State of Tennessee v Robert Benjamin Bowen
M2003-00513-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth W. Norman

Upon his plea of guilty, the Defendant was convicted of DUI. In this appeal, he attempts to present two certified questions of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). Because we conclude that this appeal does not properly present certified questions of law, we dismiss the appeal.

State of Tennessee v. Emery Wells
M2003-00795-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge L. Craig Johnson

The Appellant, Emery Wells, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault and was sentenced to an effective eight-year sentence, with the sentence being suspended after service of ninety days in jail. A probation violation warrant was subsequently issued alleging violation of the following conditions: (1) failure to report to his probation officer; (2) failure to obey the laws of this state; and (3) failure to report a new arrest. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked Wells' suspended sentence and ordered his eight-year sentence to be served with community corrections, after service of an additional ninety-day period of jail confinement. Wells concedes that the violations occurred, but he argues that the revocation did not "aid the interest of both the public and the [Appellant]," as it will likely result in the loss of his employment.

State of Tennessee v. Dywand Carlos Pettway
M2003-00238-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Charles Lee

A Bedford County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Dywand Carlos Pettway, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II offender to twenty years in the Department of Correction for the aggravated robbery conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the possession of a Schedule II controlled substance conviction, to be served consecutively. In this appeal, the defendant claims (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated robbery conviction and (2) that his sentences are excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee v. Basil Marceaux
M2003-00876-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carol L. Soloman

Because the record confirms that the appellant did not perfect an appeal from an adverse decision of the general sessions court within ten days of that decision, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the late attempted appeal.

State of Tennessee v. John Crawley, Sr.
M2003-01289-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway

The Defendant, John Crawley, Sr., pled guilty to driving under the influence, first offense. As part of his plea agreement, he expressly reserved with the consent of the trial court and the State the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The certified question of law stems from the trial court's denial of the Defendant's motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of a police officer stopping the Defendant's automobile. Because we find that the police officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant, we reverse the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. This case is remanded for entry of an order of dismissal.

State of Tennessee v. Walter Ray Smith, Jr.
M2003-01291-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge James K. Clayton, Jr.

The Defendant, Walter R. Smith, Jr., was convicted by a jury of five counts of child rape. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of forty years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentences. We affirm the Defendant's five convictions for child rape. The trial judge erred by failing to state on the record the facts that support the imposition of consecutive sentences. However, the record clearly shows that consecutive sentencing was proper. Therefore, we affirm the Defendant's sentences.

State of Tennessee v. Martin Stuart Hammock
M2002-01326-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carol L. Soloman

Defendant, Martin Stuart Hammock, was originally convicted of first degree murder following a jury trial. On appeal, this Court found that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation to support a conviction for first degree murder. Accordingly, we modified the judgment to reflect a conviction of second degree murder and remanded the case to the trial court for re-sentencing. State v. Martin Stuart Hammock, No. M2000-00334-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 824, (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Oct. 12, 2001), no perm. to app. filed. Following a new sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve twenty-five years. Defendant appeals. After a review of the record, the briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Jason White
E2002-02736-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.

Following a bench trial appellant, Jason White, was found guilty of D.U.I. Second Offense in violation of T.C.A. 55-11-401. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days with incarceration for forty-five days followed by probation for the balance of the sentence. The appellant appeals, contending that the evidence was not sufficient for a D.U.I. Second Offense conviction. After a review of the record we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jimmy H. Spurlock v. Boiler & Heat Exchange Systems, Inc.
E2002-02842-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: W. Frank Brown III, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann._ 5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Plaintiff alleges he suffers from a occupational disease within the definition thereof contained in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-31. The trial judge found the plaintiff failed to show that his lung disease was caused by or arose from his occupation as a welder with the Defendant and dismissed the case. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., in which E. RILEY ANDERSON, J., and ROGER E. THAYER, SP. J., joined. Ronald J. Berke, Chattanooga, Tennessee, attorney for the Appellant, Jimmy H. Spurlock. C. Douglas Dooley, Charles W. Poss and Michael D. Newton, Chattanooga, Tennessee, attorneys for Appellee, Boiler & Heat Exchange Systems, Inc. MEMORANDUM OPINION Facts There is no dispute concerning the fact the Plaintiff is totallydisabled as a result of interstitial pulmonary fibrosis. Further, the evidence shows the Plaintiff worked for the Defendant for ten years before his illness caused him to be unable to work. The Plaintiff worked as a welder for the defendant. He and other employees testified they and the Plaintiff were exposed to a significant amount of metal particles and dust caused by the welding work they did. There is no evidence to dispute this. Charles N. Adams, Jr., a mechanical engineer conducted a study of the work done in the Defendant's plant and found some thirty substances to which the Plaintiff would have been exposed. These included metal particles and other substances. These findings were not disputed. There is little dispute in the medical evidence in this case except the significant and controlling issue of whether the Plaintiff's illness is a result of a hazard of his occupation with the Defendant. Medical Evidence There was extensive medical proof introduced in the record by oral testimony of expert witnesses and various reports from other experts. Additionally, several studies concerning interstitial pulmonary fibrosis was introduced. Amongst this evidence, the most significant evidence was presented by Dr. Suresh Enjeti, a pulmonary specialist, Dr. James D. Snell, Jr., a pulmonary disease specialist, and Dr. William F. McGann Jr., a specialist in internal medicine. Further there were reports from four highly qualified pathologists found in the record. Dr. Enjeti, who testified in person, testified that the Plaintiff's lung disease was caused by the exposure to the metal dust, et al, encountered by the Plaintiff in his work with the Defendant. Dr. Enjuti based his opinion upon medical studies which he had done and which he had studied which indicated the illness suffered by the plaintiff is caused by exposure to metal particles. Dr. Enjeti testified he had the report from the engineer which tested the material said to be found in the work place. He found no metal or dust particles in the Plaintiff's lungs. When asked if he had any objective findings to support his conclusion the Plaintiff's disease was caused by his work for the Defendant, Dr. Enjeti responded: "Beyond the occupational history, no." Dr. James D. Snell, examined the Plaintiff and confirmed the diagnosis of interstitial pulmonary fibrosis. Dr. Snell discussed each of the substances listed by the engineer as being present in the work place. He testified none of these would cause the problem which the Plaintiff has. He found none of these - nor asbestos - present in the Plaintiff's lung biopsy. Dr. Snell was of the opinion the Plaintiff interstitial fibrosis was of unknown origin and did not relate its' beginning to the Plaintiff's work for the Defendant. Dr. McGann gave a video deposition and testified the Plaintiff's condition of uncertain etiology and that it was not caused or aggravated by the work for the Defendant. The four pathologists found no evidence that any of the particles contained in the engineer's report were present in the Plaintiff's lung tissue. -2-

Alonzo Leonardo Gayden v. State of Tennessee
M2003-00165-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge James K. Clayton, Jr.

The petitioner, Alonzo Leonardo Gayden, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court's denying him post-conviction relief from his 2001 conviction for theft of property valued at $1,000 or more, a Class D felony. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Alonzo Maurice Rogan - Concurring
M2002-01603-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jane W. Wheatcraft

I write separately to explain why I am concurring in results only in this case. The record reflects that Defendant’s counsel adamantly asserted that aggravated assault was a lesser-included offense of attempted first degree murder. Just as adamantly, the State argued that aggravated assault was not a lesser-included offense of attempted first degree murder under our supreme court’s decision in State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 1999). The record also reflects that while the trial court had reservations about the appropriateness of charging aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense, it was ultimately persuaded to do so by arguments of Defendant’s counsel. Counsel’s conduct may or may not be grounds for relief to Defendant in a post-conviction proceeding, but that must be decided at a later hearing on a later date.

State of Tennessee v. Alonzo Maurice Rogan
M2002-01603-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jane W. Wheatcraft

The defendant filed a delayed appeal, alleging error: (1) in denying the defendant the opportunity to file an amended motion for new trial; (2) in the failure to amend the indictment for attempted first degree murder to aggravated assault; (3) in the failure of the indictment for evading arrest to contain statutory language; and, (4) in admitting the defendant’s confession in violation of an in limine order during the second phase of a bifurcated trial. We conclude that no reversible errors were attendant and affirm the convictions.

Mary E. Madison, as Surviving Spouse of James R. Madison, Deceased, et al., v. State of Tennessee
E2003-01537-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Vance W. Cheek, Jr., Commissioner

These consolidated claims against the State of Tennessee ("State") arise out of an automobile accident which resulted in the death of James R. Madison and personal injury to Mary E. Madison, Kenneth R. Madison, and Wilma J. Madison (collectively referred to as "Claimants"). The State filed a motion for summary judgment which the Claims Commission ("Commission") granted based primarily on Claimants' failure to file a timely response. The Commission later set aside its order granting the State's summary judgment motion and ordered Claimants to file a response to that motion no later than March 19, 2003. Claimants filed their response to the motion for summary judgment on March 18, 2003. On May 14, 2003, apparently acting under the misapprehension that Claimants still had not responded to the motion for summary judgment, the Commission dismissed the claims based on Claimants' violation of its previous order directing them to respond. We vacate the dismissal of these claims and remand for further proceedings.

State of Tennessee v. Octavian Reeves
W2002-01313-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roger A. Page

The defendant appeals his conviction for second degree murder and the sentence of twenty-five years. After review, we conclude that the restrictions placed on the defendant's cross examination of the witness were within the discretion of the trial court. Further, we affirm the conviction and sentence imposed.

State of Tennessee v. Stacy L. Mack and Martress Shaw
W2002-01828-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jon Kerry Blackwood

The defendants appeal their convictions of possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver. The defendants allege error in the trial court’s failure to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant and denial of their motions for judgment of acquittal. Upon review, we reverse the failure to suppress the search warrant and reverse and dismiss the convictions of both defendants. The conviction of Stacy Mack is reversed due to insufficiency of the evidence, and Martress Shaw’s conviction is reversed due to insufficiency of evidence after suppression of the search warrant.

State of Tennessee v. Stacy L. Mack And Martress Shaw - Dissenting/Concurring
W2002-01828-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jon Kerry Blackwood

While I concur in the majority’s reversal of Defendant Mack’s conviction based upon insufficient evidence of constructive possession of cocaine, I respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority opinion that holds that the search warrant did not sufficiently describe the premises to be searched, because it omitted the street address, to meet constitutional standards. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Bostic, 898 S.W.2d 242, does not apply under the facts of this case because “[w]e are not confronted herein with an ambiguous description, i.e., one that is susceptible to multiple interpretations, but rather the omission of important details in the description.” I believe warrant, which was cured by Detective Tutor’s knowledge of the location to be searched. To hold otherwise effectively ignores the precedent established in Bostic.

Elmer Da Vid Do Yle v. Un Ited Par Cel Servic E,
2003-00078-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe H. Walker, III Sp.J.
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. Section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of the finding of fact and conclusions of law. The only issue submitted to the trial judge was the extent of the employee's permanent vocational disability. The employer appeals the award of permanent disability benefits to an employee. We affirm.

Stacey F. Baldon v. State of Tennessee
W2003-00763-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

The petitioner, Stacey Baldon, appeals from the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The issues presented for review are whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel and whether the guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered. The judgment is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Levar Gray
W2002-02259-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Otis Higgs, Jr.

The defendant, Levar Gray, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated kidnapping. The trial court imposed sentences of twelve years for each of the four offenses. Because the trial court ordered partially consecutive sentencing, the effective sentence is twenty-four years. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that the sentence is excessive. Because the record does not support the imposition of maximum sentences for each conviction and because consecutive sentences were not warranted, the judgments must be modified to reflect concurrent sentences of ten years for each conviction.

Floyd Lee Perry, Jr., v. State of Tennessee
W2002-02303-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge William B. Acree, Jr.

The petitioner, Floyd Lee Perry, Jr., filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Obion County Circuit Court. In his petition, the petitioner raised several issues, with his two chief complaints being that the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on the lesser-included offenses of felony murder and that trial counsel was ineffective. Subsequent to an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court dismissed the petition and the petitioner timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Atta Najjar
W2003-00329-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carolyn Wade Blackett

The defendant was convicted of aggravated rape and aggravated robbery. He contends on appeal that 1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, and 2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to aggravated rape. The judgment for aggravated robbery is affirmed. We conclude that a constructive amendment of the indictment for aggravated rape occurred because the jury was permitted to convict the defendant based on an element different from that which was charged or included within the indictment. Accordingly, the judgment for aggravated rape is reversed.

Diann Parnell v. Victor L. Ivy, Peter J. Dauster, Hardee, Martin, Jaynes & Ivy, P.A., C. Wesley Fowler and Glankler Brown, PLLC
W2003-00023-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

This is a legal malpractice case. The client filed suit in federal court against a municipality for the
death of her husband under the Governmental Tort Liability Act and U.S.C. § 1983. The federal
court dismissed the GTLA claim but retained the §1983 claims. The client dismissed her attorneys, hired new counsel and filed the GTLA claim in state court. The state court dismissed the GTLA claim because, while the GTLA claim was pending in federal court, the applicable statute of limitations expired. The client sued her original attorneys for malpractice. Shortly thereafter, the client settled the remaining § 1983 claims against the municipality. The defendant attorneys filed a motion for summary judgment in the malpractice case, arguing that the settlement with the municipality on the §1983 claims mandated dismissal of the legal malpractice claim. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion. The client appealed. We reverse, holding that the damages sought in the legal malpractice lawsuit are separate and distinct from the damages sought in the underlying lawsuit, and therefore settlement of the underlying lawsuit does not shield the former attorneys from liability.
 

John Thomas Still v. Commissary Operations, Inc.
M2003-00528-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Allen W. Wallace, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Ross H. Hicks, Circuit Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court determined that I(1) Employee was entitled to the current cause of action pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 5-6-241(a)(2). The employee sustained no additional vocational disability over and above the previously awarded twenty-five percent. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (22 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed ALLEN W. WALLACE, SR. J., in which ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., J. and JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., joined. Aubrey T. Givens, Madison, Tennessee, for appellant, John Thomas Still Mark A. Baugh, Nashville, Tennessee, for appellee, Commissary Operations, Inc. MEMORANDUM OPINION FACTS On March 13, 1998, the plaintiff injured his back at work. At trial, the parties stipulated that the plaintiff's injury was work-related, that it occurred during the course and scope of his employment, and that proper notice was given. The incident was compensable at a rate of $492. Thus, the only issue at trial was the extent of permanent vocational disability and whether the award should be paid in a lump sum. At the conclusion of proof, the trial court found that the plaintiff had sustained a twenty-five percent vocational disability to the body which equated to two and a half times the bodily impairment. The trial court further ruled that the plaintiff's rights pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 5-6-241(2)(b) were not impaired. Subsequent to the original case, the plaintiff returned to his employment with Commissary Operations, Inc. However, in July 22, he was terminated. The plaintiff then filed a new cause of action pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 5-6-(a)(2) in an attempt to increase his previously adjudicated award of twenty-five percent vocational disability. In the second case, the trial court determined that reconsideration of the previous award was required under the facts and circumstances of the plaintiff's loss of employment with Commissary Operations, Inc. However, it did not award the plaintiff any additional vocational disability The following facts were adduced at the second trial. After his March 1998 injury, the plaintiff was ultimately released to return to work at Commissary Operations, Inc. Dr. Cushman, the plaintiff's treating physician, assigned the plaintiff a ten percent permanent impairment to the body as a whole. Dr. Cushman told the plaintiff that he should use "common sense" and temporarily refrain from lifting heavy objects. Dr. Cushman did not give the plaintiff any permanent restrictions. He testified that he instructed the plaintiff that if he had any problems to return to see him. Dr. Cushman stated that he did not treat the plaintiff again. The plaintiff returned to work in October 1998, and he continued there until July 22. The plaintiff testified regarding problems that he suffered when he returned to work after his back injury. He stated that many of his tasks caused him pain. He also stated that he could not sit for more than three hours in the same position. The plaintiff acknowledged that he did not complain to his supervisors about the alleged pain he suffered. He maintained that it was because he was afraid he might lose his job. The plaintiff's wife also testified regarding the plaintiff's pain and decreased activity. On September 6, 21, the plaintiff underwent a physical for the Department of Transportation. The physical was performed at Concentra Medical Center. As part of the examination, the plaintiff filled out a form indicating that he had had a prior back and spinal injury. However, he also stated in the forms that he was not having any problems from his 1998 injury and that he did not have any restrictions with job activities. The plaintiff tried to explain that he filled out the forms as he did because on "that date it wasn't hurting." Following the physical, the plaintiff was re-certified to continue driving. In October 21, while planting flowers, the plaintiff injured himself at his home. Three to four weeks after the accident, the plaintiff went to see his own physician, Dr. Peach. On February 19, 22, Dr. McCarty, an orthopedic specialist to whom Dr. Peach had referred the plaintiff, performed surgery on the plaintiff's shoulder. On March 7, 22, the plaintiff filled out a form requesting Family or Medical Leave. The form stated that the plaintiff was entitled to twelve weeks of unpaid leave. However, the plaintiff contends that he was approved for six months leave. The plaintiff was already on leave when he completed the form. -2-

Kimberly Clark v. Hardee's Food Systems, Inc.,
M2002-02942-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Allen W. Wallace, Sr.J.
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeal Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant, employee, has appealed the trial court's decision in this case, holding the employee had failed to carry the burden of proof as to causation, and denied benefits. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (22 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed ALLEN W. WALLACE, SR.J., in which ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., J. and JOHN K. BYERS, SR.J., joined. D. Andrew Saulters, Nashville, Tennessee for appellant, Kimberly Clark Vanessa L. Comerford, Brentwood, Tennessee for appellee, Hardee's Food Systems, Inc., et al. MEMORANDUM OPINION ISSUES The issues in this appeal as stated by the employee and employer are whether or not the trial court erred in ruling the employee failed to carry the burden of proof as to medical causation due to inconsistencies in her trial testimony and history given medical professionals. Employee alleges in this appeal that the inconsistencies in her testimony as well as her history given to medical professionals were caused by confusion on her part, or that the alleged inconsistencies were misinterpretations. -2-

State of Tennessee v. Gary Allen Larkins, Jr.
E2003-00404-CCA-MR3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phyllis H. Miller

A Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Gary Allen Larkins, Jr., of attempted aggravated assault, a Class D felony; resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor; and disorderly conduct, a Class C misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of seven years, six months, and thirty days, respectively. The defendant appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the defendant’s convictions but remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment for the attempted aggravated assault.