Michael Wright v. State of Tennessee
Appellant, Michael Wright, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was subsequently amended by appointed counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the petition was denied. On appeal, Appellant argues that he was entitled to post-conviction relief on his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Antonio Jones
Convicted of aggravated robbery and sentenced as a career offender to a prison term of 30 years, the defendant, Michael Antonio Jones, appeals and challenges both the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the propriety of the sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the Marshall County Circuit Court's judgment. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Delawrence Williams
This is a Rule 9, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress drug evidence seized from his home during a search executed pursuant to a warrant. The defendant, Delawrence Williams, is charged with possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver based on the drug evidence recovered from his home and with aggravated assault based on a domestic violence episode involving his girlfriend that preceded the issuance of the search warrant. At the suppression hearing, he argued that the officer’s affidavit in support of the warrant failed to establish probable cause because it did not contain sufficient facts to show that the defendant’s girlfriend, who was the source for the officer’s knowledge, satisfied the two-pronged test, as set forth in State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1989), for information supplied by a criminal informant. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the affidavit sufficiently demonstrated the basis for the informant’s knowledge and the reliability of her information. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court denying the motion to suppress. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrance D. Nichols
The appellant, Terrance D. Nichols, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that “reflection” in the context of the instruction on premeditation means “careful consideration,” and (2) the trial court committed plain error by permitting the State to engage in improper and prejudicial argument in its summation to the jury. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mary Jo Earl Headrick vs. William H. Headrick, Jr.
This appeal arises from a divorce in which the husband appeals the trial court's classification of separate and marital property as well as the division of these assets. The trial court reserved the issue of the wife's request for attorney's fees. Since all issues were not adjudicated by the final decree, the order was not final pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Accordingly, we hold that this appeal is premature and dismiss and remand to the trial court. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: A.Y.M. and A.N.W., Jr.
A.N.W., Sr., father, alone appeals the termination of his parental rights as to two children, A.Y.M. and A.N.W., Jr., the youngest of which had been removed from parental custody at birth due to the child's addiction to cocaine. A.N.W., Sr., challenges the trial court's findings that DCS exercised reasonable efforts to provide family services, that A.N.W., Sr., failed to substantially comply with permanency plan goals, that A.N.W., Sr., had abandoned these two children, and that the best interest of the children required termination of parental rights. We affirm the trial court's findings in all respects and remand the case for such other proceedings as may be necessary. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Milburn Edwards v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Milburn L. Edwards, appeals the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tenessee v. Christopher Demotto Linsey
A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Demotto Linsey, of one count of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, one count of possession of more than half an ounce of marijuana with the intent to sell, and one count of possession of an altered serial number item. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of fourteen years in prison. The Defendant appeals, contending: (1) the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to sustain his conviction for possession of cocaine; and (2) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgments. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ginger Jackson
The defendant, Ginger Jackson, was convicted of solicitation of first degree murder. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of eight years and six months. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the trial court erred by the admission of certain testimony; (2) that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence certain audiotape recordings; (3) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding the inaudible portions of the audiotape recordings; (4) that the trial court erred by failing to suppress the audiotape recording of the defendant's arrest; (5) that the trial court erred by denying the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the state's proof; (6) that the trial court erred by excluding certain evidence offered by the defendant; (6) that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence testimony regarding lawsuits involving the defendant and various public entities; (7) that the trial court erred by failing to require the state to elect the specific date on which the offense occurred; (8) that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing; and (9) that the sentence is excessive. The defendant has also asked this court to review her sentence under the guidelines of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The sentence is modified and the cause is remanded for consideration of the defendant's suitability for probation. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stanley Adams v. Warden, David Mills
The Petitioner, Stanley Adams, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Earl Jefferson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Earl Jefferson, was convicted by a jury of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. His conviction was affirmed by this Court on appeal. See State v. Earl T. Jefferson, No. W2000-00608-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 687061, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, June 12, 2001) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 29, 2001). The petitioner’s Rule 11 application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court was denied on October 29, 2001. Id. The petitioner then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. After counsel was appointed, an amended petition was filed, alleging that the petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that his right to a speedy trial was denied. The post-conviction |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Randy Alan Barnes v. Amy Robertson Barnes
This is a divorce case. In contemplation of a divorce grounded on irreconcilable differences, Husband and Wife entered into a Marital Dissolution Agreement. Subsequently, Husband filed a complaint for divorce, and the complaint, inter alia, disavowed the prior executed Marital Dissolution Agreement. The divorce case proceeded to trial, and the trial court granted the divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct and enforced the Marital Dissolution Agreement, dividing the marital property and debt. Husband appeals. Because Husband-Appellant repudiated the Marital Dissolution Agreement prior to the entry of the trial court’s Final Decree of Divorce, there was no agreement between the parties, and the Marital Dissolution Agreement should not have been enforced. We reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Perry Barnum
The defendant appeals his conviction for robbery, (1) contesting the sufficiency of the identification evidence, and (2) contending that his enhanced sentence of fourteen years was imposed errantly in light of Blakely v. Washington. Upon review, we conclude that the evidence was indeed sufficient to support the jury’s verdict and that the defendant’s prior convictions warrant the enhanced sentence of fourteen years. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dale Eugene Walker v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner Dale Eugene Walker appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Thomas, et al. - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur in the conclusion of the majority that Thomas’s conviction should be affirmed. As to the sentence of death, however, I respectfully dissent. As I have previously expressed in a long line of dissents, I believe that the comparative proportionality review protocol currently embraced by the majority is inadequate to shield defendants from the arbitrary and is proportionate imposition of the death penalty. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (1995 Supp.). I have consistently expressed my displeasure with the current protocol since the time of its adoption in State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn. 1997). See State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 529 (Tenn. 2004) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Leach, 148 S.W.3d, 42, 68 (Tenn. 2004) (Birch, J., concurringand dissenting); State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d 600, 632 (Tenn. 2004) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Berry, 141 S.W.3d 549, 589 (Tenn. 2004) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Holton, 126 S.W.3d 845, 872 (Tenn. 2004) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Davidson, 121 S.W.3d 600, 629-36 (Tenn. 2003) (Birch, J., dissenting); State v. Carter, 114 S.W.3d 895, 910-11 (Tenn. 2003) (Birch, J., dissenting); State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 288-89 (Tenn. 2002) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447, 467-68 (Tenn. 2002) (Birch, J., dissenting); State v. Stevens, 78 S.W.3d 817, 852 (Tenn. 2002) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. McKinney, 74 S.W.3d 291, 320-22 (Tenn. 2002) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 411, 431-32 (Tenn. 2001) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 720 (Tenn. 2001) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); Terry v. State, 46 S.W.3d 147, 167 (Tenn. 2001) (Birch, J., dissenting); State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 23-24 (Tenn. 2001) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 196, 233-34 (Tenn. 2000) (Birch, J., dissenting). As previously discussed, I believe that the problem with the current proportionality analysis is threefold: (1) the proportionality test is overbroad, (2) the pool of cases used for comparison is inadequate, and (3) review is too subjective. These flaws seriously undermine the reliability of the current proportionality protocol. See State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d at 793-800 (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting). In my view, the current comparative proportionality protocol is woefully inadequate to protect defendants from the arbitrary or disproportionate imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion affirming the imposition of the penalty of death. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio D. Aziz
The defendant, Anthony D. Aziz, appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's denial of alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Calvin J. Oliver v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary and that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to adequately explain the consequences of the pleas and for failing to raise the issue of his mental competency at the sentencing hearing. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cornelius Boales
The Appellant, Cornelius Boales, was convicted by a Henderson County jury of one count of felony possession of cocaine with the intent to sell, a class B felony, and one count of felony possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, a class E felony. For these crimes, Boales received an effective twelve-year sentence as a Range I offender. In addition, the trial court imposed a $100,000 fine as assessed by the jury for the cocaine conviction. On appeal, Boales argues (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support either of his convictions and (2) that the trial court erred in imposing the maximum sentence and the maximum fine for his class B felony conviction. After review, we conclude that the evidence supports the convictions and the length of the sentence imposed. However, we modify Boales’ fine of $100,000 to reflect assessment of a fine in the amount of $50,000. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Brandi Shantika Taylor v. Cedrick Cortez Wilson
Appellant challenges trial court’s dismissal of his petition, under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(4), seeking to rescind his voluntary legitimation of child, modify custody, set aside paternity order and modify child support arrearage, based on results of DNA test that conclusively proves that he is not the father of the child. We reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Lee Tuttle v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Christopher Lee Tuttle, appeals as of right the judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for drug-related offenses and effective forty-year sentence. The petitioner contends (1) that the state breached his plea agreement which undermined the voluntariness of his guilty plea and (2) that the state engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by acting vindictively and violating Rule 8(a), Tenn. R. Crim. P., requiring mandatory joinder. We affirm the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jamie L. Bailey
The defendant attempts to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37 while a motion is pending in the trial court. The trial court has held the defendant’s remaining motion in abeyance because the defendant has pursued this appeal. We find this appeal premature and remand the case to the trial court to complete the proceedings and issue a final judgment, from which the defendant may then appeal. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sandra Kaye Kemp Parish, et al., v. Jerry Donald Kemp, et al.
This appeal arises out of a complaint filed by Appellants seeking to invalidate certain inter vivos |
Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Barry Wayne Dunham
The defendant, Barry Wayne Dunham, was convicted by a Macon County Criminal Court jury of the first degree premeditated murder of his father and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by: (1) restricting defense counsel’s voir dire of the jury venire; (2) interfering with defense counsel’s examination of a witness and denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on the court’s allegedly prejudicial commentary on the witness’s testimony; and (3) disallowing a defense expert witness on the subject of domestic violence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Macon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Barry Wayne Dunham - Dissenting
I concur in most of the reasoning and results reached in the majority opinion. I respectfully disagree, though, with the conclusion that Dr. Goetting was not qualified to testify as an expert in this parent-child homicide case. The trial court excluded her testimony because it was the first time she had testified in such a case, she was a sociologist, and she relied on facts that were not in evidence. It concluded that her testimony would not be a substantial help to the jury. |
Macon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Javvor Thomas v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals |