State of Tennessee v. Betsy F. Speer
The appellant, Betsy F. Speer, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of driving under the influence. The appellant subsequently acknowledged that she was guilty of driving under the influence, second offense. The trial court sentenced the appellant to the mandatory forty-five days in jail, followed by a probationary period of ten months and fourteen days. The trial court also revoked the appellant's driver's license for a period of two years and imposed a seven hundred fifty dollar ($750) fine. On appeal, the appellant contends that the State failed to comply with her Rule 16 motion for discovery. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Debra Foster
The appellant, Debra Foster, pled guilty to seven counts of attempt to obtain possession of a controlled substance by fraud, Class D felonies. She received an effective sentence of eight years as a Range II, multiple offender. The trial court denied alternative sentencing and the appellant timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dexter Lee Spence
The defendant, Dexter Lee Spence, entered a guilty plea to second degree murder. The trial court imposed a twenty-five-year sentence. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the sentence was excessive. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robin A. Conner
The defendant, Robin A. Conner, pled guilty to robbery, and the Blount County trial court sentenced her to three years' incarceration as a Range I standard offender. The defendant appeals the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thurman L. Whitsey and Charlie Mae Whitsey - Amended Judgement
Came the appellants, THURMAN L. WHITSEY and CHARLIE MAE WHITSEY, by counsel, and the state, by the Attorney General, and this case was heard on the record on appeal from the Criminal Court of Davidson County; and upon consideration thereof, this court is of the opinion that our original judgment entered April 23, 2003, should be vacated; that there is reversible error in the judgments of the trial court relating only to the weapons offense under Count 5; and the case should be remanded for a re-sentencing determination relating to appellant, Charlie Mae Whitsey. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John M. Hollis, individually and as the Surviviing Parent of Raven BLair Hollis, v. W. Charles Doerflinger, Administrator ad Litem for the Estate of Rhonda B. Hollis, et al.
This is an insurance case. The mother and the father were covered by an automobile insurance policy that excluded coverage for certain family members who were residents of the same household as the insureds. The mother was pregnant with a viable fetus. She was at fault in an automobile accident in which she and the fetus died. On behalf of the deceased fetus, the father filed a wrongful death action against the mother's estate. On a motion for partial summary judgment, the father sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether the insurance company was obligated to provide coverage for the deceased fetus. The trial court found that the insurance policy's family exclusion provision was ambiguous. Consequently, it construed the policy in favor of the father, finding that the fetus was not considered a resident of the father's household and that the insurance company was required to provide coverage for the deceased fetus. After a trial, the father was awarded damages plus prejudgment interest. The insurance company and the administrator ad litem of the mother's estate appeal. The insurance company argues that the fetus was excluded from coverage. The administrator ad litem of the mother's estate asserts that the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest. We reverse, finding that the fetus was a resident of the mother's household, and consequently a resident of the father's household, and that the insurance company was therefore not obligated to provide coverage for the fetus. The award of prejudgment interest is reversed as well. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Randy J. Overstreet v. Rebecca D. Overstreet
In this divorce Husband appeals the type and amount of alimony awarded Wife at the end of a twenty-three year marriage. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings and the trial court acted within its discretion in applying relevant legal principles, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Hazel Ann Edde v. Gladys Dalton Edde
After a thirty-six year marriage, Wife filed for divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, inappropriate marital conduct, and adultery. The trial court granted the divorce to Wife, divided the marital property, and awarded Wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $425 per month. Husband appeals. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's decision, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: R.L.H., A Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age, State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services, v. Darlene Medley Hall - Dissenting
While I concur in the majority’s opinion finding that grounds for termination of Hall’s parental rights as to R.L.H. have been established by clear and convincing evidence, I dissent as to the majority’s conclusion that termination of Hall’s parental rights is in the best interests of the minor child. I recognize that the evidence is certainly not favorable to Hall in some particulars, including the fact that her sole support is derived from social security, that she has no prospects of employment in the near future, her past failure to provide a safe and suitable home for the minor child in the face of abuse, her impaired mental condition, and the fact that Hall had no suitable residence for the child at the time of trial. However, this court must balance this evidence with the situation as it pertains to R.L.H. R.L.H. is a special needs child who has specific learning, speech, and behavioral problems. All reports indicate that R.L.H. is in need of continued counseling and therapy. Under the current arrangement, R.L.H. resides in a therapeutic foster home under the care of trained foster parents. This foster home has served as a stable and supportive environment for the minor child since approximately July 2000. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Melissa Combs Cranston v. Edward Scott Combs
We granted review to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the appellant (father) in this post-divorce case failed to present evidence of a material change of circumstances justifying a change of custody of the parties’ two minor children. The Chancellor granted a change in custody from the appellee (mother) after finding that there was a material change in circumstances that presented a substantial risk of harm to the children. A majority of the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there was no material change of circumstances that presented a threat of substantial harm to the children. After reviewing the record and applying our recent decision in Kendrick v. Shoemake, 90 S.W.3d 566 (Tenn. 2002), we conclude that a material change of circumstances occurred after the initial custody determination and that the modification of custody was in the best interest of the children. Although the Chancellor and the Court of Appeals did not have the benefit of Kendrick in this case, and therefore applied an incorrect legal standard, we affirm the result reached by the Chancery Court. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the Chancery Court is reinstated.d. |
Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
Jeffrey Whitaker v. State of Tennessee
Aggrieved that the lower court denied post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner, Jeffrey Whitaker, appeals and claims that his convictions resulted from the ineffective assistance of counsel and involuntary guilty pleas. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Roane | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Alan White
The defendant, Christopher Alan White, appeals as of right his conviction by a Blount County Circuit Court jury for aggravated assault and the resulting ten-year sentence as a Range II, multiple offender. He contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument required a mistrial, and (3) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Town of Rogersville, ex rel. Water Commission v. Mid Hawkins County Utility District
Petition to alter Respondent Utility's boundary was sustained by County Executive and Trial Court. On appeal, we vacate and remand with instructions.
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Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Charles T. Kimery, v. Unicoi County Insurance Agency, et al.
In a dispute over corporate ownership and management, the Trial Court awarded Judgment for compensatory and punitive damages and attorneys fees. On appeal, we affirm the compensatory damages and attorney fees award, but reverse punitive damage award.
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Unicoi | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Debiasi Sirnard King
The defendant was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and was sentenced to twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant brings this appeal and contends the following: (1) The participation of a special prosecutor, hired by the victim's family, is a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights; (2) The trial court erroneously denied defense counsel the opportunity to cross-examine the driver of the vehicle containing the victim, Fernando Hawkins; (3) The trial court failed to give a curative instruction after Detective Hawkins stated that he obtained a warrant for first degree murder of the defendant; (4) The trial court failed to charge the jury on the lesser included offense of facilitation of second degree murder; and (5) The trial court erroneously sentenced the defendant to twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. We conclude the trial court did not err and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Romey Stone
The Appellant, Romey Stone, appeals the decision of the Grainger County Circuit Court revoking his placement in the community corrections program and ordering service of his original sentences in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Stone argues that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by relying on unreliable evidence in revoking his community corrections sentences, and (2) he was denied due process based upon the lack of a "neutral and detached" fact-finder. After review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Grainger | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steve E. Todd v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Steve E. Todd, pled guilty in 1994 to two counts of rape of a child, receiving concurrent twenty-three-year sentences as a Range I offender. He filed a post-conviction petition in 1995 alleging, inter alia, that at the time of his pleas of guilty he had not understood that his sentences would be served without the possibility of parole. Counsel, appointed to represent him, filed an amended petition, which the post-conviction court dismissed following an evidentiary hearing. This court reversed the dismissal and remanded the matter for additional findings to be made. Following the remand, the post-conviction court granted the petition, concluding that the guilty pleas had not been knowing. The State appealed and, following our review, we reverse the order of the post-conviction court and remand this matter for another evidentiary hearing. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephen Massey, a/k/a Stephania
The appellant, Stephen Massey, was convicted by a jury in the Giles County Circuit Court of two counts of selling less than .5 grams of crack cocaine, Class C felonies, and three counts of selling .5 grams or more of crack cocaine, Class B felonies. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range II multiple offender to an effective sentence of eighteen years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, (2) the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion to sever, (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to exclude two African-Americans from the jury based on their race, and (4) the sentences imposed by the trial court were excessive. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Ronald Crabtree
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Brandon Ronald Crabtree, was found guilty of (1) selling marijuana, a Schedule VI controlled substance in an amount of not less than one-half ounce nor more than ten pounds, a Class E felony, and (2) selling a counterfeit controlled substance, a Class E felony. After a sentencing hearing, Defendant was sentenced to two years for each conviction, and the trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. The trial court also determined at the sentencing hearing that Defendant was then (or at that time) on probation for a prior conviction and that Defendant was in violation of that probation. The trial court revoked Defendant's probation and ordered the original sentence of eighteen months to run consecutively to the sentences imposed for the two felony convictions for an effective sentence of five and one-half years. In his appeal, Defendant does not contest his conviction for selling a Schedule VI controlled substance. However, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for the sale of a counterfeit controlled substance. Defendant also challenges the length of his sentences arguing that the trial court failed to follow the principles of the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 and failed to properly weigh mitigating and enhancing factors. After a careful review of the record, we affirm Defendant's conviction for the sale of a counterfeit controlled substance and affirm the trial court's judgments as to Defendant's sentences. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William Andrew Dixon v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, William Andrew Dixon, was convicted in 1981 of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced by the jury to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Subsequently, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and our supreme court determined that his sentence was void, remanding for resentencing and concluding that he should have been sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. On remand, the trial court sentenced the petitioner to life with parole, and he appealed the resentencing, arguing that only a jury could impose the sentence. We conclude that the directive of our supreme court was that the punishment should be life with the possibility of parole and that the court could set this punishment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Blackmon
The appellant, Bobby Blackmon, appeals from the lower court's denial of his motion to modify and correct an illegal sentence or in the alternative petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Finding no error in the summary dismissal of the appellant's motion or petition, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Clorie L. Jackson
The Defendant, Clorie L. Jackson, was convicted by a jury of forgery and money laundering. The trial court subsequently merged the forgery conviction into the money laundering conviction,1 and sentenced the Defendant to nineteen years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the money laundering conviction, as well as the trial court’s jury instructions on that offense. Because we find the evidence insufficient to support the money laundering conviction, we reverse that conviction and dismiss the charge. The conviction for forgery is reinstated. The case is remanded to the trial court for sentencing on the forgery conviction. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Roy Cole v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Charles Roy Cole, filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court of Madison County. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jamie Lou Haneline
The Defendant, Jamie Lou Haneline, was convicted by a jury of one count of rape of a child. Following a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced to thirty-eight years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises three issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of a police officer regarding a statement made by the Defendant; and (3) whether the trial court erred by enhancing the Defendant’s sentence based upon the offense having been committed to gratify the Defendant’s desire for pleasure or excitement. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Decatur | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Doug Long v. T. Allen Pannell, Jr.,
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Knox | Court of Appeals |