James Morton Burris v. Lisa Estes Burris
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Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Suzanne D. Burkhart
The defendant, Suzanne D. Burkhart, appeals certified questions of law from the Sevier County Circuit Court, where she pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) and violation of the implied consent law. The reserved certified question challenges on constitutional grounds a Sevierville police officer’s basis for stopping her vehicle and also his authority for doing so outside the City of Sevierville. We affirm the action of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David M. Sharp v. Debbie F. Stevenson
I must respectfully dissent in this case. Unfortunately, I find that I disagree with both the majority opinion and the concurrence. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
David M. Sharp v. Debbie And Michael Stevenson
I concur in the result reached by Judge Farmer. However, because I reach the result by different reasoning, I write separately. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
David M. Sharp v. Debbie F. Stevenson
The trial court denied Father’s petition to modify custody of his three minor children, who are in the custody of their maternal grandparents. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jose E. Bejar, in Re: Liberty Bonding Company
The petitioner, Liberty Bonding Company, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of its request to return the $5000 paid as a final forfeiture on the bond for the defendant, Jose E. Bejar. The defendant violated his bond agreement in 1996, and the petitioner paid the final forfeiture in 1997. Some ten years later, the State dismissed the pending charges against the defendant. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the trial court’s denial because: (1) there was no written final order of forfeiture entered; and (2) the language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-133(c) (2006) prohibits the State from dismissing the underlying charges. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Cantrell v. Joe Easterling, Warden
In 1995, a Hickman County jury convicted the Petitioner of four counts of aggravated rape and one count of false imprisonment, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II multiple offender to a total effective sentence of eighty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, claiming the trial court did not have statutory authority to sentence him as a Range II multiple offender. The habeas court dismissed the petition without a hearing, finding that “[h]abeas corpus relief is not appropriate.” After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nicholas Allen Montieth
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Nicholas Allen Montieth, was found guilty of sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court imposed a sentence of three years as a Range One offender. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred by not allowing Defendant to impeach the victim with testimony of a prior inconsistent statement. Following our review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Lee Adams, Jr. v. State of Tennesse
Petitioner, Robert Lee Adams, was convicted by a Tipton County Jury of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with the intent to deliver and simple possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance. As a result, he was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to a fourteen-year sentence. This Court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions on appeal. State v. Robert Lee Adams, Jr., No. W2007-00880-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2152497 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 22, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2008). Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief on various grounds, including ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. We have reviewed the record and conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re IMP: a Child Under the Age of Eighteen Years, J.J.A., Petitioner/Appellant, v. M.P., et al.
Petitioner brought this action in Juvenile Court to establish paternity and set co-parenting time with the child. The mother answered and, as an affirmative defense, averred that the father had signed a waiver of his parental right and cited the statutes stating that a waiver of parental rights could not be revoked. The Trial Court appointed a guardian ad litem, and the sole issue tried by the Trial Court was whether the waiver should be voided on the grounds that the father had signed the waiver under duress and undue pressure. The Trial Judge found that the father failed to carry the burden of proof to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he signed the waiver of interest and notice due to fraud, duress or intentional misrepresentation. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Saundra J. Counce, RN, v. Asecension Health, et al.
The plaintiff, formerly an at-will employee of Baptist Hospital, filed this action asserting that she was wrongfully terminated from her employment. She asserted twelve claims, inter alia, retaliatory discharge, age and sex discrimination, sexual harassment, violation of wage and hour laws, and violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The trial court summarily dismissed all of the claims. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Ex Rel. Markie Jade Laxton v. Samuel Byron Biggerstaff
This is an appeal by the father requesting modification of his child support obligation due to |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
Lamar Tennessee, LLC, et al., v. Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals, et al.
The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County adopted a redevelopment plan for an area of the city which included the site of a long-existing billboard. The Tennessee Department of Transportation subsequently ordered the removal of the billboard to accommodate a road-widening project. The sign’s owner filed an application for a permit to relocate the sign on another portion of its leasehold, but the city declined to approve the application because the redevelopment plan totally prohibits signs of that type. The sign company filed a petition for certiorari in the Chancery Court of Davidson County, asserting that Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208 of the zoning statutes gave it the right to replace the sign. The court agreed, and ordered the city to re-evaluate the permit application in accordance with the statutory provisions for a pre-existing non-conforming use after a change of zoning. We reverse, finding that the grandfather provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208 have no applicability to the restrictions contained in redevelopment plans under Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-20-201 et seq. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Darnell Pinex v. State of Tennessee
The defendant, Larry Darnell Pinex, appeals from his Davidson County Criminal Court convictions of assault, attempted vandalism, and attempted theft. He claims that the trial court erred in not requiring the State to elect an offense to serve as the basis for the assault charge, that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions of assault and attempted vandalism, and that the trial court erroneously sentenced him on all convictions. The attempted vandalism conviction must be reversed, and that charge must be dismissed because insufficient evidence underlies the conviction. The assault conviction is affirmed as are the sentences for assault and attempted theft. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shuttleworth, Williams, Harper, Waring and Derrick, PLLC, v. Gary K. Smith, Smith, Sabbatini, & McLeary, PLLC
This dispute is between an attorney and his former firm. All parties to this suit appeal the trial court’s interpretation of their operating agreement about how the fees and expenses generated by the withdrawing member’s cases should be apportioned among them. The operating agreement gave the firm discretion to value the services provided by its other members, but the trial court correctly determined that the firm’s claimed value was not reasonable. We reverse the trial court’s holding with regard to the withdrawing lawyer’s interest in a member’s share of the expenses he is obligated to pay the firm. The trial court is affirmed on the issue of sanctions and as to its refusal to make an award to nonparties. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Charles M. Myer, III, et al. v. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
Property owners sued, alleging that the Metropolitan Government was using or taking their property without their permission and without compensation. The Metropolitan Government took an easement over the property by eminent domain and the State built the Victory Memorial Bridge over part of it. The Metropolitan Government later transferred its interest in the property to the State. Much later, the Metropolitan Government built the Gay Street Connector over part of the easement and maintained exclusive control over the part of the easement not used for the bridge. The trial court found for the government. The property owners appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Alice L. Warren v. David E. Warren
In a divorce action, Wife appeals the trial court’s division of the marital estate, its determination of her income for child support purposes, and its division of the parties’ income tax liabilities. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Jane Field, et al., v. The Ladies Hermitage Association and State of Tennessee
The heirs of the woman who conveyed Tulip Grove to the Ladies’ Hermitage Association filed suit claiming, among other things, that due to the Association’s failure to pay the heirs as required in the deed of conveyance, the property reverted to the heirs. We affirm the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment to the Association holding that the Association did not fail to comply with the obligations relevant to the reversion, so no reversion was triggered. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antionette Horton
The defendant, Antionette Horton, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and was sentenced to eighteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, she argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not in self-defense or defense of others. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kathy Melissa Cantrell v. Nissan North America, Inc., et al.
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been |
Warren | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Joe Turner v. Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire, LLC, et al.
Employee sustained a compensable injury to his lower back. He alleged that he also sustained a mental injury as a result of chronic pain. His employer contended that the chronic pa in and any menta l conditions a rising f rom it we re the re sult of seve ra l previous injurie s and surge rie s. The tria l court awa rded bene fits for the menta l injury. The employe r contends tha t the trial court erred by doing so. We disagree and affirm the judgment. |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Naomi Schutte, as Adminstrator of the Estate of William Anthony Lucy, deceased v. Cheyenne Johnson, Shelby County Assessor et al.
This appeal arises out of an action to refund tangible personal property taxes. The |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nigel Kavic Watkins
The Defendant, Nigel Kavic Watkins, was charged with one count of first degree felony murder and one count of aggravated child abuse. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of one count of reckless homicide, a Class D felony, and one count of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-215(b), -15-402(b). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years for reckless homicide and, as a violent offender, to twenty-five years for aggravated child abuse. The trial court ordered him to serve these sentences consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty-nine years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of certain autopsy photographs; (3) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him of aggravated child abuse; and (4) the trial court erred in setting the length of his sentence and in ordering consecutive service. We notice as plain error that the Defendant’s rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution’s double jeopardy clause were violated by his dual convictions. After our review, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated child abuse. We merge the Defendant’s reckless homicide conviction into his aggravated child abuse conviction and remand for resentencing. |
Smith | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Reid
The Defendant-Appellant, Kevin Reid, appeals the revocation of his intensive probation by the Circuit Court of Madison County, for which his original four-year term of probation was re-instated after the service of eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail. Reid originally pled guilty to attempted aggravated assault, a Class D felony, possession of a |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Johnny Bernosa Young
The Defendant-Appellant, Johnny Bernosa Young, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property valued at $1000 or more, a Class D felony. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in ordering Young to serve his felony sentences consecutively. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |