Bobby R. Hopkins vs. Doyle K. Riggs, et al
Bobby R. Hopkins ("Hopkins") sued Doyle K. Riggs and Ruth Riggs ("the Riggs") alleging, in part, that the Riggs had contracted to construct a road on the Riggs' property for Hopkins' use and had failed to construct an adequate road. The Riggs filed a motion for summary judgment and the Trial Court granted them summary judgment. The Riggs then sought attorney's fees pursuant to the parties' contract. The parties then reached an agreement with regard to attorney's fees, an agreement which the Riggs subsequently alleged was breached by Hopkins. The Riggs then filed a motion and the Trial Court entered an order granting the Riggs additional attorney's fees. Hopkins appeals to this Court raising issues regarding the grant of summary judgment and the award of attorney's fees. We affirm the grant of summary judgment, hold that the Riggs were entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to the parties' contract, vacate the Trial Court's November 25, 2008 Order granting additional attorney's fees, and remand this case to the Trial Court for entry of an order that complies with the parties' August 6, 2008 agreement. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
John Skipper and Brenda Skipper v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Wells Fargo purchased foreclosed property, which it then sold to the Skippers. The Skippers contracted to sell the property, but before the sale was completed, two IRS tax liens against the previous owners were discovered. The Skippers sued Wells Fargo, and the trial court awarded them their lost profits from the anticipated sale. Wells Fargo appeals, and we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Bain v. TRW., Inc., et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. An employee sustained a work-related repetitive exposure hearing loss injury. After he retired for reasons unrelated to the injury, he filed suit in the Criminal Court for Wilson County seeking workers’ compensation benefits. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded 65% permanent partial disability to the hearing of both ears and set the date of injury as the date that the employee first learned of his hearing loss. The employer appealed arguing that the award was excessive and that the trial court erred in setting the date of injury. We find that the award was excessive and modify it to 15% permanent partial disability to the hearing of both ears. We have also determined that the trial court erred with regard to its determination of the date of the injury. |
Wilson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Annemarie Tubbs v. St. Thomas Hospital
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee developed a latex allergy as a result of her employment at a hospital, and the hospital made certain accommodations that enabled the employee to continue working. However, the employee’s sensitivity to latex increased over the years, and she eventually left her job. The employee filed a petition seeking workers’ compensation benefits in the Chancery Court of Davidson County. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded the employee 60% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. On this appeal, the employer contends that the treating physician’s impairment rating should not have been admitted into evidence because it was not in accordance with the AMA Guides. The employer also argues that a lower impairment should have been used by the trial court and that the award should have been capped. We affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. John Tyler Beason
The Defendant, John Tyler Beason, was convicted of attempted first degree murder, for which he received a twenty-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender. The Defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his pretrial statement and that the court erred in sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Union | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marcus Ray Clark v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Marcus Ray Clark, appeals as of right the Madison County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his guilty plea convictions for five counts of aggravated burglary, Class C felonies, and four counts of theft of property, Class D felonies. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that counsel's ineffective assistance rendered his guilty pleas unknowing and involuntary. After the appointment of counsel and a full evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court found that the Petitioner failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence and denied the petition. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Skipper And Brenda Skipper v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Wells Fargo purchased foreclosed property, which it then sold to the Skippers. The Skippers contracted to sell the property, but before the sale was completed, two IRS tax liens against the previous owners were discovered. The Skippers sued Wells Fargo, and the trial court awarded them their lost profits from the anticipated sale. Wells Fargo appeals, and we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Marco Linsey v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Marco Linsey, appeals as of right the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his guilty plea conviction for one count of child rape, a Class A felony. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that counsel’s ineffective assistance rendered his guilty pleas unknowing and involuntary. After the appointment of counsel and a full evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court found that the Petitioner failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence and denied the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Leslie Paul Hatfield v. Jim Morrow, Warden - Concurring
I concur in the results reached by the majority opinion; yet, I choose to write |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Leslie Paul Hatfield v. Jim Morrow, Warden
The Petitioner, Leslie Paul Hatfield, appeals the Bledsoe County Circuit Court's partial denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he contended (1) that his conviction for incest, a Class C felony, was void because he was illegally sentenced to community supervision for life, (2) that his convictions for two counts of statutory rape, a Class E felony, and one count each of solicitation of a minor and casual exchange of a Schedule IV controlled substance, both Class E felonies, were void because he was not awarded all his pre-trial jail credits, and (3) that his convictions for statutory rape, solicitation of a minor, and casual exchange were void because he was not awarded pre-trial jail credits against the sentences that he was ordered to serve concurrently. The trial court granted the writ of habeas corpus for the Petitioner's sentence for incest, but it denied habeas corpus relief on the Petitioner's remaining grounds. Because the judgment for statutory rape reflects an illegal sentence and because the Petitioner's pre-trial credits were not applied to the sentences that he was ordered to serve concurrently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for transfer to the Criminal Court for Scott County for the entry of corrected judgments. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Latoya Danielle Patton v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Latoya Danielle Patton, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony, and received a sentence of forty years. On appeal, the petitioner contends that her guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel in advising the petitioner. Following review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Justin Rashard Forrest v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Justin Rashard Forrest, appeals the judgment of the Madison County Circuit Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the petitioner pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, and three counts of aggravated robbery in case number 07-337; aggravated burglary and theft in case number 07-285; and possession of marijuana and especially aggravated robbery in 07-286. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court denied his petition. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition for post-conviction relief. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stevie Leonard Kelly
The defendant, Stevie Leonard Kelly, appeals the sentencing decision of the Montgomery County Circuit Court. The defendant pled guilty to one count of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance and two counts of evading arrest. He was subsequently sentenced to concurrent sentences of ten years for the drug conviction and five years for each evading arrest. The trial court further ordered that the effective ten-year sentence be served in the Department of Correction consecutive to sentences for which the defendant was found to be in violation of probation. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sentences, specifically contending that: (1) the trial court improperly weighed the enhancing and mitigating factors in determining the sentence lengths; (2) the court erred in ordering that the sentences be served in confinement; and (3) consecutive sentencing was improperly imposed. Following review of the record, we conclude that: (1) a challenge based upon the weighing of enhancement or mitigating factors is no longer a ground for appeal; (2) no abuse of discretion resulted from the court's decision that confinement was necessary because measures less restrictive than confinement had recently been applied; and (3) no abuse of discretion resulted from the court's decision to impose consecutive sentencing based upon the fact that the defendant was on probation at the time the offenses were committed. Accordingly, we affirm the sentences as imposed. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Quincy Bryan Banks
The defendant, Quincy Bryan Banks, appeals the consecutive-sentencing decision of the Davidson County Criminal Court, which was imposed following remand from the Court of Criminal Appeals for resentencing. See State v. Quincy Bryan Banks, No. M2007-00545-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Apr. 11, 2008). Upon our de novo review of the order of consecutive sentencing without a presumption of correctness, we vacate the judgments of the trial court and remand for further sentencing proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bykeem Bret Jenkins
The defendant, Bykeem Bret Jenkins, pleaded guilty in 2007 in the Blount County Circuit Court to possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, a Class E felony, and received a two-year suspended sentence. In response to a timely petition for violation of the defendant's probation, the trial court revoked the probation and ordered the defendant to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals from the order of confinement. We affirm the trial court's order. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation v. Ida B. Street
In 1991, Ms. Street executed a note and deed of trust in favor of National Bank of Commerce. National Bank of Commerce immediately assigned the deed of trust to Troy & Nichols, Inc. In 1994, Chase acquired Troy & Nichols, and in 2003, National Bank of Commerce released the deed of trust. Chase brought suit claiming that the deed of trust had been erroneously released, seeking to rescind the releases and to reinstate the deed of trust. The trial court granted summary judgment to Chase, and we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Elgy Smith
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Elgy Smith, of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, and possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver, both Class B felonies; possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, and possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver, both Class E felonies. At sentencing, the trial court merged each pair of convictions and sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five persistent offender for the cocaine offense and five years as a Range III, persistent offender for the marijuana offense. Finding the Defendant to be a professional criminal, the trial court also ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of thirty years incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that his sentence is excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John H. Key, II, and Wanda Morrison v. Carolyn Lyle, et al
Appellees, as shareholders, leased a commercial building and property from a relative. When the relative died, the property was left to numerous heirs, including Appellees and the non-shareholder Appellants, and Appellee Carolyn Lyle was named property manager. Appellees fell behind on their rent owed pursuant to the lease, but ultimately repaid the arrearage, and disbursements were made to the property co-owners. Appellants sued, claiming that Lyle should be removed as property manager, that she was obligated to declare the lease in default and to re-let the property, and that the Appellees breached their fiduciary duties to the other property co-owners. The trial court denied Appellants' claims, and we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Owens v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Charles Owens, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of six counts of aggravated sexual battery. He received a sentence of twenty-four years. State v. Charles Owens, No. M2005-02571-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1094136, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 12, 2007), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Aug. 20, 2007). Petitioner's convictions were affirmed on appeal. Id. Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief on the basis of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing,the post-conviction court denied the petition for relief. Petitioner appeals, arguing that the post-conviction court improperly denied the petition for relief. We agree with the post-conviction court that Petitioner failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's failure to object to various things at trial, in part because this Court had already determined on direct appeal that the alleged "prosecutorial misconduct" at trial did not affect the outcome of trial. Accordingly, because we determine that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Christopher Dial
In Maury County on June 17, 2002, Appellant pled guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery. He was sentenced to two six-year sentences to be served consecutively. He was placed on probation. After violating probation, he was placed on Community Corrections. On July 10, 2008, Appellant's Community Corrections officer filed a violation report. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Appellants Community Corrections sentence and ordered him to serve his full twelve year sentence. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court abused it discretion in revoking his Community Corrections sentence and that the trial court did not have authority to impose the full twelve year sentence. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the Community Corrections sentence. However, we agree with Appellant that he had previously served the first six-year consecutive sentence, and the trial court can only impose the remaining six-year sentence. Therefore, we affirm the revocation of the Community Corrections sentence, and modify Appellant's sentence to six years. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michelle Shoemaker v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Michelle Shoemaker, was unsuccessful in her direct appeal to this Court from her convictions in Jackson County for first degree murder, conspiracy and tampering with evidence. These convictions resulted in an effective life sentence. See State v. Michelle Shoemaker, No. M2005-02652-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 3095446 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 2, 2006), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. March 12, 2007). Following her unsuccessful direct appeal, she filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that she was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel by both her trial and appellate counsel. After conducting an evidentiary hearing on the post-conviction petition, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner now appeals the post-conviction court's denial of her petition. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has been unable to prove that either trial or appellate counsel were ineffective. Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition. |
Jackson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Vaughn
A Davidson County jury found the defendant, Antonio Vaughn, guilty of possession of not less than one-half ounce nor more than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver within one thousand feet of a school, a class D felony. The trial court sentenced him, as a Range III career offender, to serve 12 years, at 100 percent, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the denial of his motion for a mistrial. After reviewing the parties' briefs, the record, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joseph Kevin Adams v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
The plaintiff made a claim under his homeowner’s insurance policy after his house burned. The insurer denied the claim because, after the policy was issued, the plaintiff deeded the property to his sons so that it would pass to them if he died, and he did not notify the insurer. The plaintiff sued the insurer for breach of contract. The insurer claimed that the plaintiff had no insurable interest in the property, that he breached a “warranty of ownership” under the policy, that he had a duty to disclose the change of ownership after the policy issued, and that he violated a provision of the policy addressing concealment and fraud. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and ordered the insurer to pay him approximately $72,000 in accordance with the policy limits. The trial court also awarded discretionary costs to the plaintiff, but it denied the plaintiff’s request for prejudgment interest. The insurer appeals, claiming that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the policy for various reasons, and that the trial court erred in awarding the plaintiff discretionary costs. The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in declining to award prejudgment interest. We affirm the trial court’s award pursuant to the insurance policy and its award of discretionary costs, and we vacate the portion of the judgment denying the request for prejudgment interest and remand for such an award. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
Samantha Mackus Knight v. James Darrell Mackus
At the parties’ divorce, Mother was named primary residential parent of their minor child and Father was allowed visitation. The parties continued living together for approximately one year following their divorce, and thereafter, they exercised alternating one-week visitation for approximately one year. Father petitioned to be named primary residential parent citing his increased visitation with the child as a material change in circumstances. The trial court denied his petition without making the findings required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-101(a)(2)(B)(i). We vacate the trial court’s order denying Father’s petition, and we remand to the trial court with instructions to make the necessary findings and then to render its decision accordingly. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Harry Richard
The Defendant-Appellant, Harry Richard, pled guilty in the Criminal Court of Shelby County to driving while under the influence of an intoxicant, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in a county workhouse. This sentence was suspended, and Richard was ordered to serve eleven months and twenty-eight days on probation. He was also assessed a six hundred dollar fine and ordered to pay fifteen dollars in other fees. Richard claims on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Pursuant to Rule 37 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, he reserved the following certified questions of law: (1) “Whether there was reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop for speeding”; (2) “Whether there was probable cause to arrest Harry Richard for DUI”; and (3) “Whether placing Harry Richard in the back of the squad car was a ‘brief detention’ in this instance.” Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |