Mark Alan Deakins v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Mark Alan Deakins, appeals pro se the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his conviction for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by finding that the judgment was not void and by dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing and without appointment of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gussie Willis Vann
Pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State appeals the trial court’s order denying jury instructions on lesser included offenses at the Defendant Gussie Willis Vann’s retrial for felony murder. See T.C.A. §39-13-202(a)(2) (1991). The Defendant was originally convicted by a McMinn County jury of felony murder committed in the perpetration of aggravated rape and two counts of incest. He was sentenced to death plus six years’ incarceration. In affirming his convictions on direct appeal, this court, see State v. Gussie Willis Vann, No. 03C01-9602-CC-00066, 1997 WL 309320 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, June 10, 1997), and the Tennessee Supreme Court, see State v. Vann, 976 S.W.2d 93 (Tenn. 1998), rejected the Defendant’s claim that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of felony murder. The Defendant subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court ordered a new trial on grounds unrelated to the issue presented in this appeal. Prior to retrial, the Defendant moved to dismiss his indictment and bar instructions on the lesser included offenses of felony murder arguing, among other things, (1) that principles of double jeopardy, collateral estoppel, and judicial estoppel precluded the State from prosecuting the Defendant on any lesser included offense of felony murder because the “explicit statements” of both this court and the Tennessee Supreme Court “on direct appeal that the trial record was ‘devoid of evidence’ of lesser included offenses were factual determinations, necessary to valid final judgments, from which the government is prohibited from seeking an inconsistent determination” and (2) that “the [original] trial judge’s refusal to instruct on such lesser included offenses was a qualitative determination of the evidence, tantamount to an acquittal and triggering traditional double jeopardy and res judicata [as] to those charges.”Following a hearing, the trial court agreed in part with the Defendant and actually barred retrial on any lesser included offenses of felony murder. The State sought and we granted Rule 9 review to determine “whether constitutional double jeopardy protections bar at the trial the inclusion of lesser included offenses of first degree felony murder.” Upon our review, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James F. Mason
This is a direct appeal from a guilty plea pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Defendant, James F. Mason, pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver. As part of his plea agreement, the Defendant attempted to reserve a certified question of law, challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of his residence. Because the Defendant has failed to properly certify his issue for review, the appeal is dismissed. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Reginald Maurice Adkins
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Reginald Maurice Adkins, was convicted of first degree felony murder, see Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-302, and attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, see Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-12-107(a), -13-403(b). In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict him of either offense. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William David Morgan v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company et al.
In this workers’ compensation appeal, the employee alleged a work-related incident aggravated a pre-existing back condition and that he required surgery as a result of the injury. His employer denied the claim, contending that the surgery was for treatment of a preexisting condition and that the work related incident did not advance the pre-existing condition. The trial court found for the employee and awarded 20% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer appealed. We affirm the judgment. |
Obion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
John Griggs v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, John Griggs, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated kidnapping, kidnapping, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and attempted rape, for which he received an effective sentence of eleven years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not entered voluntarily and knowingly because he was not informed of his right against compulsory self-incrimination. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth Alan Steele v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
I concur in the majority opinion. I respectfully express my view that the trial court’s “ would not have changed the results” formulation does not necessarily equate to the application of a wrong standard. As the majority opinion notes, Mixon and Vasques formulate the standard for establishing entitlement to coram nobis relief as when the petitioner shows that the new evidence “may have” resulted in a different judgment. See State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 527 (Tenn. 2007); State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.3d 661, 672 (Tenn. 1999). One might view the trial court’s formulation in the present case as merely stating the correct standard in the negative. Certainly, the more precise formulation of the opposite of “may have” is “could not have” or “cannot have,” but still the court may have correctly determined that no possibility existed that the result of trial may have been different with the new evidence at play. Obviously, the use of the Mixon-Vasques language would be preferable. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eddie H. Pittman
The defendant, Eddie H. Pittman, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of theft of property valued between $500-$1000, a Class E felony, and was sentenced as a career offender to six years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the value of the stolen goods. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Frank Barrett and Jodi Lynn Cheatham v. Town of Nolensville
Parties who pled guilty to violation of a Nolensville ordinance argued that the costs assessed in their cases violated Article VI, Section 14 of the Tennessee Constitution. The Nolensville municipal court found against the parties. On appeal, the circuit court also found against the parties. On further appeal, we affirm the lower courts’ decisions against one party and affirm in part and reverse in part the lower courts’ decisions against the other party. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Phoenix Credit v. Deborah L. Akers
This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee. Appellant obtained a credit card from Appellee’s predecessor in interest, and defaulted on payment of the debt. Appellee brought suit to recover the debt, and the trial court granted summary judgment to Appellee. Appellant appeals, arguing that there is a dispute of fact as to whether Appellee is a lawful successor in interest, and also asserting that the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s request to have certain documents included in the record. Affirmed. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Alan Steele v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Kenneth Alan Steele, filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, alleging that because of newly discovered DNA evidence, his convictions should be vacated and/or he should be granted a new trial to present evidence of a third-party perpetrator. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his petition without a hearing and that it applied the wrong standard in making its ruling. We agree that the trial court used the wrong standard; nevertheless, we conclude that the trial court did not err in dismissing the petition. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Douglas Boruff v. State of Tennessee
The appellant, Douglas Boruff, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to discharge a fine that the trial court imposed as part of his punishment for a prior conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, the appellant’s appeal is dismissed. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Scotty Mack Griffith
The Defendant, Scotty Mack Griffith, pled guilty to promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony, and to possession of methamphetamine, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-433, 39-17-418 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to six years’ confinement for the promotion conviction and to eleven months, twenty-nine days’ confinement for the possession conviction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by imposing a sentence of full confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Damon G. and Rosa G.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father on the grounds of abandonment and persistence of conditions, and upon finding that termination was in the best interests of the children. We affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Tawanna Currie v. Haywood County, Tennessee
Plaintiff sued Haywood County and a Haywood County sheriff’s deputy after she was sexually harassed by the deputy. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Plaintiff against Haywood County and against the deputy. Haywood County appeals, challenging the finding of liability and the amount of damages awarded against it. We affirm. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Chris Jones
The Defendant, Chris Jones, was charged with one count of first degree murder with respect to victim Donald Munsey; two counts of attempted first degree murder with respect to victims Justin Smith and David Eagan; one count of use of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; and one count of possession of a firearm where alcoholic beverages are served. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of one count of second degree murder; one count of attempted second degree murder with respect to Mr. Smith; one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter with respect to Mr. Eagan; one count of use of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; and one count of possession of a firearm where alcoholic beverages are served. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions on the first three counts; (2) the trial court erred when it excluded testimony of Mr. Munsey’s prior violent acts; (3) that the trial court erred in allowing the State to present evidence regarding the Defendant’s recent divorce; (4) that the trial court erred in allowing the State to rehabilitate a witness with his prior consistent statement; and (5) that the Defendant’s rights to trial by jury and due process were violated by the use of sequential jury instructions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frederick Lamont Moore
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Frederick Lamont Moore, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder; first degree murder committed while in the perpetration of a felony (felony murder); aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; and two counts of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. The trial court merged the first degree premeditated murder conviction with the felony murder conviction and ordered a sentence of life imprisonment for the resulting conviction. As to the remaining counts, the trial court ordered a sentence of 20 years for the aggravated kidnapping conviction and concurrent sentences of 10 years for each of the tampering with evidence convictions. The trial court also ordered the Defendant to serve his 20-year sentence for aggravated kidnapping consecutively to his life imprisonment sentence for the first degree murder conviction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dimecos Ichad Jones v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Dimecos Ichad Jones, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gerald Deon Jenkins v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Gerald Deon Jenkins, entered a best-interest guilty plea to one count of second degree murder, a Class A felony; one count of theft over $500, a Class E felony; one count of theft over $1,000, a Class D felony, and one count of setting fire to personal property, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-210(b), -14-103, -14-105(2)-(3), -14-303(b) (2003). The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to twenty-five years for the second degree murder conviction, two years for the theft over $500 conviction, four years for the theft over $1,000 conviction, and two years for the setting fire to personal property conviction. The court ordered that the terms run concurrently for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years. The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner presents the following issues for review: (1) The post-conviction court erred when it found that the Petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel; (2) The post-conviction court |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jimmy Rankin v. Everybody’s Oil Corporation d/b/a Quick Tire/Tire Barn, et al.
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee sustained a work-related injury in September 2007, but medical treatment was not offered by the employer at that time. He continued to work for several months despite his injury. In March 2008, his employer sent him to a physician. He was diagnosed with a significant spinal injury, which required surgical treatment and resulted in severe disability. His employer had changed its workers’ compensation insurer in November 2007. Employee’s claim was settled, but the two insurers disagreed as to which was liable. The trial court found that the insurer at the time of the original injury was liable. That insurer has appealed, contending that the later insurer should be liable due to the gradual worsening of the employee’s condition after November 2007. We affirm the judgment. |
Washington | Workers Compensation Panel | |
In Re Conservatorship of Karubah Carnahan
In this conservatorship case, a daughter filed a petition asking the court to appoint her as the conservator of her father, who had experienced cognitive decline after a stroke and required full-time care in an inpatient facility. The father’s spouse protested the appointment of the daughter as the conservator and requested that a neutral third party be appointed instead. After a hearing, the trial court determined that the daughter was the appropriate person to serve as conservator, and specifically enumerated the power to file for divorce on behalf of the ward to the conservator. The spouse appeals. We affirm. Our first opinion in this case originally was filed on January 21, 2011. Appellant thereafter filed a petition to rehear. The petition to rehear contained a meritorious assertion. Accordingly, we granted the petition, withdrew our original opinion and now submit this substitute opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Visuvalingam Vilvarajah, M.D. v. Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners
Physician appeals Chancery Court decision affirming his summary suspension of his license to practice medicine on the basis of his conviction in the State of Kentucky for facilitation to traffic in controlled substances. We affirm the Chancery Court judgment and the summary suspension of the physician’s license. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Devereux v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee sought reconsideration of his earlier workers’ compensation settlement, which had been “capped” pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-241(d). His employer asserted that he had been terminated for cause, and was therefore not eligible for reconsideration. The trial court found for the employee and awarded additional benefits. We affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Helen M. Land v. Jack Casteel
The appellant appeals the trial court’s issuance of orders of protection against him. The appellant’s sister and brother-in-law filed petitions for ex parte orders of protection and alleged that on two separate occasions, the appellant fired shots toward their home. The appellant denies the allegations. After a hearing, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that entry of the orders of protection was necessary. We affirm. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Charles A. Walker v. State of Tennessee
A Montgomery County jury convicted the Petitioner, Charles A. Walker, of two counts of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-eight years, at 100%, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed his convictions, and this Court affirmed his two rape of a child convictions but reversed and remanded for a new trial the aggravated sexual battery conviction. State v. Charles A. Walker, No. M2005-00165-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 3313651, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 15, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 12, 2007). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that: (1) his trial counsel was ineffective; (2) the prosecutor committed several acts of prosecutorial misconduct at trial; (3) his convictions should be reversed based upon “cumulative error and bias”; and (4) his sentencing was illegal. After careful review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals |