State of Tennessee v. Ladarius Devonte Maxwell
The Defendant, Ladarius Devonte Maxwell, challenges his jury convictions for two counts of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, alleging that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentencing. After a thorough examination of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cristy Irene Fair v. Stephen Lynn Cochran
We granted this appeal to determine whether the return of proof of service of process 412 days after issuance of a summons precludes a plaintiff from relying upon the original commencement of the lawsuit to toll the running of the statute of limitations. We hold that the plain language of Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 3 and 4.03 does not condition the effectiveness of the original commencement to toll the statute of limitations upon the prompt return of proof of service. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s lawsuit. We remand this case to the trial court to determine whether service of process occurred within ninety days of issuance of the summons. If so, the plaintiff may rely upon the original commencement of the lawsuit to toll the statute of limitations. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Cristy Irene Fair v. Stephen Lynn Cochran - Concur
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that failure to return proof of service does not render commencement ineffective to toll the statute of limitations under Rule 3. I write separately, however, to address the majority’s failure to construe Rule 4.03(1), which states that a plaintiff “shall promptly make proof of service.” See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(1) (2012). Although the majority provides a brief historical perspective of companion Rules 3 and 4.03, including significant changes in the return of proof of service requirements of both rules, the majority relies almost entirely on Rule 3 to conclude that Ms. Fair’s failure to promptly return proof of service did not affect the commencement of her action. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Mulkey
Pursuant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State appeals the manner of service of the sentence ordered by the Criminal Court for McMinn County. As a Range I, standard offender, the Defendant, Jeremy Mulkey, entered a plea of guilty to vandalism of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, vandalism of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony, and reckless endangerment, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant, consistent with the plea agreement, to concurrent terms of four years for Class D felony vandalism; four years for Class C felony vandalism and two years for reckless endangerment. After conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in the community corrections program. In doing so, the State argues that the trial court abused its discretion because the Defendant pleaded guilty to reckless endangerment, a crime against the person, and therefore, failed to meet the minimum statutory requirements to be sentenced under the Community Corrections Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-106 (2012). Upon review, we reverse and remand for resentencing. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. George Andrew Stanhope
The Defendant, George Andrew Stanhope, was indicted for first degree premeditated murder, three counts of first degree felony murder, theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, aggravated burglary, and aggravated rape. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202, -13-502, -14-103, -14-105(a)(3), -14-403. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, and aggravated burglary. The jury acquitted the Defendant of the charge of aggravated rape and one count of first degree felony murder. The trial court merged the two first degree felony murder convictions with the first degree premeditated murder conviction. The jury imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for the first degree premeditated murder conviction. The trial court held a sentencing hearing on the remaining convictions and imposed a sentence of six years for the aggravated burglary conviction and a sentence of four years for the theft conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutive to each other and to the sentence for the first degree premeditated murder conviction, for an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole plus ten years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress statements he made to the police; (2) that the trial court erred by not allowing defense counsel to review the personnel file of a former police detective; (3) that the in-court security around the Defendant was excessive and gave the jury the impression that he was in custody; (4) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions; (5) that the trial court erred by not merging the Defendant’s convictions for theft and aggravated burglary; (6) that the statutory aggravating circumstance of the victim’s age was unconstitutional; (7) that a new trial was warranted because one of the jurors failed to disclose her relationship with the court clerk during voir dire; and (8) that the Defendant was entitled to a new trial due to cumulative error. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gorge A. Rubio v. Geneva Vaughn, et al.
Appellant’s failure to timely file a notice of appeal deprives this court of jurisdiction to hear the matter and this appeal must be dismissed. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dusty Ross Binkley
The Petitioner, Dusty Ross Binkley, pled guilty to manufacture of methamphetamine and possession of a weapon in the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an eight-year sentence to be served on community corrections. The Petitioner’s community corrections officer filed a violation warrant, and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Petitioner’s community corrections sentence, finding that he had violated the terms of his sentence, and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement, to run consecutively with his sentence in another county on an unrelated charge. The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the habeas court summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas court erred by summarily dismissing his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Glenn Hasaflook
The Defendant, Robert Glenn Hasaflook, was indicted for one count of promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine, and filed a pretrial motion to suppress all his statements made to the police. The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion, and the Defendant pleaded guilty to the indicted offense reserving a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) about whether the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle by law enforcement was lawful. After review, we conclude that the Defendant has failed to comply with the strict requirements of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Danny Ray Grooms v. City of Trenton, Tennessee, et al.
The employee, a sanitation worker, was struck in the groin area when he fell onto a bed frame. Within a few days, he developed swelling and infection of same. His treating physician testified that the condition was not caused by the work injury, and an evaluating physician testified that the employee’s condition was consistent with the injury. The trial court found that the swelling and infection were not related to the work injury and dismissed employee’s complaint. The employee appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Gibson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Jeffrey Matthew Brown v. Jennifer Lindsey (Williams) Brown
Husband filed a petition pursuant to Rule 60.02 to set aside a provision of the parties’ divorce decree that required him to pay $80,000 to Wife in accordance with an antenuptial agreement. He sought relief under Rule 60.02(2) for fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party. The trial court denied Husband’s petition and “confirmed” the divorce decree. We find that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard, and as a result, it did not properly exercise its discretion. We also find that Wife’s conduct constituted misrepresentation or other misconduct within the meaning of Rule 60.02(2). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying Husband’s Rule 60 petition and we vacate the challenged portion of the divorce decree. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey Matthew Brown v. Jennifer Lindsey (Williams) Brown - Dissenting
For the reasons discussed below, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion in this case. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Michael M. Shofner v. Eddie Mahaffey v. Midstate Finance Company, Inc.
A trial court granted Third-Party Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute where Third-PartyPlaintiff took no steps to pursue his claims against Third-PartyDefendant more than six years after Third-PartyPlaintiff was granted a new trial, and where Third-Party Plaintiff failed to comply with the trial court’s scheduling order, thereby causing additional delays. Third-Party Plaintiff appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Trial courts have broad discretionary authority to control their dockets and proceedings, and the court here did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Third-Party Plaintiff’s complaint against Third-Party Defendant. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Bradford Stahr Fakes v. Patricia Nicole Zahorik
Unmarried parents who had been involved in extensive litigation over custody of their two children finally entered into an agreed order that gave custody of their six year old son to the father and custody of their two year old daughter to the mother. Two years later, the father filed a petition for modification of custody, alleging improper conduct by the Mother. After a hearing, the trial court found that there had been a material change of circumstances and awarded the father primary custody of the little girl. The mother argues on appeal that the trial court’s final order was deficient because it did not specifically identify the material change of circumstance that justified reopening the question of custody and because the court did not apply the statutory factors found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) to the question of the children’s best interest. We affirm the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Clyde Deuel v. The Surgical Clinic, PLLC
A surgeon left a sponge in the abdomen of a patient, closing the incision after receiving assurances from two operating room nurses that all the surgical sponges used in the operation had been fully accounted for. A second surgery was required to remove the sponge from the patient’s body. The patient died of unrelated causes seven months later. The patient’s widow filed a medical malpractice complaint against the surgeon and argued that the evidence of negligence was so plain that she could be excused from the normal requirement of producing expert testimony to prove that medical malpractice had occurred. The defendant surgeon presented expert testimony during trial to prove that the surgical standard of care entitled him to rely on the accuracy of the sponge count provided by his nurses. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant surgeon. The plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the use of expert testimony in a case that is based on the common knowledge exception and res ipsa loquitur. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John Wesley Green, Individually and as Shareholder of Champs-Elysees, Inc. v. Champs-Elysee, Inc. et al.
