City of Whitwell, Tennessee, v. West Valley Water System, Inc.
M2002-02959-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Special Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jeffrey F. Stewart

This is a contract dispute between the plaintiff, an incorporated municipality, and the defendant, a nonprofit water systems corporation that supplied water to residents living outside the city limits. The parties entered into several agreements for the sale of potable treated water from the plaintiff to the defendant, the specific terms for which varied under each agreement. In particular, a 1981 agreement placed limits on the defendant's ability to assign its rights under the contract and required that the defendant purchase all its water requirements up to eight million gallons per month from the plaintiff, while an agreement executed in 1994 contained no minimum purchase requirement for the defendant and expressly provided that successors to the defendant, "whether the result of legal process, assignment, or otherwise," succeeded to the rights of the defendant under the contract. In 2002, the defendant entered into negotiations for the sale of its assets to a third party water company. In response, the plaintiff filed a petition for injunctive relief, alleging, inter alia, that the contract between the parties did not allow the defendant to assign its rights without the plaintiff's prior consent and that the City would suffer irreparable harm if deprived of the income generated by its water sale to the defendant. Following an injunction hearing and a subsequent trial, the trial court ruled, inter alia, that the 1994 contract superceded the previous agreements between the parties and the defendant was free to transfer its assets to the third party water company without the plaintiff's consent. The plaintiff appeals, arguing the 1994 contract was ultra vires because its mayor lacked the authority to execute it, there was no meeting of the minds to form a valid contract between the parties, and the trial court abused its discretion in dissolving the temporary injunction and denying the City's request for a permanent injunction. Having reviewed the entire record in this case, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Marcia Ann Raines v. Jimmy Ray Raines
M2002-01952-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Clara W. Byrd

This is a divorce case involving the division of marital property. In 1988, the husband moved into the wife's house. The parties married in 1992 and remained married for ten years. During that time, the parties sold the wife's house and bought a new home with the proceeds. The new home was purchased in the names of both the husband and the wife. In 2002, the parties divorced. The trial court found that the parties' property had become so commingled that virtually none of it could be considered separate property, and divided the marital assets evenly. The trial court also allocated to the wife a larger portion of a marital debt to the wife's mother. From that decree, the wife now appeals. We affirm, finding that the evidence clearly supports the trial court's finding of commingling and transmutation of property, and finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's allocation of the marital debt.

State of Tennessee v. Russell Dale Oliver
E2003-00123-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Cupp

The defendant, Russell Dale Oliver, was convicted by a jury in the Johnson County Circuit Court of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life in prison. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by overruling his motion to dismiss the indictment based on the violation of his right to a speedy prosecution and trial and that the evidence is insufficient to convict him of murder in the first degree. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Kelvin Wade Cloyd v. State of Tennessee
E2003-00125-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Cupp

The post-conviction petitioner, Kelvin Wade Cloyd, was convicted of two counts of vehicular homicide and possession of a controlled substance. After appointment of counsel and a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal of right, he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal and that the state withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Gregory L. Anderson
M2002-02289-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.

The defendant was found guilty of driving under the influence, fifth offense. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the roadblock, contending that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant, the roadblock guidelines are unconstitutional, and the police did not substantially comply with the roadblock guidelines. The defendant also made a motion in limine to keep out testimony regarding the defendant's use of a racial slur. Both motions were denied. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as to all issues.

In Re: C.L.J.
M2003-01949-COA-R9-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: W. Scott Rosenberg
This appeal involves a dispute over the custody of an eight-year-old boy. The child's parents never married and engaged in a protracted, bitter custody dispute until the father died of cancer in 2003. Immediately after the father's death, his sister and brother-in-law filed a petition in the Davidson County Juvenile Court seeking custody of the child. The child's mother opposed the petition, asserting that her custodial rights were superior to those of the boy's aunt and uncle. The juvenile court granted temporary custody of the child to his aunt and uncle pending a hearing. The court also determined that the child's mother could not gain custody of her son unless she proved that she would be able to adequately fulfill her parenting responsibilities. The juvenile court granted the mother's request for an interlocutory appeal, and this court granted the petition to determine whether the juvenile court applied the correct legal standard for custody disputes between a biological parent and non-parents. We have determined that the juvenile court has not employed the correct standard in this case and that the child's mother is entitled to have custody of her son unless the trial court determines that returning the child to his mother will expose him to a risk of substantial harm.

State of Tennessee v. Edward L. Williams
E2002-00325-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Baumgartner

A Knox County jury convicted the juvenile defendant, Edward L. Williams, of premeditated first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of life for the premeditated murder conviction and twenty-two years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for premeditated murder; and (2) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. We remand for entry of an amended judgment reflecting a sentence of life with the possibility of parole and deleting any reference to a merger of the premeditated murder count and the felony murder count. We further order that the sentences run concurrently rather than consecutively. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lovin
E2002-01231-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge E. Shayne Sexton

The defendant, Christopher Lovin, was convicted of felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient and submits that the trial court erred by failing to exclude cumulative medical testimony. The judgment is affirmed.

Chattanooga Publishing. v. Hamilton County Election Commission
E2003-00076-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: W. Frank Brown, III
In this case involving the Tennessee Public Records Act, the issue is whether the Appellee Hamilton County Election Commission should have been compelled to release to the Appellant certain records relating to the Democratic primary election in Hamilton County held on May 7, 2002. The Trial Court held that although the documents were public records, they were also investigative records of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation ("TBI") and thus subject to the exception found at T.C.A. 10-7-504(a)(2) of the Public Records Act. We find that the records at issue were not investigative records of the TBI at the time the request was made and that they should have been released to the Appellant Chattanooga Publishing Company ("CPC"), and accordingly reverse the Trial Court's judgment to the contrary. We affirm the Trial Court's refusal to award attorney's fees to CPC.

State of Tennessee v. Vernon Waller
M2001-02414-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in ruling that the appellant's prior felony drug convictions would be admissible for impeachment purposes if he testified. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the prior convictions were relevant to the issue of the appellant's credibility and that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any unfair prejudicial effect. We granted the appellant's application for permission to appeal. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable law, we conclude that the trial court erred in allowing the State to use the appellant's prior felony drug convictions for impeachment purposes. However, because the appellant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the trial court's erroneous ruling, we hold that the error was harmless. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

Mark Henderson v. Board of Professional Responsibility
M2002-02566-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Allen W. Wallace

This is a direct appeal from an attorney disciplinary proceeding originating in the Board of Professional Responsibility ("Board"). After the appellant, Mark Henderson, disagreed with an initial proposal for a public censure, Disciplinary Counsel filed a petition for discipline. Henderson entered a conditional guilty plea before the Board in exchange for a public censure, but upon review, this Court rejected that plea. The Board ultimately recommended that Henderson be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months. Henderson then filed a petition for certiorari in the Chancery Court for Sumner County alleging several procedural defects, including the allegation that the Board did not have authority to pursue the disciplinary petition because he had not demanded a formal hearing. The trial court dismissed Henderson's petition for certiorari due to his failure to file a complete transcript with the court. On direct appeal to this Court, Henderson argues that the Board lacked jurisdiction to pursue the petition for discipline, that the Board failed to follow the required procedure when it submitted the conditional guilty plea to this Court for review, and that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for certiorari. We affirm the decision of the trial court, holding that it properly dismissed the petition for certiorari, that the Board had authority to initiate a formal petition for discipline, and that this Court had the authority to review and reject the conditional guilty plea.

Rutherford County v. Martha Jordan Wilson, et al
M2000-01382-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Don R. Ash

This appeal arises out of a condemnation proceeding brought by Rutherford County against the appellees. The appellant, claiming an interest through her deceased husband in the property to be condemned, filed a motion to intervene in the proceeding. The trial court denied the appellant's motion to intervene and dismissed her cross-claim for declaratory judgment, finding that she held no interest in the property under the provisions of the granting instrument. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the granting instrument conveyed a contingent remainder to each member of the class. As such, the conveyance to the appellant's husband lapsed when he predeceased the life tenant, leaving appellant without an interest in the property. We granted review, and we now hold that each class member held a vested, transmissible interest in the property prior to the death of the life tenant and that the appellant holds no interest in the property. We remand this cause to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Joan Schmitt v. James Charles Smith; In Re: S. Denise McCrary v. Joan Schmitt
W2000-01726-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge George H. Brown

The issues in this case are whether the lien for attorney's fees was properly preserved, and if so, whether a separate action was required to enforce that lien. The trial court found that the lien had been properly preserved and enforced it in the amount of $37,332. On direct appeal, the intermediate court reversed that judgment and held that the attorney's failure to note the lien in the final judgment as required by Chumbley v. Thomas, 198 S.W.2d 551 (Tenn. 1947), or to amend the judgment to include a notation of the lien, was fatal to the preservation and enforceability of the lien. We granted permission to appeal to revisit and reconsider the "notation" requirement of Chumbley. After careful consideration, we now overrule Chumbley to the extent that it requires an attorney's lien be noted in the final judgment. We also hold that the lien in this case was properly enforced in the court in which the matter was litigated. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for enforcement of the lien and a determination of attorney's fees on appeal.

State of Tennessee v. Reginald Terry
W2001-03027-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Fred Axley

We granted the defendant's application for permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to decide whether attempted aggravated criminal trespass is a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated burglary, and, if so, whether the trial court in this case committed plain error by failing to so instruct the jury. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that attempted aggravated criminal trespass is not a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated burglary and thus found no error in the trial court's failure to so instruct the jury. The defendant appealed to this Court. After a thorough review of the record and the relevant case law, we conclude that attempted aggravated criminal trespass is a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated burglary. However, we hold that the failure to instruct the jury on this lesser-included offense was not plain error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

State of Tennessee v. Clay A. Thompson
W2002-02800-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jon Kerry Blackwood

The appellant, Clay A. Thompson, pled guilty to theft of property valued over $1,000. The McNairy County trial court sentenced him as a Range II multiple offender to seven years incarceration. On appeal, the appellant contends his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Leonard Franklin
W2002-03008-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Fred Axley

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Leonard Franklin, of simple assault. The trial court sentenced him to seven months in the Shelby County Correctional Center with sixty days incarceration followed by eleven months and twenty-nine days probation. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in: (1) denying the defendant’s motion for a continuance; (2) limiting the defendant’s cross-examination of the victim concerning her civil lawsuit against him; (3) admitting evidence of the defendant’s suspension from his place of employment; (4) improperly commenting on the evidence; and (5) imposing a period of confinement. We reduce the probationary term to ten months but otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. James Mellon
E1999-01505-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary Beth Leibowitz

Although the defendant, James A. Mellon, raises numerous issues on appeal, the dispositive issue is whether his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary, and the subsequently imposed death sentence in violation of due process, when he was not adequately informed of the consequences should he breach the plea agreement. Prior to trial, the defendant pleaded guilty to felony murder and especially aggravated robbery as part of a plea agreement with the prosecution. The agreement provided that, in exchange for his pleas of guilty, the State would recommend a sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole on the felony murder conviction and a concurrent sentence of fifteen to twenty-five years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, with the trial court to decide the actual length of the sentence. Pursuant to the agreement, sentencing would be reserved until after testimony by the defendant in any related proceeding or at the conclusion of such proceedings. The defendant reneged on the agreement and instead moved to withdraw his guilty pleas. The trial court denied the defendant's motion and empaneled a jury. A sentencing hearing was conducted, resulting in a sentence of death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and death sentence for the felony murder. On automatic appeal to this Court, we conclude that the defendant was not adequately informed of the consequences if he should breach the plea agreement. We are constrained to hold that the defendant's pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered, and thus the subsequent sentence denied him due process of law. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

State of Tennessee v. Paul Charles Carnahan
E2003-00400-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge E. Eugene Eblen

The Defendant, Paul Charles Carnahan, was indicted by the Grand Jury of Morgan County for unlawfully, knowingly, and intentionally failing to provide support for a minor child pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-15-101. After the Defendant waived his right to a jury trial, the trial judge found him guilty of the Class E felony "Flagrant Nonsupport" and sentenced the Defendant to one year imprisonment and six years of probation. Further, the court ordered that the Defendant pay $64,041.19 in restitution. The Defendant now appeals that order contending: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) that the indictment contained a fatal flaw. Finding reversible error in the judgment of the trial court below, we reverse the Defendant's conviction and dismiss the indictment.

State of Tennessee v. Luis Anthony Ramon
W2002-03084-CCA-RM-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Julian P. Guinn

The Henry County Grand Jury indicted the fifteen-year-old Defendant for first degree murder for the stabbing death of his aunt. The Defendant was tried as an adult and convicted of the charged offense, after a jury rejected his insanity defense. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment. The Defendant appealed, arguing that his insanity defense was established by clear and convincing evidence. In an opinion filed August 9, 2002, a majority of this Court reversed the judgment of conviction, modified the judgment to “Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity,” and remanded the case for further proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-7-303. State v. Ramon, No. W2001-00389-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1841608, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 9, 2002). The State filed an application for permission to appeal with the Tennessee Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. On December 23, 2002, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted the State’s application for the purpose of remanding the case to this Court for reconsideration in light of State v. Flake, 88 S.W.3d 540 (Tenn. 2002). On remand, we find that a rational jury could have found that the Defendant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, as a result of a severe mental illness or defect, the Defendant was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act of stabbing his aunt to death so as to entitle him to the insanity defense. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction for first degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment.

State of Tennessee v. Christopher Allen Harris
E2001-02810-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rebecca J. Stern

On October 29, 1997, the Hamblen County Grand Jury returned an indictment against the appellant, Christopher Allen Harris for rape of a child in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-522. On January 19, 2000, the appellant entered a guilty plea to attempted rape of a child. He received a sentence of eight years to be served as a work-release sentence for 11 months and 29 days in the county workhouse with the balance on intensive probation. The appellant raises the following issues in this appeal: (1) whether he was properly subject to revocation of a Community Corrections sentence, and (2) whether the record preponderates against a determination that he had violated the terms of his Community Corrections sentence. After a review the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Whirlpool Corporation v. Sherry Pratt
M2002-02449-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Chancellor
In this appeal, the employer questions the trial court's award of 75 percent disability for a serious disfigurement. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the evidence fails to preponderate against the findings of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Randall Scott
M2001-02911-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn
A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Randall Scott, of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. This Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions upon his direct appeal, see State v. Randall Scott, No. 01C01-9708-CR-00334, 1999 WL 547460, at *14 (Tenn. Crim. App. At Nashville, July 28, 1999), but the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, see State v. Scott, 33 S.W.3d 746 (Tenn. 2000). At the conclusion of the defendant’s second trial, a second Davidson County jury convicted the defendant of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court subsequently ordered the defendant to serve an aggregate thirty-five-year sentence for his convictions. The defendant now brings the instant direct appeal of his convictions and sentence alleging five grounds of error. The defendant argues that the trial court (1) erroneously admitted the evidence that the victim identified the defendant as her perpetrator in the first trial, (2) erroneously admitted certain hearsay testimony as an adoptive admission by a party opponent, (3) erroneously instructed the jury that they could draw an inference of guilt if they concluded that the defendant had concealed or destroyed or had attempted to destroy or conceal evidence of his crime, (4) failed to separate the defendant’s charges for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, as was required by law, and (5) ordered the defendant to serve an excessive sentence. After a thorough review of the defendant’s claims and the record, we find that several of the defendant’s allegations were previously determined by this Court pursuant to his first direct appeal and that none of his claims merit relief.

Ruthie Curbow v. James Stucki
M2001-02908-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Lonnie R. Hoover
In this case, Ruthie Ann Curbow appeals from a custody and support proceeding in Williamson County Juvenile Court. On the day of the hearing, parties and counsel appeared in camera for a pre-trial conference. Upon announcement of an apparent settlement in open court, Mother expressed disagreement with the terms of the settlement and a desire to preserve her right to appeal. The trial court determined that no settlement existed and trial on the merits proceeded with proof from all parties. The court entered an order awarding joint custody with Father as primary custodian under the statutory fitness comparison. Mother appeals. We affirm the judgment.

Sherry Hunter v. Jay Ura
M2002-02573-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Marietta M. Shipley
Administratrix of estate of deceased husband filed wrongful death action against defendants anesthesiologist and anesthesia services group. Jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, finding defendants at fault and awarding damages for medical and funeral expenses, and the pecuniary value of the life of the deceased including loss of consortium of wife and children. Defendants appeal, raising several procedural and evidentiary issues for consideration. We vacate and remand.

Shemeka Buford v. State
M2003-00176-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: C. L. Rogers
This is an action for damages against the Department of Children's Services of the State and one of its employees who allegedly strip-searched one of the plaintiff's young children, and attempted to strip-search another, while ostensibly seeking evidence of abuse allegedly inflicted by the mother. Process was never served on the employee. The claim was transferred to the Claims Commission. The plaintiff appeals, complaining of the dismissal of the employee, and of the transfer to the Commission. The judgment is affirmed.