M2002-02661-COA-R3-CV
M2002-02661-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

In Re: The Estate of Merle Halliburton Neal Myers v. Farmers & Merchants Bank Corp., Inc. Brooksie Byers, Douglas Myers, James Myers
M2002-00888-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Burch

After the death of their elderly mother, her sons discovered that the decedent's stepson and his wife had used a power of attorney to transfer the funds from the decedent's $20,000 CD to themselves. The decedent's son filed a petition to have the money restored to her estate. The trial court held that the CD was a valid inter vivos gift from the decedent. We reverse, because there is no evidence in the record that such a gift was ever made.

Barbara Lee Bunce Kerce v. Stephen Paul Kerce
M2002-01744-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Lee Russell
The appellant Stephen Paul Kerce challenges the divorce decree entered in Moore County Circuit Court, alleging that the court erred in its valuation and distribution of the marital estate. We affirm.

In Re: Lillie Odessie Green, Decedent
M2002-01672-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Royce Taylor
Trial Court Judge: Frank G. Clement, Jr.
The court is asked to construe the following language contained in a form will: "I give all my estate to my children, if any, who survive me in equal shares, per stirpes." The testatrix was survived by four of her five children. The trial court held that the two children of the testatrix's child who predeceased her did not take any of her estate. We hold likewise.

Jasmine A. Ali v. Eric N. Fisher, et al.
E2003-00255-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: John S. Mclellan, III
After an automobile accident in which she suffered serious injuries, Jasmine A. Ali ("Plaintiff") sued both the driver of the automobile, Eric N. Fisher ("Fisher"), and the owner of the automobile, Thomas Scheve ("Scheve"). The claim against Scheve was based on negligent entrustment. Prior to trial, Plaintiff and Scheve were in sharp disagreement as to whether Scheve's alleged negligent entrustment resulted in Scheve's being vicariously liable for Fisher's conduct, or whether Scheve's negligence should be apportioned by the jury pursuant to comparative fault principles. The trial court concluded Scheve's alleged negligent entrustment should be apportioned by the jury pursuant to comparative fault principles. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and apportioned fault, 80% to Fisher and 20% to Scheve based on his negligent entrustment of the vehicle to Fisher. The trial court entered a judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment asking the trial court to reverse its earlier pre-trial ruling and hold Scheve vicariously liable for Fisher's negligence because Scheve negligently entrusted the vehicle to Fisher. The trial court granted the motion and amended the judgment which, in effect, held Scheve and Fisher jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the jury's award. Scheve appeals. We hold the trial court erred when it amended the original judgment after concluding, post- trial, that Scheve was vicariously liable for Fisher's conduct. We vacate the amended judgment and reinstate the original judgment of the trial court entered in accordance with the jury's verdict apportioning fault.

State of Tennessee v. Charles Rufus Foster Sr.
W2002-00350-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed Mcginley

The defendant appeals his conviction of rape and his ten-year sentence. The defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, that the trial court erroneously allowed the victim to testify, and that expert testimony should not have been admitted into evidence. The defendant also contends that the trial court erred in sentencing. After careful review, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and the trial court did not err. We affirm the conviction and the judgment of the trial court.

Andrew Cole v. State of Tennessee
W2002-01432-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge L. Terry Lafferty

The Appellant, Andrew Cole, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Gibson County Circuit Court. Cole is currently incarcerated as a result of his jury convictions for attempted first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, Cole raises the issues of: (1) whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to appoint “new counsel” for him at trial; and (3) whether he was improperly sentenced as a multiple offender. After review of the issues, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

State of Tennessee v. Rhonda Rock
E2002-01580-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Jerry Beck

The defendant appeals her sentence of four years for voluntary manslaughter. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her any form of alternative sentencing. We conclude that the trial court did not err in sentencing and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Charles W. Cole v. State of Tennessee
E2002-02535-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lynn W. Brown

The petitioner, Charles W. Cole, pled guilty on February 4, 2000, to five sexual offenses and, in January 2001, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner timely appealed. We affirm the dismissal of the petition

Shawn E. McWhorter v. Randall Bare
E2002-02896-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: W. Neil Thomas, III
Professional pilot Shawn E. McWhorter ("Plaintiff") sued Randall Barre ("Defendant") for defamation based upon a letter Defendant wrote to the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") containing allegations that plaintiff was medically unfit to be a pilot. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and awarded $25,000 in compensatory damages and $42,500 in punitive damages. The trial court entered its judgment, as later amended, in favor of plaintiff against defendant for $105,820.01, consisting of compensatory damages of $25,000, punitive damages of $42,500, and attorney fees and expenses in the amount of $38,320.01. The trial court's award of attorney fees and expenses was based upon defendant's refusal to admit liability in response to requests for admission. Defendant appeals. We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part.

TGJ & Co. vs. Michael E. MaGill
E2003-00298-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: John F. Weaver
Margaret E. Bowers ("the Claimant") appeals the judgment of the trial court, which reversed an administrative determination of the Commissioner of the Department of Labor and Workforce Development ("the Commissioner"). The Commissioner had held that the Claimant is eligible for unemployment compensation as a result of the termination of her employment with TGJ & Co., Inc. ("the Employer"). Because we hold that the Claimant voluntarily quit her employment without good cause, we affirm the trial court.

Lindsay Alford vs. Oak Ridge City Schools
E2002-03133-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.
Lindsay E. Alford ("the plaintiff") and her father, David R. Alford, IV, sued The Oak Ridge City Schools ("the high school") under the Governmental Tort Liability Act ("GTLA") for injuries sustained by the plaintiff when she slipped on a hallway floor at Oak Ridge High School, where she was a student. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's proof, the trial court granted the high school's motion for an involuntary dismissal, finding that, while the plaintiff had proven the existence of water on the floor, she had failed to prove that the high school knew or should have known about the water. From this ruling, the plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Adana Carter v. Utica Mutual Insurance Company
E2002-01779-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Thayer, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: W. Frank Brown III, Chancellor
The trial court sustained a motion for summary judgment in favor of the employer and held that the injury did not occur within the course of employment. The employee contends she was required to make the trip in question and was on a special mission and that the usual rule of noncompensability in going to or coming from work did not apply. The judgment is reversed as the injury occurred on the return trip which was a special errand or mission for the benefit of the employer.

State of Tennessee v. Valerie Arlene Bullion
M2002-02370-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Charles Lee

The appellant, Valerie Arlene Bullion, pled guilty in the Marshall County Circuit Court to operating a motor vehicle in violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act, a Class E felony; driving under the influence, tenth offense, a Class E felony; driving on a revoked license, fourth offense, a Class A misdemeanor; and violation of the implied consent law. The trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, suspended the appellant's driver's license for ten years, and imposed a three thousand dollar ($3000) fine. On appeal, the appellant complains that the sentences imposed by the trial court are excessive. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Ricky Lynn Littrell
M2002-01298-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee Russell

The defendant, Ricky Lynn Littrell, was convicted by a Bedford County Circuit Court jury of theft of property valued more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a career offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. In this delayed appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the stolen merchandise into evidence because a chain of custody had not been established; and (3) the trial court erred by allowing a list of the stolen merchandise into evidence because the testifying witness did not properly authenticate the list pursuant to Rule 901, Tenn. R. Evid. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tony Willis v. Dept of Correction
M2000-01397-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
The issue in this case is the proper standard to be applied to motions to dismiss petitions for common-law writ of certiorari in prison disciplinary proceedings. This appeal involves a prisoner who was charged with and convicted of the disciplinary violation of attempted escape. The prisoner filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County challenging the action of the disciplinary board arguing that it was illegal, arbitrary, and excessively punitive. The chancery court granted the Department of Correction's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because the process provided to the petitioner was commensurate with the sanctions imposed upon him, and therefore, there was no violation or deprivation of due process. The majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, with Judge Koch dissenting. We granted Petitioner's request for permission to appeal, and after conducting our own de novo review of the record, we hold that the petitioner did state a claim for relief under the common-law writ of certiorari because his petition alleged that the disciplinary board failed to follow its own disciplinary guidelines and that the petitioner was substantially prejudiced thereby. At the same time, we agree with the Department of Correction that the petitioner did not state a claim for relief under the due process clause of the United States Constitution or the Tennessee Constitution. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part, affirmed in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Dianna Dawn Mcgahey v. Davis Lee Mcgahgey
W2003-01051-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Ron E. Harmon

State of Tennessee v. Evelyn Holly
W2002-01200-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arthur T. Bennett

Defendant, Evelyn Holly was convicted of second degree murder following a jury trial. Defendant now challenges her conviction arguing that the trial court erred in not suppressing her statement to the police. Defendant also contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction of second degree murder. Specifically, Defendant argues that the evidence showed that she and the victim, Ronald Kyles, were engaged in mutual combat at the time of the killing and requests this court to reduce her conviction to voluntary manslaughter. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm Defendant's conviction for second degree murder.

W2003-00129-COA-R3-CV
W2003-00129-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood

Mary Guess v. Sharp Manufacturing Co. of America,
W2002-00818-WC-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.

State of Tennessee v. Redonna Hanna
W2002-00821-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge James C. Beasley, Jr.

The petitioner, Redonna Hanna, was convicted of three counts of aggravated robbery, one count of especially aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of first degree murder. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective by not objecting to the trial court's instructions as to criminal responsibility. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appealed. We affirm the dismissal.

State of Tennessee v. Voss Johnson
W2002-01487-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bernie Weinman

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Voss Johnson, was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated robbery, one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter, and one count of second degree murder. Defendant now appeals his convictions arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for second degree murder based on a theory of criminal responsibility. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

William Perry v. Ricki Perry
W2001-01350-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Martha B. Brasfield
We granted this appeal to determine the correct standard to be applied in modifying a temporary, open-ended award of rehabilitative alimony. We hold that a substantial and material change in circumstances must be shown in order to extend, or otherwise modify, such an award. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Ray Edwards v. Hallsdale-Powell Utility District
E2002-00395-SC-S09-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Wheeler A. Rosenbalm
The plaintiffs brought suit against Hallsdale-Powell Utility District for nuisance and inverse condemnation after their homes were flooded with raw sewage on two occasions. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the utility district on the plaintiffs' claim for inverse condemnation, holding that no taking of their properties had occurred. The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment. The intermediate appellate court held that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient facts to overcome summary judgment by showing that the sewage backup into their homes had caused a permanent loss of market value. We hold that a governmental defendant must perform a purposeful or intentional act for a taking to exist. Because such an act was not shown in the present case, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

In Re: The Estate of Lowell Frazier
E2002-01203-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Billy Joe White
This appeal concerns two separate suits filed in the Chancery Court for Campbell County in connection with the administration of the Estate of Lowell Frazier. The first suit was brought by Sam Lough, individually, and also, along with his wife, Debbie Lough, as parents and guardians of Matthew Lough, and Darryl Herron and Elizabeth Herron, as parents and guardians of Chelsea Herron. It sought to establish a lost or spoilated will of Mr. Frazier, which was dated January 30, 1998 ("the first will"). The second suit was brought by Matthew Lough and Chelsea Herron by and through their guardian ad litem, appointed in the first case, contesting a later will dated May 24, 2000 ("the second will"). The cases were consolidated below and the suit seeking to establish the first will was tried first. Under an agreement of the parties, the first case must be decided in favor of the minors before they would have standing to contest the second will. After a plenary trial a jury found as to the first case that the Plaintiffs proved by clear and convincing evidence that Lowell Frazier did not destroy the first will. Thereupon, the second trial was had before the same jury, which found against the second will on the ground that due execution was not proved and that Glenda Faye Smith, who was the sole beneficiary of the second will, and at the time it was executed was attorney-in-fact for Mr. Frazier, did not overcome the presumption of undue influence over Mr. Frazier by clear and convincing evidence. Ms. Smith raises a number of issues, many of which merit a critical examination, but our review of the record persuades us that the issue which contends that she was entitled to a directed verdict in the first case is the dispositive issue in this appeal. We find that the Court was in error in not directing a verdict in her favor in the lost will case and reverse the judgment rendered therein. This results in the Plaintiffs not having standing to pursue the second case, which is reversed and dismissed.