Plaintiff raises a plethora of issues on appeal from an action that began as a declaratory judgment action seeking to enforce a sales contract and turned into complex litigation involving numerous claims. On appeal, Plaintiff challenges, inter alia, the trial court’s decisions regarding the exclusion of evidence pursuant to the Dead Man’s Statute, the denial of a motion to amend to add an additional party, issues related to discovery, the trial court’s grant of directed verdict on numerous claims to the Defendants, and several other rulings by the trial court. We affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cornelius Richmond v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Cornelius Richmond, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 2003 convictions for robbery and three counts of forgery and resulting thirty-three-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that (1) his three forgery convictions are void because they should have been merged into a single conviction and (2) his multiple sentences violate principles of double jeopardy. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Rollen
The Appellant, Brandon Rollen, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion for correction of clerical errors in four aggravated robbery judgments. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion. We reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the motion and remand the case to the trial court for consideration on the merits pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 and Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Elizabeth LaFon Western Vinson v. James Gerald Vinson
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. Father challenges numerous rulings by the trial court, regarding both parenting issues and financial issues. We affirm in part, as modified, we reverse in part, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
Cantrell Lashone Winters v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Cantrell Lashone Winters, stands convicted of possession of 50 grams or more of hydromorphone in a school zone with intent to sell, a Class A felony, and Class E felony evading arrest. See State v. Cantrell Lashone Winters, M2009-01164-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 1085101, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. March 24, 2011), no perm. app. filed. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirty-four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief, and petitioner now appeals. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John D. Glass v. Suntrust Bank, et al.
Plaintiff beneficiary filed an action challenging the reasonableness of an executor’s fee taken by SunTrust as Executor. The probate court upheld the executor’s fee, and Plaintiff then filed an action against SunTrust Bank and SunTrust as Trustee. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment to Defendants based upon collateral estoppel and res judicata. We reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants and we remand for further proceedings |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marquon L. Green
A Madison County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Marquon L. Green, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to ten years to be served at 85%. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Margie R. Huskey et al v. Rhea County, Tennessee
In this negligence action, the trial court, following a bench trial, found the defendant 51% at fault and the plaintiff 49% at fault for a severe injury plaintiff, Margie R. Huskey, suffered to her left arm at the Rhea County Convenience Center. The trial court assessed total compensatory damages at $298,376.65, which it reduced by 49%, awarding $152,172.09 to Ms. Huskey. The court further assessed damages of $25,000.00 for loss of consortium in favor of plaintiff, Norman Huskey, which it likewise reduced by 49%, awarding $12,750.00. The County raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by finding the County liable for negligence; (2) whether the injured plaintiff was at least 50% at fault and therefore barred from recovery; and (3) whether the damages awarded were excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Edward Ragland, et al. v. Roy Morrison
This appeal arises from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee. Appellants claimed that Appellee was liable for injuries caused by dogs that Appellee allegedly owned and allowed to run loose in the Appellants’ neighborhood. The trial court’s order fails to state the legal ground upon which the court granted the motion for summary judgment. Further, there is no indication in the record of the trial court’s reason(s) for granting the motion. Because Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04 mandates inclusion of the trial court’s legal ground in the order on the motion for summary judgment, we vacate and remand. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Darelle Smith
This appeal concerns the appropriate response when a trial court learns during a jury’s deliberations that a juror exchanged Facebook messages with one of the State’s witnesses during the trial. A criminal court in Davidson County declined the defendant’s request to hold a hearing to question the juror and the witness to ascertain whether the communications required a new trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the trial court had not erred by declining the defendant’s request for a hearing. State v. Smith, No. M2010-01384-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 8502564 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 2, 2012). We disagree and, therefore, vacate the judgment and remand the case for a hearing consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
William Henry Preston v. Jewel Steel, Warden
William Henry Preston (“the Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Pursuant to a plea agreement and his pleas of guilty to six counts of aggravated rape, the Petitioner received a total effective sentence of forty years as a Range I standard offender. In his petition, he alleges that his sentences are illegal because the trial court and his counsel failed to advise him that he would be subject to community supervision for life as a result of his convictions. In addition, the Petitioner asserts that his total effective sentence of forty years has expired due to the accumulation of sentence reduction credits. The habeas corpus court dismissed his petition. The Petitioner now appeals. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |