State of Tennessee, ex rel., Jonathan Hulon Brown v. Jackie Lynn Ross
Jonathan Hulon Brown (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s refusal to change the surname of his minor child, born out of wedlock, from that of the minor child’s mother Jackie Lynn Ross (“Mother”) to that of Father. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jermaine Scruggs
The defendant, Jermaine Scruggs, pled guilty to driving under the influence, first offense, a Class A misdemeanor; reckless driving, a Class B misdemeanor; and driving without a license, a Class C misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10-401, -403, -205, 50-351 (2003). The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days and a $350.00 fine for driving under the influence, first offense; six months and a $100.00 fine for reckless driving; and thirty days and a $50.00 fine for driving without a license, each at a seventy-five percent service rate. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to an earlier five-year sentence for tampering with evidence. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by ordering his sentences for the three misdemeanor convictions to be served consecutively to his prior felony sentence. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the Matter of E.J.M. d.o.b. 10/31/1994, Lee T. Myers v. Sandra Brown
This is a child custody case which originated in juvenile court. On March 24, 2005, the court entered an order which, inter alia, awarded joint custody to the parties, with the mother being the primary custodian. Relying on Local Rule 15 of the Shelby County Juvenile Court, father timely appealed to the Circuit Court of Shelby County. By order entered October 11, 2005, the circuit court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On October 28, 2005, father filed a notice of appeal in the circuit court, appealing the final judgment of dismissal in the circuit court and the final judgment of the juvenile court entered on March 24, 2005. We vacate the order of the circuit court dismissing the case and remand the case to the trial court with directions to enter an order transferring this appeal to the Court of Appeals. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Phillips & Associates v. George D. Blackburn, et al.
Defendants/Appellants appeal the order of the circuit court dismissing their appeal from general sessions court based upon their failure to appear for trial in the circuit court. We affirm. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Bowers Smith v. Riley Dean Smith
This is a divorce case. In a post-trial proceeding after remand by the Court of Appeals, Husband appeals the order of the trial court which effectively awarded certain stock to Wife. The appeal is dismissed for failure to file a timely notice of appeal. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Marshall Burks, et al. v. Elevation Outdoor Advertising, LLC f/k/a Delta Outdoor Advertising, LLC
The Appellee is a billboard advertising business engaged in selling advertising space on the billboards it maintains. The Appellants contracted with the principal owner of the business to sell the business in exchange for a commission. One of the Appellants had partial ownership interest in three of the billboards serviced by the business. After closing the sale, the Appellee paid the Appellants a significantly smaller commission than the parties had agreed upon. The Appellants brought suit for breach of contract seeking to recover the remainder of the commission allegedly owed. The Appellee subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that, pursuant to the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act of 1973 codified at section 62-13-101 et seq. of the Tennessee Code, the Appellants could not recover a commission as a matter of law. The Appellee also sought to invoke the Act’s provisions to recover the commission already paid to the Appellants. Finding it undisputed that the Appellants did not have a real estate broker’s license when negotiating the sale of the business and that real estate comprised a significant portion of the Appellee’s assets, the trial court granted the Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Further, the trial court ordered the Appellants to return the commission already paid by the Appellee. The Appellants have appealed the trial court’s decision to this Court. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Corey Biggs - Dissenting
Because I conclude the defendant’s due process rights were violated by the introduction of unreliable pretrial identification evidence, I respectfully dissent. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Corey Biggs
Following a jury trial, the defendant, Corey Biggs, was convicted of sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a multiple offender to eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by not suppressing his out-of-court identification by a police officer. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher Busby v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Christopher Busby, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Casey Watson
Defendant, Casey Watson, entered a plea of guilty to one count of possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony; one count of possession of dihydrocodeinone with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class D felony; one count of possession of more than one-half ounce but less than ten pounds of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class E felony; one count of unlawful possession of a weapon with intent to employ it in the commission of an offense, a Class E felony; and one count of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent sentences of eight years for his Class B felony conviction, two years for his Class D felony conviction and for each of his Class E felony convictions, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for his misdemeanor conviction, for an effective sentence of eight years. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences in split confinement, with probation after serving ninety days in confinement. As a condition of his plea agreement, Defendant reserved a certified question of law regarding the validity of a search warrant. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Raymon Haymon v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Raymon Haymon, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he raises thirteen issues regarding claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and the violation of certain constitutional rights. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, including the petitioner’s reply brief, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Melton, R & J of Tennessee, Inc., and State of Tennessee, on the Relation of John Melton and R&J of Tennessee, Inc. v. City of Lexington, Tennessee
This case involves equitable estoppel against a municipal government. In 1998, a real estate company developed a large residential subdivision just outside the defendant city. The city annexed the property and provided services to the area. The developer later became insolvent and failed to pave one of the roads in the subdivision. Subsequently, the plaintiffs purchased lots in the subdivision fronting the unpaved road and applied to the defendant city for building permits for the lots. The city denied the permits in part because the road in front of the lots was unpaved. The plaintiffs filed this declaratory judgment action against the city, arguing that the city was estopped from denying the building permits on the basis of the unpaved roads, and that city was obligated to pave the road and to issue building permits to the plaintiffs. The trial court concluded that the city was not estopped from enforcing the requirement that the road be paved and was not obligated to pave the road. The plaintiffs now appeal. We affirm, concluding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision not to apply equitable estoppel under the circumstances of this case. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
Shaune Woolen v. Stephen Dotson, Warden
The petitioner, Shaune Woolen, appeals from the circuit court’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review of the parties’ briefs and applicable law, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Willie L. Pegues v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Willie L. Pegues, who is serving a sentence of life imprisonment for first degree felony murder, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frederick D. Deberry
The Defendant, Frederick D. Deberry, appeals from an order of the trial court dismissing his “motion for new trial.” The trial court dismissed the pleading because it “was not timely filed, the issue has previously been adjudicated in this matter and the Motion for New Trial is not well-taken.” We affirm the order of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jon Douglas Hall v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jon Douglas Hall, appeals the dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. In this appeal, he alleges that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his petition without a hearing and that the judgment of conviction is void because the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel. Lelsa L. Parks v. Dennis Parks
This is an attempt to set aside a child support order. The child in question was born in February 2001. The mother of the child and the respondent signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, certifying that respondent was the child’s biological father. The respondent’s sister obtained primary custody of the child and began to collect State benefits for the child. In September 2003, the State, on behalf of the sister, filed a petition against the respondent to set child support payments. An order was entered, setting current and back child support payments. Subsequently, the State filed a petition for contempt against the respondent for failing to make the child support payments required under the order. The respondent appeared at the contempt hearing and signed an order acknowledging being in contempt and agreeing to make support payments as provided. A week later, the respondent filed a petition to set aside the original support order, asserting that he was not served with process and that he is not the biological father of the child. The trial court permitted the respondent to undergo DNA testing, which showed that he was not the father of the child. On that basis, the trial court dismissed the case against the respondent. The State now appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part, concluding that the respondent is not entitled to retroactive relief from the support order, but that he is entitled to prospective relief because he submitted sufficient evidence on which to rescind his voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex. rel., Jacqueline Evonne Chears v. John Edward Barrett
The juvenile court established child support based on a finding that the obligor was capable of earning $6 per hour. Having determined that the record before us contains no evidence to support that finding, we reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael E. Bunting
The Defendant, Michael E. Bunting, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine for resale, and he subsequently pled guilty to felony failure to appear. Following a joint sentencing hearing for these two convictions, the trial court imposed an effective twenty-one-year sentence as a Range III, persistent offender to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his cocaine possession conviction, and (2) a sentence of community corrections was appropriate, and his sentences were improperly enhanced in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). After a review of the record, the judgments of conviction and resulting sentences are affirmed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Linda L. Evans v. Audrey H. Evans
In this divorce action, the parties announced a property settlement in open court which settlement was made a part of the Divorce Decree. Defendant filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 Motion to Set Aside Divorce and to reopen the issue of the property settlement which the Trial Court refused. On appeal, we affirm. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Henry A. Edmondson, Jr.
A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Henry A. Edmondson, Jr., of carjacking, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to twenty years to be served in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, (2) that the trial court erred in not granting his motion to suppress, (3) that the trial court erred in its instruction to the jury on possession, and (4) that the trial court erred in sentencing him. We conclude that although the trial court erred in charging the jury on the definition of possession, the error was harmless. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jermaine Hughey
The defendant, Jermaine Hughey, was convicted of four counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and four counts of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years for each aggravated robbery conviction and five years for each attempted aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court ordered (1) that in Case No. 03-00283, the three attempted aggravated robbery sentences be served concurrently to each other and consecutively to the aggravated robbery sentence, for a total sentence of sixteen years; (2) that in Case No. 03-00284, the three aggravated robbery and one attempted robbery sentences be served concurrently to each other, for a total sentence of eleven years; and (3) that the sentences in Case No. 03-00284 be served consecutively to the sentences in Case No. 03-00283, for an effective sentence of twenty-seven years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals claiming: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, (2) that the trial court erred in allowing the interpreter to participate in the trial, (3) that the trial court erred in allowing a witness’s testimony and in not allowing the defendant to cross-examine witnesses about their immigrant status, (4) that the prosecutor made improper comments about the defendant’s right to testify, (5) that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury on lesser included offenses, and (6) that the trial court erred in sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stephanie J. Pate v. Samuel D. Pate
This is a divorce involving the classification of property as “marital” or “separate.” The parties were married in 1986. In 1998, the wife received a substantial inheritance. She used a portion of the inheritance to pay off the mortgage on the marital home, to purchase undeveloped property adjacent to the marital home, and to purchase a vehicle. Later, the parties separated and the marital home was sold. From the proceeds of the sale, the wife received her separate contribution to the property, as well as half of the profit earned on the property. She used her proceeds to purchase another home. The husband’s name was on the title of the new home, but he was not an obligor on the mortgage. The parties made an unsuccessful attempt to reconcile, and subsequently filed cross petitions for divorce. They resolved all issues, except for the classification and division of certain property that was titled in both parties’ names but purchased with the wife’s inheritance. After a hearing, the trial court found that the wife did not intend to transmute any of her inheritance into marital property. Based on this finding, the trial court determined that the parties had already equitably divided their interest in the marital property, and that there was no property left to divide. From this order, the husband now appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy Thomas v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Timothy Thomas, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to adequately investigate the case or explain the ramifications of the plea agreement and that his guilty pleas were consequently unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rashad K. Sanders
The defendant, Rashad K. Sanders, pled guilty to one count of introduction of marijuana into a penal institution, a Class C felony. The Sullivan County Criminal Court sentenced him to a four-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred in denying him alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals |