State of Tennessee v. Thorne Peters
A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Thorne Peters, of one count of simple possession of marijuana, see T.C.A. § 39-17-418, and the trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days’ incarceration in the local workhouse; with respect to the manner of service, the judgment said,“[T]ime served.” On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, the trial court’s granting the State’s motion to quash a subpoena of the former sheriff, and the trial court’s limitation of crossexamination of a witness. Discerning neither a paucity in the evidence nor reversible error committed by the trial court, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for clarification of pretrial jail credit. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremiah L. Woods
The defendant, Jeremiah L. Woods, was convicted by a Madison County jury of one count of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. He contends that the evidence is insufficient only with regard to the element of premeditation. Following review of the record, we conclude that the evidence of premeditation in the record is overwhelming and, accordingly, affirm the conviction. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Kenneth Dubose
The defendant, Robert Kenneth Dubose, appeals the decision of the Hardin County Circuit Court revoking his probationary sentence. The defendant pled guilty to rape, a Class B felony, and received a sentence of eight years. The sentence was to be suspended to supervised probation following the service of one year. Subsequently, a violation warrant was issued charging the defendant with multiple violations of the terms and conditions of his probation. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered the balance of the sentence be served in the Department of Correction. Following review, we conclude that the defendant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the revocation or in imposing a sentence of confinement. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randall Murphy
The defendant, Randell Murphy, appeals from his Madison County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded convictions of burglary of an automobile; theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000; vandalism of property valued at $500 or more but less than $1,000; possession of burglary tools; and criminal impersonation. The defendant received an effective sentence of 21 and one-half years. In this appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by rejecting his plea agreement with the State, by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, and by imposing an excessive sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Edward Durham
The appellant, Charles Edward Durham, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of possession of not less than one-half ounce but not more than ten pounds of marijuana in a school zone with the intent to sell and of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence that he alleges was discovered after he was illegally detained and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his drug conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Drew Freeman, Jr.
The defendant, James Drew Freeman, Jr., appeals from his White County Circuit Court jury conviction of second degree murder, claiming that the admission of the autopsy report via a witness who did not perform the autopsy violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him, that the State engaged in improper and inflammatory closing argument, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
White | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Raleigh Kristopher Frye
A Coffee County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant,Raleigh Kristopher Frye,of one count of third offense driving under the influence (“DUI”), and the trial court found the defendant guilty of violating the implied consent law. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained following the stop of his vehicle and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, claims that the trial court committed reversible error by permitting the State to exercise four peremptory challenges and by permitting the indictment for the implied consent violation to be taken to the jury room, and contends that the cumulative effect of the errors at trial entitles him to a new trial. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joseph S. Lucas, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Joseph S. Lucas, Jr., appeals the Williamson County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to rape of a child and resulting twenty-five year sentence. On appeal, he contends that (1) his guilty plea was not voluntarily and knowingly entered, (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to preserve a suppression issue for appeal, failing to address waiver of the Petitioner’s ex post facto rights during sentencing, and failing to prepare witnesses for the sentencing hearing, and (3) appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to include transcripts of the suppression hearing and the guilty plea hearing in the record on direct appeal, failing to request a rehearing, and failing to argue that the Petitioner’s sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gail Lynn Padgett (a.k.a. "Gail Lynn Nevels")
A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Gail Lynn Padgett, of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”), fourth offense, a Class E felony, and driving on a revoked license. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to one year of incarceration for felony DUI with 150 days to be served in confinement and the remainder to be served on probation. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six months probation for driving on a revoked license, to be served concurrently with the DUI sentence. The trial court also revoked the Defendant’s license for five years, ordering the Defendant to attend DUI school. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction for DUI, fourth offense; (2) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for the State’s failure to preserve evidence; and (3) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress evidence of her actions and statements to police due to the lack of probable cause to effectuate the arrest. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Wade Osborne
The defendant, Jeffrey Wade Osborne, appeals his Williamson County Circuit Court bench trial conviction of felony failure to appear, see T.C.A. § 39-16-609, arguing that his trial should not have occurred while competency proceedings were still pending and that the trial court erroneously denied a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the State’s proof. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Keesha P. Washington
The Defendant, Keesha P. Washington, was found guilty by a Williamson County Circuit Court jury of aggravated arson, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-14-302 (2010). She was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to eighteen years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error by not holding a hearing to ensure that she knowingly and voluntarily waived her right not to testify and that her sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Keith Richard Gibson
Defendant-Appellant, Keith Richard Gibson, was convicted after a jury trial for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and simple possession of a controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender and received eight years’ incarceration for the felony and eleven months and twenty-nine days’ incarceration for the misdemeanor. He appeals the trial court’s denial of his motions to suppress evidence, arguing that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to support the investigatory stop of the defendant as required by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. Upon review, although we reject a part of the trial court’s reasoning in its denial of the motions to suppress, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Troy Mitchell v. Fayetteville Public Utilities
The trial court awarded workers’ compensation benefits to an injured lineman who had violated a rule requiring the use of protective gloves while in a bucket lift. The employer appealed, contending that the statutory defenses of willful misconduct and, more particularly, the willful failure or refusal to use a safety appliance or device precluded recovery. The appeal was referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008). After oral argument before the Panel, but before the Panel filed its opinion, the case was transferred to the full Court. Because the evidence establishes that the employee admitted his knowledge of a regularly enforced safety rule, understood the rationale for the rule, and willfully (rather than negligently or recklessly) failed to comply, the injuries he suffered because of the rule violation are not compensable. The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, reversed and the case is dismissed. |
Lincoln | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Kyler R.C.H., et al.
In this case for parental termination, the Trial Court found statutory grounds for terminating the parents' parental rights to their three minor children. Only the father has appealed, and we hold that the evidence preponderates in favor of the Trial Court's finding for grounds of abandonment, as well as termination of parental rights being in the best interest of the children. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Troy Mitchell v. Fayetteville Public Utilities - Dissent
Today the majority adopts Larson’s four-element test for applying the defenses of willful misconduct or willful failure to use a safety device. This test allows an employer to assert the defenses of willful misconduct or willful failure to use a safety device when four elements are satisfied: the employee has actual notice of the employer’s rule, the employee understands that the rule is in place for safety reasons, the employer consistently enforces the rule, and the employee has no valid excuse for violating the rule. I disagree with the majority that the application of Larson’s test compels the conclusion that Mr. Mitchell’s removal of his gloves was a willful failure to comply with his employer’s safety rule. The majority concludes that “[t]he lack of a valid excuse for the failure to use a safety appliance or device, when the first three elements [of Larson’s test] have been satisfied, amounts to willfulness.” Our case law compels a different conclusion. |
Lincoln | Supreme Court | |
Daniel Lee Coleman v. Andrea Gibson Coleman
In this divorce action the parties engaged in mediation and resolved several issues in the case. The Trial Court entered a Divorce Decree without conducting an evidentiary hearing on the disputed issues remaining. The father appealed to this Court. We affirm that part of the |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Tommy Hinton and wife, Jean Marie Hinton v. Jerry L.Edmonds and wife, Susan D. Edmonds
Adjoining property owners dispute the validity of an Agreement which placed restrictions upon a roadway across one property which provided access to the other property. The trial court, after making specific factual findings, found the Agreement invalid and non-binding upon the parties. We affirm the trial court’s factual findings as well as its ultimate determination of invalidity. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nicholas Short
A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Nicholas Short, of one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of second degree murder. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced Short to life imprisonment. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to establish his convictions given Short’s theory of self-defense. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Teresa Ann Barrett Goodman v. Jeffery Wayne Goodman
This divorce case deals primarily with child support. The parties entered into a consent order n the amount of child support to be paid. Father subsequently lost his job and sought modification of his obligation. The divorce referee modified the support based on Father’s alleged earning capacity rather than on his actual income. Father appealed the ruling of the referee, but did not file a transcript of the hearing with the trial court. The trial court entered a final decree of divorce, finding all property to be marital, affirming the ruling of the referee, setting permanent child support based on Father’s alleged earning capacity, and awarding attorney fees to Mother. We reverse the judgment setting child support based on Father’s earning capacity and remand for a determination of Father’s child support based on his actual income. Additionally, we vacate the judgment of the trial court awarding Mother $35,000.00 in attorney fees, award Mother $7,675.00 in attorney fees and remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the remaining portion of the attorney fees in light of this opinion. This case is affirmed in all other respects. Reversed in part, vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Christina K. Deweese Richmond v. Gregory Alan Richmond
Christina K. Deweese Richmond (“Wife”) and Gregory Alan Richmond (“Husband”) were divorced in June of 1999. In March of 2011, Wife filed a motion to clarify the parties’ Final Decree of Divorce. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered its order holding, inter alia, that Wife was awarded 42.5% of Husband’s disposable military retired pay. The Trial Court also ordered that Husband shall pay to Wife her share of his military retirement accruing from August 2010 through June 2011 in the amount of $4,915.90 less federal taxes. Husband appeals raising issues regarding whether Husband should be entitled to the protection of the unclean hands doctrine and whether Wife waived her rights to past payments of Husband’s military retirement. We find neither unclean hands nor waiver, and we affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
PNC Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI Limited Partnership, et al. v. Bluff City Community Development Corporation, et al.
This is an appeal from the grant of a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss in favor of Appellees, an attorney, her professional limited liability company (“PLLC”), a title company, and a law firm. As to the law firm, the trial court found that the causes of action, if any, sounded in legal malpractice and were barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations found at Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-104(a)(2). As to the attorney, the PLLC, and the title company, the trial court found that any causes of action alleged against these Appellees sounded in tort and were claims for unliquidated damages; thus the court held that it lacked jurisdiction under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 16-11-102. After reviewing the Complaint, we conclude that: (1) the trial court did not apply the discovery rule in reaching its conclusion that Appellants’ claims that sound in legal malpractice are barred by the statute of limitations; (2) applying the discovery rule, there is nothing in the pleadings from which to infer that the Appellants’ knowledge of breach or misappropriation on the part of the general partner also means that Appellants knew, or should have known, about any wrongdoing on the part of the law firm, the PLLC, and the attorney; (3) therefore, any claims sounding in legal malpractice, against the law firm, the attorney, and her PLLC, survive the motion to dismiss; however, because there was no attorney-client relationship between the Appellants and the title company, claims for legal malpractice cannot lie against the title company; (4) many of the claims against the law firm, the PLLC, and the title company that sound in tort are not sufficiently pled under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 8.01 or, where they sound in fraud, are not pled with particularity as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 9.02; these claims were properly dismissed with the following exceptions: (a) the Complaint does sufficiently plead a cause of action for aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary duty against the title company, the law firm, the attorney, and her PLLC; to the extent that the alleged aiding and abetting was the result of a plan or design by the Appellees, conspiracy may also lie for that tort; (b) the Complaint does sufficiently plead causes of action for misappropriation or conversion and conspiracy against the Appellee attorney, individually, but not against the law firm, the title company, or the PLLC (due to lack of particularity in the pleadings as to these Appellees); (5) because the amounts of the alleged misappropriations are known, the damages sought are not all unliquidated; therefore, the chancery court has jurisdiction. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randall Kelvin Madison
A jury convicted Randall Kelvin Madison (“the Defendant”) of twenty-two counts of rape, three counts of aggravated statutory rape, and one count of forgery. The trial court subsequently merged several of the offenses so as to leave in place twelve counts of rape and one count of forgery. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of thirty-five years. In this appeal, the Defendant challenges (1) the trial court’s ruling under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) that evidence of his uncharged bad acts was admissible; (2) the State’s election of offenses; (3) the sufficiency of the evidence; and (4) his sentence. We hold that (1) the Defendant is not entitled to relief from the trial court’s Rule 404(b) ruling; (2) the Defendant has not demonstrated that the State’s election of offenses was fatally deficient; and (3) the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions. We also affirm the trial court’s sentencing decisions. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and sentences. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brandi Nicole Sosebee v. John Charles Sosebee, Jr.
In March of 2011, John Charles Sosebee, Jr. (“Husband”) was found guilty of 69 counts of criminal contempt for violating an order of protection in favor of Brandi Nicole Sosebee (“Wife”). Husband was sentenced to 10 days in jail for each violation, for a total of 690 days. Husband appeals raising several issues including whether he received proper notice that Wife was seeking criminal contempt. We find and hold that Husband did not receive proper notice that criminal contempt was being pursued and should not have been convicted and sentenced accordingly. We, however, hold that the record on appeal supports a finding that Husband violated the order of protection on 69 occasions. We, therefore, modify the judgment to reflect that Husband committed civil contempt, and remand to the Trial Court with direction to set a purge amount and proceed accordingly. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carlos Cannon
The defendant, Carlos Cannon, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wilson Reynolds v. Lee Roy Roberson
This appeal involves a contract dispute over the purchase of more than 100 acres of rustic property adjacent to the Great Smoky Mountains National Park. Wilson Reynolds offered to purchase the property from Lee Roy Roberson, Jr. for 3 million dollars. The parties formed a contract evidencing their agreement. Following the closing date, Wilson Reynolds filed suit, alleging breach of contract. The trial court ruled that Lee Roy Roberson, Jr. breached the contract and awarded Wilson Reynolds $600,000 in damages plus interest, attorney fees, and other costs. Lee Roy Roberson, Jr. appeals. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals |