William B. Francis v. State of Tennessee
In 2006, a jury convicted the petitioner, William B. Francis, of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. A panel of this court affirmed his conviction and sentence. See State v. William B. Francis, Jr., No. M2006-02177-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 4224629, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 30, 2007). In his post-conviction petition, the petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the petitioner argues that his counsel were ineffective for failing to present a complete defense and for not preventing the state from referring to the petitioner’s residence as a halfway house. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael D. Hawk
On February 16, 2010, the defendant, Michael D. Hawk, entered an open plea in case numbers S1000006 and S1000007 to three counts of burglary, Class D felonies; six counts of theft over $1,000, Class D felonies; eight counts of theft under $500, Class A misdemeanors; two counts of criminal trespass, Class C misdemeanors; and one count of vandalism under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of six years, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, the defendant argues that his sentence is excessive and disputes the denial of alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Ryan Watson
Appellant, Ryan Watson, was indicted in June of 2009 by the Polk County Grand Jury for driving under the influence (“DUI”) of an intoxicant, marijuana, narcotic drug, or drug producing stimulating effects on the central nervous system, or in the alternative, driving while the alcohol concentration in the defendant’s blood or breath was .08% or more. Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the following: (1) the search of his person and vehicle; (2) his statement at the time of the arrest; (3) the results of the blood alcohol test; and (4) the results of the field sobriety tests. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motions. Subsequently, Petitioner pled guilty to DUI, first offense and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration in the county jail. The trial court suspended the sentence, after service of forty-eight hours, and ordered Appellant to serve the sentence on probation. As a condition of the guilty plea, Appellant reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure arguing that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the factual findings of the trial court that there was probable cause for the stop of Appellant’s vehicle. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Polk | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Maurice Hickman
The Defendant-Appellant, Joshua Maurice Hickman, appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence. He pled guilty in the Criminal Court of Davidson County to possession with intent to sell a Schedule I controlled substance, a Class B felony. Hickman was originally sentenced as a multiple offender to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Pursuant to the plea agreement, this sentence was suspended to twelve years on community corrections. On appeal, Hickman concedes that he violated the terms of the community corrections sentence. He argues, however, that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing his original sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Julio Ramirez
A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Julio Ramirez, of six counts of aggravated sexual battery, one count of rape of a child, and one count of assault, for crimes involving multiple victims, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of eighteen years of confinement. The trial court subsequently reduced this sentence to fifteen years following a motion for new trial hearing. On direct appeal from his convictions, the Defendant contends: (1) his trial counsel deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel by failing to move to sever the offenses with respect to the multiple victims; (2) he did not knowingly waive his right to be tried separately for the offenses and, as such, his joint trial for these offenses violated his rights to due process, a jury trial, and the effective assistance of counsel; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for rape of a child; (4) the trial court improperly limited the defense’s cross-examination of the victims’ mother; (5) the trial court improperly limited the defense’s presentation of character testimony; (6) the State made improper remarks during closing argument; and (7) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ricky Lynn Hill v. State of Tennessee
The trial court dismissed this action, inter alia, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We dismiss this appeal for Appellant's failure to timely file the notice of appeal. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert A. Guerrero
Defendant, Robert A. Guerrero, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury on two counts of first degree murder, two counts of felony murder, nine counts of attempted first degree murder, and nine counts of aggravated assault. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and nine counts of attempted first degree murder. Defendant was sentenced by the trial court to two consecutive life sentences and nine fifteen-year sentences, to run consecutive to the life sentences, for a total effective sentence of two life sentences plus 135 years. In this direct appeal, Defendant makes the following assignments of error: 1) the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s challenges for cause to three jurors; 2) the trial court erred by not allowing Defendant to conduct an individual voir dire of the prospective jurors regarding their media exposure to the case; 3) the trial court erred by not striking three jurors after they saw Defendant being escorted to the restroom by a courtroom deputy; 4) the trial court erred in allowing a witness for the State to remain in the courtroom in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 615; 5) the trial court erred by allowing the testimony of an emergency room doctor who treated some of the victims; 6) the trial court erred by allowing two exhibits into evidence over Defendant’s objection as to the chain of custody; 7) the indictments charging attempted first degree murder, Counts 5 through 9, should have been dismissed for failing to provide Defendant adequate notice of the charge; 8) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on criminal responsibility; 9) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing; 10) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. Following a careful review of the record on appeal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Iyana R.W.
The primary residential parent of the parties’ ten-year-old daughter requested permission to relocate to Colorado. The mother’s reason for the relocation was that she had married a man who was a military service member stationed in Colorado. The father opposed the move. The trial court denied the request after finding that the mother’s conduct surrounding the move constituted a material change in circumstances and that it was in the child’s best interest that the father become the primary residential parent. The mother appeals. At the time of the request to relocate, Mother was the primary residential parent and spent substantially more time with the child; thus, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(d) applied. Finding that the trial court erred in failing to apply Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(d), we reverse the trial court’s judgment; grant Mother’s request to relocate to Colorado with the parties’ minor child; deny Father’s petition to change custody; and remand for the trial court to set Father’s visitation. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dane Shannon Briest
The appellant, Dane Shannon Briest, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to theft of property valued one thousand dollars or more but less than ten thousand dollars, a Class D felony, and evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. He received concurrent sentences of six years, one month for the felony conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor conviction to be served on probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dewayne Jones v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Dewayne Jones, of two counts of aggravated rape, and the trial court merged the convictions and sentenced him to twenty-two years as a Range I, violent offender. This Court affirmed the Petitioners convictions on direct appeal. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which he later amended, and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner now appeals, claiming the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition for post-conviction relief because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude the post-conviction court properly dismissed the Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief. As such, we affirm its judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stephen Lynn Hugueley v. State of Tennessee
Following affirmance on direct appeal of his murder conviction and accompanying sentence of death, State v. Hugueley, 185 S.W.3d 356 (Tenn. 2006), the Petitioner, Stephen Lynn Hugueley, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court appointed the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender to represent the Petitioner. The Petitioner thereafter wrote the post-conviction court expressing his desire to withdraw his petition for post-conviction relief. A competency hearing was held in November 2008. On January 8, 2009, the post-conviction court found the Petitioner competent and entered an order dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief. A notice of appeal was filed on February 19, 2009. The Petitioner filed a motion to remand the matter to the post-conviction court. The motion was predicated upon the Petitioner’s desire to proceed with any and all available challenges to his conviction and sentence. This court entered an order concluding that the motion to remand shall be heard contemporaneously with arguments on the merits of the Petitioner’s Rule 3 appeal. On appeal to this court, the Petitioner presents a number of claims related to the lower court’s determination that he was competent to withdraw his petition for post-conviction relief, including the lower court’s denial of independent experts, medically appropriate experts, and sufficient time to prepare. Following a thorough and exhaustive review of the record and the applicable law, this court declines to expand the precedent established in Pike v. State and concludes that the Petitioner may not belatedly withdraw his decision to dismiss his petition for post-conviction relief. Additionally, this court concludes that the post-conviction court did not err in concluding that the Petitioner was competent to withdraw his motion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jenny A. Pennington v. Christopher J. Hennessee
Mother filed a petition in 2010 to modify child support set in a 2005 order and parenting plan on the basis of a substantial and material change of circumstances. The trial court dismissed the petition, holding that there was not a significant variance in the parties’ presumptive child support obligations in 2005 and 2010. Mother appeals, contending that the 2005 order and parenting plan are void because they relieved Father of his obligation to pay child support. Finding that the 2005 order fails to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-1-1(e)(1)(A) and Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. Ch. 1240–2–4–.02(7), we reverse the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
McCall Brister v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, et al.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of a hospital’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court determined that plaintiff’s claim sounded in medical malpractice and dismissed plaintiff’s claim for failure to comply with the written notice and certificate of good faith requirements of the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act. Finding that Plaintiff’s complaint states claim for ordinary negligence and premises liability, we reverse the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rodney McAlister
The defendant, Rodney McAlister, was convicted by a Lauderdale County jury of vandalism between $1000 and $10,000, a Class D felony. He was thereafter sentenced to a term of five years, as a multiple offender, in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence, asserting that the State failed to negate the defenses of duress and necessity. Following review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient and affirm the conviction. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tony Hoover v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Tony Hoover, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner entered open Alford pleas to two counts of rape and two counts of incest. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-one years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner contends that his pleas were not entered with an understanding of the nature and consequences of the pleas. He also contends that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly inform him of the terms and consequences of his guilty pleas and by advising him to waive his ex post facto rights and be sentenced pursuant to the 2005 amendments to the Sentencing Act. Following careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Walter Williams
The Shelby County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Walter Williams, for one count of rape in connection with the rape of his thirteen-year-old daughter. A jury found Appellant guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Appellant to eight years as a Range I, standard offender. Appellant appeals his conviction. He argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in allowing testimony of an expert witness; (3) the trial court erred in allowing certain questions during the jury voir dire; and (4) the trial court erred in failing to give the missing witness jury instruction. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Appellant’s argument must fail. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Andre Wilks v. Maxine Wilks
This is an appeal of a divorce matter. We dismiss this appeal for Appellant's failure to appeal a final judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Aiden R. B., et al.
Amy B. (“Mother”) is the biological mother of the minor children, Aiden R. B. and Evan M. B. (“the Children”). The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Children. Following a trial, the Juvenile Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”) found and held, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Children on four grounds under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), (2), and (3) and that termination was in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
O’Rane M. Cornish, Sr. v. The Home Depot, Inc.
The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant in this malicious prosecution action. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randy K. Sanders
The defendant, Randy K. Sanders, entered a plea of guilty to driving under the influence, first offense, a Class A misdemeanor, on July 2, 2010. The trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail and suspended all but 120 days of the sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court relied on an inappropriate enhancement factor in determining the period of confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Thomas Edward Kotewa v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Thomas Edward Kotewa, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Phillip Lynn Dorse
Appellant, Phillip Lynn Dorse, was indicted by the Dyer County Grand Jury for two counts of aggravated assault in connection with a neighborhood altercation during which Appellant hit two individuals with a baseball bat. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of one count of aggravated assault and one count of assault. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of eight years as a Range II, multiple offender to be served consecutively to a previously imposed sentence. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carl Bost v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Carl Bost, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to sell cocaine, a Class C felony, and attempted aggravated burglary, a Class D felony, in exchange for a cumulative sentence of six years, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. He filed for post-conviction relief, which was denied by the post-conviction court. On appeal, he argues that he entered his plea unknowingly, involuntarily, and unintelligently due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Chad Rogers v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Chad Rogers, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at the sentencing phase of his trial by not investigating and presenting evidence of his mental illness as a mitigating factor. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Junior P. Samuel
A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury found the appellant, Junior P. Samuel, guilty of five counts of rape and one count of sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of thirty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant’s motion for judgments of acquittal because of the State’s failure to establish venue; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting a medical report containing statements the victim made to Phyllis Lynn Thompson in violation of the Confrontation Clause and the rule prohibiting hearsay statements; (3) whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing; and (4) whether the cumulative errors at trial denied the appellant due process. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |