Steven Lamont Anderson v. Glen Turner, Warden, State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Steven L. Anderson, appeals from the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, he contends: the trial court did not follow the proper procedures for processing his petition for writ of habeas corpus; the court improperly dismissed his petition; and his right against double jeopardy was violated. After careful review, we conclude that no error exists and affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Wayne Webb v. Brandon O.Canada, et al - Concurring
The majority holds that the Judgment denominated “Final Judgment” reducing the previous Judgment from $723,426.27 to $598,426.27 was a “juristic act” of acceptance of the remittitur under protest. I do not agree. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
John Wayne Webb v. Brandon O.Canada, et al
John Wayne Webb was injured in a car wreck and filed suit against two other drivers. A jury found defendant Brandon O. Canada to be solely at fault and awarded Mr. Webb $723,426.27 in compensatory damages against Mr. Canada. An order was entered awarding Mr. Webb judgment against Mr. Canada in the amount of $723,426.27 and dismissing the case as to the other driver, Douglas D. Townsend. Mr. Canada filed a motion seeking a new trial or in the alternative, a remittitur. Following a hearing, the trial court suggested a remittitur in the amount of $125,000. Final judgment was entered on July 24, 2006, referencing the remittitur and reducing the amount of the judgment to $598,426.27. On appeal, Mr. Canada argues that he is entitled to a new trial because Mr. Webb never accepted the remittitur, the verdict was excessive, and the remittitur was inadequate. After review, we find no error and affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
William Harrison Nix, III v. Richard Terry Sutton
The appellant contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing his appeal from general sessions court when he failed to appear on the date of the hearing. He claimed that he had gone to the wrong courthouse on the hearing date. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Schneider et al. v. The City of Jackson
We granted this appeal primarily to determine whether Tennessee common law includes a law enforcement investigative privilege (“law enforcement privilege”) which operates to exempt from disclosure governmental records that would otherwise be accessible via the Tennessee Public Records Act (“Public Records Act”). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503 (Supp. 2006).1 We hold that Tennessee common law does not include the law enforcement privilege and that it should not be adopted herein. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which adopted the law enforcement privilege and applied it as an exception to the Public Records Act. However, we remand this case to the trial court to determine whether any of the police department records at issue are part of a pending, open, or ongoing criminal investigation and thus exempt from disclosure. We also reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and reinstate the judgment of the trial court permitting Petitioners to recover their attorneys’ fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-505(g) (1999). On remand, the trial court shall calculate and award Petitioners the attorneys’ fees they have incurred on appeal. Finally, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the permanent injunction issued by the trial court requiring the City of Jackson (“City”) to respond in writing to future Public Records Act requests of The Jackson Sun or its agents. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
C.S.C., et al. v. Knox County Board of Education, et al.
In this class action lawsuit filed against the Knox County Board of Education and its superintendent, the trial court awarded the Plaintiffs a portion of their attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Defendants argue on appeal that the trial court erred in finding the Plaintiffs to be “prevailing parties” in the litigation and that the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees was unwarranted and erroneous. We hold that although the Plaintiffs were not successful on all of their claims, they achieved enough success in their lawsuit to be “prevailing parties.” We find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in awarding Plaintiffs $45,000 in attorney’s fees, and consequently affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re D.Y.H.
The father was granted custody of his minor child in juvenile court after the court found the daughter to be dependent and neglected. Three years after the order was entered, the mother filed a petition for change of custody in juvenile court, which was denied. The mother appealed the juvenile court’s order to circuit court. The circuit court dismissed the appeal concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the petition filed by the mother was not a part of the dependency and neglect proceeding. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and hold that the subsequent custody decision was a part of the dependency and neglect proceeding so that it is properly appealable to circuit court for a de novo hearing. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Savalas O. McNeal
The defendant, Savalas O. McNeal, was convicted by a Madison County jury of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and deliver and received a ten-year sentence to the Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ulysses Richardson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Ulysses Richardson , appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition for post-conviction relief fails as it is a second such petition and as it is barred by the statute of limitations. The petition similarly fails if considered as a petition for habeas corpus relief, a motion to reopen a petition for post-conviction relief or a petition for writ of error coram nobis. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Thomas M. Powell v. Glen Turner, Warden
The Petitioner, Thomas M. Powell, appeals the lower court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to assert a ground that would entitle him to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Arthur T. Copeland
The Defendant, Arthur T. Copeland, was convicted of one count of first degree murder and sentenced to death. The jury found a single aggravating circumstance, that the Defendant previously had been convicted of one or more felonies involving violence to the person, see Tenn. Code Ann.§ 39-13-204(i)(2) (1997), and further found that the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(g)(1) (1997). The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court properly excluded expert testimony on eyewitness identification but committed plain error by failing to conduct a hearing pursuant to Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 157 (Tenn. 1999), and ordered a remand for a determination of whether the error was harmless. Further, the Court of Criminal Appeals set aside the sentence of death as disproportionate. We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal in order to resolve the dispositive issues. We first hold that the trial court erred by prohibiting the Defendant from offering expert testimony regarding eyewitness testimony and overrule State v. Coley, 32 S.W.3d 831 (Tenn. 2000). Because the exclusion of the testimony cannot be classified as harmless under these circumstances, the Defendant must be granted a new trial. Although the trial court failed to conduct a Momon hearing, consideration of that issue is not necessary because of the grant of a new trial. Finally, we conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by finding that the death sentence was disproportionate; thus the State may choose to seek the death penalty upon remand. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for a new trial. |
Blount | Supreme Court | |
Rudolph Powers v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Paroles
This appeal involves a prisoner seeking parole. The petitioner was convicted in 1981 and is serving a life sentence. In 2004, he was denied parole based on the severity of his offense. He filed the instant petition for a common-law writ of certiorari, claiming violations of his constitutional right to equal protection and due process, and a violation of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. The trial court dismissed the petition on its face, finding that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The petitioner filed this appeal. We affirm, concluding that the petition does not state a claim for relief. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Allen Shawn Dye v. Amanda Layne Fowler
The primary residential parent of the parties' eleven-year-old child requested permission to relocate to Georgia because her husband accepted employment that provided a significant increase in pay and better opportunities for advancement. The father opposed the relocation. The trial court, which made no findings of fact, denied the request based upon the conclusion the relocation did not have a reasonable purpose. We have determined the evidence preponderates in favor of the finding that the mother had a reasonable purpose for relocating to Georgia. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to grant the requested relocation to Georgia. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William T. Utley
The Appellant, William T. Utley, was convicted by a Chester County jury of the Class D felonies of burglary and theft of property over $1000. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed concurrent four-year sentences of incarceration for each conviction. On appeal, Utley has raised three issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication; and (3) whether the court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgments of conviction and resulting sentences. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kim McGill v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, Kim McGill, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. McGill pled guilty to aggravated robbery and received a sentence of 7.2 years, as a mitigated offender, to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, she asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise her of the right to request recusal of the trial judge based upon the judge’s comments to the Appellant following her request to obtain private counsel. Following review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher Lovin v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Christopher Lovin, was convicted of felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse and sentenced to life imprisonment. His conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner timely appealed. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal. |
Claiborne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Herbert Cope
The defendant, Herbert Cope, was convicted by an Overton County Criminal Court jury of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance (morphine), a Class C felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence by failing to apply applicable mitigating factors and erroneously applying an inapplicable enhancement factor. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Overton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Patrick McGee v. Tommy Jacobs, Jacobs, Cohen & McCormick, PLLC CPAS
Appellant asserts the circuit court erred by dismissing this action as untimely under the savings statute. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Delshaun Epps
The appellant, Delshaun Epps, was indicted for especially aggravated robbery and felony murder. After a jury trial, the appellant was convicted of especially aggravated robbery and reckless homicide. The appellant was subsequently sentenced to twenty-four years for the robbery conviction and four years on the homicide conviction. The trial court ordered the appellant to serve the sentences consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty-eight years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, the appellant pursued this appeal. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rick Braden - Concurring
I join with my colleagues in concluding that reversal of both convictions is necessary. I write separately to note, in basic terms, my reasons for so concluding. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rick Braden
The defendant, Rick Braden, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of aggravated robbery, and he received concurrent nine-year sentences. On appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court erred in not allowing him to introduce the guilty pleas of two named co-defendants, (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions, and (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of facilitation. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to charge the lesser-included offense of facilitation, and therefore, reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new trial. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dickey L. Cotton v. David Mills, Warden (State of Tennessee)
This case is before us after remand by the Tennessee Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of its holdings in Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251 (Tenn. 2007); Smith v. Lewis, 202 S.W.3d 124 (Tenn. 2006); and Shaun Hoover v. State, 215 S.W.3rd 776 (Tenn. Jan. 23, 2007). The petitioner, Dickey L. Cotton, appeals the circuit court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Upon reconsideration, we affirm the court’s dismissal of the habeas corpus petition. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mohamed Medhet Karim
In November 2004, the defendant, Mohamed Medhet Karim, was indicted by a Wayne County grand jury on one count of attempted first degree murder. On August 31, 2005, following a jury trial in Wayne County Circuit Court, the jury convicted the defendant of attempted second degree murder and imposed a fine of $10,000. Following a sentencing hearing on October 13, 2005, the trial court sentenced the defendant to twelve years of incarceration as a Range I, standard offender, the maximum sentence allowed under the statute. The defendant timely filed a motion for a new trial on November 1, 2005; this motion was denied on January 4, 2006. The defendant now appeals, claiming his sentence was excessive. In making his claim, the defendant argues that two of the enhancement factors provided in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-114 were improperly applied to his sentence. Concluding that application of the two enhancement factors which the defendant does not challenge is sufficient to support the twelve-year sentence imposed by the trial court, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brenda J. Woodward v. Michael v. Woodward - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s Opinion affirming the Trial Court’s division of the marital property. I take no issue with the Trial Court and the majority concerning what was marital property and what was separate property. However, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s Opinion as I believe that it, as did the Trial Court, largely ignores the fact that this is a short term marriage, a very short term marriage, and what is the court’s goal in such a situation. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda J. Woodward v. Michael v. Woodward
In this divorce case, Husband argues that the trial court erred in its classification, valuation, and division of the marital estate, including the award to Wife of $1,000 to “equalize the marital property division.” Upon our determination that the evidence did not support an award of $1,000 to Wife to equalize the marital property division, the trial court’s judgment is vacated in that regard. In all other respects, Husband failed to show that the evidence preponderated against the trial court’s decision, and the judgment is affirmed. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Vacated in Part and Affirmed in Part; Cause Remanded |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals |