State of Tennessee v. Gary Wayne McCullough
Following a preliminary hearing in Hamilton County General Sessions Court, a Hamilton County grand jury charged the defendant, Gary Wayne McCullough, with operating a boat without lights, see T.C.A. § 69-9-209 (2004), boating under the influence, see id. § 69-9- 217(a), violating the implied consent law, see id. § 69-9-217(f)(1), and simple possession of marijuana, see id. § 39-17-418 (2006). In the trial court, the defendant contended in a motion to dismiss the indictment that the actions of the Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency (TWRA) in setting their own cases in a disproportionate number before certain general sessions judges constituted “judge-shopping” and resulted in a violation of the defendant’s due process rights. Following an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion, the trial court agreed and remanded the case for a new preliminary hearing before a division of the general sessions court not implicated by the judge-shopping allegation. On interlocutory appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court should have dismissed his indictment with prejudice instead of remanding the case for a new preliminary hearing. The State contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the indictment and remanding the case. Because we conclude that the trial court’s findings of fact are not supported by the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and direct the trial court to reinstate the indictment on remand. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Easter Baugh v. Barbara Thomas, et al.
Nephew of grantor of quitclaim deed conveying property to grantor’s sister appeals the declaration that the deed was null and void based on a finding that the nephew exercised undue influence on grantor. Finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding of a confidential relationship between grantor and nephew and in light of nephew’s failure to rebut the presumption of undue influence raised thereby, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: LaPorsha S.
This appeal involves a dispute over the placement of a child formerly in the custody of the Department of Children’s Services. Because the child turned eighteen years old during the pendency of these proceedings, this appeal is moot and must be dismissed. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Dion Jones v. Melissa Rodriguez, et al.
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. After the employee sustained an on the job injury, she sued her employer for workers’ compensation benefits. She alleged that her employer was a subcontractor for the principal contractor but she sued only the employer, not the principal contractor. Nearly two years later, the employee requested and received the trial court’s permission to amend her complaint to add the principal contractor as a defendant. The principal contractor filed a motion to dismiss based upon the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court granted the motion. After a trial, the trial court awarded the employee judgement for workers’ compensation benefits against the employer. The employee appealed, contending that the trial court erred by granting the principal contractor’s motion to dismiss. We affirm the judgment. |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Michael Angelo Coleman v. State of Tennessee
This appeal involves the role of expert testimony in proceedings to determine whether a prisoner who has been sentenced to death is intellectually disabled and thus barred from being executed under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203 (2010). An inmate facing execution filed a motion in the Criminal Court for Shelby County to re-open his post-conviction proceedings on the ground that he was intellectually disabled at the time he committed the crime for which he was convicted and on the ground that his trial counsel had been ineffective in investigating and presenting mitigating evidence. At the hearing, the prisoner presented expert testimony that his functional intelligence quotient (“I.Q.”) was actually lower than the raw test scores on his I.Q. tests and that he was mentally disabled for the purpose of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(a). The State presented no contrary evidence. The trial court dismissed the prisoner’s motion to re-open his post-conviction petition after concluding that he had failed to prove that he was intellectually disabled and that he was procedurally barred from raising his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Coleman v. State, No. W2007-02767-CCA-R3-PD, 2010 WL 118696 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 13, 2010). We granted the prisoner’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal. We find that Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(a)(1) does not require that raw scores on I.Q. tests be accepted at their face value and that the courts may consider competent expert testimony showing that a test score does not accurately reflect a person’s functional I.Q. or that the raw I.Q. test score is artificially inflated or deflated. We have also determined that both the post-conviction trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals properly determined that the prisoner’s claim involving the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel in connection with the investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence is procedurally barred. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Zada M.
In this parental termination case the Trial Court, upon hearing evidence, terminated the mother's parental rights upon finding grounds of abandonment and that it is in the best interest of the child. The mother has appealed and we conclude from the record that the statutory grounds for abandonment were established by clear and convincing evidence, and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Adoption of Gabrielle N. N.
Jeanenne W. M. (“Petitioner”) filed a petition seeking to adopt the minor child, Gabrielle N.N. (“the Child”) and to terminate the parental rights of Russell A.N. (“Father”) to the Child. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order on June 14, 2010 finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence existed to support a termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(3) and (g)(5), and that clear and convincing evidence existed that it was in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. Father appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca Lynn Weingart v. Jonathan Shane Forester
This appeal arises from an entry of divorce. The parties executed a prenuptial agreement prior to their marriage. The prenuptial agreement outlined the classification of separate property and the parties’ respective rights in the event of divorce. After nearly seven years of marriage, the wife filed a petition for divorce. The parties participated in mediation, and a hearing was held to resolve the remaining issues. At the hearing, counsel for both parties presented arguments regarding the unresolved issues and eventually reached an agreement to settle those issues during a recess of the hearing. Counsel for the parties announced the agreement before the trial court, and the trial court subsequently entered an order. The husband appeals and challenges the trial court’s finding that the wife’s retirement account is entirely her separate property. After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court erred in finding that the prenuptial agreement was ambiguous. Nevertheless, the trial court properly awarded the wife’s retirement account to her as separate property. Therefore, we reverse in part and affirm in part. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Victor E. McConnell v. Jim Morrow, Warden, and State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Victor E. McConnell, appeals the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief attacking his 1983 conviction for assault with intent to commit first degree murder. The Petitioner alleged that his judgment of conviction was void because the indictment was illegally amended on the day of his plea “to broaden the original charge without being resubmitted to the grand jury[.]” The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner had failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. Following our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the order summarily ismissing the petition. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kasey N. Maddox
The Defendant, Kasey N. Maddox, appeals the sentencing decision of the Bedford County Circuit Court. Following her guilty plea to the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, the trial court imposed a nine-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jose E. Molina a/k/a Roberto C. Perez v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jose E. Molina, aka Roberto C. Perez, was convicted by a jury of aggravated rape and aggravated robbery and was, thereafter, sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-one years at 100%. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal. The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief and, following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner raises the following issues for review: (1) the post-conviction court erred in its determination that the Petitioner’s trial counsel was effective; and (2) in light of a recent publication, the fingerprint comparison testimony at his trial should be excluded as scientifically unreliable. Following our review, we conclude that the Petitioner has not shown he is entitled to relief. We affirm the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tommy L. Beaty a/k/a Jacky Wayne Beaty
The Defendant, Tommy L. Beaty, pled guilty to aggravated burglary and agreed to allow the trial court to set the length and manner of his sentence. The trial court sentenced him to thirteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it set the length of his sentence and when it ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Doe, Alias a Citizen and Rresident of Hamilton County, Tennessee, v. Mark Gwyn, Director of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, et al.
This declaratory judgment action challenges the constitutionality of the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification and Tracking Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-201 et seq, on the grounds that plaintiff should not be required to register because his criminal convictions occurred in other states prior to the passage of the Tennessee Act, as applied to him. The Trial Judge declared that plaintiff was required to register under the Act, and plaintiff has appealed. On appeal, we affirm the Chancellor's Judgment which requires plaintiff to register in accordance with the Act. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Shanda Alene Wright v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Shanda Alene Wright, appeals as of right from the Marshall County Circuit Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner was convicted of especially aggravated burglary, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated robbery. She received an effective sentence of 16 years for her convictions. The Petitioner challenges the performance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Clarence E. Johnson v. Tanner-Peck, L.L.C.; William B. Tanner; Individually and d/b/a Tanner-Peck Outdoor, et al.
This is the second appeal in this breach of contract case. The plaintiff employee filed this lawsuit against the defendants for breach of an oral employment agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and awarded him damages. The defendants filed a motion to revise the summary judgment order and submitted an affidavit in support of the motion. The trial court struck the supporting affidavit and denied the motion to revise. The defendants filed the first appeal. In the first appeal, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, including the award of damages, was affirmed, but the cause was remanded to the trial court for findings on its denial of the motion to revise. On remand, the trial court explained that it struck the affidavit submitted with the motion to revise for lack of personal knowledge and because it violated the Dead Man’s Statute. The defendants now appeal the trial court’s order denying the motion to revise. We reverse the denial of the motion to revise and remand for a recalculation of damages. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Patsy Freeman, Personal Representative and Administratrix of the Estate of John R. Freeman, Deceased v. CSX Transportation, Inc., et al.
In this interlocutory appeal, we are asked to determine: (1) whether the Tennessee savings statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105(a), may be invoked twice within the one-year savings period to save otherwise untimely actions; and (2) whether the Appellee acted with the diligence and good faith necessary to invoke the protection of the savings statute. We conclude that Appellee’s suit was properly brought within the protection of the Tennessee savings statute. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, et rel. Frances Craig Creighton v. Wilbur Foster Creighton
This is an appeal from the trial court’s order, finding Appellant in criminal contempt of court for willful failure to pay his ordered child support. Appellant appeals, alleging that the trial court erred in: (1) denying Appellant a full transcript of the hearing at the State’s expense; (2) giving little or no credence to the evidence offered by Appellant’s witness; and (3) finding Appellant in criminal contempt for willful failure to pay child support. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Central Parking Systems of Tennessee, Inc. v. Nashville Downtown Platinum, LLC
NDP purchased property upon which Central Parking operated pay-parking lots pursuant to lease amendments with the prior owner. Central Parking calculated the rent it owed NDP pursuant to the amendments, but due to a computer glitch, paid double the rent it claimed was owed. NDP refused to refund the money, claiming the payment equaled the fair rental value of the property. Central Parking sued NDP for the alleged overpayment, and the trial court dismissed Central Parking’s claims. Because Central Parking’s only basis for relief on appeal–an implied notice theory–was first raised in a Rule 59.04 motion, and an issue first raised in a motion to alter or amend is not properly raised before the trial court, we find the issue is waived on appeal. The trial court’s dismissal of Central Parking’s claims is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Melody Jennings Bowers v. Daniel R. Bowers
Alleging Husband’s failure to pay child support and alimony as required, Wife filed petitions for contempt. The trial court found Husband guilty of seven counts of willful criminal contempt and entered a judgment against him for unmet obligations. On appeal, Husband claims the trial court erred in finding him in contempt, in imputing a $1,000 per month income to Wife, in upholding his work-related childcare obligation, in denying his counterpetition to modify spousal and child support, and in excluding certain witness testimony. He also argues that he was denied a hearing regarding Wife’s attorney fees. Because the trial court failed to make a finding regarding Husband’s ability to pay, we reverse Husband’s criminal contempt conviction. Additionally, we find the trial court erred in upholding the workrelated childcare award, and we remand for a determination of Husband’s retroactive credit for amounts paid subsequent to the filing of his petition to modify and for a recalculation of his future support obligations. However, we find that the trial court did not err in imputing Mother’s income, in refusing to allow Father’s witness to testify, nor in awarding Wife her attorney fees without a hearing. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Lebron Arnold
The Defendant, Timothy Lebron Arnold, was indicted for especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, but pled guilty to robbery, a Class C felony, and received a sentence of five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in permitting testimony from an officer at the sentencing hearing; that the trial court erred in setting the length of his sentence; and that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
American General Financial Services, Inc. v. Martin Goss/Unknown Tenant of Foreclosed Property
The plaintiff foreclosed on real property following the default on a loan secured by a deed of trust. The plaintiff then filed a detainer warrant in General Sessions Court and the defendant appeared claiming rightful possession to the property because of a quit claim deed. After hearing the evidence, the General Sessions Court awarded possession of the property to the plaintiff. The defendant appealed to the Knox County Circuit Court. A jury trial commenced, and at the close of proof, the plaintiff moved for a directed verdict. The trial court granted the directed verdict and awarded possession of the property to the plaintiff. The defendant appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
American General Financial Services, Inc. v. Martin Goss/Unknown Tenant of Foreclosed Property - Concurring/Dissenting
I concur in the decision of the majority to affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of American General Financial Services, Inc. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Goss’s appeal is not so devoid of merit as to warrant a holding that his appeal is frivolous in nature. When an appellant seeks to reverse or modify a trial court’s judgment based upon an alleged error grounded in the facts of the case, but fails to present us with a verbatim transcript or statement of the evidence, the appellant’s appeal has no chance of success. An appeal is deemed frivolous if it is devoid of merit or if it has no reasonable chance of success. Bursack v. Wilson, 982 S.W.2d 341, 345 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); Industrial Dev. Bd. v. Hancock, 901 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). See also Linn v. Howard, E2006-00024-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 208442 at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed on January 26, 2007). When the only issues on an appeal are factual ones – as opposed to legal questions – we must have a record that permits us to reach those issues. In my judgment, this appeal is – by definition – a frivolous appeal. I would remand for a hearing to determine “just damages” due the appellee pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122 (2000). |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Duff L. Brumley v. The City of Cleveland
This lawsuit stems from a grievance process initiated by a detective with the Cleveland Police Department, Duff L. Brumley (“Brumley”). Brumley was instructed to undergo retraining as a result of a citizen complaint letter written in connection with his investigation of a possible burglary. Brumley was dissatisfied with the mandatory retraining and initiated the grievance process under the City of Cleveland’s official policy. The grievance reached an appeal hearing before the City Manager. The City Manager affirmed the order to Brumley to undergo retraining. Brumley filed an Application for Writ of Certiorari in the Trial Court. The Trial Court denied Brumley’s Writ of Certiorari. Brumley appeals, claiming that the Trial Court improperly excluded additional evidence Brumley wanted to introduce and found a material basis for the City Manager’s decision where none existed. We hold that the Trial Court did not err in its decision as to the additional evidence Brumley sought to admit. We further hold that the City Manager did not act arbitrarily or capriciously and had a material basis for her decision. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry Ward
The defendant, Larry Ward, stands convicted of criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to four years in the workhouse. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction. Upon our close review of the evidence, we are constrained to conclude that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a homicide was committed in this case. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, vacate the conviction, and dismiss the charge against the defendant. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennesse v. Antonio L. Saulsberry
The defendant, Antonio L. Saulsberry, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of murder during the perpetration of a robbery and murder during the perpetration of a burglary. His convictions were merged and he was sentenced to life imprisonment, to be served consecutively to prior convictions for especially aggravated robbery and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery for which he had already been sentenced to an effective term of fifty years as a Range II offender. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |