State of Tennessee v. Joshua W. Eads
The defendant, Joshua W. Eads, was convicted by a Union County jury of facilitation of burglary, a Class E felony; theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor; and theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony. Following a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced to an effective term of six years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in: (1) failing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that the defendant committed the instant crimes; and (2) charging the jury with the lesser included offense of criminal responsibility for facilitation of burglary because the evidence indicated that the defendant did not promote or assist in the crimes. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgments of conviction. |
Union | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Elizabeth Cude v. Gilbert E. Herren, M.D., et al.
The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s re-filed suit for failure to comply with the 60-day notice and certificate of good faith requirements set out in the Medical Malpractice Act. Because we find such requirements applicable to Plaintiff’s suit and no extraordinary cause to excuse her non-compliance, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tonya Renee Fletcher v. Glen Allen Fletcher
This post-divorce appeal involves parenting issues. The parties, parents of two minor children, divorced pursuant to a marital dissolution agreement. After post-divorce custody disputes arose, the parties went through mediation and arrived at an agreed parenting plan. The next day, the mother repudiated the agreement. The father then filed a motion to enforce the mediation agreement. The mother requested an evidentiary hearing on whether the parenting arrangement embodied in the mediated parenting plan was in the best interest of the children. The trial court declined to hear any evidence, and found that the mediated parenting plan was a valid, enforceable contract. It entered an order enforcing the mediated parenting plan. The mother now appeals. We reverse, holding that the trial court erred in applying contract analysis to the mediated parenting plan, and remanding for an evidentiary hearing on whether the parenting arrangement in the mediated parenting plan is in the best interest of the minor children. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee vs. Wayne Boykin
Following a bench trial, the defendant, Wayne Boykin, was convicted of fraudulently using a credit card to obtain goods with a value in excess of $60,000, which is punishable as a Class B felony. The Circuit Court of Madison County sentenced the defendant to ten years incarceration as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, the defendant maintains that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) his sentence was excessive. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jason Kayser v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jason Kayser, appeals the Weakley County Circuit Court’s denial of postconviction relief from his conviction upon his guilty plea for second degree murder, a Class A felony, for which he is serving seventeen years as a violent offender. The Petitioner contends that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty plea and that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Weakley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony M. Reliford
The defendant, Anthony M. Reliford, pled guilty to domestic assault and aggravated assault, receiving concurrent sentences of four years and eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served in confinement. The court further ordered that the defendant pay restitution to the victim in the amount of $830.19. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by: (1) imposing a fully incarcerative sentence and (2) improperly ordering restitution. Following review of the record, we affirm the sentences of incarceration but remand for reconsideration of restitution in light of the defendant’s ability to pay. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles H. Vires, Jr.
The State appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s granting of the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a sobriety checkpoint. The State claims that the trial court erred by concluding that the Defendant was unreasonably seized at the checkpoint due to the failure of the advance publicity to comply with Tennessee Department of Safety General Order 410-1. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Benjamin Patterson and Charles P. Yokley
Defendants, Benjamin Patterson and Charles P. Yokley, were indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a child care facility in Count 1 and delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a child care facility in Count 2. Following a jury trial, Defendants were both convicted as charged, and the trial court merged the delivery offenses with the sale offenses. Defendant Patterson was sentenced as a standard offender to serve three years incarcerated,and Defendant Yokley was sentenced as a multiple offender to serve seven years incarcerated. Both defendants raise several issues on appeal, including the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, alleged errors regarding the jury instructions, and the trialcourt’s refusal to exclude certain evidence. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tyrone E. McClain d/b/a T-Mac Productions v. Bank of America, N.A., et al.
The plaintiff has appealed from an order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss some, but not all, of the plaintiff’s claims. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the plaintiff’s claims or the defendants’ counterclaim, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Lynn Parker
We granted this appeal by the State to determine if the defendant’s conviction of second degree murder should be affirmed pursuant to State v. Mellons, 557 S.W.2d 497 (Tenn. 1977), despite insufficient evidence to support it. We hold that Mellons does not control the outcome of this case. We also hold that sufficient proof must support every element of the offense of which a defendant is convicted, even where the conviction offense is charged as a lesser-included offense and sufficient proof supports the greater offense. In this case, the trial court erred in charging the jury with second degree murder as a lesser-included offense of first degree felony murder. Because the proof is not sufficient to support it, we must reverse and vacate the conviction of second degree murder. However, because the proof is sufficient to support the offense of reckless homicide, we remand this matter to the trial court for (1) entry of an amended judgment reflecting a conviction of reckless homicide, and (2) sentencing on reckless homicide. The defendant is entitled to no relief on his remaining issues. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. |
Cocke | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Bryant K. Pride
The Defendant, Bryant K. Pride, pled nolo contendere to one count of felony possession of 26 grams of cocaine for sale or delivery in a Drug-Free School Zone, one count of misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and one count of felony conspiracy to possess more than 26 grams of cocaine for sale or delivery in a Drug-Free School Zone. The Defendant attempted to reserve a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(1) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictments due to a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. After review, we conclude that this Court does not have jurisdiction to address the certified question because it does not meet the requirements of State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988). The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Northwest Tennessee Motorsports Park, LLC v. Tennessee Asphalt Company
This is a breach of contract case. Appellants contracted with Appellees to pave their existing drag strip. Because the soil under the drag strip contained too much moisture, the paving project failed and other parts of the drag strip not included in the contract were damaged. The trial court awarded damages for the Appellant, but later reduced the damages by the amount over and above the original contract. Appellant appeals. Because the Appellant failed to present any evidence that Appellee breached the contract, we reverse and remand. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deandre Blake
The defendant, Deandre Blake, appeals his two Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree murder, claiming that the convicting evidence was insufficient, that the trial court erred by admitting prejudicial photographs into evidence, and that the court erred by overruling his pretrial motion to suppress his written statement to the police. We affirm both the conviction in count one of felony murder predicated upon aggravated child abuse and the conviction in count two of felony murder predicated upon aggravated child neglect. On remand, the judgment in count one must be amended, and the trial court should effectuate merger, in part, by vacating the judgment in count two. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deandre Blake - Concurring
I concur with the conclusion in the majority opinion that sufficient evidence supports the conviction in count one. I also concur with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction in count two and agree that the two felony murder convictions should have been merged into a single judgment. I write separately, however, to address a conflict between the language in the first degree murder statute and the language of the child abuse and child neglect statutes that the majority does not mention. I also note that the trial court erred by giving an incomplete instruction for count two, murder in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect, although I conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Alexander Herrera
A Wilson County jury convicted the defendant of attempted unlawful photographing, a Class B misdemeanor; sexual battery, a Class E felony; attempted sexual battery, a Class A misdemeanor; and unlawful photographing, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to one year in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the felony conviction. The court sentenced him to six months at 75% in the county jail for the Class B misdemeanor conviction and to eleven months, twenty-nine days at 75% for each Class A misdemeanor conviction. The court ordered the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for unlawful photographing and attempted unlawful photographing because the victim was in a public place where she had no expectation of privacy and (2) the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion for a continuance to give his attorney an opportunity to obtain the defendant’s medical records. Following our review, we reverse and dismiss the defendant’s convictions for unlawful photographing and attempted unlawful photographing. We affirm the defendant’s convictions for sexual battery and attempted sexual battery. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Antonio Oliver v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County jury convicted the petitioner, Antonio Oliver, of first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the petitioner’s conviction and sentence. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and motion to toll limitations period alleging that he was deprived of second-tier review of his conviction by the Tennessee Supreme Court based on various misrepresentations by appellate counsel. Specifically, the petitioner argues that appellate counsel failed to notify him of this court’s opinion on direct appeal, which caused him to be “unaware” that a Rule 11 application needed to be filed or that the statute of limitations for post-conviction relief had expired. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the petitioner now appeals. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we conclude that the petitioner was denied second-tier review of his conviction through no fault of his own. In reversing the judgment of the post-conviction court, we grant the petitioner a delayed appeal and stay further proceedings on his remaining claims of post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Scott Flynn
On August 6, 2009, the defendant pleaded guilty in case number 92306 to theft over $1,000, a Class D felony, in exchange for a sentence of two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant was released on December 20, 2009, and placed on supervised probation. On March 12, 2010, the defendant pleaded guilty in case number 91245 to theft over $10,000, a Class C felony, in exchange for a sentence of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender. The trial court suspended the defendant’s sentence in 91245 and placed the defendant on probation. On November 8, 2010, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the defendant argues that the court abused its discretion in revoking the defendant’s probation, alleging that the record does not demonstrate that the defendant was in violation of his probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eric Amos v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his sentences were illegal. The habeas corpus court denied the petition. The petitioner now appeals, challenging the habeas corpus court’s ruling and the constitutionality of the 2009 amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-101. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Billy F. Johnson v. State of Tennessee
In 2000, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Billy F. Johnson,of felony murder, first degree murder, and theft, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus two years. In 2010, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition,concluding that his petition was not filed within the applicable statute of limitations. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he was mentally incompetent and unable to timely proceed with his petition, and, as a result, the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy McMillon
Appellant, Jeremy McMillon, was indicted by the Hamilton County Grand Jury for first degree murder and felony murder. At the conclusion of a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder. As a result, he was sentenced to life in prison. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant appealed, presenting the following issues for our review: (1) whether the testimony of accomplice Cory Haden was sufficiently corroborated; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting the introduction of testimony about a bullet found during the autopsy into evidence; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; and (4) whether the trial court erred by refusing to grant a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we determine: (1) that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (2) that if the jury determined Mr. Haden was an accomplice, his testimony was sufficiently corroborated; (3) that the trial court did not err in admitting testimony about a bullet found during the autopsy into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule; and (4) that the trial court properly denied the motion for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Prince Adams
The defendant, Prince Adams, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of premeditated first degree murder and subsequently sentenced to life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He now appeals his conviction, presenting five issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the trial court properly allowed into evidence photographs of the victim (a) while she was alive and (b) of her body at the crime scene; (3) whether the court properly denied the defendant’s motion in limine with regard to the admission of his prior domestic violence charge; (4) whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial because an alternate juror left a note expressing his position with regard to the defendant’s guilt, which was found by the jury foreperson prior to jury deliberations; and (5) whether the court correctly denied the defendant’s request for a special jury instruction on diminished capacity. Following review of the record, we find no issue that would entitle the defendant to relief. As such, the conviction and sentence are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frederick Hobson
The Defendant, Frederick Hobson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of three counts of selling cocaine, three counts of possessing cocaine with the intent to sell, and three counts of possessing cocaine with the intent to deliver, Class C felonies. See T.C.A. 39-17-417(a) (2010). The trial court merged the convictions for possession with the intent to sell and possession with the intent to deliver and sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years’ confinement for two of the sale convictions and two of the possession convictions and to six years’ confinement for the remaining sale and possession convictions. The ten-year sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to the six-year sentences, for an effective sixteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by imposing the maximum sentence for four convictions and by imposing partially consecutive sentences. We affirm the convictions, but we vacate the judgments and remand the case for entry of judgments reflecting merger of the jury verdicts into three convictions for sale of a controlled substance. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marilyn Sesler
The Defendant, Marilyn Sesler, was convicted by a Dickson County Circuit Court jury of making a false report, a Class D felony. See T.C.A.§ 39-16-502(a) (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years’ probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction and that the trial court erred by failing to consider and make appropriate findings when rejecting judicial diversion. We affirm the Defendant’s conviction, but we remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Edith Nell Allen Shaw v. Jerry Emerson Shaw
Mother and Father were divorced in 2006, and Father was ordered to pay child support for the parties’ adult disabled son. In 2010, the divorce court increased Father’s child support obligation for the adult disabled son. We vacate both orders to the extent that they required Father to pay child support for the adult disabled son because the divorce court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to order such support. We also remand this matter for such further proceedings as may be necessary. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Jessica Elaine Dillard v. Jeremy Williamson Blanks
Mother of the parties’ three-year-old child appeals the trial court’s designation of Father as the primary residential parent. Mother, who was temporarily named the primary residential parent while the action was pending, contends the initial order by which she was appointed was not a temporary order, but a final order and, thus, res judicata applies. The trial court disagreed and entered a final order naming Father the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child. We affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals |