Opinions

State vs. Michael Cook
W2001-01539-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: William B. Acree
The Defendant, Michael Joseph Cook, was convicted of driving under the influence, second offense. The trial court sentenced him to 11 months and 29 days and required him to serve six months of that sentence in the local jail. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the trial court improperly sentenced the Defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

William H. Jett v. State of Tennessee
M1999-01409-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Steve R. Dozier

State vs. James McKinley Cunningham
M1999-01995-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Buddy D. Perry
The defendant was convicted by a Grundy County jury of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to life. In this appeal, he challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the admission of a photograph of the victim's body; (3) the exclusion of testimony relating to statements made by the victim; and (4) the evidentiary rulings relating to the victim's propensity toward violence. Upon our review of the record, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In re: K.D.D. (DOB 9/20/96) and B.T.D. (DOB 1/13/98)
M2000-01554-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Barry Tatum
The Juvenile Court terminated the parental rights of a mother to her young children. The mother appealed, arguing that she was not given an adequate opportunity to defend those rights. We find that she voluntarily failed to avail herself of the opportunities that were offered to her, and we affirm the trial court.

Thomas Gammons v. Peterbilt Motors Company,
M1999-02575-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: J. O. Bond, Judge
The trial court found the plaintiff had sustained a permanent partial disability to his right arm of sixty percent, which would entitle him to one-hundred twenty weeks of partial permanent disability. The defendant argues the trial judge erred in setting the amount of the award because the treating physician fixed the medical impairment rating at six percent, and the independent medical examiner fixed the rate at thirty-four percent; the trial judge used neither of these ratings to reach the amount awarded. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Donna Marcom v. Pca Apparel Industries, Inc. and WaUSAu
M2000-00377-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Tom E. Gray, Sp.J.
Trial Court Judge: John Rollins, Chancellor
The trial court found the plaintiff had suffered an injury arising out of her employment with the defendant and awarded her a vocational disability of sixty (6%) percent to the left leg. The defendant argues that the evidence does not support the award of sixty (6%) percent to the left leg based on an anatomical rating of twelve (12%) percent. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State vs. Thomas Edward Ford
M1999-2362-CCA-R3-CD

Trial Court Judge: Charles D. Haston, Sr.
The appellant, Thomas Edward Ford, was convicted of Class C felony aggravated assault and Class D vandalism. The Circuit Court of Warren County sentenced the appellant to five years for aggravated assault and two years for vandalism. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively. Upon appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for review: (1) propriety of the five-year sentence; (2) imposition of consecutive sentences; (3) sufficiency of the evidence for aggravated assault; and (4) misleading jury instruction. After review, we find no error. Accordingly, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Warren County is affirmed.

William Henderson vs. Donal Campbell
M2000-00411-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
This is an appeal by a prison inmate from a dismissal of his suit for declaratory judgment in the Chancery Court of Davidson County. The trial court dismissed the claim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-804 for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. We affirm.

State vs. Charles B. Sullivan
M1999-02547-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz
Charles B. Sullivan entered guilty pleas in the Davidson County Criminal Court to three counts of aggravated rape, one count of especially aggravated burglary, three counts of aggravated burglary, and one count of rape, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifty-nine years. In this appeal as of right, the appellant contends that the individual sentences are excessive and that partial consecutive sentences are not warranted. After review, we affirm.

City of Springfield vs. Hobson Cleaning, Inc., et al
M2000-01114-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: James E. Walton
This case involves a contract between the City of Springfield and defendant, United Services Unlimited, formerly Hobson Cleaning, to clean the floors of the police department. Defendant appeals whether the evidence preponderated against the judgment of the trial court. We affirm the judgment.

State vs. Coley
M1997-00116-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Donald P. Harris

State vs. Coley
M1997-00116-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Donald P. Harris

Fain v. Fain
M1999-02261-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Russell Heldman
In this post-divorce proceeding, Clifton Dean Fain ("Father") filed a petition seeking sole custody of the parties' minor child. Susan Lorraine Fain ("Mother") counterclaimed for a modification of the joint custody arrangement or, in the alternative, for sole custody of the child. The trial court awarded Mother sole custody. Father appeals the award of sole custody to Mother. He also challenges the award of attorney's fees to Mother and questions the fairness of the quantum of his visitation time with the child. Mother seeks attorney's fees for this appeal. We affirm.

Sweatt vs. Bd. of Paroles
M1999-02265-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
Appellant Antonio L. Sweatt brings this Petition for a Common Law Writ of Certiorari regarding the Tennessee Board of Paroles' decision to deny him parole based on the seriousness of the offense that he committed. Appellant avers that the Board of Paroles acted illegally or arbitrarily in denying his parole because appellant asserts that his guilty plea agreement included the agreement that he would only serve thirty percent of his twenty-five-year sentence and then he would be released on parole.

Burgess vs. Tie Co. 1, LLC
M1999-02232-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: L. Craig Johnson
In this slip and fall action the Trial Court granted defendant summary judgment. We vacate and remand.

Next Generation, Inc. vs. Wal-Mart
M2000-00114-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Brothers
In this contract dispute, the jury awarded damages to Wal-Mart, Inc., and the Trial Court concurred. Next Generation, Inc., appealed raising issues as to the admissibility of evidence and the Trial Court's instructions to the jury. We affirm.

Mandrell vs. McBee
M2000-00108-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, III
This is a partnership dispute occasioned by the misappropriation of partnership funds by two of the five partners. In an earlier appeal in this case, this Court affirmed the judgment of the Trial Court awarding damages to the innocent partners but increased the amount of that judgment. This Court then remanded the case to the Trial Court, which heard further proof and made findings as to the distribution of partnership assets. In this appeal, a Defendant partner seeks reversal of the Trial Court's valuation and accounting of the partnership assets and computation of prejudgment interest. We find the concurrent findings of fact by the Special Master and the Trial Court are supported by material evidence in the record, and that the Special Master and the Trial Court properly interpreted this Court's earlier Opinion. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Trial Court in all respects.

Next Generation, Inc. vs. Wal-Mart
M2000-00114-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Brothers
In this contract dispute, the jury awarded damages to Wal-Mart, Inc., and the Trial Court concurred. Next Generation, Inc., appealed raising issues as to the admissibility of evidence and the Trial Court's instructions to the jury. We affirm.

Cumberland Bank vs. Smith
M2000-00052-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: C. K. Smith
A creditor filed an action to sell a parcel of the debtor's real estate to satisfy a judgment lien on the property. The Chancery Court of Smith County granted the relief requested. The judgment debtor asserts on appeal that the underlying judgment and a nulla bona sheriff's return are void. For the reasons set forth in our opinion below, we affirm the action of the lower court.

General Bancshares vs. Volunteer Bank & Trust
M2000-00231-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: John W. Rollins
The Plaintiff, General Bancshares, Inc., filed a declaratory judgment action asking the Trial Court to declare a restrictive covenant in its warranty deed unenforceable. Defendant Volunteer Bank & Trust's predecessor in title of the property at issue originally placed the restriction on the property several years ago. Plaintiff contends, among other arguments, that the restrictive covenant does not bind it as a remote grantee because the restrictive clause does not contain specific "successors and assigns" language. Both parties filed Motions for Summary Judgment, and the Trial Court granted Defendant's Motion. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Arms vs. Stanton
M2000-00811-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Carol A. Catalano
In what started out as an order of protection proceeding but later turned into a "divorce" action, the original plaintiff, James Vertner Arms, who was the counter-defendant in the "divorce" case, filed a third-party action against Richard D. Stanton, individually and doing business as Shiloh Family, Ltd. ("Stanton"). Stanton had purchased a tract of real property from the counter-plaintiff, Tammy Lou Arms, subsequent to the institution of her "divorce" action against Mr. Arms. The trial court determined that Mr. Arms and Tammy Lou Arms were not validly married; it proceeded to set aside the transfer as a fraudulent conveyance and awarded Stanton a judgment against Tammy Lou Arms for $50,000. Stanton appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in setting aside the conveyance. We reverse.

Stephen Stamps vs. Victoria Dibonaventura
W1999-00534-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Julian P. Guinn
This case arises from the Appellee's legal representation of the Appellant in a Petition for Post Conviction Relief. The Appellant's Petition was denied by the Criminal Court of Henry County and the Court of Criminal Appeals. After denial of his Application for Permission to Appeal by the Tennessee Supreme Court, the Appellant filed a Complaint of Legal Malpractice with the Circuit Court of Henry County. The trial court dismissed the Appellant's Complaint following a Motion to Dismiss filed by the Appellee. The Appellant appeals from the dismissal of his Complaint filed in the Circuit Court of Henry County. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court's decision.

State vs. Margaret Somerville
W1999-01333-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Cornelia A. Clark
Trial Court Judge: Julian P. Guinn
Defendant Margaret Ree Somerville was convicted by a jury of one count of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of twelve (12) years on the felony offense and eleven (11) months, twenty-nine (29) days on the misdemeanor offense. The sentences were run concurrent to one another. Defendant challenges her convictions, asserting that (1) she was denied her right to the timely appointment of counsel; (2) the indictments against her were defective and should be quashed; and (3) the search warrant executed in this case was defective. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

State vs. Michael Smith
W1999-02413-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
The Defendant, Michael W. Smith, appeals as of right from the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he asserts that his conviction for escape, which was entered pursuant to his guilty plea, should be set aside because the plea was entered involuntarily due to his trial counsel's ineffectiveness. We conclude that the trial court properly denied relief based on its findings that the Defendant received effective assistance of counsel and that he entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

State vs. Samuel Pegues
W1999-01865-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: John Franklin Murchison
The Defendant, Samuel Pegues, was convicted of second degree murder after a jury trial. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant asserts that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to sustain his conviction, that the trial court erred by denying proposed testimony regarding statements made by the victim on the night of the incident, and that the trial court erred by excluding the Defendant's testimony regarding statements made by the victim that she had stabbed or cut someone. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction, that the trial court did err by denying the proposed testimony of statements made by the victim but that such error was harmless, and that the Defendant has waived his issue regarding the statements of the victim that she had stabbed or cut someone. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.