Capt. Gabriel Thomas (“the Defendants”) in the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court dismissed certain of Walker’s claims for failure to state a claim and ultimately granted summary judgment for the Defendants on the remaining claim. Walker timely appealed. We hold, inter alia, that Walker has no private right of action for being released early from jail, and we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Laurel Hills Condominiums Property Owners' Association v. Tennessee Regulatory Authority
A water utility challenges the authority of the Tennessee Regulatory Authority to order it to divest itself of the water system and to continue providing service until the sale. We find no error in the actions of the Tennessee Regulatory Authority. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Grayson H.
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Grayson H., the minor child (“Child”) of Steven H. (“Father”) and Jessica L. (“Mother”). The Child was taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on March 9, 2012, following Father’s incarceration and Mother’s subsequent arrest. Mother’s parental rights to the Child were terminated in a separate proceeding. On October 17, 2012, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father. Following a bench trial held on July 11, 2013, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) Father had abandoned the Child by showing wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare and (2) the conditions causing the removal of the Child into protective custody persisted. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Father has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stanley Blue
The defendant, Stanley Blue, appeals from his resentencing to an effective term of forty-six years as a Range III, persistent offender for his convictions for facilitation of first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and reckless endangerment. On appeal, the defendant contends that his sentence is excessive, and the State agrees. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to forty years for attempted second degree murder and in classifying the defendant as a Range III, persistent offender for his reckless endangerment conviction. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgments are affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Lee Hutchison
A Knox County jury convicted appellant of three counts of facilitation of first degree murder and one count of facilitation of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the facilitation of first degree murder convictions and sentenced appellant to seventeen years. The trial court also sentenced appellant to a concurrent sentence of eight years for facilitation of especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, appellant presents thirteen issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s motion to suppress evidence seized in an extended warrantless search of his house; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce video footage of the crime scene; (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of blood samples taken from appellant without a warrant; (4) whether the trial court erred in admitting prior bad act evidence; (5) whether the trial court erred by allowing testimony regarding evidence that had been destroyed; (6) whether the trial court erred by allowing a medical examiner to testify about an autopsy performed by another medical examiner; (7) whether the trial court erred in denying appellant’s three motions for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct; (8) whether the trial court erred when it denied appellant’s request for a continuance in light of the State’s late disclosure of certain evidence; (9) whether the trial court erred by denying appellant’s request to strike a witness’s testimony when the testimony was internally contradictory; (10) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce graphic photographs of the victim’s injuries; (11) whether the trial court erred in its jury instructions; (12) whether the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s convictions; and (13) whether appellant is entitled to a new trial due to cumulative error. Based on our thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Lee Hutchison - concurring and dissenting
I concur with the results and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. I disagree, though, with the majority’s conclusion that the Confrontation Clause was not implicated in the admission of the autopsy report. I believe the admission of the report in this case violated the Confrontation Clause but was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Boccous McGill, Jr. and Darius Lacy
Darius Lacy (“Defendant Lacy”) and Boccous McGill, Jr., (“Defendant McGill”) (collectively “the Defendants”) each were charged with one count of rape of a child. Both Defendants were juveniles at the time of the alleged crimes. After a joint hearing, the juvenile court transferred both Defendants to circuit court to be tried as adults. The Defendants each pleaded guilty to one count of facilitation of rape of a child, and each Defendant reserved a certified question of law concerning the propriety of the juvenile court’s order of transfer. This Court consolidated the Defendants’ appeals. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reject the Defendants’ challenges to the juvenile court’s orders of transfer and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dennie Stough v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company
An employee sustained a compensable lower back injury, had surgery, returned to work, and settled his claim. Several months later, he re-injured his lower back. After several surgical procedures, he was unable to return to work. He filed this action for workers’ compensation benefits against his employer and the Second Injury Fund. The trial court awarded permanent total disability benefits, apportioning 50% of the award to the employer and 50% to the Fund. The Fund has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by assigning any liability to it because the later injury rendered the employee totally disabled without regard to the first injury. We conclude that the trial court failed to provide the basis for its apportionment of liability between the Fund and the employer. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment to that extent and remand the case for further consideration on this issue. |
Obion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Walter Francis Fitzpatrick, III
Appellant, Walter Francis Fitzpatrick, III, was indicted by the Monroe County Grand Jury for one count of tampering with government records. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted as charged and sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days with twenty days to serve in incarceration and the remainder to be served on probation. Appellant appeals his conviction. He argues that his indictment was faulty because the grand jury foreperson was not eligible to serve; that the trial court erred in ruling that Appellant could not testify regarding his proposed defense of necessity; and that the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s request for a jury instruction on the defense of necessity. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Gene Rogers
Appellant Robert G. Rogers was on probation for multiple counts of aggravated burglary, theft over $10,000, and theft of $500 or less. His probation officer filed a probation violation warrant as a result of Appellant’s arrest in Bradley Count for extortion. The probation violation warrant was subsequently amended to allege that Appellant had absconded from supervision. At the conclusion of the probation violation hearing, the trial judge revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve his originally imposed twenty-year sentence. Appellant appeals arguing that the trial court erred in revoking his sentence and that the trial judge should have recused herself. After a review of the record on appeal, we affirm the revocation of Appellant’s probation. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Martin v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Michael Martin, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2009 convictions for attempt to commit second degree murder, aggravated assault, and violating an order of protection and his effective eighteen-year, eleven-month, and twenty-nine-day sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel (1) failed to interview and present a witness at the trial, (2) failed to object contemporaneously to the admission of the narrative portion of the order of protection, and (3) failed to include the transcript of the motion for a new trial hearing in the appellate record. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Prescott
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Donald Prescott, was found guilty of especially aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to serve twenty years’ incarceration. In this appeal as of right, Defendant presents two issues for review. He asserts that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the victim’s pre-trial and trial identifications of Defendant; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for especially aggravated robbery because the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim suffered serious bodily injury. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Maurice Williams v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Maurice Williams, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2007 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of carjacking and aggravated robbery, claiming that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lakeisha Margaret Watkins v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Lakeisha Margaret Watkins, was convicted by a jury of four counts of aggravated child abuse, two counts of aggravated child neglect, and one count of attempted child neglect. The trial court sentenced her to an effective sentence of forty years. On appeal, this court reversed and dismissed one of the aggravated child neglect convictions based on insufficient evidence. State v. Lakeisha Margaret Watkins, No. M2009-02607-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 2682173, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 8, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 2011). Petitioner’s sentence was unaffected by this court’s decision. In her post-conviction petition, petitioner alleged that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied her petition, and she now appeals from that denial. Specifically, petitioner argues that trial counsel should have moved to suppress petitioner’s statements to police, that he did not ensure she understood the significance of her decision not to testify at trial despite being aware that she had a learning disability, and that he should have called a witness at trial or at the sentencing hearing to testify about her learning disability. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jose Umanzor v. Zurich American Insurance Company et al.
An employee asserted that he injured his lower back while working as a construction laborer for his employer. Approximately two years after the incident, the employee provided written notice of his injury to his employer. The employer denied the claim, contending that the employee failed to give timely notice of his injury and that his claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court agreed with the employer and entered judgment in its favor. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Brenda S. Harper v. William H. Harper
The parties to this proceeding were divorced in 2003; in the final decree, Wife was awarded one-half of Husband’s military retirement. In 2005, the court modified the final decree to provide that the portion of Husband’s retirement pay designated for his disability benefits was not marital property and, therefore, was not to be included in the amount Wife received from Husband. Wife filed a contempt proceeding in 2011 alleging that Husband was failing to pay her the amount of his retirement pay he was required to pay. In March 2012, following a hearing, the trial court entered an order in which it did not find Husband to be in contempt; Wife thereafter filed various motions seeking to have the court modify the manner in which Husband was computing the amount she would receive. Wife appeals the denial of relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
LeAnn Barnes v. David Ellett Barnes
Following a five-day divorce trial, the trial court valued and divided the parties’ sizeable marital estate, awarded $6,000 per month in alimony in futuro to Wife, and declined to award attorney’s fees to either party. On cross-motions to alter or amend, the trial court altered its division of marital property as to several assets, and it modified the alimony award from $6,000 per month in alimony in futuro to $4,300 per month in rehabilitative alimony for four years. Wife then filed another post-trial motion, pro se, which the trial court denied. Wife appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for such other proceedings as may be necessary. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals |