State of Tennessee v. Russell L. Tipton - Concurring
This case illustrates the growing disparity in the application of diversion, both pre-trial and judicial, in the State of Tennessee. The appellant in this case, who presents an unblemished combined history of thirty-five years of meritorious service to his country in the military and to the citizens of this state as a police officer, is denied diversion, in effect, for operating a boat without proper light. Meanwhile, on the date this opinion is being written, the Shelby County Criminal Court grants diversion of a conviction for manslaughter stemming from the shooting death of the defendant’s husband. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Russell L. Tipton
The appellant, Russell L. Tipton, was charged with reckless operation of a motor vessel and failure to observe the motor vessel light law. The appellant applied for pretrial diversion and has twice been denied. In the instant appeal, the appellant challenges the prosecutor’s second denial of his application for pretrial diversion. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court upholding the prosecutor’s denial of diversion and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tonya L. Merrick v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, being of the opinion the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Farmer v. David Hersh
This is a defamation case. The defendant owned a minor league baseball team which played for the City of Jackson, Tennessee. In 2002, the plaintiff, the mayor of Jackson, was negotiating with the defendant team owners to purchase the baseball team on behalf of the city. Soon the plaintiff mayor and the defendant owner became embroiled in a lawsuit related to the sale of the team. Two years later, the plaintiff mayor filed the instant lawsuit, alleging that the defendant team owner had defamed him by telling the media that the mayor was attempting to “steal” the team. After some discovery, the defendant team owner filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. At the hearing on the motion, the trial court noted that matters outside the complaint had been submitted to the court, and it therefore treated the motion as one for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that the statement allegedly made by the defendant team owner was not defamatory, and that the plaintiff mayor had not presented sufficient proof of damages. The plaintiff mayor now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the statement allegedly made is mere hyperbole and not defamatory as a matter of law. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Ray Carlton
The defendant, Michael Ray Carlton, was convicted of theft over $60,000 (Class B felony) and sentenced to eight years as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant now appeals his conviction and sentencing and presents the following issues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the trial court erred in its jury instruction regarding accomplice corroboration; (3) the trial court committed plain error in allowing certain testimony and in allowing improper comments in closing argument; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing by its order of incarceration. After review, we affirm the conviction but modify the manner of service of sentence to serve six months in the local jail or workhouse, with eligibility for work release if available, followed by supervised probation for the remainder of his sentence. We remand to the trial court for the determination and setting of restitution payments. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Threat
The defendant, David Threat, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery, for which he received concurrent sentences of life and twelve years, respectively. He raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to police; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting a store surveillance videotape into evidence; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his felony murder conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Randal Louis Murdaugh v. Svetlana Nicolaevna Shketik (Murdaugh)
In this divorce case, the husband filed for divorce approximately five months after entering into marriage with the wife, an immigrant who had come to the United States from Latvia on a religious work visa. The husband resided in Madison County, Tennessee, and the wife and her son spent a majority of the duration of the marriage living in Cincinnati, Ohio, where the wife worked for a church and her son attended school. The chancellor awarded the wife temporary support and held a bench trial. The chancellor granted the parties a divorce based upon stipulated grounds and awarded the wife 25% of the value of the parties’ marital property, as well as attorney’s fees. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Vanda Watkins
The appellant, Vanda Watkins, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and pursuant to the plea agreement, received a two-year sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the appellant serve his entire sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court erred by denying his request for probation. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Melvin Perry v. Bruce Westbrooks, et al.
Appellant challenges trial court’s order dismissing Appellant’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The record reveals that the court reached its decision in a lawful manner. We affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Charles Skinner
The defendant, Robert Charles Skinner, appeals from the judgment of the Dyer County Circuit Court, revoking his probation and imposing service of the remainder of his misdemeanor sentence in confinement. In this appeal, the defendant argues that the court erred in revoking his probation. Following our review of the record, parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we determine no error exists in the court’s revocation of probation, and thus affirm the court’s judgment. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Glenn Bernard Mann
The petitioner, Glenn Bernard Mann, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Following our review of the record, parties’ briefs and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Connie Lee Arnold v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Connie Lee Arnold, appeals the Carter County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for child rape and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and resulting effective thirty-seven-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that (1) he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his attorney failed to file a motion for change of venue based on pretrial publicity and (2) the post-conviction court judge erred by refusing to recuse himself from this case. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the petitioner did not receive the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the postconviction court did not err by denying the petitioner’s motion to recuse. Nevertheless, we hold that the judge who presided over this post-conviction proceeding is disqualified from any subsequent proceedings in this case. |
Carter | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mitchell Ridley
Defendant, Mitchell Ridley, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence and the imposing of a sentence of confinement. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cheryl Brown Giggers, et al. v. Memphis Housing Authority, et al.
This appeal involves a wrongful death action arising from the fatal shooting of a tenant at a public housing property. The decedent was in the manager’s office of the apartment complex when another tenant, who was involved in an altercation with a security guard on the premises, obtained a rifle from his apartment and began shooting at the security guard. The decedent was struck and killed by a bullet fired by the other tenant during the incident. The plaintiffs, the surviving children and sister of the decedent, sued the defendant owner and operator of the public housing property, asserting claims for wrongful death through negligence and breach of contract per the lease agreement. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Davis
The Appellant, Michael Davis, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Davis raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury with regard to criminal responsibility for the conduct of another; and (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of conviction. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Willis B. Amos, et al. v. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee - Dissenting
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the lump-sum payments made to Appellants upon their retirement were not for performing personal services; but instead, were in lieu of the employee using his/her accrued vacation time. Although the payments were indeed made in lieu of the employee using his/her accrued vacation time, the payments were compensation for the employee performing personal services during his/her employment.
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Willis Bruce Amos, et al. v. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee
This appeal involves a declaratory judgment on the issue of whether pursuant to the Metro Code, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, should have included lump-sum payments for accrued vacation time in the calculation of pension benefits for retired employees, or in the alternative, whether the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee should be estopped from excluding lump-sum payments for accrued vacation time from the calculation of pension benefits for retired employees. On appeal, the Appellants claim that the trial court erred in finding that: 1) pursuant to the Metro Code, lump-sum payments should be excluded from the calculation of pension benefits for retired employees, 2) the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee is not estopped from excluding the lump-sum payments from the calculations, and 3) denying certification of this matter as a class action. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cassandra Rogers v. State of Tennessee
Following a car accident, Claimant/Appellant filed a Complaint with the Tennessee Claims Commission. The Complaint stated that Claimant/Appellant did not have sufficient facts to state definitively a claim for negligence against a Tennessee State Trooper. The State filed a motion to dismiss, which the Commission granted. Claimant/Appellant appeals. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter of: M.A.W.
The trial court dismissed Father’s petition to modify child custody upon determining no material change in circumstances had occurred. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ann M. Honeycutt v. Wilkes, Mccullough & Wagner, and Barbara McCullough, Individually
This appeal involves a legal malpractice claim that a client brought against her former attorney after this Court issued a decision terminating the client’s receipt of alimony. The attorney had represented the client in her divorce case. When the parties executed their marital dissolution agreement, the attorney allegedly provided erroneous advice to the client about a provision that would terminate her alimony if she cohabited with an unrelated male. Subsequent to the divorce, the client’s ex-husband filed a petition to terminate his alimony obligation because the client was living with another man. Although the client initially retained this same attorney to defend against the petition, she later discharged her and retained other counsel. The trial court ruled in the client’s favor, but on appeal, we reversed and terminated the alimony obligation. The client then sued her former attorney, but the trial court granted summary judgment to the attorney based upon the one year statute of limitations for legal malpractice claims. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Accredo Health Incorporated, et al. v. David Patterson
The trial court dismissed this lawsuit upon determining that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendant, a Texas resident. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
David Lane Goss v. State of Tennessee
Wilson County- The Defendant, David Lane Goss, was convicted by a Wilson County jury of driving under the influence. On appeal, the Defendant alleges the trial court erred when it: denied his motion to suppress certain oral statements he gave during the traffic stop; denied his motion to dismiss based on his claim that he was not properly taken before a magistrate; and denied his motion for judgment of acquittal. After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mike Campbell v. Country Homes, Inc., et al.
On this appeal, it is alleged the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing appellant’s complaint for failure to obey an order compelling discovery and for refusing to vacate that order. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Terre Jo Fields v. James R. Fields, Jr.
Husband was found in civil contempt and incarcerated. He was further enjoined from being selfemployed. He appeals only the injunction which we reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Nancy Ann McCracken Sizemore v. Steven Douglas Sizemore and Nancy Ann McCracken Sizemore v. Steven Douglas Sizemore
Nancy Ann McCracken Sizemore (“Wife”) initially sued her spouse, Steven Douglas Sizemore (“Husband”), for divorce in the Washington County Circuit Court. She subsequently filed a notice of voluntary dismissal in that case. On the day the notice of nonsuit was filed in Circuit Court, Wife filed a divorce complaint in the Chancery Court for Washington County. The parties proceeded to trial in that court. The Chancery Court granted Wife a divorce, divided the parties’ marital property, and ordered Husband to pay Wife child support and alimony. Following the entry of the Chancery Court’s judgment, Husband filed a counterclaim in the Circuit Court proceeding – the one that had been dormant since Wife filed her notice of voluntary nonsuit some two years earlier. He argues that the case in Circuit Court was still pending because that court had not entered an order dismissing Wife’s complaint. The Circuit Court dismissed Husband’s counterclaim, stating (1) that Husband had waived his right to have the parties’ divorce case tried in Circuit Court by fully participating in the trial in Chancery Court; and (2) that Wife’s notice of nonsuit had “effectively dismissed the case” in Circuit Court. On appeal from the Chancery Court case, Husband contends that (1) the Chancery Court “never had jurisdiction” because the complaint in Circuit Court was pending when the -2- Chancery Court purported to assume jurisdiction; (2) the Chancery Court erred in not allowing him to obtain a transcript of the divorce hearing; (3) the Chancellor was biased against him and should have recused himself; (4) the Chancery Court erred in ordering him to pay child support for the parties’ disabled adult son; (5) the Chancery Court erred in its division of the parties’ marital property; (6) the Chancery Court erred in awarding Wife alimony; (7) the Chancery Court erred in imputing $100,000 per year of income to Husband; and (8) the Chancery Court erred in finding him in contempt. On appeal from the Circuit Court, Husband argues that the court lacked authority to dismiss his counterclaim. We affirm the judgments of both courts. |
Washington | Court of Appeals |