State of Tennessee v. Frank M. Green
The Defendant, Frank M. Green, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of rape in Counts 1 and 3 and assault by extremely offensive or provocative physical contact in Counts 2 and 4 and was acquitted of the charge of aggravated kidnapping in Count 5. The Defendant filed a post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal as to the rape conviction in Count 3 and the assault conviction in Count 4. The trial court denied this motion but merged Count 3 with Count 1 and merged Count 4 with Count 2. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of ten years for each of the rape convictions and a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the assault convictions and ordered the rape and assault convictions served concurrently, for an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the State’s faulty election of offenses led the trial court to provide erroneous and misleading jury instructions, which undermined the integrity of the jury’s verdict; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions in count 3 for rape and count 4 for assault; and (3) the convictions in Counts 2 and 4 reflect the incorrect offense class and sentence. Because the State failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that errors regarding the election, the charge, and the supplemental jury instructions were harmless, we reverse the Defendant’s convictions and remand the case for a new trial on the offenses of rape in Counts 1 and 3 and the offenses of assault by extremely offensive or provocative physical contact in Counts 2 and 4. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
W. David Hall v. Zora Humphrey
This is a conservatorship action initiated by University of Tennessee Medical Center with |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frank M. Green - Dissenting
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the State’s election of the offenses was flawed and that the trial court erred in instructing the jury pursuant to the State’s faulty election. Cf. State v. Ellis, 89 S.W.3d 584, 596 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (“[B]ecause the election requirement is ‘fundamental, immediately touching the constitutional rights of an accused,’ a trial court has a duty even absent a request by the defendant to ensure the timely election of offenses by the State and to properly instruct the jury concerning the requirement of a unanimous verdict.” (quoting Burlison v. State, 501 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tenn. 1973)). I part ways with the majority regarding the remedy to which the Defendant is entitled for the double jeopardy issue which resulted from the State’s flawed election and the court’s reliance upon the election in its jury instructions. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Mosley
Michael Mosley, Defendant, claims the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of attempted aggravated assault, that the trial court erred by not requiring the State to make an election as to the precise definition of serious bodily injury for which a conviction was being sought, and that the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s request for two special jury instructions. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Katherine Mechelle Stooksbury v. Matthew D. Varney
This appeal concerns a father’s continued failure to remit payment for his child support |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven Lamont Anderson
A Sumner County jury convicted the defendant, Steven Lamont Anderson, of unlawful possession of a firearm after being convicted of a felony involving violence and unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, for which he received an agreed-upon sentence of twelve years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. The defendant also argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in sentencing the defendant as a Range II offender. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marlon Jackson
The Defendant, Marlon Jackson, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his three-year |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Fredrick Munn
Fredrick Munn, Defendant, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s order |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kimberly D. Fisher, ET AL. v. Garrison Smith M.D., ET AL.
This appeal arises from a health care liability action. The plaintiffs filed their complaint |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Clayton v. Joseph Dixon et al.
Property owner sued owners of an adjacent property for damages allegedly caused by the installation of a pipe culvert. The plaintiff alleged that, due to improper installation, the pipe culvert obstructed the downstream flow of water and caused the plaintiff’s property to flood. Both sides filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the adjacent property owners based on the statute of repose for defective improvements to real property. We conclude that the statute of repose could not be asserted by the adjacent property owners. So we reverse the grant of summary judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark Eric Howard
Defendant, Mark Eric Howard, was convicted after a jury trial of second degree murder, a |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Benjamin McCurry Et Al. v. Agness McCurry
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Leroy Sexton Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner’s original and untimely petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed on the merits because all his claims were either waived or previously determined. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a second petition alleging that the statute of limitations for his first petition should have been tolled due to his then mental incompetency. The post-conviction court dismissed the second petition, finding that the Petitioner was not mentally incompetent. On appeal, we conclude that, because the Petitioner’s first petition was resolved on the merits, any second or subsequent petition is barred, and any issue regarding the timely filing of the first petition is immaterial. Accordingly, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Fentress | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Linda Gail Compton v. Kathy A. Leslie et al.
This appeal involves an issue of arbitration. The trial court entered an order declining to |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Braylin T.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The mother appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights, arguing that it is not in the child’s best interest for her rights to be terminated. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm. |
DeKalb | Court of Appeals | |
Tino C. Sutton v. The Westmoreland Law Firm et al.
This action concerns the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims against his former attorney for breach of contract, malpractice, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. We affirm. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Zachary Moss v. Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board
The issue presented is whether a civil service merit board acts arbitrarily or capriciously |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Michael F. Thomas v. Ken Smith Auto Parts
This appeal concerns breach of contract. In 2012, Michael F. Thomas (“Thomas”), |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kristopher Johnson
The Defendant, Kristopher Johnson, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William Goetz v. Donel Autin, et al.
The trial court dismissed Appellant’s action for aggravated perjury for failure to state a claim under Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 12.02(6); the trial court dismissed Appellant’s action for spoliation of evidence as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court also assessed sanctions against Appellant’s attorney pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Teal Properties, Inc. v. Dog House Investments, LLC, et al.
This appeal arises from a series of civil actions between a tenant and its landlord. The first |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Evon Kay Creger v. Daniel William Creger
In this divorce action, the trial court distributed the parties’ marital assets and debts, |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen Farber Et Al. v. Nucsafe, Inc. Et Al.
This is a breach of contract action between a lender, borrower, and guarantor on a promissory note. When the borrower ceased payment on the promissory note and the borrower and guarantor failed to cure the default, the lender commenced this action against the borrower and the guarantor. After extensive discovery, the lender passed away, and the personal representatives of the lender’s estate were substituted as the party plaintiffs. The estate filed a motion for summary judgment based on two grounds. The first ground was that in their discovery responses, the defendants admitted that they failed to remit payments as required by the promissory note. Second, the defendants’ discovery responses denied that the defendants had any facts or evidence upon which to support the affirmative defenses that the lender violated the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing and/or that the note was unenforceable. The defendants filed a response in opposition to the summary judgment motion, supported by the affidavit of the president of both defendants. Relying on the affidavit, the defendants asserted, for the first time, that neither defendant was ever liable for the debt because the lender had never remitted the loan proceeds to the borrower. The trial court ruled that the bulk of the affidavit was inadmissible on three grounds. First, it found the officer’s testimony regarding conversations with the deceased lender inadmissible under the Dead Man’s Statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 24-1-203. Second, it found certain statements were directly contradictory to previous discovery responses, so the court accordingly rejected the evidence under the Cancellation Rule. Third, it found the business records the affiant referenced in his affidavit but did not produce failed to satisfy the best evidence rule. After considering the statement of undisputed facts, discovery responses, and the defendants’ admissions, the trial court concluded that the material facts were undisputed and that the estate was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, it granted the estate’s motion and awarded a judgment for the outstanding principal and interest totaling $260,710.00 and $12,445.28 in attorneys’ fees and expenses. The defendants appealed. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Adriane Allen v. American Yeast Inc. ET AL.
In a prior appeal involving this case, this Court vacated the trial court’s decision to require |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Rose v. Tennessee Claims Commission
Appellant seeks to appeal a decision regarding a Criminal Injuries Compensation Act claim |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |