State of Tennessee v. Brittany Scott Pye
The Defendant, Brittany Scott Pye, was convicted by a Maury County jury of sale of .5 gramsor more of cocaine, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-17-417. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a fifteen-year sentence for this conviction, which was ordered to be served consecutively to two prior sentences. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges only the imposition of consecutive sentences. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, we must remand for entry of a corrected judgment. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christina Kay Deering
The petitioner, Christina Kay Deering, appeals from the Jefferson County Circuit Court's dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief filed on her behalf by her mother, Melissa Deering. The State has moved to have this court summarily affirm the dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the motion and affirm the order of dismissal pursuant to Rule 20. |
Jefferson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rachel Sumner, et al v. Metropolitan Board of Public Health
Petitioners challenge a mosquito spraying plan adopted by a local board of health alleging that it violates an ordinance on the same subject. Dismissal by the trial court is affirmed since there is no conflict between the plan and ordinance and petitioners fail to allege a legally cognizable ground to challenge the plan since dissatisfaction with the plan is not sufficient. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Sidney J.
We granted appeal to determine whether a trial court may grant an intervening adoption petition pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-116(f)(1) when the intervening petitioners did not have physical custody or the right to receive physical custody of the child sought to be adopted at the time they filed their petition. The maternal grandparents petitioned to adopt the child, who was in their physical custody, and the paternal grandparents filed an intervening adoption petition. After engaging in a comparative fitness analysis, the trial court granted the paternal grandparents' petition. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in considering the paternal grandparents' petition because they did not meet the physical custody requirement in section 36-1-116(f)(1) and remanded the case to the trial court to enter an order granting the maternal grandparents' petition. We hold that section 36-1-116(f)(1) includes an exception to the physical custody requirement when the petitioners have filed an intervening adoption petition and the child sought to be adopted is in the physical custody of the original petitioners. We also hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings that the paternal grandparents were fit, that they were financially capable of providing for the child, and that the child's best interests would be served by granting their petition. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court in all respects. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Santial Jones
The Defendant, Antonio Santial Jones, appeals his conviction by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court for second degree murder, a Class A felony, for which he was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-two years in the Department of Correction. The Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the testimony of two witnesses should have been considered accomplice testimony, requiring independent corroboration. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lorenzo Johnson v. Corrections Corporation of America, et al.
This is an appeal in a civil rights action filed by the Appellant, a pro se litigant. During the course of the proceedings, the Appellant was incarcerated. The trial court involuntarily dismissed the Appellant’s claim pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02 upon finding that the Appellant failed to prosecute his case. The Appellant appeals the dismissal. Finding that the trial court failed to rule on several of the Appellant’s motions and objections, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal and remand for further proceedings. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Sarah E. Palmer vs. Michael Howard Palmer
Shortly after their marriage, both Husband and Wife filed complaints for divorce. The trial court found both parties guilty of inappropriate marital conduct and granted a divorce. Husband raises numerous issues on appeal. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Terrance Lavar Davis v. State of Tennessee
We granted permission to appeal in this habeas corpus case to address the legality of a pleabargained sentence requiring the defendant, being sentenced for two cocaine offenses committed in a school zone, to serve twenty-two years of a Range I sentence at “100%.” The defendant alleges that his sentence is illegal because it makes no provision for the possibility of early release on parole. The trial court denied relief. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded for further proceedings. We hold that the defendant’s sentence is not illegal, and he is therefore not entitled to habeas corpus relief. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Hickman | Supreme Court | |
Terrance Lavar Davis v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
As the majority opinion observes, the Court of Criminal Appeals has twice held that petitioner Davis’s sentences were illegal. After our intermediate appellate court’s first opinion in this case, Davis v. State, No. M2007-01729-CCA-R3-HC, 2008 WL 1958174, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 6, 2008), we granted the State’s application for permission to appeal and remanded for reconsideration in light of our decision in Edwards v. State, 269 S.W.3d 915 (Tenn. 2008). Upon reconsideration, the Court of Criminal Appeals again remanded to the trial court for the entry of habeas corpus relief. Davis v. State, No. M2009- 00011-CCA-RM-HC, 2009 WL 961777, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. April 8, 2009). Upon application by the State, we granted permission to appeal. |
Hickman | Supreme Court | |
Terrance Lavar Davis v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
I write separately to state my position in this case. I concur with the views of my colleagues as expressed in the majority and concurring opinions that the defendant is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. My decision in this case would have been different had the trial court imposed this sentence on the defendant after a trial. However, because this was a voluntary guilty plea agreement, and not a sentence imposed by the trial court following a trial, the defendant waived any habeas corpus relief he may have been entitled to receive because the sentence he bargained for was within the statutory minimum and statutory maximum for the offense. |
Hickman | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Dillman, Jr.
The Defendant, Ronald Dillman, Jr., was convicted of especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony, aggravated assault, a Class C felony, robbery, a Class C felony, attempted aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and assault, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to serve eighteen years for especially aggravated burglary, eight years for aggravated assault, eight years for robbery, and five years for attempted aggravated assault. He was sentenced to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor conviction. All sentences were concurrent, resulting in an effective eighteen-year sentence. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court's approval of the verdict in its role as thirteenth juror, and the exclusion from evidence of Robert Collins's plea agreement document. We affirm the convictions, but we vacate the judgments for aggravated assault and attempted aggravated assault and remand the case for entry of a judgment merging the attempted aggravated assault conviction with the aggravated assault conviction. |
Claiborne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Johnny Tate
The defendant, Johnny Tate, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, Class A felonies; two counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies; and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. He was subsequently sentenced to two sentences of life without parole, to two sentences of twelve years, and to a sentence of six years for the respective convictions. Further, the trial court ordered that the two sentences of life be served consecutively to each other, with the other sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, he contends that the evidence presented is insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the crimes. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgments of conviction. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Abron Spraggins
The defendant, Abron Spraggins, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of thirteen years in the Department of Correction. The defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court committed plain error by instructing the jury that felony reckless endangerment was a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault as charged in the indictment; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; and (3) whether the trial court erred by enhancing the defendant's aggravated assault sentence and ordering that the aggravated assault and reckless endangerment sentences be served consecutively. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Crystal Miranda Kirby
A Campbell County Criminal Court Jury found the appellant, Crystal Miranda Kirby, guilty of the first degree premeditated murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery of Jonathan Pierce. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of life, twenty-one years, and eighteen years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's pretrial ruling on the admissibility of a statement she made in the course of plea negotiations and the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining her conviction of first degree premeditated murder. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court; however, we remand for an entry of a judgment reflecting that the conviction for second degree murder is merged into the conviction for first degree murder. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Allison J. Person, as Administratix of the Estate of Effie J. Wooten, Deceased, et al. v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc., d/b/a Primacy Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center, et al.
This is an action for negligence and wrongful death filed against a nursing home by the administrator of decedent patient’s estate. The trial court denied Defendant nursing home’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment upon finding decedent patient was not competent to execute the power of attorney pursuant to which decedent’s daughter had executed an arbitration agreement with Defendant. Defendant appeals. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter Of: Kempton, L.D.
While cohabitating with Appellant, Mother gave birth to a child, and shortly thereafter, Appellant acknowledged paternity. Several years later, a DNA test allegedly indicated that Appellant was not the child’s biological father. After receiving the DNA test results, Appellant waited more than two years to file a petition to disestablish paternity, which the juvenile court denied. Because Appellant failed to file his petition for Rule 60.02 relief “within a reasonable time,” we affirm the decision of the juvenile court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Abron Spraggins
The defendant, Abron Spraggins, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of thirteen years in the Department of Correction. The defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court committed plain error by instructing the jury that felony reckless endangerment was a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault as charged in the indictment; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; and (3) whether the trial court erred by enhancing the defendant’s aggravated assault sentence and ordering that the aggravated assault and reckless endangerment sentences be served consecutively. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James W. Gentry, Jr., et al vs. Todd Clark McCain, et al
James W. Gentry, Jr., Margaret A. Gentry ("the Gentrys"), Paul Mallchok, and Lowrance Mallchok sued Todd Clark McCain, Christy McCain ("the McCains"), and the City of Chattanooga ("the City") seeking, in part, a declaration of ownership with regard to a right-of-way known as Manchester Avenue, and a restraining order preventing the McCains from entering the right-of-way. After a hearing, the Trial Court denied the Gentrys' request for a temporary injunction to bar the McCains and the City from the right-of-way and further held that Manchester Avenue had been dedicated, the City had accepted the dedication, the City had never formally abandoned the portion of Manchester Avenue at issue in this case, and that the City held title to the Manchester Avenue right-of-way as a public right-of-way. The Gentrys appeal to this Court claiming that the Trial Court erred in denying them title to the Manchester Avenue right-of-way. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
City of Murfreesboro v. Thomas Leon Norton
This case involves an appeal from a judgment entered by a city court following a traffic citation. The circuit court found that the defendant had not violated the city ordinance alleged to have been violated, but the court sua sponte determined that the defendant had violated a different city ordinance. The defendant appeals. We reverse and remand. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Anna S.
This is an appeal from the Trial Court's refusal to terminate the parental rights of Rickie T. ("Father") to his one year old daughter, Anna S. (the "Child"). In June 2008, Rebecca S. ("Mother") became pregnant with the Child. Several months before the Child was born, Mother terminated all communication with Father, notwithstanding Father's numerous attempts to remain in contact with Mother. Shortly after Mother gave birth, she saw Father's sister at a store and told her that she, i.e. Mother, had suffered a miscarriage. In reality, Mother had given the Child up for adoption through Bethany Christian Services of East Tennessee ("Bethany Christian"). Mother also had lied to Bethany Christian and, because of this deception, Bethany Christian was unaware of Father's true identity. Father learned that Mother had given birth to the Child after reading a Notice in the local newspaper stating that Bethany Christian had filed a petition to terminate parental rights and that his parental rights were about to be terminated. Father immediately notified Bethany Christian of his existence and retained counsel. Based on stipulated facts, Bethany Christian and Father filed competing motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted Father's motion after finding that there was no clear and convincing evidence of grounds to terminate his parental rights. Bethany Christian appeals, and we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey Allen Welty v. Kimberly Dawn Welty
Defendant appeals the trial court's order denying her motion to transfer the case based on the relocation of the parties. We dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Johnathan Norman
The defendant, Johnathan Norman, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw guilty pleas that he entered to charges of (1) being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun, a Class E felony, and (2) unlawful possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), a Class A misdemeanor. After careful review, we conclude that the defendant’s motion to withdraw his pleas was not timely, and we affirm the judgments from the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stanley Finney, vs. Tennessee Dept. of Correction, et al
Petitioner, a prisoner, filed a Common Law Writ of Certiorari in the Chancery Court, alleging that he had been illegally disciplined while incarcerated. Respondents agreed that the writ should be granted and thereafter they filed a Motion to Dismiss the action. The Trial Judge dismissed the writ and petitioner has appealed. On appeal, petitioner argues that the allegations set forth in his petition must be taken as true under the Rules of Civil Procedure. The factual allegations pled by petitioner, when taken as true, state a cause of action. We therefore vacate the Order of Dismissal and remand for further proceedings. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
Joe Allen Pennington v. Sonya Rene Pennington
This is the second appeal from the Trial Court's altering the custodial arrangement of the parties' minor child. In the first trial, the Trial Court excluded testimony of the child's stepfather, on the grounds that the mother had not properly noticed the Court and party that the stepfather was a witness. On the first appeal, this Court remanded this case to the Trial Court and directed that the stepfather's testimony be allowed. On remand, the stepfather testified at length, but it was revealed during his examination that he had read the entire evidentiary transcript of the first trial. The Trial Court then ruled that the stepfather's testimony should be stricken, but went ahead and considered his testimony and essentially determined that his testimony did not alter the weight of the evidence as found in the first trial, and affirmed the Court's original award of granting custody to the father. On appeal, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shawn Hatcher
We granted permission to appeal in this case in order to consider whether Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 permits a defendant to amend his motion for new trial after the hearing on the initial motion has been conducted and an order denying the motion has been entered. In this case, newly-appointed defense counsel filed several pleadings seeking to add grounds in support of a new trial after the hearing on the original motion for new trial had been held and an order denying a new trial had been entered. The trial court considered the new grounds and subsequently entered a second order denying a new trial. The defendant appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals refused to consider any issues raised after the trial court denied the original motion for new trial. As to the issues that were raised in that motion, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the defendant is not entitled to relief. We have concluded that trial courts should not permit the defense to amend its motion for new trial after the new trial hearing has been held and an order denying a new trial has been entered. Further, we have reviewed an issue the defendant properly preserved and have reviewed for plain error the issues the defendant failed to preserve but argues to this Court. We hold that the defendant is not entitled to relief on any of these issues and therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Shelby | Supreme Court |