State of Tennessee v. Wheatley Jamar Graham, III
W2000-01723-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge L. Terry Lafferty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roger A. Page

After a jury trial, Defendant, Wheatley Jamar Graham, III, was convicted of two counts of attempted first degree murder, three counts of aggravated assault and possession of a weapon in commission of a felony. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-four (24) years incarceration as a Range I offender for two counts of attempted first degree murder, 4.5 years incarceration for three counts of aggravated assault and 1.9 years for possession of a weapon in the commission of a felony. The trial court ordered all sentences to be served concurrently, but merged two counts of aggravated assault with the two counts of attempted first degree murder. In this appeal as of right Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to convict Defendant of attempted first degree murder in counts 3 and 4 of the indictment; (2) whether the trial court erred by permitting the State to introduce evidence that Defendant refused to permit law enforcement officers to obtain a "hand swab" from him; and (3) whether the trial court erred in not dismissing Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault in counts 7 and 8 instead of merging these convictions with counts 3 and 4, attempted first degree murder, as being in violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy. We conclude that the evidence in this record supports Defendant's convictions for attempted first degree murder, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling Defendant's refusal for hand swabs was admissible and the trial court's merging of the two counts of aggravated assault with the attempted first degree murder conviction was not double jeopardy. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Margo Ellis
W2000-02242-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald H. Allen

The Appellant, Margo Ellis, appeals from the Henderson County Circuit Court's judgment revoking her sentence of community corrections. Following revocation, Ellis' three-year sentence was ordered to be served in the Department of Correction. At the time of Ellis' indictment and on the date her guilty plea was entered, the trial judge who presided at Ellis' revocation hearing was employed as an assistant district attorney in the same office that prosecuted Ellis. On appeal, Ellis raises one issue for our review: Whether "the trial court erred by neglecting to disqualify himself from presiding over [her] revocation hearing." After review, we find no error and affirm the trial court's judgment.

State of Tennessee v. Ralph Phillips
W2000-02317-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

The Defendant, Ralph Phillips, appeals as of right from the sentence imposed by the trial court, asserting that the trial court erred by denying his request for community corrections. We find no error; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Wardel Glenn
W2000-02590-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

The Defendant, Jimmy Wardel Glenn, was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to deliver over .5 grams of cocaine. He was subsequently sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to nine years incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by failing to grant a mistrial after a comment made by the State during its opening statement and that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. We find no error; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Bobby J. Armstrong
W2000-02598-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

The Appellant, Bobby J. Armstrong, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Armstrong's convictions stem from his guilty pleas to two counts of felony murder and two resulting consecutive sentences of life without the possibility of parole. In this appeal, Armstrong raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made; and (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a competency hearing to determine Armstrong's mental condition. After review, we find Armstrong's guilty plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary and that he received effective assistance of counsel. As such, we affirm the judgment of the Madison County Circuit Court.

State of Tennessee v. Joe L. Patrick, Sr.
W2000-02998-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge L. Terry Lafferty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

This is an appeal by the State of Tennessee as to whether the trial court erred in granting the Appellee/Defendant's motion to award program credits toward his release date from the Department of Corrections. After docketing of this case on May 8, 2001, for disposition of the State's appeal, the State filed a motion to consider post-judgment fact pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedures 14(a). After a review of the motion and the attached affidavit in support of the motion, we granted the State's motion. After a review of the entire record, and the motion for post-judgment of fact, we find that the Defendant has been released from the Department of Corrections and, thus, this appeal is dismissed.

Anthony E. Brasfield v. State of Tennessee
W2001-00169-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge William B. Acree

The Appellant, Anthony E. Brasfield, appeals from the dismissal by the Weakley County Circuit Court of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Brasfield asserts that the trial court erred in finding that his trial counsel was not ineffective by failing to preserve in his direct appeal the issues of (1) the trial court's suppression of his confession to the police and (2) the trial court's failure to charge misdemeanor escape as a lesser-included offense of felony escape. With regard to the first issue, we find that although trial counsel was deficient, no prejudice resulted. With regard to Brasfield's second issue, we find that misdemeanor escape is not a lesser-included offense of felony escape; therefore, no error occurred. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Gregory Scott Caudill v. State of Tennessee
E2000-00586-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ben W. Hooper, II

A Cocke County grand jury indicted the petitioner on four counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated assault. On November 28, 1994, the petitioner pled guilty to all six counts. Following a sentencing hearing, he received twelve years on each aggravated robbery and six years on each aggravated assault. The trial court then ran some of the sentences consecutively resulting in an effective sentence of thirty years as a Range I, standard offender. On direct appeal this Court modified the sentence to twenty-four years. State v. Gregory Scott Caudill, No. 03C01-9510-CC-00338, 1997 WL 7009 at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, January 9, 1997). The petitioner's application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court was denied. Thereafter, he filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging errors made with regard to his plea. Counsel was appointed to assist him; an amended petition was filed; and the trial court conducted a hearing thereon. At the conclusion of this hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. Through this appeal the petitioner avers that the trial court failed to comply with Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure in taking his plea. More particularly, he alleges that the trial court did not advise him of the mandatory minimum and maximum penalties that he could potentially receive. After reviewing the record, we find that the petitioner's specific claim lacks merit. However, through its brief the State observes that constitutionally mandated advice concerning the petitioner's confrontation rights was not provided by the trial court in its colloquy at the time of the petitioner's plea. Therefore, the State requests that this Court remand the case for a hearing to determine if this omission was harmless. We agree and remand the matter for this purpose.

Christopher Stacy Long v. State of Tennessee
E2000-01909-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge James Edward Beckner

The Petitioner pled guilty to first degree felony murder and to forgery, receiving concurrent sentences of life with the possibility of parole and one year's incarceration, respectively. The Petitioner subsequently petitioned the trial court for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied post-conviction relief. The Petitioner now appeals this decision. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when he entered his pleas of guilty, causing him to enter his pleas involuntarily and unknowingly. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the Petitioner's representation was not deficient and thus affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Zan Ray McCracken
E2000-1762-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Jerry Beck

The defendant appeals from his Sullivan County Criminal Court conviction and sentence for driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months and 29 days, with a six-month period of confinement, 45 days of which had to be served in continuous confinement. After the six-month confinement period, the defendant would serve the balance of the sentence on supervised probation. The trial court approved a $1,200 fine recommended by the jury. In this direct appeal, the defendant complains that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court committed reversible error in the guilt phase by allowing the jury to be informed that the defendant previously had been convicted of DUI, and that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of a conforming judgment.

Anthony P. Jones v. State of Tennessee
M2000-01416-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Walter C. Kurtz

The petitioner, Anthony P. Jones, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to three counts of aggravated sexual battery and received consecutive sentences of ten years for each count for a total effective sentence of thirty years. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were involuntary and unknowing. The post-conviction court denied his petition. Consequently, the petitioner presents the following issue for our review: whether the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim for post-conviction relief. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Damien Marcess Jackson
M2000-00763-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

The Defendant, Damien Marcess Jackson, was indicted for first degree murder and two counts of attempted first degree murder. A jury convicted the Defendant of second degree murder and two counts of attempted second degree murder. He was subsequently sentenced as a Range I offender to twenty-five years for the murder and twelve years for each of the attempted murders, all to run consecutively. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress; the trial court's refusal to order the State to disclose the identity of a confidential informant; the sufficiency of the evidence; and the length and manner of service of his sentences. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Jean Kelly Fisher Wallace v. Richard Edward Wallace
02A01-9702-CH-00029
Authoring Judge: Judge Hewitt P. Tomlin
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Neal Small

This is a post-divorce custody proceeding. Jean Kelly Fisher Wallace (“mother”) was
granted a divorce in the Chancery Court of Shelby County from Richard Edward Wallace
(“father”) in May, 1992. Mother was awarded custody of the parties’ minor child, Caroline. In
April, 1995, father filed a petition to change legal custody from mother to father. Following a
bench trial, the court denied the relief sought by father and permitted custody to remain with
mother. The court delayed its decision for six months, principally to allow mother the
opportunity to make changes in two aspects of her life: (1) the neighborhood in which she and
the minor child had been living for slightly over a year and (2) her ongoing association and
relationship with her boyfriend. The trial court felt both aspects were detrimental to the welfare
of the parties’ child.

Sara J. and Jerry H. Malone v. First Capital Home Improvements
02A01-9704-CV-00091
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge John Franklin Murchison

Defendant First Capital Home Improvements appeals the trial court’s judgment entered in favor of Plaintiffs/Appellees Sara J. Malone and Jerry H. Malone in this breach of contract action. We affirm.

Barbara Korthoff vs. Herbert Korthoff
W2001-01712-COA-R10-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Kay S. Robilio
In this pending divorce action, the trial court ordered Husband to transfer $300,000.00 to Wife as a partial distribution of the marital estate. Husband filed an application for extraordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10 Tenn. R. App. P. which this Court granted. Husband contends that the trial court is without authority to make a partial distribution of marital funds during the pendency of the divorce action. Furthermore, if the court had such authority, it could not do so absent an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the property was marital or separate. The application was granted and the order of the trial court reversed.

State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services, v. Amy Diane Bottoms, and Brian Bottoms, Sr. In the Matter of: Brian Scott Bottoms, Jr., Israel Vaughn Bottoms, and Elijah Keane Bottoms
01A01-9706-JV-00249
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Judge Andrew J. Shookhoff

Brian Bottoms, Sr., and Amy Bottoms have appealed from the judgment of the Juvenile
Court, terminating their parental rights in respect to Brian Scott Bottoms, aged 7, Israel Vaughn
Bottoms, aged 5, and Elijah Keane Bottoms, aged 2, and placing them in the legal guardianship
of AGAPE with the right to place them for adoption.

Sheila Faye Hagen McCall Barnett v. Ronald Edward Barnett, Sr.
01A01-9706-CV-00244
Authoring Judge: Presiding W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Muriel Robinson

Plaintiff, Sheila Faye Hagen McCall Barnett (Wife), and defendant, Ronald Edward Barnett, Sr. (Husband), were divorced by decree entered January 9, 1997. Husband appeals and presents issues concerning property division, alimony, and attorney’s fees.

John Watson Little, et. al. and Leslie Earl Little, Executors for the Estate of Leslie H. Llittle, Deceased, . v. Michael Hogan, Jeff Payne et. al.
01A01-9707-CV-00291
Authoring Judge: Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee Russell

The captioned executors filed this suit to recover damages for the wrongful death of 88
year old Leslie H. Little, deceased, who lost his life in a motor vehicle collision at the
intersection of North Main Street and Colloredo Boulevard in Shelbyville, Bedford County,
Tennessee. Movement of traffic through the intersection was controlled by the multicolored
lights of an ordinary traffic control signal.
Several

George Stinson, Edward D. Lewis, and Gelsco of Tennessee, Inc., v. 138 Fifth Avenue South, et. al. and Metro Development and Housing Authority - Concurring
01A01-9702-CV-00060
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell

I concur in the conclusion that paragraph 17 of the lease was not triggered by the sale from the lessors to MDHA. I am also of the opinion that the critical sentence beginning with “All damages awarded for such taking . . .” refers to a partial taking, because the damages are described later in the sentence as “compensation for diminution in value to the leasehold or to the fee of the property herein leased.” A taking of the whole would not diminish the value of the leasehold or the fee; it would extinguish the leasehold and the fee and replace them with a monetary award.

William Craig Browning v. James River Corporation
W1999-01799-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: J. Steven Stafford, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris, Chancellor
The trial court determined that the plaintiff suffered a 5% vocational impairment to each leg. The defendant asserts that the plaintiff failed to provide proper notice of his injuries; that he failed to prove that the injuries arose out of and within the course and scope of his employment; and that the evidence does not support the amount of vocational disability awarded. For the reasons set forth below, We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

William Craig Browning v. James River Corporation
W1999-01799-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Wil V. Doran, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris, Chancellor
The trial court determined that the plaintiff suffered a 5% vocational impairment to each leg. The defendant asserts that the plaintiff failed to provide proper notice of his injuries; that he failed to prove that the injuries arose out of and within the course and scope of his employment; and that the evidence does not support the amount of vocational disability awarded. For the reasons set forth below, We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Dept. of Children's Svcs. vs. Pamela Cox, et al
M1999-01598-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Holloway
This case presents two issues. The first is whether proper notice was given to the mother of a dependent and neglected child to meet due process requirements and allow adjudication of her right to visitation and of the goal of the permanency plan for the child. The second issue is whether the evidence preponderated against the trial court's decision to change the goal of the permanency plan to termination of parental rights and terminate the mother's visitation. We affirm the circuit court on both issues finding no due process violation and more than adequate evidence to support the trial court's decision.

James Dortch, Sr. vs. Evonne Dortch
M1999-02053-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Muriel Robinson
This appeal involves a dispute over the division of a marital estate following a seventeen-year marriage. Both parties sought a divorce in the Circuit Court for Davidson County. During a short bench trial, they stipulated that each of them had grounds for divorce but contested the classification, valuation, and division of their separate and marital property. The trial court declared the parties divorced and undertook to divide their marital estate equally. Both parties are dissatisfied with the division of the marital estate. The husband asserts that the trial court made a significant mathematical error in calculating the amount required to equalize the division. For her part, the wife asserts that the trial court misclassified items of separate property as marital property. We have determined that the trial court properly determined that the parties should receive equal shares of the net marital estate. However, we also find that the trial court misclassified a number of items of the wife's separate property and erroneously calculated the amount to be awarded to the wife to equalize the division of the marital estate. Accordingly, we have corrected the errors and affirm the judgment as modified herein.

James Ray vs. Thomas Richards
M2000-01808-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant for personal injuries resulting from an alleged assault which occurred on October 20, 1998. The jury found for Defendant. Plaintiff appeals raising two issues: (1) Whether the trial court committed reversible error by admitting evidence of Plaintiff's character, reputation, conduct, and criminal records, and (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the neighbor's petition describing Plaintiff as a public nuisance into evidence. We affirm the trial court.

Connie McGahey vs. James Wilson
M2000-01931-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
Upon divorce, the parties entered into an agreement that provided the parties would retain ownership as the marital residence as tenants in common, but could not sell the property without mutual consent. Mrs. McGahey now desires to partition the property over her former husband's objection. The special master found that the contract provision barring partition was unenforceable. The chancellor found the provision enforceable but only for a reasonable period of time (sixteen years). Mr. Wilson now appeals the trial court's judgment ordering partition by sale. Resolution of this appeal requires us to examine the effect of a contract barring partition between tenants in common when no time limitation or purpose for the restriction against sale was stated in the agreement. We hold the contract provision to be unenforceable.