State of Tennessee v. Don Mask Brown, Jr.
The Defendant-Appellant, Don Mask Brown, Jr., was convicted by a Hardeman County jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a violent offender to forty years for second degree murder and, as a multiple offender, to fifteen years for the aggravated robbery. The trial court ordered these sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of fifty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Brown claims: (1) the trial court violated the principles of Blakely v. Washington by finding that several enhancement factors were applicable; and (2) the trial court should not have imposed consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Andre L. Mayfield v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Andre L. Mayfield, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, challenging his convictions for aggravated robbery, aggravated rape, rape, and two counts of aggravated kidnapping based on newly discovered evidence. The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition without a hearing. Petitioner appeals. We determine that the coram nobis court properly dismissed the petition after finding that the "newly discovered" evidence relied upon by Petitioner would have provided "insignificant assistance to the defense of the charges" had it been presented at trial. Accordingly, the judgment of the coram nobis court dismissing the petition is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dionis Nick Papa
The defendant, Dionis Nick Papa, appeals the sentencing decision of the Davidson County Criminal Court. Because the record supports the trial court's ordering a sentence of confinement, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Johnny Lee Lewis v. State of Tennessee
Following a jury trial, the Petitioner, Johnny Lee Lewis, was convicted of two counts of facilitation of second degree murder, a Class B felony, and one count of aggravated arson, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. __ 39-11-403, -13-210, -14-302. This Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. See State v. Johnny Lee Lewis, No. M2002-01350-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22398394 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Oct. 21, 2003). The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying him relief because: (1) trial counsel failed to request that the jury be sequestered; (2) trial counsel failed to interview and present witnesses; (3) trial counsel failed to object, based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to the use of enhancement factors during the Petitioner's sentencing hearing; (4) trial counsel failed to object, based on the Confrontation Clause, to testimony regarding a co-conspirator's statements; and (5) the cumulative effect of trial counsel's errors denied him a fair trial. After our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Terry James Lee A/K/A Terry Lee Williams v. State of Tennessee
The defendant, Terry James Lee aka Terry Lee Williams, appeals the revocation of his probation. He initially entered guilty pleas to felony evading arrest, reckless endangerment, and reckless aggravated assault, for which he received a total effective sentence of four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He served six months of his sentence before being placed on intensive probation. On appeal, he argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to revoke his probation and contends his sentence had expired. The State has moved the Court to affirm the revocation of probation pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After careful review, we affirm the revocation of probation pursuant to Rule 20. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kane Stackhouse
The defendant, Kane Stackhouse, aggrieved of his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty years, appeals contending that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress his statements. We discern no error regarding the motion to suppress; however, we conclude, via plain error, that the trial court erred by failing to merge the second degree murder conviction into the merged convictions of first degree felony murder. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for the verdict of second degree murder to be merged into the judgment of first degree felony murder. In all other respects, the judgments of conviction are affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anne S. Phillips vs. Anderson County, Tennessee
This appeal involves a retaliatory discharge claim. Employee claims that she was discharged after reporting her supervisor's unlawful activities. Employer denied that employee was discharged, claimed that she quit, and demonstrated that the State terminated the grant funding the program overseen by employee. A jury trial commenced, and at the close of all proof, employer moved for a directed verdict. The trial court granted the motion for directed verdict and found that employee failed to prove a causal link between her discharge and her decision to engage in a protected activity. Employee appeals. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin Millen v. Shelby County Sheriff's Department
After unsuccessfully appealing his worker's compensation lawsuit, appellant was assessed appellate court costs. A Fieri Facias/Writ of Execution was executed, and appellant's car was attached and sold at a sheriff's sale. Appellant then filed a lawsuit against the sheriff's office claiming he had been carjacked. The trial court dismissed appellant's complaint and we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kelvin Reed
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Kelvin Reed, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and aggravated burglary. The trial court merged the offenses of first degree murder and felony murder, and defendant was sentenced to serve concurrent sentences of life imprisonment for his murder conviction and three years for aggravated burglary. On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence, including testimony about the music played at defendant's birthday party, testimony that one witness had seen defendant with a gun, and photographs of the victim; and (3) that the judgment for aggravated burglary should be corrected to reflect defendant's actual sentence. Following review, we affirm the convictions and remand to the trial court solely for entry of a corrected amended judgment for aggravated burglary in accordance with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcos Acosta Raymundo, A/K/A Marcos Raymundo Acosta
The Defendant, Marcos Acosta Raymundo, a.k.a. Marcos Raymundo Acosta, was charged with one count of aggravated child abuse of a child less than eight years old, a Class A felony, one count of aggravated child neglect of a child less than eight years old, a Class A felony, and two counts of child abuse of a child less than six years old, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. __ 39-15-401(a), -402(b). Following a jury trial, he was convicted of four offenses: one count of attempted aggravated child abuse of a child less than eight years old, a Class B felony, and the other three offenses as charged. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years for count one, attempted aggravated child abuse, twenty-five years for count two, aggravated child neglect, four years for count three, child abuse, and four years for count four, child abuse. The trial court ordered that count two was to be served concurrently with count one, and that counts three and four were to be served concurrently with each other, but consecutively to count two. Thus, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of twenty-nine years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him; and (2) his convictions for counts one, two, and four violated the principles of double jeopardy. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict the defendant of count two, aggravated child neglect, and that the defendant's convictions for count one, attempted aggravated child abuse, and count four, child abuse, violate the principles of double jeopardy. Thus, we reverse the defendant's convictions on counts two and four, and affirm his convictions on counts one and three. We remand to the trial court for a redetermination of concurrent and consecutive sentencing. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Philip Michael Patterson
The Defendant-Appellant, Phillip Michael Patterson, pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Blount County to two counts of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, two counts of theft of property between $1,000 and $10,000, a Class D felony, and one count of theft under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. He received an effective sentence of thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Patterson subsequently appealed his guilty pleas, and a protracted procedural history developed. On appeal, two of Patterson's claims remain: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying, without a hearing, his "Motion for Modification or Reduction of Sentence"; and (2) whether his convictions are void because he did not sign the plea agreement. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Vincent Jordan
The Defendant, Vincent Jordan, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court's order revoking his probation for robbery, a Class C felony, and ordering the Defendant to serve the remainder of his eight-year sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Viola Darlene Stephens
Defendant, Viola Darlene Stephens, pled guilty to theft of property valued at less than $500, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced her to eleven months, twenty-nine days for the theft conviction, to serve six months, and six months for driving on a revoked license, to be fully served in incarceration. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with each other. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in not stating whether it had considered a sentence of community corrections. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Victor L. Dobbins v. State of Tennessee
Following a bench trial, the Petitioner, Victor L. Dobbins, was found guilty of being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-17- 1307(b)(2). This Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. State v. Victor L. Dobbins, No. M2007-01751-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2648951 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, July 3, 2008), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2008). The petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying him relief because: (1) trial counsel failed to properly investigate his case and (2) the cumulative effect of trial counsel's errors entitles him to a new trial. After our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher Lovin v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Christopher Lovin, appeals the Claiborne County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse. On appeal, he contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by (1) failing to object to the State's amendment of his indictment, (2) failing to examine and rebut the State's medical witnesses properly, (3) failing to object to the State's use of demonstrative evidence, and (4) failing to object to the State's presentation of two theories of causation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Claiborne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Scott Winfrey
The Defendant, David Scott Winfrey, pleaded guilty to twenty-nine Class A misdemeanors consisting of one count of aggravated criminal trespass, one count of stalking, thirteen counts of harassment, and fourteen counts of violation of an order of protection. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days for each offense and ordered that ten of his violation of an order of protection sentences run consecutively. In a previous decision, we remanded this matter for re-sentencing, concluding that the trial court erroneously applied Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13- 113(g). See State v. David Scott Winfrey, No. M2008-01429-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 2486180 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Aug. 14, 2009). The defendant now appeals the consecutive sentences imposed upon re-sentencing and contends that they are not in accordance with our previous opinion in this matter. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lamario Sumner A/K/A Lamario Fleming v. State of Tennessee
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Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jermaine Mitchell Gray
A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Jermaine Mitchell Gray, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his confession to police; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and (3) his sentence is excessive. Following our review, we conclude that there is no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William W. Griffin v. Walker Die Casting, Inc., et al.
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee sought to compel the employer to provide a total left knee replacement surgery based upon court-approved settlement for a work-related left knee contusion. The trial court ordered the employer to provide the knee replacement surgery and awarded attorney’s fees to the employee. The employer has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by finding that the proposed surgery was causally related to the work injury. We agree and reverse the trial court’s order. |
Marshall | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Thomas E. Blake v. Nissan North America, Inc., et al.
The employee sustained a compensable injury to his right arm. After surgery and recovery, he returned to work for the same employer at the same rate of pay. Over a year later, his work week was reduced from forty to thirty-two hours per week as part of a plant-wide reduction in hours due to economic conditions. While working the reduced number of hours, he accepted a buyout offer and voluntarily resigned. Subsequently, his workers’ compensation case was tried. The trial court held that he did not have a meaningful return to work because of the reduction in work hours and made an award of more than one and one-half times the impairment. The employer has appealed, contending that employee had a meaningful return to work in spite of the plant-wide reduction of work hours carried out for the purpose of preventing layoffs. We agree that the reduction in force, under these facts, does not impair the determination that the employee had a meaningful return to work, and we modify the judgment accordingly |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
In Re: Pauline M., Stephen M., and Rachael M.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated both parents' rights to the children on grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii); and (2)persistence of conditions as set out at Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113(g)(3). The trial court also terminated Father's parental rights on the additional ground of abandonment by failure to support pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-102(1)(A)(i), and Mother's parental rights on the additional ground of mental incompetence pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113 (g)(8)(B). Finding clear and convincing evidence in the record to support each of these grounds, as well as clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights is in the best interests of the children, we affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Cydnie B. O'Rourke v. James P. O'Rourke
In the last proceeding in this protracted post-divorce litigation, the trial court transferred custody, or primary residential placement, of three children of a divorced couple from the mother to the father. In this consolidated appeal, the mother claims that the trial court erred in a number of ways. However, a number of her arguments relate to orders or actions that have been rendered moot by the final order, including her challenges to the use of a"parenting coordinator." As to the final order modifying residential placement, we hold that the trial court did not err in declining to use Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-6-406 to limit the father's visitation with the children and that the court acted within its discretion in limiting the testimony of Mother's expert witness as a discovery sanction. We also hold that the trial court's award of $330,000 in attorney fees to the father was not error. We affirm the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
International Market and Restaurant, Inc., et al. v. Belmont University, et al.
International Market and Restaurant, Inc. and Patti Myint, owner of the P.M. Café, sued the Belmont University and the Metropolitan Government because representatives of Belmont and the United States Secret Service informed the plaintiffs that the streets and sidewalks around plaintiffs’ establishments would be closed for security purposes the evening of the Presidential debate at Belmont pursuant to a plan developed by the Secret Service. The plaintiffs closed the businesses that evening; however, the sidewalks were not closed. The plaintiffs claim that they lost revenue by closing and seek compensation based on negligent representation, constructive fraud and breach of the indemnity agreement between Belmont and Metro. The trial court granted Belmont’s motion for summary judgment and Metro’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Bonner Givens, et al. v. Mark S. Josovitz, et al.
After an elevated PSA test in October 2000, Dr. Josovitz referred Decedent to a urologist. After an even higher PSA level on retest, the urologist performed a biopsy, which was benign. Despite being informed of his need for additional PSA testing, decedent did not return to the urologist, and, despite routinely seeing decedent for other health issues, Dr. Josovitz did not again discuss the need for repeat testing with decedent until 2004. In May 2004, decedent was diagnosed with advanced prostate cancer, and he died in September 2005. Plaintiffs' expert testified that decedent's prostate cancer must have been diagnosed by December 2001 in order for decedent to survive. However, it is undisputed that the defendants had no knowledge of his prostate cancer by that time. Plaintiffs filed suit in this case beyond the three-year statute of repose for medical malpractice. Because they are unable to prove defendants had knowledge of decedent's prostate cancer, fraudulent concealment is unavailable to toll the statute of repose. Accordingly, we find that plaintiffs' wrongful death claim is barred by the statute of repose and further that plaintiffs are not entitled to recover damages for pain and suffering. Summary judgment is granted to defendants, and the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claim is affirmed. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Wade Phelps/Phelps Harrington Construction Co., Inc. v. C & C Construction Co., LLC, et al.
Contractor agreed to build duplex for property owner, with plaintiff providing construction financing. At closing, contractor was paid, but contractor did not pay plaintiff as agreed. Plaintiff sued property owner, contractor, and bank. We previously affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the bank, finding that contractor and plaintiff were in a joint venture, such that payment to contractor was payment to plaintiff. Property owner then moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Because we find no separate agreement between property owner and plaintiff requiring repayment directly to plaintiff, plaintiff's cause of action against property owner is precluded, and the trial court's grant of summary judgment is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |