Marsha Bordes v. Julian Bordes
Husband filed a petition to modify the amount of alimony in futuro set in the divorce decree, asserting that health problems and a decrease in his income arising after the divorce constituted a substantial and material change in circumstances that warranted a reduction in the amount of alimony. Husband appeals the denial of the petition and award of attorneyfees to Wife. Finding that Husband was entitled to modification and that the award of attorney fees was inappropriate, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and modify the award of alimony. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Bob Keith Watson v. Tennessee Department of Safety
This appeal involves the forfeiture of personal property seized in connection with a criminal investigation. The petitioner’s home was searched pursuant to a search warrant executed on his home. Items of his personal property were seized by authorities, and later forfeited and sold. The petitioner property owner filed this lawsuit, arguing that administrative protocols regarding forfeiture proceedings were not followed and contesting the forfeiture of his personal property. The administrative law judge held that the forfeiture and sale were valid, and the property owner appealed to the trial court. The trial court affirmed. The property owner now appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcos Enrique Collazo, Sr.
A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Marcos Enrique Collazo, Sr., of three counts of rape of a child, seven counts of rape by fraud, seven counts of statutory rape by an authority figure, and seven counts of misdemeanor assault. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of 130 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude pornographic videos found in his bedroom, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for rape by fraud and statutory rape by an authority figure, and that the trial court erred in sentencing. We conclude that the trial court erred in denying the appellant’s severance motion. However, the error was harmless. Finding no further error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Larry E. Parrish, P.C. v. Dodson, et al.
The former attorney of a client filed a seldom used “In Rem Complaint to Trace and Recover Res” to prosecute a chose-in-action assigned by the former client in payment of attorney’s fees. The funds to be recovered by this action were being held in trust by another law firm following the resolution of a separate, but related action. The former client filed an answer asserting that the assignment was unconscionable, thus, unenforceable; she also filed a counter-claim against her former attorney for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court found that certain provisions of the assignment were unconscionable and others were not and granted partial summary judgment to each party. Finding that the provision awarding $50,000 to the plaintiff was not unconscionable, the trial court granted a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor for that amount plus interest. The trial court also awarded the former client $10,000 in attorney’s fees upon a finding that she was the “prevailing party” in this action. Both parties appeal. We reverse upon a finding that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude a grant of summary judgment to either party and remand for further proceedings. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Delmar Reed v. State of Tennessee
Aggrieved by his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of ten counts of harassment, one count of attempted aggravated burglary, one count of vandalism of property valued at $500 or less, one count of vandalism of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, and one count of setting fire to personal property, for which he received an effective sentence of 19 years’ incarceration, the petitioner, Delmar Reed, filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a full evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Markquitton Sanders
The appellant, Markquitton Sanders,pled guilty to two felony drug offenses and was allowed to serve his sentences in community corrections. Thereafter, the trial court found him guilty of violating his community corrections sentences and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s imposition of a term of incarceration. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Doyle Sweeney v. David Tenney
Plaintiff sued defendant, alleging defendant owed money on a loan. Defendant defended on the ground that the contract was oral and the statute of frauds barred any collection. The Trial Court awarded Judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $4,500.00. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Doyle Sweeney v. David Tenney - Dissenting in part and Concurring in part
Charles D. Susano, Jr., J., dissenting in part and concurring in part. I agree with the majority that Tenny raised at trial the defense of the statute of frauds. I also agree with the majority that Tenny is liable to Sweeney in the uncontested amount of $4,500. I disagree with the majority’s reliance on the partial performance exception to the statute of frauds as I find such reliance unnecessary. In my judgment, a writing was not required in this case under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-2-101(a)(5) (Supp. 2010) because we are dealing with an agreement that could have been performed within one year. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Rhoden v. Donald D. Rhoden
This is an action for unlawful detainer. The property at issue was deeded to the plaintiff and his father “as tenants in common with the right of survivorship.” For a time, the father, the plaintiff, and the plaintiff’s brother all lived together on the property. The father died intestate. After the father’s death, the plaintiff asked his brother to leave the property, and the brother refused. The plaintiff then filed this action against his brother for unlawful detainer, claiming that he was the sole owner of the property after their father’s death based on his right of survivorship. After a bench trial, the trial court agreed and held in favor of the plaintiff. The brother now appeals. We affirm. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
Dwayne R. Cross v. State of Tennessee
The defendant, Dwayne R. Cross, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictments in this case, and the State moves this court to affirm the circuit court’s order summarily via Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. The State’s motion is well taken, and accordingly, the circuit court’s order is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Dawson Johnson v. Madison County, Tennessee
Madison County allegedly erroneously mis-assigned and sold a portion of Appellant’s property. Many years later, in 2006, Appellant learned of the alleged mistake and filed suit to quiet title against Madison County, two former owners, and the then-current property owner. In 2010, the matter was settled prior to trial, and the property was returned to Appellant. Appellant then filed suit against Madison County seeking to recover his litigation expenses incurred in the action to quiet title. The trial court, however, dismissed his claims as time-barred. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jozie C.C.
This is a modification of child custody case. Mother and Father entered into a consent order naming Father primary residential parent and giving Mother visitation. Mother petitioned the juvenile court to change custody. The court denied the petition to change custody, but modified Mother’s visitation. Mother appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Lee Brown
The Defendant, Joshua Lee Brown, was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of two counts of felony murder; attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; and attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2006) (amended 2007), 39-12-101 (2010), 39-13-403 (2010). He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for each of the felony murder convictions, to twenty years’ confinement for attempted first degree murder, and to ten years’ confinement for attempted especially aggravated robbery. The attempted first degree murder conviction was ordered to be served consecutively to the remaining convictions, for an effective sentence of life plus twenty years. On appeal, he contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to redact a portion of the video evidence; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to strike the State’s notice of intent to seek a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibilityof parole; (3) the trial court erred bydenying his motion to strike the felony murder aggravating circumstance from the State’s notice of intent to seek a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole; (4) the trial court erred by granting the State’s requestto augmentthe pattern juryinstruction on the “heinous,atrocious, and cruel” aggravating circumstance; (5) the trial court erred by rejecting his requested sentencing instruction regarding the statutorymitigating circumstance thathe acted underthe substantial domination of another person; (6) his rights to due process and a fair trial were violated when the trial court failed to give the jury meaningful guidance or directions as to their deliberations during the punishment phase of the trial; (7) the trial court erred by imposing partially consecutive sentences; and (8) the evidence was insufficient to establish the “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” aggravating circumstance as to one of the victims during sentencing. We conclude that although the trial court erred when giving a special jury instruction, the error was harmless in light of the whole record. Furthermore, we conclude that although the evidence was insufficient to establish an aggravating circumstance and the trial court failed to make the necessary findings when imposing consecutive sentences, the sentences imposed were appropriate. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Daniel Ewing v. State of Tennessee
Much aggrieved by his guilty-pleaded convictions of rape and introduction of drugs into a penal institution, the petitioner, Daniel Ewing, filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his guilty pleas were involuntarily and unknowingly entered as a product of the ineffective assistance of counsel. Following the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. George Eugene Cody
A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, George Eugene Cody, of two counts of criminally negligent homicide, see T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2006), two counts of first degree murder committed in the perpetration of a robbery,see id.§ 39-13-202(a)(2), two counts of especially aggravated robbery,see id.§ 39-13-403,and two counts of identity theft, see id. § 39-14-150. At sentencing, the trial court merged the criminally negligent homicide convictions into the felony murder convictions and imposed a total effective sentence of life plus 20 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. Discerning no infirmity in the evidence, we affirm the judgments of the trial court |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
C.F. Property, LLC v. Rachel Scott et al.
This is a landlord-tenant dispute involving commercial property with a known and disclosed “leaky roof.” The lease states that the "property” is leased “as is where is.” In an email sent prior to the execution of the lease, the landlord stated it would “talk about” repairing the roof after the first year. The leakage increased dramatically after the first year. The tenant began withholding rent. The landlord filed an unlawful detainer action and the tenant filed a counterclaim for damages resulting from the leaky roof. A bench trial ensured. The court held that, by telling the tenant it would “talk about” repairing the roof, the landlord misrepresented that the roof was repairable when the landlord knew it could not be repaired, and that the landlord had a duty under the lease to repair the roof. The landlord appeals. We reverse the judgment and remand for a determination of the damages due the landlord under the lease. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Danny E. Rogers v. Howard Carlton, Warden
The petitioner, Danny E. Rogers, filed in the Johnson County Criminal Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals. The State filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the petition was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Casandra Cornwell v. Troy Cornwell
This case involves the plaintiff’s motion seeking an order holding her former husband in contempt for failing to make certain monthly payments of $1,071 from his military retirement as required by the terms of a marital dissolution agreement incorporated into the parties’ divorce judgment. The wife’s former spouse stopped making the payments after the wife remarried. The trial court denied the motion upon finding that the payments in question were alimony subject to modification rather than a property distribution as the wife contends. The court held that Mr. Cornwell “properly” stopped paying the “alimony” when his former wife remarried. The wife has appealed. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a hearing on the wife’s motion. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Ginny Beth King, et al. v. Flowmaster, Inc.
Flowmaster invited a professional driver to attend an exhibition in which such driver allegedly lost control of his vehicle, killing or injuring many spectators. The plaintiffs sued numerous defendants, including Flowmaster, and the trial court granted Flowmaster’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm the trial court’s finding that Flowmaster was not a member of a joint venture. However, we find that Flowmaster failed to negate the duty element of the plaintiffs’ negligence claim, and that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Flowmaster “engaged in” an ultrahazardous activity or “participated” in a “drag race,” and we remand on these issues. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Bradford v. Abe Stephens
The appellant, the former business partner of the appellee, appeals the trial court’s determination that the appellee did not breach their partnership agreement, as well as the trial court’s distribution of partnership profits. Appellant also appeals the trial court’s decision not to grant a jury trial. We affirm the trial court’s decision not to grant a jury trial as well as its determination that the appellee did not breach the partnership agreement. We adjust the amount of the court’s awards to account for $5,000 of an $8,000 sale which the appellee kept rather than depositing it into the partnership account. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Wanda Leaver Williams, et al. v. Brandon Leaver, et al.
The trial court imposed a constructive trust on a six-acre parcel of real property to carry out the intent of the father that his son and daughter would divide the property. The court ordered the sale of the property and division of the proceeds. We have concluded that the more appropriate equitable remedy is a resulting trust and have modified the judgment with regard to the disposition of the sale proceeds. Otherwise, we affirm the result reached by the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Renwick A. Earls, Jr. v. Howard Carlton, Warden
The petitioner, Renwick A. Earls, Jr., pled guilty to one count of second degree murder and received a sentence of forty years as a Range II offender. He now appeals the dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief, arguing that the trial court did not have the authority to sentence him to forty years, rendering the judgment void. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that his judgment is void or that he is otherwise entitled to relief, we affirm the denial of habeas corpus relief. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Valerie Rochelle Evans Albertson v. Matthew Scott Albertson
After more than seventeen years of marriage, Valerie Rochelle Evans Albertson (“Wife”) sued Matthew Scott Albertson (“Husband”) for divorce. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Decree of Divorce on December 17, 2010 nunc pro tunc to November 8, 2010. In the Final Decree of Divorce the Trial Court, inter alia, awarded Wife a divorce, awarded Wife transitional alimony, divided the marital assets and debts, entered a permanent parenting plan with regard to the parties’ minor child, and awarded Wife attorney’s fees. Husband appeals the property division and the award of alimony. The record on appeal contains no transcript or statement of the evidence. We affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Toby Johnson
The Hamilton County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, William Toby Johnson, charging him with aggravated burglary, resisting arrest, and four counts of aggravated robbery. By agreement, count six of the indictment was amended to charge attempted aggravated robbery rather than aggravated robbery. It also appears that the resisting arrest charge was dismissed before trial. At trial, following the close of the State’s proof, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal regarding the aggravated robbery of Luis Lopez, and the charge was reduced to robbery. The jury convicted Defendant of aggravated criminal trespass, theft of property valued under $500 from Luis Lopez, and two counts of the lesser-included offense of robbery involving Edgar Perez and Valentina Soto Santizo. Defendant was sentenced to eleven months and twenty nine days each for aggravated criminal trespass and theft, and fifteen years for each robbery conviction. The trial court ordered the two robbery sentences to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the other two sentences. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce an audio recording of the 911 call made by one of the victims at the time of the offenses; and (3) that his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shonda M. Mickel v. Eric Cross, et al.
Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal of an order of the trial court which failed to adjudicate all claims. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Madison | Court of Appeals |