State of Tennessee v. Timothy James Coley
Following a jury trial in the Madison County Circuit Court, Defendant Timothy James Coley was convicted of the Class B felony offense of initiation of the process to manufacture methamphetamine, and also of the Class A misdemeanor offenses of possession of methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and evading arrest. For each of the Class A misdemeanors, he was sentenced to serve concurrent sentences of 11 months and 29 days, with a 75% service by incarceration prior to eligibility for work release, furlough, trusty status and/or rehabilitation programs. Defendant was sentenced to serve 12 years as a Range I standard offender for the felony conviction, with service in the Community Corrections Program, consecutive to, and following service of the sentence for the misdemeanor convictions. Typed under “Special Conditions” of each judgment for a misdemeanor conviction is a requirement that the incarceration must be served in the Madison County Jail and not at the Madison County penal farm. Also typed in the Special Conditions section is the provision that Defendant was not eligible for work release or “any other special jail credits.” Handwritten on the judgment for possession of methamphetamine is the addition “(other than [g]ood [b]ehavior credits).” Defendant presents one very narrow issue in this appeal. He argues that the trial court had no authority to place any restrictions on “the earning of credits and the manner in which the credits are earned.” Specifically, he asserts he should be entitled to sentence credits under Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-2-147. The state filed a brief with a detailed argument section, but failed to address the precise issue raised by Defendant. Following a thorough review of the record and Defendant’s brief, we reverse the judgments of the trial court as to the sentencing credit restrictions in the misdemeanor judgments and remand for entry of amended judgments that do not include the restriction on earning sentencing credits. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Raynella Dossett Leath
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Raynella Dossett Leath, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life, with the possibility of parole. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that she was retried in violation of her state and federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy; (2) that the trial court erred by declining to exclude test results from analysis of the victim’s blood and urine; (3) that the trial court erred by admitting “certain estate planning documents” into evidence at trial; (4) that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion for a mistrial after a witness testified that she had previously stated that she was “scared” of the Defendant; (5) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction for first degree premeditated murder; (6) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the State’s duty to preserve evidence pursuant to State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999); (7) that the trial court’s jury instruction regarding the defense of alibi improperly shifted the burden of proof onto the Defendant; (8) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the Defendant’s “theory of defense”; (9) that the trial court used an improper method to select the alternate juror; (10) that members of the jury committed misconduct by deliberating prematurely and reviewing extraneous prejudicial information; (11) that the State withheld evidence favorable to the Defendant in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny; (12) that the Defendant is entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence; (13) that the trial court, by accepting the jury’s guilty verdict, “abdicated” its role as the thirteenth juror; and (14) that the Defendant is entitled to a new trial based upon cumulative error. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mansour Bin El Amin
The Defendant, Mansour Bin El Amin, appeals from his conviction by a Montgomery County Circuit Court jury for theft of property valued at more than $1000, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-14-103 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to seven years, six months’ confinement. The Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Keith Allen Powell
Keith Allen Powell (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to two counts of theft of property over $1,000, Class D felonies, and one count of simple possession of Lortab and Soma pills, a Class A misdemeanor. The plea agreement provided that the Defendant would serve concurrent sentences for the two theft convictions but otherwise left sentencing for all the convictions open to the trial court. At the time of sentencing, the Defendant also had a community corrections violation for an additional conviction of theft of property over $1,000. Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of four years’ incarceration. The Defendant has appealed the trial court’s sentence, asserting that the trial court erred in requiring the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frank Graham
A jury convicted the defendant, Frank Graham, of the first degree premeditated murder of his ex-fiancee, Taffi Crawford. The defendant received a life sentence. On appeal, the defendant contests the sufficiency of the evidence establishing premeditation. He also asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the statement he gave police, in which he acknowledged having accidentally shot the victim. The defendant asserts that he was arrested without probable cause and that his waiver of rights was not valid because police did not inform him about the presence of an attorney who had been contacted by his family to represent him. The defendant also appeals on the ground that the trial court erred in allowing certain testimony regarding prior bad acts. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err, and we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gregory E. Hearn et al v. Erie Insurance Exchange
Homeowners claim that cracks in the exterior bricks of their home were caused by blasting in the neighborhood. Their insurance company denied coverage under the homeowner policy. The juryreturned a verdict in favor of the homeowners. Based upon our construction of the insurance contract and its exclusion for damage caused by earth movement, we conclude that the judgment approving the verdict is erroneous and must be reversed. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Arnold, an un-emancipated child, by Renate Arnold, Mother/Next-Best Friend v. Randy Kennedy
The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for damages under Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-21-108. We affirm |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John Pierce Lankford v. Southern Health Partners
This is an appeal from an order entered on March 12, 2013. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Ann Woodard Maxwell v. Ronald Edward Woodard, Jr.
