Tracye Jenae Simpson (Brogden), et al. v. Ralph Edward Simpson
This appeal involves child support arrearages incurred by Ralph Edward Simpson (“Father”) over the course of many years. Following a trial, the Trial Court concluded that certain payments made directly to the child were gratuitous and should not count as a credit against Father’s child support obligation. The Trial Court also concluded that various payments made by Father to third parties for expenses incurred on the child’s behalf and which were made as expressly directed by Tracye Jenae Simpson (“Mother”) also should not count as credits against Father’s child support obligation. We affirm the Trial Court’s conclusion with respect to the money sent directly to the child. However, we conclude that the Trial Court erred in its conclusion that Father should not be given a credit for payments made to third parties for expenses related to the child and which were made by Father in accordance with the express directives of Mother. The judgment of the Trial Court is, therefore, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Dennis Reid, Jr. v. State of Tennessee - Concurring and Dissenting
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Paul Dennis Reid, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
We granted interlocutory review in this post-conviction capital case to clarify the procedure for determining competency to proceed in a post-conviction action. For the reasons explained herein, we hold that the civil standard for mental incompetence adopted in State v. Nix, 40 S.W.3d 459 (Tenn. 2001), applies to a competency determination during post-conviction proceedings. To trigger a hearing on competency, a petitioner must make a prima facie showing of incompetence by submission of affidavits, depositions, medical reports, or other credible evidence. A petitioner bears the burden of proving that he or she is incompetent by clear and convincing evidence. A finding of incompetence requires neither a stay of the post-conviction proceedings nor abeyance of individual issues. A trial court should appoint, if necessary, a “next friend” or guardian ad litem to pursue the action on behalf of the petitioner. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed as modified, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Ennix Hariston, et al. v. Lillian B. Newsom
This appeal stems from a negligence action resulting from an automobile accident. A husband and wife filed suit against the defendant alleging personal injury and property damage resulting from the defendant’s alleged negligence that caused the automobile accident involving the wife and the defendant. In addition to the wife’s claims, the husband brought claims against the defendant for loss of consortium and loss of services. Additionally, the wife’s uninsured motorist insurance carrier was served but unnamed. Both Newsom and the uninsured motorist insurance carrier filed Motions to Exclude All Medical Proof of Plaintiff and Motion for Summary Judgment. The circuit court granted the defendant’s and the unnamed but served uninsured motorist insurance carrier’s Motions to Exclude All Medical Proof of Plaintiff and Motion for Summary Judgment. The order adjudicated the wife’s personal injury claims only. On appeal, the plaintiffs assert that the circuit court erred when it granted the defendant’s and the unnamed but served uninsured motorist insurance carrier’s Motions to Exclude All Medical Proof of Plaintiff and Motion for Summary Judgment. However, because we find that the circuit court failed to execute a final order disposing of all of the plaintiffs’ causes of action, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to rule 3(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Cynthia A. Fisher v. Plus Mark, Inc.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation |
Greene | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Susan v. Cespedes v. Sodexho Marriott Services, Inc., et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation |
Washington | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Lyle Davis
The defendant, Kenneth Lyle Davis, appeals from the trial court’s order revoking his probation and reinstating his original sentence of two years. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sedley Alley v. State of Tennessee
In 1985, the Petitioner, Sedley Alley, was convicted of aggravated rape, kidnapping, and first degree murder. For the capital crime of first degree murder, the jury imposed the sentence of death. Petitioner Alley’s execution was scheduled for May 17, 2006; however, on May 16, 2006, the |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Janie Belle Corn v. Hhs and James Farmer, Director, Division of Worker's Compensation, Tennessee Dept. of Labor and Workforce Development
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225 (e) (3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Plaintiff has appealed the action of the trial court, which determined that the Plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations and by failure to provide notice timely in accordance with the law. Upon our consideration of all of the evidence, we find that the evidence preponderates in favor of the findings of the trial court, and we affirm. |
Franklin | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Betty Potter, et al. v. Ford Motor Company
While traveling on a rain-slick road at a moderate rate of speed, Betty Potter lost control of her 1997 Ford Escort which spun around and crashed into a tree. Her seat back collapsed into the rear seat and her spinal cord was severed. Betty Potter was rendered a paraplegic. She and her husband sued Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) for the enhanced injuries Ms. Potter received as a result of the collapse of her seat back. The jury found Ford to be 70% at fault, Ms. Potter to be 30% at fault, and determined Ms. Potter’s compensatory damages to be ten million dollars. Judgment was entered for Ms. Potter in the amount of seven million dollars. The primary issues Ford raises on this appeal are (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant Ford a judgment notwithstanding the verdict; and (2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the doctrine of intervening cause. We hold that Ms. Potter presented material evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that the Ford Escort was defective, and that the trial court correctly found the intervening cause doctrine inapplicable in a case such as this one, where the alleged intervening cause is the negligent conduct of the plaintiff. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Betty Potter, et al. v. Ford Motor Company - Concurring
While I agree with Ford, that Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2, comment f, requires: “To establish a prima facie case of defect, the plaintiff must prove the availability of a technologically feasible and practical alternative design that would have reduced or prevented the plaintiff’s harm . . .”, unless and until Tennessee adopts Restatement (Third) of Torts on this issue, Judge Lee in my view, has correctly summarized the state of Tennessee law on this issue. Accordingly, I concur in her Opinion in affirming the Trial Court. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James B. Sanders
The defendant, James B. Sanders, appeals from his conviction for third offense of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (D.U.I.) and from the resulting sentence. On appeal, the defendant claims that a prior facially valid judgment of conviction for a previous D.U.I. was insufficient to sustain enhanced punishment when the written waiver of counsel was not introduced and the defendant testified that he was not represented by counsel. We conclude the prior certified judgment of conviction is facially valid and is not subject to collateral attack in this proceeding. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michele Safa v. Martha A. Loving
This appeal stems from a negligence suit arising from an automobile accident. At trial, the circuit court entered two separate orders dismissing the case. One order dismissed the case based on the statute of limitations. The other order dismissed the case for a failure to prosecute based on the plaintiff’s failure to comply with a previous court order awarding discretionary costs to the defendant that was granted when the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her first filing of the instant suit. On appeal, the plaintiff asserts that the circuit court erred when it dismissed her claims because the applicable statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to section 28-1-106 of the Tennessee Code as she was of “unsound mind.” The defendant has also asserted that the circuit court properly dismissed the case for a failure to prosecute based on the plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rita Lynn Neff
The Defendant, Rita Lynn Neff, appeals from the order of the trial court revoking her probation and ordering that her effective eight-year sentence be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her probation and ordering that her sentences be served in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. M.L.
This is an appeal by a minor from a decision of the Circuit Court for Marion County declaring him a delinquent based upon a finding he was guilty of aggravated arson. The sole issue on appeal concerns the sufficiency of the evidence. Because the evidence is sufficient to support the finding of guilt of aggravated arson beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
Riley Bolding, et al. v. Dentis Sisson, et al.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a Jury verdict. The appeal arises out of a commercial real estate sale and involves the alleged misrepresentation of a restrictive covenant attached to property at issue. The Jury found that the Defendants/Appellants intentionally and negligently misrepresented the restrictive covenant that applied to the property. Finding that there is no material evidence to support the Jury’s finding that Plaintiffs/Appellants’ reliance upon Defendants/Appellees’ representation was justified, we vacate the Judgment entered on the Jury Verdict. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Schneider, Tajuana Cheshier, Jamie Page, and The Gannett Satellite Information Network, d/b/a The Jackson Sun v. The City of Jackson
This case involves the Tennessee Public Records Act. The plaintiff newspaper sought access to investigative records generated by local law enforcement during the course of criminal investigations. The newspaper also sought financial documents relating to a license agreement between the municipal government and a private baseball franchise. The municipal government refused to disclose the criminal investigative records and failed to respond to the newspaper’s written requests for the baseball franchise documents. The newspaper filed suit against the municipal government in the Madison County Chancery Court. After a show-cause hearing, the trial court ruled that the Public Records Act required the disclosure of both types of documents, and awarded the newspaper attorney’s fees. The municipal government appeals. As to the criminal investigative records, we recognize the common-law law enforcement privilege, and on that basis we vacate the judgment of the trial court, reverse the award of attorney’s fees, and remand for further proceedings. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Johnny Collins v. Mid-South Uniform Service, Inc., et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation |
Coffee | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Charles Manning v. Jack Morgan, Warden
Petitioner, Charles Manning, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, attacking his two convictions for second degree murder. Following a hearing, the trial court denied any relief to Petitioner. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kimberly Greene v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Kimberly Greene, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus on March 1, 2005, and counsel was subsequently appointed to assist Petitioner. A hearing was held on June 1, 2005, and, after consulting with her counsel, Petitioner voluntarily withdrew her petition. Thereafter Petitioner filed a pro se notice of appeal. Upon a review of the record in this case, we conclude that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mary Ellen Hall McIntire v. Timothy Lapleau McIntire
The trial court granted Mother’s petition in objection to Father’s proposed relocation of the parties’ minor children and amended parenting plan to award custody to Mother; ordered Father to repay prepaid child support to Mother; set Father’s child support obligation based on his current income; ordered Father to refund sums to the children’s accounts; awarded Mother the parties’ timeshare property; and ordered Father to pay $30,000 of Mother’s attorney’s fees. We affirm in part, modify in part, reverse in part, and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Arthur Perry v. Nps Energy Services, Inc., et al.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Tennessee Supreme Court of findings of facts and conclusions of law. In this appeal the Appellant/Defendant ("Employer") asserts the trial judge erred in finding the statutory cap of two and one-half multiplier set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1) did not apply, and applying the six times multiplier set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(6). Further, Employer alleges that the trial judge erred in finding that Appellee/Plaintiff ("Employee") was unable to make a meaningful return to work as set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated 50-6-241. Employer further avers that the trial judge erred in allowing a co-employee to testify as a rebuttal witness when his testimony did not rebut any testimony given by Employer's proof. We conclude the evidence fails to preponderate against the findings of the trial court, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Steven Scott Means, et al. v. David Vincent Ashby, et al.
This is the second appeal of a protracted custody dispute among the parents and an aunt and uncle of a minor child. The aunt and uncle have had legal custody since 1997. This action commenced in 2000, when the aunt and uncle filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the parents and the parents filed counter-petitions for custody. In 2002, the trial court dismissed the petition to terminate and custody remained with the aunt and uncle. On appeal this Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition to terminate but vacated the custody determination due to the application of an incorrect legal standard. The case was remanded for the trial court to determine the legal effect of the 1997 custody order on the pending custody claims. The record in this second appeal tells us the trial court failed to determine on remand the effect of the 1997 custody order. Having determined the record is inadequate for this Court to make the determination, we have no option but to vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter once again. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of Z.A.W.
The trial court denied continuance, awarded custody of the parties’ child to Father, and refused to grant Mother visitation until she completed a psychological evaluation and petitioned the court. Mother appeals, asserting the trial court erred by denying a continuance and by refusing to award her visitation rights. We affirm the denial of a continuance, but reverse the denial of visitation and remand to the trial court to set visitation. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Jonathon Christopher Hood v. State of Tennessee
This is an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. The Petitioner, Jonathon Christopher Hood, entered a best-interest guilty plea to felony reckless endangerment and, pursuant to a plea agreement, was sentenced to one year imprisonment with a release eligibility date of 30%. The Petitioner filed for and was denied post-conviction relief. The Petitioner now appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, claiming his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel which resulted in an involuntary guilty plea. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals |