State of Tennessee v. Scotty Henry Pace, Jr.
The appellant’s former girlfriend obtained an order of protection against the appellant in June of 2003. In August of 2003, the former girlfriend filed warrants alleging two separate violations of the order of protection by the appellant. The general sessions court found the appellant guilty of criminal contempt for both violations and sentenced the appellant to ten days in jail for each offense. The appellant appealed to the circuit court, which held a hearing and affirmed the convictions. Because the appellant has failed to include in the appellate record the June 2003 order of protection which he was found to have violated, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gerald Wells
Appellant, Gerald Wells, was indicted for one count of aggravated robbery. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted as charged. The trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range II multiple offender to seventeen years for the conviction. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Because the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for aggravated robbery, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deddrick Parker, Taurus Driver, and Tremaine Roberson
The defendants, Deddrick Parker, Taurus Driver, and Tremaine Roberson, were indicted for two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and five counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. Each defendant was convicted of both counts of aggravated robbery, and Roberson was also convicted of all five counts of aggravated assault, Parker of two counts, and Driver of two counts of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of aggravated assault. Roberson, Parker, and Driver were sentenced as Range I, standard offenders to consecutive sentences totaling thirty-five, twentyfour, and twenty years, respectively. In this consolidated appeal, they raise three issues: (1) the evidence is insufficient; (2) the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors and in imposing consecutive sentencing; and (3) the trial court erred by not timely disclosing its prior relationship with an assault victim. Following our review, we remand for resentencing as to those sentences imposed on each defendant which exceed the minimum, affirm the remaining judgments, and remand to the trial court for a determination as to whether the sentences should be served concurrently or consecutively. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tommy Lee Watson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Tommy L. Watson, pled guilty to vehicular homicide (Class B felony) and reckless endangerment (Class E felony) in exchange for a sentence of twelve years. On appeal, he contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and submits that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After review, we conclude that no error exists and affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory O. Cherry
Appellant, Gregory O. Cherry, was found guilty by a jury of possession of over .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, delivery of under .5 grams of cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. As a result, he was sentenced to a total effective sentence of eight years. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve the effective eight-year sentence consecutively to sentences in case numbers 8395 and 8396.1 Appellant filed a motion for new trial. Appellant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress Appellant’s confession and improperly refused to suppress evidence obtained by a warrantless search of Appellant’s car. Appellant also contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions. Because the record does not indicate that the trial court denied Appellant’s motion for new trial, we determine that we lack jurisdiction to hear the case and dismiss the appeal. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Teresa McWherter v. JACOA Alcoholism Center
This is a negligence case. The defendant is a treatment facility for drug and alcohol addictions. The plaintiff was an inpatient at the defendant facility, undergoing substance abuse treatment. The plaintiff was admitted on referral from her probation officer. As part of her treatment, the plaintiff participated in experiential therapy designed to teach through experiences. For one exercise, a group of patients were organized into a team and a rope was tied between two posts, with a mattress on one side. The team was asked to devise a plan for getting all team members over the rope, without touching it. The plaintiff’s team decided to “toss” the female members of the team over the rope. The plaintiff was thrown over the rope once without injury. However, the team had to repeat the exercise. During the second attempt, the plaintiff was tossed over the rope, but this time her foot missed the mattress and she broke her ankle. The plaintiff then filed this lawsuit against the defendant facility. The facility moved for summary judgment, arguing that it could not be held liable because the plaintiff voluntarily chose to engage in the exercise despite an obvious risk of injury. The trial court granted the motion. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse and remand, finding that the defendant facility had a duty of care to the plaintiff and that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the extent to which the plaintiff felt compelled to participate in the exercise and as to whether the fault attributable to the plaintiff is greater than the fault attributable to the defendant facility. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Conaway v. U.S. Pipe and Foundry Company, et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee, Kenneth Conaway, was permanently and totally disabled. The employer has appealed that ruling, contending that the Mr. Conaway’s work as a minister precludes a finding of total disability. We agree and modify the award of the trial court to seventy-two percent permanent partial disability of the body as a whole. |
Marion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Lee Marise
The defendant, Gary Lee Marise, was convicted by a Carroll County jury of attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, a Class D felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to four years in the Department of Correction. He raises essentially three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in refusing his request for special jury instructions; and (3) whether he was denied a fair trial and the effective assistance of counsel due to the poor acoustics in the temporary courtroom, which prevented some jurors from hearing his trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services, v. P.W.K., In Re: J.B.K. DOB: 11/25/02
The parties stipulated statutory grounds for termination of parental rights, and the Trial Court found that it was in the child’s best interest that the father’s parental rights be terminated. On appeal, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Lilliane Kambu v. Jean Katera
The Trial Court granted the parties a divorce, ordering the husband to pay child support and alimony in futuro. The husband has appealed arguing the Trial Court abused its discretion in awarding the wife alimony. We modify the alimony award and otherwise affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Keshun Goods v. Tony Parker, Warden
The State appeals the habeas court’s grant of a petition for habeas corpus relief filed by the Petitioner, Anthony Keshun Goods. The Petitioner alleged in his petition that his sentence was illegal because he was sentenced to concurrent terms when the law required him to be sentenced to consecutive terms. On appeal, the State contends the statutory requirement of consecutive sentences does not apply to the Petitioner, his petition is not yet ripe, and the remedy set out by the habeas court is improper. Finding no error in the judgment of the habeas court, we affirm the grant of habeas corpus relief and remand the case to the Shelby County Criminal Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony Keshun Goods v. Tony Parker, Warden - Dissenting
The majority, relying upon the authority of McLaney v. Bell, affirms the grant of habeas corpus relief. However, relying upon the authority of the Tennessee Supreme Court cases discussed below, I must respectfully dissent. My reasons are two-fold. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William T. Carter
A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, William T. Carter, of premeditated first-degree murder, see T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(1) (2006), felony murder, see id. § 39-13-202(a)(2), and aggravated robbery, see id. § 39-13-402(a)(2). On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding all three convictions. He also asserts that the trial court erred in finding that he qualified as a dangerous offender regarding the aggravated robbery conviction and that the trial court erred in ordering him to serve the aggravated robbery sentence consecutively to his firstdegree murder conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court; however, we remand for the execution of a proper merger of the first degree murder findings of guilt. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dennis Jarrett v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Dennis Jarrett, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel as grounds for relief. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition as timebarred. The petitioner appeals the dismissal, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Larry Johnson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Larry Johnson, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to request an instruction on second-degree murder as a lesser-included offense of premeditated first-degree murder and did not raise the trial court’s failure to give such instruction as an issue in the motion for new trial. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rickey Williams v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Rickey Williams, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree premeditated murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction on the definition of “knowing.” Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Guy Martin
Appellant, Guy Martin, was found guilty by a jury of aggravated robbery and intentionally evading arrest in a motor vehicle. As a result, the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of nine years. Following the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant initiated this appeal. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. As part of his argument that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the photographic lineup as unduly suggestive. Because the photographic lineup was not unduly suggestive and there was evidence presented from which a rational juror could conclude that Appellant committed aggravated robbery and intentionally evaded arrest in a motor vehicle, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Suzy Whitley v. Sam Lewis
This appeal involves a claim in juvenile court to recover child support payments. The mother of the child at issue told the respondent that he was the child’s father. In reliance on this, the respondent signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, and the juvenile court entered an agreed order setting child support and establishing the respondent’s child support arrearage. Over two years later, the respondent learned that the child might not be his, and he petitioned the juvenile court for a paternity test. His petition was granted, and the test showed that he was not the biological father of the child. The juvenile court set aside the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity based on fraud, relieved the respondent of any future obligation to pay child support, and forgave all past child support arrearages. Subsequently, the respondent filed a petition against the mother, seeking damages because the mother had fraudulently induced him into signing the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. The juvenile court granted the respondent’s petition against the mother, awarding him damages consisting of the child support erroneously paid, the cost of paternity testing, and attorney’s fees. The State, on behalf of the mother, now appeals. We reverse, concluding that the juvenile court erroneously forgave the respondent’s accrued child support arrearages, and that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondent’s petition against the mother for damages. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald C. Howse v. Tennessee Department of Correction
In 1982, appellant prisoner was sentenced to one twenty-five year determinate sentence and four five-to-ten-year indeterminate sentences, to run consecutively. In 2003, appellant filed a declaratory judgment action in the Davidson County Chancery Court, alleging that he had been wrongfully denied the possibility of custodial parole. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant appeals such ruling. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John Ruff v. Raleigh Assembly of God Church, Inc.
On remand pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-3-128, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Defendant with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for assault. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Wayne Watkins
The defendant, David Wayne Watkins, pled guilty to the offenses of theft over $1000, felony reckless endangerment, and felony failure to appear. As a result, he received a total effective sentence of eight years to be served consecutively to a prior sentence of six years he was already serving. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing and ordering confinement. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Justin Mathis
A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Justin Mathis, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant claims that (1) the trial court erred by allowing an expert to testify about the appellant’s potential gang membership; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce into evidence a picture of a gun stored in a witnesses’ cellular telephone; (3) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence a photograph of the victim’s heart; (4) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on criminal responsibility for the conduct of another; and (5) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Thomas R. Jones, Jr. v. Heather L. Rusch-Jones - Concurring
I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately to address two matters. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas R. Jones, Jr. v. Heather L. Rusch-Jones
Following a short marriage of less than four years, Thomas R. Jones, Jr. (“Father”) filed a complaint for divorce from Heather L. Rusch-Jones (“Mother”). Mother filed a counter-claim also seeking a divorce. Both parties sought to be the primary residential parent of their young daughter. While this case was pending, both parties filed competing petitions for orders of protection. Father’s petition was granted; Mother’s was not. Following a very lengthy trial, the Trial Court designated Father as the primary residential parent and awarded Mother supervised and restricted co-parenting time. The Trial Court awarded Mother a limited amount of alimony. Mother appeals raising numerous issues, including a challenge to the Trial Court’s designation of Father as the primary residential parent and the amount of alimony she was awarded. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Lee T. Myers v. Sandra Brown
This case involves the third and fourth appeals (consolidated) of successive petitions to modify custody. The mother and father of the child at issue were never married. The mother was designated the primary residential parent for the child, and the father was given designated parenting time and ordered to pay child support. In 2002, the father filed a petition to modify custody. The trial court denied the father’s petition, and the decision was affirmed by this Court (“E.J.M. I”). During the pendency of that appeal, the father filed a second petition for a change of custody based on facts that arose after his first petition was denied. A hearing on this petition was conducted shortly after this Court issued its decision in E.J.M. I. A juvenile court judge held that, though he might otherwise change custody to the father, he was bound by the appellate decision in E.J.M. I to give final decision-making authority to the mother. Nevertheless, joint custody was ordered. The father now appeals that decision. Shortly after that, the father filed another petition to modify custody, based on facts that arose after the decision to award joint custody. Another juvenile court judge conducted a hearing, heard testimony, and reviewed the entire record. After doing so, the juvenile court judge strongly criticized the father’s litigiousness and, in light of the pending appeal of the joint custody award, dismissed the father’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The father appeals that decision as well. Both appeals were consolidated, but the appeal was dismissed due to a procedural defect (E.J.M. II). The procedural defect was cured, and we now hear the consolidated appeal. We reverse the conclusion by both juvenile court judges, holding that the trial court has jurisdiction and authority to modify custody even while an appeal is pending, so long as the modification is based on new facts and changed conditions that arose after the trial court judgment that is the subject of the appeal. The cause is remanded for a decision on the father’s petitions to modify custody. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |