State of Tennessee v. James Brent Moubray
The Defendant was convicted by a jury of possessing a firearm where alcoholic beverages are served, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served at seventy-five percent. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Weakley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Doug Jones vs. Eddie Gillette, Sr., et al
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Karen Mountjoy vs. City of Chattanooga
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Karen Mountjoy vs. City of Chattanooga
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Arfken & Associates, P.A. vs. Simpson Bridge Company, Inc.
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Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Arfken & Associates, P.A. vs. Simpson Bridge Company, Inc.
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Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
M.P.P.,al vs. D.L.K. In Re: C.E.P.
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Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Walter Fletcher v. Deanna M. Fletcher,
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Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Peggy Gaston vs. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Ins.
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McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Peggy Gaston vs. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Ins.
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McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
City of Collegedale vs. Hamilton County Water Treatment
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Petty vs. State
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Court of Appeals | ||
Jamie Mason vs. Charles Mason, Jr.
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Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
2001-02185-COA-R3-CV
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Roane | Court of Appeals | |
2000-02521-COA-R3-CV
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Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Services v. C.S.M. And L.M.M.
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Union | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Dewayne Carpenter
The defendant, Antonio Dewayne Carpenter, was indicted for premeditated murder, felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and especially aggravated robbery. The state filed notice seeking the death penalty. The defendant was convicted on each count of the indictment and the trial court merged the felony murder conviction with the premeditated murder conviction. At the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial, the jury imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The trial court ordered concurrent twenty-year sentences for especially aggravated kidnapping and especially aggravated robbery. All of these sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to three life sentences for federal convictions stemming from the same incident. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the dual sovereignty doctrine, which permits successive federal and state prosecutions for the same acts, should be abandoned. The judgments are affirmed. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Damien Darden
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Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mark Graham vs. Michael J. Mohr
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Lynn Hall, et al vs. Mark Bookout
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Judith Silvey vs. Darrel Silvey
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Barry Dunham v. State of Tennessee
On October 5, 1998, the defendant, Barry Dunham, pled guilty in the Macon County Criminal Court to one count of second degree murder and received a sentence of twenty-five years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant filed for post-conviction relief which was granted by the post-conviction court. The State now appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for new trial. |
Macon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Herring
The Defendant was convicted in Wayne County Circuit Court of five counts of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The Defendant received an effective sentence of seventy-five years incarceration. This Court subsequently reversed the five rape of a child convictions and remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the remaining two twelve-year sentences for aggravated sexual battery should be served consecutively or concurrently. The trial court determined that the sentences should be served consecutively for an effective sentence of twenty-four years incarceration. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in ordering that the Defendant's sentences for aggravated sexual battery run consecutively. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Johnson
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possessing with intent to sell less than 0.5 grams of a substance containing cocaine, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I standard offender to five years incarceration in the workhouse. The trial court suspended the sentence and placed the Defendant on probation for five years. Approximately four months later, a warrant was issued against the Defendant alleging that he had violated the terms and conditions of his probation. The warrant alleged that the Defendant had been arrested for evading arrest and aggravated assault, that the Defendant had failed to report these arrests to his probation officer, and that the Defendant had failed to report to his probation officer after being released from jail. Following a hearing on the warrant, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant now brings this appeal, in which he challenges the trial court's order requiring him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Reginald Merriweather
This case returns to this court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The defendant appeals his jury convictions of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and especially Because Ely and Bowers involve the issue of lesser-included offenses only, the remand does not alter the analyses in our original opinion as to other issues. However, the necessity of a new trial does render premature our earlier determination to dismiss the conviction for aggravated assault. So as to avoid confusion, sections I and II from our original opinion will be restated in their entirety. Sections III and IV, dealing with the conviction for aggravated assault and the issue of lesser-included offenses, have been changed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals |