Nikki F. Nelson v. Magnetic Separation Systems, Inc., and
M1999-02009-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John A. Turnbull, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Irvin Kilcrease, Jr., Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with the Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee contends the Chancellor erroneously: [1] considered as substantive evidence the medical report of Dr. Miller; [2] failed to find her elbow, shoulder, neck and spine disabilities were caused by her work, and therefore [3] rendered an inadequate award. As discussed below, the panel concludes that the parties offered voluminous medical records, including those of Dr. Miller, which were, without objection or limitation, treated by the parties throughout the trial as substantive evidence. The chancellor properly treated those reports as substantive evidence. The panel further concludes the chancellor's decision limiting the award to work-related disability to the hands and wrists is supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and that the award of 2 percent disability to both arms should be affirmed in all respects. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed. JOHN A. TURNBULL, Sp. J., in which FRANK F. DROWOTA , III, and FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR.,, Sp.J., joined. Peter D. Heil and Michael A. Friedland, Alan Wise, Stillman, Karr, & Wise, Nashville, TN, for the appellant, Nikki F. Nelson Sean Antone Hunt, Spicer, Flynn & Rudstrom, PLLC, Nashville, TN, for the appellees, Magnetic Separation Systems, Inc. and Travelers Insurance Co. MEMORANDUM OPINION Nikki Nelson worked for Magnetic Separation Systems as an electronics technician, a job which included assembling electronic devices. Her job included some highly repetitive work with screwdrivers and other hand tools. There is a significant dispute in the testimony and other evidence as to whether the tasks required hand and wrist activity which were both forceful and repetitive. Live demonstrations of the tasks required and a video tape of the assembly work were a part of the evidence at trial. Ms. Nelson was not a happy employee. Her 18 month tenure with her employer was marked with numerous inter-office memos demonstrating a deteriorating relationship with her supervisors, and dissatisfaction by the employer with the quantity and quality of Ms. Nelson's work. During her last months of work for MMS, Ms. Nelson began having hand and wrist problemsand reported: "My hands and wrists were hurting from doing coil bobbins all day. Normally I would work until my hands fell off, but being put on 3 days probation and all, my husband told me to go to the doctor." The first among many doctors who treated Ms. Nelson was Dr. David McCoy, her family doctor, who first saw her on February 5, 1995. Clinical testing and the history related by Ms. Nelson caused Dr. McCoy to form the opinion that she had work-related carpal tunnel syndrome. Ms. Nelson then selected Dr. Jack Miller, an orthopaedic surgeon, from a list of doctors furnished by MMS. Dr. Miller treated her from February 14, 1995 until September, 1996. On his initial examination, Dr. Miller, based on Ms. Nelson's complaints of rather severe pain in both wrists together with positive Phalen sign and Tinel sign, diagnosed carpel tunnel syndrome and referred her to a neurologist for EMG testing. Dr. Miller was "shocked" that Ms. Nelson's initial EMG was normal and elected not to perform carpel tunnel release surgery at that time, but instead, Dr. Miller treated Ms. Nelson conservatively with physical therapy and cortisone injections. Dr. Miller directed that she not work. When Ms. Nelson's symptoms did not improve, Dr. Miller, in March, 1995, thought "carpel tunnel release is going to be justified, being recommended even though EMG's are normal." The employer then referred Ms. Nelson to Dr. Stephen Pratt for a second opinion. Dr. Pratt was "most certain that it is not carpel tunnel syndrome" and did not recommend carpel tunnel release surgery. Upon receiving Dr. Pratt's report, Dr. Miller elected not to proceed with surgery at that time. Dr. David Gaw did an independent medical exam in October, 1995, and agreed with Dr. Miller that Ms. Nelson had carpal tunnel syndrome, and recommended that she have surgery, even without a positive EMG. Dr. Miller again examined Ms. Nelson in October of 1995, and "strongly recommended carpal tunnel release" because of her persistent, long-standing complaints and clinical symptoms. Not satisfied to authorize surgery, the worker's compensation insurer, Travelers, sought a fourth opinion from Dr. Michael Milek who examined Ms. Nelson in January, 1996. Dr. Milek found "classic" carpel tunnel compression phenomena" and opined that "in all likelihood, she does have bilateral carpel tunnel compression." He recommended a repeat electrical study, and if "the electrical study is abnormal, then I would recommend carpel tunnel release." Finally, in May, 1995, surgery was authorized by Travelers, and bilateral carpel tunnel release surgery was performed on May 8, 1996, by the company doctor, Dr. Jack Miller, who noted during surgery that "the median nerve did not appear to be significantly altered." In subsequent visits in May, June, July, September of 1996, Ms. Nelson reported serially to Dr. Miller "her pain is 95 -2-

Ralph Dean Pierce, Jr., et al v. Cincinnati Casualty Insurance Company, et al
M2000-00273-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Tom E. Gray, Sp.J.
Trial Court Judge: Larry G. Ross, Judge
In this case, the employer, appellant, contends that (1) the trial court erred in awarding permanent disability benefits for the right arm, and (2) the trial court's award of 62% permanent partial disability for employee's left arm was excessive. The employee contends that the award to the right arm was insufficient. For reasons stated below, the trial court is affirmed.

Tommy C. Smith v. Continental Casualty Ins. Company and Leggett and Platt, Inc., et al
M2000-00574-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Tom E. Gray, Sp.J.
Trial Court Judge: Don R. Ash, Chancellor
The plaintiff, Tommy C. Smith, appeals the judgment of the Chancery Court of Rutherford County where the trial court found that the plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proof that he sustained a compensible injury as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-12(12). For the reasons stated in this opinion, We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mary Martin v. Catholic Mutual Group
M2000-00228-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Tom E. Gray, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: James Weatherford, SR. J. by designation
The trial court awarded to the employee a forty (4%) percent vocational disability to each arm for the work related injury of bilateral carpel tunnel syndrome. No award of vocational disability was made to the claimant for bilateral epicondylitis and the trial court found evidence was insufficient to award future medical for epicondylitis. We affirm the findings of the trial court.

Wallace Downey James, Jr. v. Tennsco Corporation, et al
M1999-01088-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Tom E. Gray, Sp. J
Trial Court Judge: Leonard W. Martin, Chancellor
Appellant presents one issue to be determined and that is whether the trial court erred in finding that the appellant did not carry the requisite burden of proof in establishing that he sustained a compensable workers' compensation injury. In addition to the issue raised by Appellant, Appellee presents to the Court the issue of whether the employee's appeal should be dismissed for failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. While the deficiencies are serious violations of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the issue raised by the Appellant has been thoroughly reviewed by the panel, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Luke Keeling v. Florida Steel, Now Known As Ameristeel
W1999-00433-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris, Chancellor
The defendant appeals from the trial judge's finding that: the plaintiff sustained an injury within the course and scope of his employment; that he suffered a thirty-five percent vocational disability; and that he did not have a meaningful return to work. The defendant also appeals the trial court's holding that it was not entitled to a set off for funds paid to the plaintiff under a self-insurance plan. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Felipe Aguirre v. James and Patsy Chambers, d/b/a Big C
E2000-00980-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: O. Duane Sloan, Circuit Judge
Plaintiff Felipe Aguirre suffered the loss and amputation of his arm as a result of a traffic accident allegedly occurring in the course of his employment with defendant. The circuit court found the accident to be unconnected to his employment and dismissed his suit. We affirm.

Gerald Atkins v. Wozniak Industries, Inc.,
W2000-00665-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe H. Walker III, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: George R. Ellis, Chancellor
Employee suffered a brown recluse spider bite while at work. The incident resulted in infectious eczematoid dermatitis that affected his ability to work by causing swelling, interfering with sweating, severe itching and required employee to be cautious of overheating from direct rays of sunlight, justifying an award of forty percent to the body as a whole.

Dottie Lou Bell Hampton v. Henry I. Seigel Co., Inc.,
W2000-01272-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Julian P. Guinn, Judge
The employer and its insurer contend the employee's disability was caused by an independent intervening cause, namely a gradually occurring injury while working for a subsequent employer, and that the award of permanent partial disability benefits is excessive. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the evidence fails to preponderate against the findings of the trial court.

Vernon West v. State of Tennessee
W1999-01604-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Fred Axley

Vernon West appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. West collaterally attacks his conviction for second degree murder upon the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to sever, for failing to investigate the case and for failing to call two witnesses to testify at trial. After review of the record, we affirm the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief.

State of Tennessee v. Stacey Philander Baldon
W2000-00524-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

Defendant was convicted by a Lauderdale County jury of possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class B felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. In addition, defendant entered a guilty plea to felony possession of a firearm, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender, and received concurrent sentences of twelve years, eleven months and twenty-nine days, and two years respectively. Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying his request for a severance of defendants; (3) whether the trial court erred in excluding the prior recorded testimony of his co-defendant; (4) whether the trial court improperly allowed the arresting officer to testify as to his opinion regarding the veracity of co-defendant's admission; (5) whether the jury pool was tainted by statements of a potential juror; and (6) whether the state improperly exercised its peremptory challenges. Upon our review of the record, we find defendant's allegations to be without merit; thus, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In Re: Sierra Cheyenne Satterwhite
E2000-02107-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: W. Frank Brown, III
The Maternal Grandparents of the Minor Child filed a petition to terminate the biological father's and Mother's parental rights to Minor Child and to adopt her. The Minor Child, who was born out of wedlock, had lived with her Maternal Grandparents all of her life. She viewed her grandparents as her parents. Default judgment was granted against Mother. Father never supported the child and had limited visitation with her. The Trial Court terminated both the biological Father's and Mother's parental right's. Father appealed. We affirm the decision of the Trial Court.

Vesta Mosley vs. Tennessee Water Service & Sales
E2000-01713-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.
In this appeal from the Circuit Court of Anderson County the Defendant/Appellant, Tennessee Water Service and Sales, Inc., appeals the Circuit Court's order which denied Tennessee Water's motion for a new trial and overruled its objection to entry of a final judgment in favor of Plaintiff/ Appellee, Vesta G. Mosley. It is our finding that Tennessee Water did not receive notice of the hearing which resulted in the final judgment against it and, therefore, we vacate such judgment and reverse the Circuit Court's order overruling Tennessee Water's objection to entry of the judgment and its motion for a new trial. We remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Harold Lovelace, D/B/A The Last Chance Club, et al vs. City of Knoxville
E2000-01609-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Sharon J. Bell
In this Declaratory Judgment action the Trial Court held portions of a City Ordinance unconstitutional relative to notice provisions, the term "open for business" and "open display". We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.

Roy Malone vs. Harleysville Mutual In. Co.
E2000-01308-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Howell N. Peoples
This matter involves a dispute concerning a fire and casualty insurance policy ("Policy") which covered an apartment complex, Star Chase Apartments. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company ("Defendant") was the insurance carrier, and the named insured was John L. Oliver, LLC ("Oliver"). A fire in one of the apartment buildings caused substantial damage. Approximately six months later, Oliver sold Star Chase to Roy M. Malone, Sr. ("Plaintiff"), prior to starting any repairs to the burned building. Oliver also assigned to Plaintiff his right to the proceeds under the Policy, and Defendant acknowledged this assignment. The Trial Court found that Plaintiff, as Oliver's assignee, was entitled to recover the replacement cost of the burned building, plus prejudgment interest. The Trial Court denied Plaintiff recovery for business loss. Plaintiff appeals the amount awarded to him as the replacement cost and the Trial Court's denial of any additional recovery for business loss. Defendant argues that the assignment of the "proceeds" to Plaintiff did not entitle Plaintiff to recover any amount as replacement cost for repairs done after the assignment. Defendant also objects to the amount of the replacement cost found by the Trial Court and to the awarding of prejudgment interest. We reverse the Trial Court's award of prejudgment interest and affirm all other aspects of the judgment.

Judy (Kendrick) Shoemake vs. Timothy Lee Kendrick
E2000-01318-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: William M. Dender
In this appeal from the Chancery Court for Hamilton County the Appellant, Judy (Kendrick) Shoemake questions whether the Trial Court erred in granting a petition to modify custody filed by the Appellee, Timothy Lee Kendrick, and whether the Trial Court erred in its determination of the amount due her for child support arrearage and unreimbursed medical expenses paid by her on behalf of the parties' minor children. We reverse in part, modify in part and remand for further proceedings, if any, consistent with this opinion. We adjudge costs of the appeal against Judy (Kendrick) Shoemake and Timothy Lee Kendrick equally.

FTA Enterprises, Inc. vs. Pomeroy Computer Resources, Inc. & Daniel Cole
E2000-01246-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: John S. Mclellan, III
In this action for interference with business relations, interference with contract, breach of fiduciary duty, et., a jury awarded both compensatory and punitive damages in differing amounts against the defendants. The Trial Judge approved the jury verdicts and defendants have appealed. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Kevin Wayne Brim
M1999-01925-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

The defendant appeals from the revocation of his probation, contending that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Barbara Jo Heck, et al v. City of Sevierville
E2000-00464-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rex Henry Ogle

In this suit the Plaintiffs seek damages for injuries received by Barbara Jo Heck when she slipped on a patch of ice and fell on property owned by the City of Sevierville. The Trial Court found that the City had no actual or constructive notice of the presence of the ice causing Mrs. Heck to fall and, accordingly, dismissed the complaint. We affirm under Rule 10(a) of the Court of Appeals.

Tommie A. Drumwright v. Anderson Hickey Company and
W1999-00817-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: W. Michael Maloan, Sp. J
Trial Court Judge: Martha B. Brasfield, Chancellor
The plaintiff, Tommie A. Drumwright, appeals the judgment of the trial court which found the plaintiff failed to carry her burden of proving a work-related injury and dismissed her claim. For the reasons stated in this opinion, We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Tiffany R. Weatherspoon
W2000-00971-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

The defendant, Tiffany R. Weatherspoon, pled guilty in the Hardin County Circuit Court to the Class B felony of unlawful possession of over .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, with the intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell. She received the agreed-upon sentence of eight years, as a Range I offender, and a $2,000 fine. The trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered that the defendant be incarcerated. She appealed, arguing that the court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Based upon our review, we affirm the order of the trial court.

Jerry Trusty, et al., v. Capri Robinson, et al.
M2000-01590-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clara W. Byrd

This appeal arises from a landlord-tenant dispute over damage to residential property. After the landlords obtained a $3,600 judgment in the Smith County General Sessions Court, the tenants appealed to the Circuit Court for Smith County. A jury awarded the landlords $4,500. On this appeal, the appellants assert that the trial court erred by (1) permitting the landlords' lawyer to exercise a peremptory challenge in a racially discriminatory manner, (2) permitting the landlords' lawyer to make prejudicial statements to the jury during opening argument, (3) providing a supplemental instruction in response to the jury's question, and (4) failing to enter a detailed order denying their motion for new trial. We find nothing deficient in the trial court's order denying the motion for new trial. In addition, the absence of either a transcript or a statement of the evidence or proceedings prevents us from considering the substance of the tenants' other issues. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and find that the appeal is frivolous.

State of Tennessee v. John E. Parnell
W1999-00562-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph B. Brown

The defendant was convicted by a Shelby County jury of criminally negligent homicide and aggravated child abuse. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of two years for the homicide charge and twenty years for the aggravated child abuse charge. In this appeal as a matter of right, the defendant alleges (1) he was incompetent to stand trial, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the guilty verdict for aggravated child abuse. The defendant was indicted in count one for aggravated child abuse by treating the child in a manner so as to inflict injury; the defendant was indicted in count two for aggravated child abuse by neglecting the child so as to adversely affect his health and welfare; the jury was instructed to consider count two only if the defendant was found not guilty of count one; the jury found guilt only as to count one; the jury never returned a verdict on count two; and the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict under count one. Although the evidence overwhelmingly establishes guilt of aggravated child abuse by neglect as alleged in count two, the jury's failure to return a verdict on this count requires a remand for retrial on count two. We affirm the conviction for criminally negligent homicide.

James Robert Whitworth v. State of Tennessee
W2000-02000-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge James C. Beasley, Jr.

The petitioner, who is currently in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, entered pleas of guilty in 1974 in the Shelby County Criminal Court to the offenses of assault and battery with intent to rape and attempt to commit a felony, to wit: crime against nature. In 2000, he filed a petition to vacate and set aside these sentences, claiming that his pleas of guilty were not voluntary, that his counsel had been ineffective, and that he was innocent of the charges. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely, the statute of limitations having expired before it was filed; and the petitioner timely appealed. Based upon our review, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition as untimely.

John Hapney, et al., v. James Warren, et al.
E2000-00783-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Judge O. Duane Slone

In this case the plaintiffs are seeking damages for personal injuries received in a vehicle accident. The plaintiffs were exiting the interstate and were bumped from the rear by the vehicle driven by Mrs. Warren. While other facts relating to the accident were disputed, it was undisputed that there was no physical injury to either of the vehicles or their contents. The police were not called to the scene and no report was made. The plaintiffs filed suit to collect damages for injuries to Mrs. Hapney's neck which she claimed were received in the accident. The jury found no negligence on the part of the defendants. One of the doctors, who saw Mrs. Hapney, testified for the defendants in the case as to causation of Mrs. Hapney's injuries. In their motion for a new trial and on appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of the doctor. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial. The plaintiffs appeal challenging the jury verdict and the admission of the doctor's testimony. We affirm the trial court.