This appeal involves post-divorce modification of a parenting plan. The father filed a petition alleging a material change in circumstances and seeking to be designated primary residential parent for the parties’ minor son. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found a material change in circumstances but declined to designate the father as primary residential parent. Instead, the trial court left the mother in place as primary residential parent and increased the father’s parenting time. The father now appeals the trial court’s decision not to designate him as the primary residential parent. We reverse, holding that the evidence in the record preponderates against the trial court’s holding that it is in the child’s best interest for the mother to remain the primary residential parent, so the trial court erred in denying the father’s petition to designate him as the primary residential parent. |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
Donald Plunk v. Gibson Guitar Corporation
Former sales associate brought wrongful termination suit against his former employer, alleging that his termination was in breach of contract and violated the Tennessee Disability Act. When the employer failed to answer the complaint, the trial court granted the employee a default judgment on liability; the court subsequently entered an order granting the employee judgment for $184,437.50. The Employer filed various motions seeking to have the judgments set aside; the court declined to set aside the default judgment but set aside the monetary award. Following a hearing, the court awarded the employee back pay in the sum of $55,590.74 and counsel fees totaling $60,107.25. Employer and employee appeal. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | ||
Paula Jean Holley v. James Franklin Holley, III
The issue in this appeal is whether the circuit court that had granted the divorce lost subject matter jurisdiction to hear a later petition for change of custody. James Franklin Holley, III (“Father”) and Paula Jean Holley (“Mother”) were divorced in the Fourth Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). Mother was given primary custody of the parties’ two minor children (“the Children”), with Father having co-parenting time. Later, Father filed a petition (“the Petition”) to change custody based on Mother’s alleged neglect of the Children’s psychological and educational issues. The Trial Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the Petition as juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear petitions alleging dependency and neglect. Father appeals. We hold that the Petition did not allege under the relevant statutes that the Children were dependent and neglected and, therefore, the Trial Court did have jurisdiction to hear the Petition. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Courtney N.
Tina K. (“Mother”) appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, Courtney N. (“the Child”), now age 12. The Child and her older sister, Tiffany N. (“Sister”) (collectively “the Children”) were placed in the protective custody of petitioners, Raymond and Charlene W., (“Uncle and Aunt”). They were subsequently adjudicated dependent and neglected in Mother’s care. In January 2012, Uncle and Aunt, together with Janie Lindamood, the Child’s court-appointed guardian ad litem, (collectively “Petitioners”), filed a petition seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition after finding that multiple grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the Child’s best interest. The court stated that it made both findings by clear and convincing evidence. Mother appeals each of these determinations. We vacate the finding of abandonment based on conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare as such ground is not implicated by the facts of this case. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Jonathan Pulley v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jonathan Pulley, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his Wayne County Circuit Court convictions of aggravated sexual battery and assault, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the order of the Circuit Court. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mountain Commerce Bank v. First State Financial, Inc.
This appeal involves two letters of credit issued by First State to Commerce Bank for the benefit of Debtor, who subsequently defaulted on two loans that were secured by the letters. Commerce Bank issued a sight draft requesting full payment, but First State submitted partial payment. Commerce Bank filed suit. Following a hearing, the trial court held that First State was obligated to fulfill each letter of credit in its entirety. The court granted Commerce Bank’s request for attorney fees but denied the request for pre-judgment interest. First State and Commerce Bank appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carlos Kennedy v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Carlos Kennedy, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner is currently serving an effective sentence of thirty-five years in the Department of Correction following his convictions for rape of a child, attempted rape of a child, assault, and coercion of a witness. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying him relief because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Secifically, he contends that trial counsels were ineffective by: (1) failing to consider moving for a change of venue; (2) failing to interview all fact witnesses; (3) failing to file important pre-trial motions; and (4) failing to utilize an expert witness. Following review of the record, we discern no error and affirm the denial of the petition. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sean Leifer
Appellant, Sean M. Leifer, was indicted for first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse. A jury convicted him of reckless homicide and aggravated child abuse, and the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of four years and sixteen years, respectively. Appellant now challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s rulings with regard to the State’s expert witness. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Susan Moore Taylor v. John Thomas Taylor
Husband appeals the trial court’s determination that the parties’ residence was marital property; he also appeals the division of the marital property. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Ginger Jackson v. Gursheel S. Dhillon et al
The plaintiff appeals arguing that the trial court erred in setting aside a default judgment and dismissing all claims under the doctrine of res judicata. Based upon the record on appeal, we find no error and affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Jalal Bachour v. Devin Mason, et al
This case arose from two contracts between the same parties for the sale of commercial property. A provision in the second contract that was not included in the first provided that the buyer would retain $75,000 of the contract price if an access road to the property was not completed by a certain date. Completion was defined as occurring “upon the dedication and turning the streets over to the town of Woodbury and/or Cannon County, Tennessee.” The buyer subsequently filed a petition for declaratory judgment, asking the court to find that completion had not occurred and that he was therefore entitled to keep the $75,000. The trial court ruled against the buyer, holding that he was obligated to pay the full contract price to the sellers. We affirm the result reached by the trial court because we find that the $75,000 clause was not a valid liquidated clause provision, but rather a penalty. |
Cannon | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Clark Beauregard Waterford, III
The Defendant, Clark Beauregard Waterford, III, was indicted for first degree premeditated murder. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder and sentenced to forty years as a Range II, multiple offender. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for second degree murder; (2) that the trial court erred in deciding that the Defendant’s two prior convictions for aggravated assault would have been admissible for impeachment purposes if the Defendant had decided to testify at trial; and (3) that the trial court erred by imposing the maximum sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry Jereller Alston, et al
In this appeal as of right, the State challenges the Knox County Criminal Court’s setting aside the jury verdicts of guilty of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony and ordering dismissal of the charges. Because the trial court erred by setting aside the verdicts and dismissing the charges of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary, the jury verdicts are reinstated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for sentencing. Although the trial court erred by dismissing the firearms charge on the grounds named in its order, error in the indictment for that offense nevertheless requires a dismissal of those charges. Finally, the defendants’ convictions of aggravated robbery and the sentences that accompany them are affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marquon Lanorris Green
The defendant, Marquon Lanorris Green, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; aggravated rape, a Class A felony; and aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to twenty years on the aggravated kidnapping and aggravated rape convictions and ten years on the aggravated robbery conviction, to be served consecutively to each other and a prior ten-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bobby Jackson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Bobby Jackson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stephanie Lawson Miller v. Stephen Lee Miller
Stephanie Lawson Miller (“Mother”) appeals the Trial Court’s April 26, 2012 order finding and holding her in criminal contempt for violating the parties’ Permanent Parenting Plan. Mother raises issues on appeal regarding whether Stephen Lee Miller (“Father”) proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mother had violated the Permanent Parenting Plan, whether Mother could be jailed for said contempt, whether the parties’ minor child has a constitutional right to exercise his religious beliefs, and whether the Trial Court erred in failing to consider the testimony of the child. We find and hold that Father did prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mother violated the Permanent Parenting Plan, that Mother could be jailed for said contempt, that the Trial Court did not err in refusing to consider the child’s testimony about his religious decision making, and that the issue of whether the child has a constitutional right is not properly before this Court. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie Lawson Miller v. Stephen Lee Miller - Dissenting
CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., Presiding Judge, dissenting. With all due respect to my colleagues, I believe the conduct, or lack thereof, of Mother has been blown way out of proportion. Certainly, not all of the i’s were properly dotted and not all of the t’s were correctly crossed, but, in the final analysis and way before the date scheduled for the Child’s Baptism, Father had ample opportunity to weigh in on the decision. He failed to stop the Baptism when he could. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |