Donald M. Merriweather v. Luther Smith, Jr.
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
The Estate of Ella Mae Cockrill
The son of a woman who died at the age of ninety-four filed a petition for probate in solemn form of his mother's lost will. After examining a photocopy of the alleged will and hearing proof from six witnesses, the trial court granted the petition. One of the granddaughters of the decedent appealed, and she has presented a number of arguments to suggest that the trial court erred. We have considered her arguments on appeal, but in the absence of a trial transcript or a statement of the evidence, we must assume that the trial court's decision is fully supported by the record. We accordingly affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Linda F. Cathey
A Humphreys County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Linda F. Cathey, of one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. __ 39-14-104, -105(4) (2006). The trial court sentenced the defendant to six years' probation and ordered restitution to the victim in the amount of $27,000. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying her request for judicial diversion, by imposing the maximum sentence of six years, and by ordering restitution without properly considering her ability to pay. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Humphreys | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Lane McKnight
A Marshall County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Ricky Lane McKnight, for violation of the Habitual Motor Offender Act and driving on a revoked license. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve an effective sentence of three and one-half years. On appeal, the dDefendant argues that the trial court's sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Len Angus
Defendant, Jerry Len Angus, was indicted in a seventeen-count indictment by the Davidson County Grand Jury for three counts of official misconduct in violation of Tenn. Code Ann._ 39-16-402, nine counts of sexual battery by an authority figure in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-527, four counts of statutory rape in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13- 506, and one count of rape in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-503. Defendant was convicted by a jury of three counts of official misconduct, one count of attempt to commit sexual battery, a lesser-included offense of the charged offense of sexual battery, one count of sexual battery, and two counts of attempt to commit statutory rape, a lesser-included offense of statutory rape. The jury did not consider eight counts of the indictment as the trial court granted judgments of acquittal at the close of the State's proof, and defendant was acquitted by the jury of the remaining two counts. Defendant filed a motion for new trial, and following a hearing, the trial court vacated his conviction for official misconduct in Count 1 of the indictment for insufficiency of the evidence. The court granted a mistrial as to defendant's conviction for attempted sexual battery in Count 4, his conviction for official misconduct in Count 8, and his conviction for sexual battery in Count 11. In an amended order, the trial court also vacated defendant's conviction for official misconduct in Count 3 of the indictment. On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court's polling of the jury was improper and that he is entitled to a new trial. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Montague v. Cherry Lindamood, Warden
The Petitioner, Charles Montague, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wondimu Borena v. Yellow Cab Metro, Inc., et al.
The former attorney for the plaintiff, who is seeking to recover a contingency fee pursuant to an attorney's lien she filed after her services were terminated, filed this appeal challenging the trial court's finding that the parties did not enter into a binding settlement agreement and the involuntary dismissal of the underlying personal injury action. The action was dismissed because the pro se plaintiff did not comply with orders of the court. The plaintiff's former attorney claims she has the independent right to enforce a settlement she negotiated, but which her client rejected, in order to recover a fee. The pro se plaintiff also seeks to set aside the involuntary dismissal of his case. Finding no merit to the arguments asserted on appeal, we affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Duantez Cornell Jenkins
Defendant, Duantez Cornell Jenkins, was indicted for possession, within a school zone, and with intent to sell or deliver twenty-six (26) grams or more of a substance containing cocaine. In the same indictment, Robert Lee Archibald, Jr. (Archibald), was indicted for the same offense, in addition to two other charges. All charges were the result of evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. Defendant filed a motion to suppress all the evidence seized which forms the basis of the charges against him. The trial court entered an order granting the motion and dismissed the charges against defendant. The State appeals. Based upon the record and briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Matthew R. Hakoda v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Matthew R. Hakoda, appeals the post-conviction court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert J. Skillen v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Robert J. Skillen, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for error coram nobis relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rokisha Lashia Alderson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Rokisha Lashia Alderson, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court found that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, she argues that the statute of limitations was tolled because she was misled by prison officials about her minority status. After our review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court summarily dismissing the petition and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the timeliness of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mary Cathleena Blindt
A Bedford County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Mary Cathleena Blindt, for three counts of prescription fraud, two counts of forgery, and one count each of theft, introduction of contraband into a penal facility, and failure to appear. Following guilty pleas and a sentencing hearing, the defendant received an effective sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied alternative sentencing, ordered consecutive sentencing, and imposed the maximum sentence within the range for three of the defendant's convictions. The defendant also correctly notes an error on the judgment forms. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgments in part and remand the case for correction of an error on one of the judgment forms. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven Cornell Gray
The defendant, Steven Cornell Gray, appeals from his Madison County Circuit Court jury conviction of possession with the intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine. He claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, but upon our review of the case, we affirm this conviction. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Henry Johnson v. Tony Parker, Warden
The pro se petitioner, Henry Johnson, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. He was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated burglary and was sentenced to life imprisonment on August 19, 2009. On appeal, he argues that: the indictment against him was defective; the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition without a hearing or appointment of counsel; and he was subject to double jeopardy as a result of the indictment. After careful review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Gallon, et al. v. Harry Elberson, et al.
The plaintiff home buyers filed suit against two home inspectors and a home inspection company after discovering defects in the home that were not mentioned in the inspection report. The court found that the defendants were negligent and granted the plaintiffs a judgment for damages against the home inspectors and the inspection company, individually, jointly and severally. The defendants argue on appeal that the judgment was not supported by the evidence and that in holding them individually liable, the court pierced the corporate veil without the proof of the extraordinary circumstances normally required for a court to do so. We affirm the finding of liability and the judgment for damages, but we vacate the judgment as to one of the individual defendants, because the evidence preponderated against the trial court's finding that he was in partnership with the other individual defendant. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jack H. L. B-K.
Father appeals the trial court's decision to allow Mother to relocate to California with the parties' minor child. Mother and Father lived separately in California when their only child was born. Mother moved with the minor child to Tennessee in April 2008; Father also moved to Tennessee to be near the child. A year later, Father filed a Petition to Register a Foreign Decree and Modify and Enforce Visitation in the Williamson County Juvenile Court. In June 2009, Mother notified Father she intended to return to California with their child and sought court permission to do so. When the juvenile court referee denied the relocation, Mother sought a de novo hearing before the juvenile court judge. Following a full hearing, the juvenile court judge granted Mother's request to relocate finding that Father, who did not have substantially equal parenting time, failed to carry his burden under the parental relocation statute, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-6-108(d)(1). We affirm the trial court's findings that Father did not prove that Mother's move is not for a reasonable purpose, poses a specific or serious threat of harm to the child, or is vindictive. We also affirm the trial court's decision denying Mother's request for attorney's fees and deny her request for attorney's fees on appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In the matter of: Amber M. S. and Stefanie L. S.
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Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Jessica Hooper McQuade (now Burnett) v. Michael Vincent McQuade
This is a divorce appeal involving subject matter jurisdiction. The parties, the parents of one minor child, resided in Tennessee when divorce proceedings were initiated in the Tennessee trial court. The trial court entered a pendente lite order designating the father as the child's primary residential parent and setting the mother's child support obligation. Before the trial, a special master made a recommendation on the mother's child support obligation. In May 2008, after a trial, the Tennessee trial court entered an order declaring the parties divorced and designating the father as primary residential parent, but did not rule on child support. By the time of the divorce order, both parties had moved to Kentucky. Almost immediately afterward, the mother filed an objection regarding the amount of her child support obligation, and the Tennessee trial court entered an order temporarily modifying her child support. In February 2009, the mother filed a petition to modify the designation of primary residential parent. The Tennessee trial court conducted a hearing on the mother's objection to the amount of child support and her petition to modify the designation of primary residential parent. It declined to change the designation of primary residential parent, and also held that the mother owed no back child support arrearage. Both parties appeal. We hold that, under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, the Tennessee trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the mother's petition to change the designation of primary residential parent. We also hold that, under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the mother's request for modification of child support. Therefore, we vacate the trial court's orders modifying the parenting plan and modifying child support. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Debra M. Barkes, et al. v. River Park Hospital, Inc.
River Park Hospital has filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 39 petition for rehearing requesting this Court to reconsider its opinion filed on October 20, 2010. We have carefully reviewed the entire record and appellate briefs, from all of which we conclude that our opinion addressed and considered all issues raised by River Park in its appeal. Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is respectfully denied and the costs of this petition are taxed to River Park Hospital, Inc., d/b/a River Park Hospital, for which execution may issue if necessary. |
Warren | Supreme Court | |
Shemain Sherille Riley, et al. v. Edith Swift
The General Sessions Court awarded the plaintiffs an $8,500 judgment for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident. The pro se defendant attempted to appeal the judgment to the Circuit Court, but failed to have the case docketed within 45 days after filing the notice of appeal, as is required by Davidson County Local Rule 20(b). The plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground of untimeliness and to enforce the order of the General Sessions Court. The defendant did not respond to the motion, nor did she appear for the motion hearing. The Circuit Court granted the plaintiffs' motion and made the judgment of the General Sessions Court the judgment of the Circuit Court. The defendant then retained counsel, who filed a Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend the judgment eight months after it was rendered. The Circuit Court denied the motion. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michelle Lee Raines
The defendant, Michelle Lee Raines, pleaded guilty to two counts of facilitation of rape of a child, a Class B felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of ten years with the manner of service left to the discretion of the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered the sentences served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Douglas Rush
The Defendant, Andrew Douglas Rush, was convicted of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and statutory rape, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. __ 39-13-506(d)(2), -522(b)(1). In this direct appeal, he contends that: (1) the State presented insufficient evidence to convict him of either count; and (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that attempted child rape was a lesser-included offense of rape of a child. After our review, we affirm the Defendant's convictions. We remand solely for the entry of a corrected judgment form, reflecting that a conviction of rape of a child requires that the Defendant serve 100% of the sentence imposed. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James R. Smith v. State of Tennessee
Following a jury trial, the Petitioner, James R. Smith, was convicted of one count of rape, a Class B felony, one count of sexual battery, a Class E felony, and one count of attempted false imprisonment, a Class B misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. __ 39-12-107(a), -13- 302(b), -13-503(b), -13-505(c). This Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. See State v. James R. Smith, No. M2005-00615-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 264468 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Jan. 31, 2006), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. May 1, 2006). The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying him relief because his rights to due process and a fair and impartial jury were violated when five jurors ate lunch at the same table as the court clerk and two potential State witnesses. He also asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective because he (1) did not file any pretrial motions besides a request for discovery; (2) should have asked the trial court to declare a mistrial when he learned about the lunch incident; (3) failed to ask the jurors what they talked about at lunch; and (4) failed to raise the lunch incident in his direct appeal. After our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dawn Brown, et al. vs. Tennessee Title Loans, Inc.
We granted this interlocutory appeal to answer a single question of first impression: whether the Tennessee Title Pledge Act, Tenn. Code Ann. __ 45-15-101 to -120 (2000), permits a private right of action on behalf of pledgors against title pledge lenders who allegedly charged excessive interest and prohibited fees. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Title Pledge Act allegations for failure to state a claim, and the Court of Appeals reversed. We hold that the Title Pledge Act does not expressly create an individual private right of action, and plaintiffs have not carried their burden of establishing that the legislature intended to imply such a right. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Chris Lawrence vs. Leigh Ann Lawrence
Leigh Ann Lawrence ("Mother") secretly tape recorded her 2 1/2-year-old daughter's telephone conversation with the child's father, Chris Lawrence ("Father"), during the course of a divorce and custody dispute. After the divorce was concluded, Father filed a complaint against Mother seeking damages for, among other things, wiretapping in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. _39-13-601 (2006). Father filed a motion for partial summary judgment which the trial court denied upon finding that "[n]o set of facts would create liability under _39-13-601 et seq. for [Mother's] interception of [Father's] communication with his daughter." The court then entered partial summary judgment in favor of Mother and certified the judgment as final. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |