Michael C. Dressler et al. v. Edward Buford
This is an action to establish the common boundary line between adjacent property owners. ollowing a four-day bench trial, the trial court adopted Plaintiffs’ survey to establish the parties’ common boundary line. Defendant appeals arguing that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. Finding the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s numerous findings, we affirm. |
Clay | Court of Appeals | |
Otter’s Chicken Tender, LLC v. Joey Coppage
This appeal arises out of a breach of contract action between a restaurant and its former employee. On cross motions for summary judgment, the court resolved all issues between the parties except whether attorney fees should be awarded and whether a permanent injunction should be issued against the employee. The court subsequently dismissed both parties’ claims for attorney fees and extended a temporary injunction previously entered. Both parties appeal the denial of attorney fees; in addition, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in extending the temporary injunction. Finding that the court erred in determining that plaintiff was not the prevailing party, we reverse the court’s denial of attorneys fees to plaintiff and remand for an award of fees for time spent pursuing injunctive relief; we affirm the court’s action in extending the temporary injunction. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Rachel Lee Ex Rel. Rebecca Lee v. Mark Emkes, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Finance and Administration
Petitioner, when she was thirteen years old, was having difficulty eating because of the position of her teeth, which also irritated her lips and cheeks. An orthodontist recommended braces to remedy the problem; however, the Tennessee Department of Finance and Administration denied TennCare coverage for orthodontic braces. Upon review by the Davidson County Chancery Court, the court found that the TennCare regulations impermissibly required both a Salzmann Index score of 28 and an abnormal dental development, i.e., a handicapping malocclusion, to qualify for orthodontic treatment, and that the Salzmann Index was an illegal utilization control because it nullified eligibility based upon an individualized review. The trial court also found that petitioner had not demonstrated a handicapping malocclusion, which is a valid utilization control under the regulations, therefore, she did not qualify for braces. Petitioner appealed. We affirm the trial court’sfinding that the TennCare regulation in effect at the time impermissibly required a Salzmann Index score of at least 28 to qualify for orthodontic treatment. The record does, however, establish that an individualized assessment of Petitioner’s condition to determine whether she had a handicapping malocclusion was conducted by a consulting dentist employed by the agency, which satisfies the federal requirements. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision to affirm the agency’s denial of orthodontic braces. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Scott C.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated on the grounds of mental incompetence, substantial noncompliance with the provisions of the permanency plan, and persistence of conditions, as well as a finding that termination of her rights was in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
John Haynes v. Rutherford County et al.
The issue in this matter is whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-116 (“the Transfer Statute”) tolls the running of the statue of limitations when a claim under the Government Tort Liability Act is filed in a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and the court transfers the case to a court with jurisdiction. Acting pro se, the plaintiff filed a GTLA claim in the general sessions court of Rutherford County; the civil warrant was filed prior to the running of the one-year statute of limitations for a GTLA claim. Because subject matter jurisdiction over GTLA claims is limited to the circuit court, the sessions court transferred the case. The circuit court held that, because the sessions court lacked jurisdiction, the transfer itself was invalid; therefore, the action was not effectively filed until it was transferred to the circuit court. However, the date of transfer was beyond the applicable one-year statute of limitations for GTLA claims; thus, the circuit court dismissed the case as time barred. We have determined this case is not time barred because, under the Transfer Statute, the statute of limitations was tolled when the civil warrant was timely filed in sessions court and, because it was timely filed, the sessions court was authorized to transfer the case to the circuit court. Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to reinstate the case and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Lowell Blanchard
A Bedford County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant of one count of aggravated robbery, see T.C.A. 39-13-402(a)(1) (2006), for which he received a sentence of 11 years’ incarceration. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, the defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to suppress the photographic lineup identification, (2) denying his motion to suppress evidence, (3) allowing testimony concerning an officer’s identification of him as a suspect, (4) denying his motion to recuse the trial judge, (5) denying his motions for mistrial, and (6) ordering his sentence to be served consecutively to previously imposed sentences. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Willis Ayers v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Willis Ayers, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and facilitation of especially aggravated robbery and received an effective sentence of 36 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He challenges the performance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Amy Lynn Phelps v. Emerson John Phelps
The trial court granted the wife a divorce after a marriage of nineteen years, awarded her most of the marital property including the marital home, and made her wholly responsible for the mortgage debt on the residence. The court awarded the wife the husband’s share of the equity in the home in the form of alimony in solido. The husband argues on appeal that the property division was inequitable. He also contends that the trial court should have awarded alimony to him rather than to the wife. We affirm the trial court’s division of marital property and its determination not to award alimony to the husband, but we modify its judgment to include husband’s share of the equity in the marital home in the property division, rather than as a separate award of alimony in solido. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Admiral Webster v. Psychemedics Corporation
The plaintiff’s employment was terminated by the employer for violation of the company’s drug testing policy. The plaintiff alleged negligence against the defendant, a biotechnology company with independent laboratory facilities providing hair testing for the detection of drugs and providing drug-testing services to the plaintiff’s former employer. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appeals. We reverse. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Timmy Sykes et al. v. Chattanooga Housing Authority et al. - Concurring
The Court has reached a result in this case that is consistent with Kinsler v. Berkline, LLC, 320 S.W.3d 796 (Tenn. 2010) and Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777 (Tenn. 2010). However, as reflected in Chief Justice Clark’s separate opinions in both Kinsler and Gossett, I continue to believe that abandoning the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) framework that had served Tennessee’s courts well for many years in both Whistleblower Act claims and claims under the Tennessee Human Rights Act was a mistake. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Timmy Sykes et al. v. Chattanooga Housing Authority et al.
The plaintiffs, former employees of the Chattanooga Housing Authority (“CHA”), brought retaliatory discharge actions against the CHA and the Chief of the CHA Public Safety Department, pursuant to the Tennessee Public Protection Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-1-304 (2008 & Supp. 2010), and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-21-301 (2005). The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment on all claims. On appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated summary judgment on the THRA claim, finding genuine issues of material fact, and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. We affirm the grant of summary judgment on the Tennessee Public Protection Act claims because the undisputed facts establish that the plaintiffs cannot prove the essential element of an exclusive causal relationship between the plaintiffs’ whistleblowing activity and their discharge, as required by the statute. We also affirm the Court of Appeals’ ruling vacating summary judgment in defendants’ favor on the THRA claims because there are genuine issues of disputed fact making summary judgment improper. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Andrew J. Braden, III v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
This case stems from a disciplinary action taken against a prisoner, Andrew J. Braden, III (“Braden”), by the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). Braden filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Hickman County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court denied the requested relief and dismissed the petition for writ of certiorari. Braden appeals, arguing that (1) the disciplinary board denied him his due process rights by appointing him an advisor who was unfamiliar with disciplinary policy and procedures, and (2) that substantial deviations from TDOC policy deprived Braden of a fair hearing. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Barry W. Ritchie v. William E. Haslam, Governor of the State of Tennessee, et al.
Petition for declaratory judgment was filed seeking a declaration as to whether petitioner was entitled under Article 1, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution to a hearing on his contention that the court from which he was convicted lacked territorial jurisdiction. Trial Court granted motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition failed to state a claim for relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act. We affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Doris Ann Whaley
A Washington County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Doris Ann Whaley, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced her to life. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, (2) the trial court violated Tennessee Rule of Evidence 611(a) by convincing her son to testify against her, (3) the trial court erred by admitting evidence regarding a telephone conversation the appellant had with a witness after the appellant’s son testified, and (4) the trial court erred by refusing to give the jury a flight instruction. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven F. Smith
The Defendant, Steven F. Smith, appeals as of right from the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s revocation of probation and order of incarceration. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in rejecting his defense of insanity. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven F. Smith - Concurring
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly revoked the Defendant’s probation. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the defense of insanity does not apply to probation violations. I believe the defense can apply in certain cases. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard T. Hanke, Sr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Richard T. Hanke, Sr., appeals the denial of post-conviction relief by the Circuit Court of Madison County. He pled guilty to simple robbery, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, possession of a weapon with intent to employ during the commission of a felony, retaliation for past action, and two counts of kidnapping. He received an effective sentence of fourteen years. In this appeal, he claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel and requests a delayed appeal in which to challenge his sentence. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and grant a delayed appeal. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Albert Dorsey
The Defendant-Appellant, Albert Dorsey, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Dorsey claims: (1) his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence; (2) the aggravating circumstance used to impose his sentence of life without the possibility of parole was not supported by sufficient evidence; and (3) the trial court erred by admitting several photographs of the victim. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tracy J. Brooks
The appellant, Tracy J. Brooks, pled guilty in the McMinn County Circuit court to driving under the influence (DUI) and received a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served as forty-eight hours in jail and the remainder on probation. As a condition of her plea, the appellant reserved a certified question of law, namely whether the police officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Boyland
A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Anthony Boyland, of first degree murder committed in the perpetration of an aggravated burglary, see T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2)(2006); aggravated assault by the use of a deadly weapon, see id. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(B); and aggravated burglary, see id. § 39-14-403(a), and the trial court imposed an effective life sentence in the custody of the Department of Correction. In addition to attacking the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) determining that he was competent to stand trial, (2) excluding evidence of a mental disease or defect that would have negated mens rea, (3) excluding evidence of a victim’s pending criminal charges, (4) denying his special requests for jury instructions concerning imperfect self-defense and passion, and (5) instructing the jury concerning flight. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jawaskii Williams
The defendant, Jawaskii Williams, was convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony, by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury. He was sentenced to twenty-one years for the murder conviction and five years for theaggravated assault conviction, to be served concurrently in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the sentences imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. McArthur Bobo
The defendant, McArthur Bobo, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and sentenced by the trial court as a career offender to sixty years in the Department of Correction at 100%. On appeal, he raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach a defense witness’s testimony by introducing a tape-recorded conversation between himself and the witness that took place during his pretrial incarceration; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence of a pretrial photographic lineup by which two eyewitnesses identified him as the shooter; and (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing testimony by a witness that the victim’s children were at the victim’s home at the time the victim was killed. Based on our review, we conclude that the defendant has waived consideration of the suppression issue by his failure to include an adequate record on appeal. We further conclude that the defendant has waived the emaining two issues by his failure to raise them in his motion for new trial. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Calvin Austin
The Defendant, Calvin Austin, was indicted for aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court dismissed the employment of a firearm charge. Following a jury trial, the trial court declared a mistrial as to the aggravated burglary charge because the jury had failed to reach a verdict on that count. The Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of robbery, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to 14 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction of robbery. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kimberly E. Love v. Steven D. Beard
The plaintiff filed this action against her brother alleging that he misused her power of attorney and that he stole some of her property. Following a bench trial, the trial court held that the plaintiff failed to prove her claims, with the exception of her claim for theft of her automobile, and ordered the defendant to pay restitution for the vehicle. Plaintiff appealed; however, she failed to file a transcript of the proceedings or a statement of the evidence for which we must accept the findings of the trial court as correct. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John B. Alberts
The Williamson County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, John B. Alberts, for eight counts of rape of a child, one count of solicitation of a minor to commit rape of a child, and one count of solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor. Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence recovered through the execution of a warrant to search Appellant’s car. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court granted Appellant’s motion based upon the conclusion that the search warrant was invalid. At the hearing, before the trial court announced its decision, the State argued an alternative theory that the search was valid as a warrantless search through an exception to the warrant requirement i.e., probable cause with exigent circumstances. The trial court declined to rule on the validity of the search based upon this alternative theory. The State asked for and was granted an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellant Procedure to determine if the trial court can consider the alternative theory to uphold the search. We have concluded that the trial court should consider an alternative theory to determine if the search was valid as a warrantless search based on probable cause and exigent circumstances. We remand the case back to the trial court for proceedings in accordance with this opinion. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals |