Jesse R. Miltier v. Bank of America, N.A.
This is a tort action for wrongful foreclosure. Suit was filed by Jesse R. Miltier against his lender, Bank of America, N.A. (“BOA”). In his complaint, Miltier demanded $200,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages. The jury awarded Miltier $750,000 compensatory damages itemized on the verdict form as $350,000 out of pocket money losses “related solely to foreclosure,” $100,000 out of pocket losses “related solely to lawsuit,” $150,000 emotional distress “related solely to foreclosure” and $150,000 emotional distress “related solely to lawsuit.” The jury also awarded Miltier $300,000 in punitive damages. BOA filed post-judgment motions asking that the compensatory damages be remitted to eliminate “amounts related solely to the lawsuit” and amounts awarded in excess of the $200,000 demanded in the complaint. Miltier responded asserting that the issue of damages over $200,000 was tried by consent. The trial court entered an order reducing the award of compensatory damages to $200,000. Later, the court entered a final order approving the jury’s award of punitive damages in the amount of $300,000. Miltier appeals challenging the reduction of the verdict. His issues include a challenge to the constitutionality of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.02 which forbids amendment of pleadings after verdict to increase the ad damnum clause. The Attorney General has appeared on appeal to defend the constitutionality of Rule 15.02. We affirm. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Carlie G. C.
Philip C. (“Father”) appeals from the termination of his parental rights to his minor child, Carlie G. C. (“the Child”), who was five years old at the time of trial. The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory grounds for termination exist and that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the Child. Father appeals and challenges the trial court’s findings. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Anthony V. Jackson v. Ginger Jackson
This appeal involves countless motions filed over a period of nearly nine years following the parties’ contentious divorce. The mother appeals, challenging numerous rulings by the trial court. We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Becka L. A. K.
The trial court allowed the mother of a twelve year old girl to move out of state with the child over the objections of the father and set out a generous visitation schedule so the father could maintain a close relationship with his daughter. Shortly after the move, the father filed a petition for contempt and for change of custody, alleging that the mother had deliberately thwarted his court-ordered visitation to defeat his parental rights. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the father had proved his allegations, and it transferred custody of the child to him. Since we find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings, we reverse and reinstate the parenting plan in effect before the father filed his petition and remand to the trial court for crafting of a transition plan. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Becka L. A. K. - Concurring/Dissenting
The juvenile court found that a material change of circumstances had occurred due to Mother’s failure to adhere to the parenting plan, thereby repeatedly frustrating and sometimes preventing Father’s visitation, and that it was in their child’s best interest to be placed in the custody of her father. I would affirm these rulings. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony V. Jackson v. Ginger Jackson - Concurring/Dissenting
I agree with most of the majority opinion in this case. I find I must dissent from the majority’s decision to vacate the award to Father of statutory interest on Mother’s child support arrearage. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
David Lee Wright ex rel. Kaitlyn Lee Wright v. Anita J. Wright et al.
We granted this appeal to determine the proper method for computing a reasonable attorney’s fee when the attorney represents a minor. In this case, after the attorney obtained a $425,000 settlement for a minor injured in an automobile accident, the trial court awarded the attorney $141,666.66, or one-third of the recovery, pursuant to the terms of the attorney’s contingent fee agreement with the minor’s father. The court-appointed guardian ad litem appealed the fee award, and the Court of Appeals reversed. Upon remand, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and determined that $131,000 would be a reasonable attorney’s fee, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Reviewing for an abuse of discretion, we hold that the trial court applied the correct legal standard by analyzing the ten factors set forth in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a). We further hold that the fee award was neither illogical, based on an erroneous assessment of the evidence, nor an injustice to the minor. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Fentress | Supreme Court | |
Collateral Plus, LLC, et al. v. Max Well Medical, Inc.
This is an appeal of the grant of a motion for summary judgment. The parties entered into a loan management agreement providing that a placement fee would be paid only upon the occurrence of certain conditions. The agreement explicitly provided that it would terminate when the underlying bank loan was satisfied. When the underlying loan was repaid, the conditions precedent to the payment of the placement fee had not occurred. The Appellee sought payment of the placement fee when the Appellant was acquired a year later, which the Appellant refused on the grounds that the agreement had terminated. Because the agreement states unequivocally that it terminates upon repayment of the underlying loan, making the placement fee provision unenforceable, we reverse the summary judgment award in favor of the Appellee. We hold that, instead, summary judgment should have been entered in favor of the Appellant. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Collateral Plus, LLC, et al. v. Max Well Medical, Inc. - Dissenting
Because I am of opinion that the $900,000 placement fee was earned when Collateral Plus was successful in securing financial assistance for MAX Well and became payable in February 2008 when the remainder of MAX Well’s stock was purchased, I respectfully dissent from the court’s holding that MAX Well is entitled to summary judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Jaleia M. R.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents of a four year old girl on the ground of abandonment. The court also found that an additional ground that applied to the father was his failure to legitimate the child, and an additional ground that applied to the mother was her failure to remedy the conditions which led her to lose custody of the child, with little likelihood that those conditions would be remedied in the immediate future. Only the mother appealed. We reverse. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Antonio Kendrick v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Antonio Kendrick, appeals the Criminal Court of Shelby County’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sherry C. Sloan v. William Chadwick Poff
The Juvenile Court found the mother in criminal contempt for violating two orders. The first order governed the manner of the mother’s communications with her son’s father, and the second order governed the father’s right to visit with the child on specific dates. The Juvenile Court sentenced the mother to the Davidson County workhouse for ten days for violating the earlier order, but suspended the sentence for so long as the mother continued to comply with orders. The court fined the mother $50 for violating the second order. On appeal, the mother challenged: the sufficiency of the evidence supporting both findings of contempt; an evidentiary ruling; the suspension of her sentence; the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the child; and the trial court’s recusal without request. We affirm the Juvenile Court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Rodney M. Butler v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Rodney M. Butler, appeals pro se after the Madison County Circuit Court summarily dismissed his post-conviction petition seeking relief from his guilty plea to driving under the influence, fourth offense, a Class E felony, for which he received a three-year sentence with a 35 percent release eligibility. We conclude that Petitioner should have been afforded an evidentiary hearing, and for the reasons stated herein, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Small
The Defendant-Appellant, Michael Small, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies. On appeal, Small argues that the trial court erred in imposing a twenty-year sentence consecutive to his effective sentence of forty years for three previous convictions for aggravated robbery. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stacy Lee Fleming
The Defendant-Appellant, Stacy Lee Fleming, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of delivery of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a career offender to thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Fleming claims: (1) the insufficiency of the evidence; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by restricting the cross-examination of a State’s witness; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its closing argument; and (4) the trial court erred by sentencing Fleming as a career offender. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerry Wayne Lankford v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jerry Wayne Lankford, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He was convicted by a McMinn County jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property over $1,000, a Class D felony. State v. Lankford, 298 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). The petitioner was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years for aggravated burglary and ten years for theft of property, to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Id. On appeal, the petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kathy Elaine Schiffner v. Curtis James Schiffner
In a divorce action, Husband appeals trial court’s award of alimony to Wife, asserting that the amount was excessive and the duration was not supported by the evidence. Finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the nature, duration and amount of alimony awarded, the judgment is affirmed. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Shem Malmquist v. Danielle Malmquist
This is a divorce case involving a short-term marriage. The husband is a pilot at FedEx and the wife is highly educated. They have two children together. After less than five months of marriage, the husband filed for divorce alleging irreconcilable differences and inappropriate marital conduct. The wife counter-claimed, and unnecessarily protracted litigation ensued. The parties inundated the trial court with filings over a two-year period, many of which contained alarming but ultimately unproven accusations. After one transfer of the case and the withdrawal of many attorneys, the parties proceeded to trial during which they presented the live testimony of 30 witnesses and introduced 122 exhibits. The trial court awarded a divorce to both parties on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct, designated the husband as primary residential parent, granted the wife supervised visitation with the children twice a week, awarded the wife half of the 401k benefits the husband accrued during the marriage, and provided the wife transitional alimony for four months. The wife appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kelly Williams, et al., v. the Greater Chattanooga Public Television Corporation, d/b/a WTCI-TV Channel 45
The Trial Court granted summary judgment to the defendant on plaintiffs' causes of action, alleging discrimination by their employer and termination by the employer because of their age, or that they suffered a retaliatory discharge. Upon review of the record, we conclude there is disputed material evidence as to the claims of each plaintiff, and reverse the summary judgment and remand to the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
George Franklin v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, George Franklin, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. The State acknowledges on appeal that the petition was timely filed because the petitioner delivered it to the appropriate prison official for mailing within the one-year statute of limitations. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for consideration of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kendrick D. Rivers v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Kendrick D. Rivers, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, resisting arrest, evading arrest, and criminal trespass. Following a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced to serve an effective term of twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to meet with the petitioner a sufficient number of times and to properly investigate the case. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Ware v. Henry Steward, Warden
The pro se petitioner, Michael Ware, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the order of the habeas corpus court dismissing the petition. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mack Jones v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Mack Tremaine Jones, was convicted of one count of first degree murder and nine counts of attempted first degree murder. As a result, Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison for the first degree murder conviction and twenty-two years for each of the nine counts of attempted first degree murder. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. See State v. Mack Tremaine Jones, No. W2005-00014-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1840798 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, June 27, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Oct. 15, 2007). Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief, on the basis that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner has appealed. On appeal, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy Wannamaker v. Tom B. Thaxton d/b/a Thaxton Surveying
Landowner sued surveyor for damages due to an improperly prepared survey done for an adjacent landowner. The trial court granted surveyor’s motion to dismiss based on the application of the three-year statute of limitation found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-105. Landowner appealed, arguing that the limitation period is four years based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-114. We agree with landowner. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry L. Fox v. Janet E. Fox
In a divorce action, Wife argues that the trial court erred in the amount of its award of periodic alimony and in failing to order Husband to pay her attorney fees. We find that Wife’s periodic alimony should be increased to $3,000 per month. We also find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award Wife attorney fees. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals |