Ronnie Dotson v. Rice-Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge, Inc., et. al.
In this workers' compensation action, the plaintiff sought compensation for a work-related injury which caused reflex sympathetic dystrophy in his left arm, a scheduled member for workers' compensation purposes. The plaintiff contended that reflex sympathetic dystrophy which affects only a scheduled member nevertheless entitles a claimant to body-as-a-whole compensation because the American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment convert reflex sympathetic dystrophy to a rating for the body as a whole. Alternatively, the plaintiff contended that his condition extended beyond his arm because he was denied potential future treatment options for other, non-work-related injuries and because his arm's hypersensitivity and pain caused insomnia, chronic fatigue, and a diminished ability to concentrate. Holding that reflex sympathetic dystrophy must always be apportioned to the body as a whole, the trial court awarded the plaintiff permanent total disability benefits. Reversing the trial court, we hold that an award for reflex sympathetic dystrophy may be limited to the compensation for scheduled members as provided in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(A) to (D) (1999). Further, we hold that for reflex sympathetic dystrophy to be properly apportioned to the body as a whole under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(F) (1999), the claimant's injury must affect a portion of the body not statutorily scheduled, affect a particular combination of members not statutorily provided for, or cause a permanent injury to an unscheduled portion of the body. Having so held, we determine that the preponderance of the evidence fails to show that the plaintiff's condition has extended beyond his arm as a scheduled member. Therefore, we vacate the trial court's award of permanent total disability benefits to the plaintiff and hold that the plaintiff's permanent disability award is limited exclusively to 200 weeks of benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(A)(ii)(m) (1999). We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, as may be necessary. |
Blount | Supreme Court | |
Gregory Fodness v. Newport and Cocke County Economic Development Commission, Inc.
This case involves the interpretation of a portion of the Tennessee Public Records Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503. The issue presented is whether the statutory exemption set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(d)(1) is available to the Appellee which is a nonprofit joint municipal-county economic development commission. The trial court granted the commission’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the exemption was applicable and the commission did not have to provide its records to the Appellant. We hold that the commission is entitled to the statutory exemption, but that there is a genuine question of material fact as to whether the commission is the functional equivalent of a public agency. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Gregory Fodness v. Newport and Cocke County Economic Development Commission, Inc. - Dissenting
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Commission is not entitled to summary judgment on the record presently before us. I disagree, however, with the majority’s rationale for that conclusion. Specifically, I disagree with the assertion that the public’s access to the Commission’s records depends upon whether, in the words of the majority, “[the Commission] is the functional equivalent of a governmental agency.” I believe this concept of “functional equivalen[cy],” as promulgated by the Supreme Court in Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., Inc., 87 S.W.3d 67, 79 (Tenn. 2002), is not material to the issue now before us. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Richard A. Emmitt v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Richard A. Emmitt, was convicted in 1984 of assault with intent to commit second degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, armed robbery, and first degree burglary and received an effective sentence of 125 years. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief on January 21, 2004, which the post-conviction court dismissed as untimely. The petitioner appeals, claiming the statute of limitations was tolled. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alfio Orlando Lewis v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Alfio Orlando Lewis, appeals as of right from the dismissal of his petition for post- conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. He seeks relief from his convictions for two counts of attempted second degree murder and consecutive twelve-year sentences. The petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial and that his sentences are invalid under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Terrance A. Sawyers v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Terrence A. Sawyers, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steve Johnson
The defendant was convicted of theft under $500 and evading arrest, and was sentenced to two consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days at 75% release eligibility. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the failure to admit the testimony of a defense witness, and the length and consecutive nature of his sentences. Upon thorough review, we affirm the judgments and the sentences. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Ruff
The petitioner was convicted for assault in Shelby County. During the proceedings on these convictions, the trial court found the petitioner in contempt of court on two occasions. On appeal, we reversed the petitioner’s convictions for assault. Upon remand, the State moved to nolle prosequi the petitioner’s assault charges, and the trial court entered nolle prosequi on September 7, 1999, without cost, which dismissed the assault charges against the petitioner without prejudice. These charges were later expunged. On March 18, 2003, the petitioner filed two petitions to expunge the contempt judgments. The trial court denied the petitioner’s petition to expunge the contempt convictions in January of 2004. The petitioner filed a notice of appeal to this Court on February 20, 2004. The petitioner presents five issues for review: (1) whether the trial court erred under Tennessee’s Expungement Statute by refusing to expunge the petitioner’s contempt records and the related records in general sessions court; (2) whether the trial court clerk and the chief administrative official of the State violated petitioner’s due process rights and the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-102 by not expunging petitioner’s contempt records within sixty days of filing an expungement petition; (3) whether the trial court and district attorney general violated the petitioner’s constitutional rights of due process and equal protection by causing petitioner to be held |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Willie E. Kyles, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Willie E. Kyles, Jr., filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, as amended after the appointment of counsel, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel (1) failed to adequately investigate the facts surrounding Petitioner’s case or interview potential witnesses; (2) failed to file a motion to suppress; and (3) failed to challenge the chain of custody of the State’s evidence introduced at trial. After review of the record in this matter, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Keith Kennedy v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Michael Keith Kennedy, entered a plea of nolo contendere to numerous counts of burglary, theft, and vandalism arising out of events that occurred in Chester and Henderson Counties. As a result, he was sentenced to fifteen (15) years for the Chester County convictions and twelve (12) years for the Henderson County convictions, to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of fifteen (15) years. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the petitioner reserved the following certified question of law for appeal: “Did the defendant give an unequivocal, specific, intelligent, and voluntary consent to the warrantless search of his premises and vehicles, uncontaminated by duress or coercion?” This Court determined that the certified question was not dispositive as to three of the petitioner’s convictions, but determined the petitioner knowingly and voluntarily consented to the search as to the remaining convictions. See State v. Michael Kennedy, No. W2001-03107-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 402798 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Feb. 21, 2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 27, 2003). Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging: (1) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel; (2) that the trial court erred by imposing restitution; (3) that the trial court erred by admitting his prior felony convictions; and (4) that the trial court erred by failing to appoint counsel. After a hearing on a motion to dismiss filed by the State, the trial court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for an evidentiary hearing consistent with this opinion. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Harvey Farrar, Jr.
This is a direct appeal from convictions on a jury verdict of attempted aggravated robbery, resisting arrest and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a term of nine years, and concurrent sentences of six months, and eleven months and twenty-nine days, respectively. On appeal, the Defendant raises one issue, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of attempted aggravated robbery. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but reduce the effective sentence to eight years. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Orson Wendell Hudson
The defendant, Orson Wendell Hudson, pled guilty in Sumner County Criminal Court to possession with the intent to sell more than twenty-six grams of cocaine, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to eight years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals upon certified questions of law from the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a traffic stop. He claims the trial court should have granted his motion because (1) the arresting officer's stated justification for stopping his car was pretextual, (2) the officer did not have probable cause to stop his car for following too closely, (3) the officer's questioning transformed his detention into an unreasonable seizure, (4) the officer's questioning of his six-year-old daughter outside his presence was illegal, and (5) the officer coerced his consent to search. We affirm the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Lee Miller
Upon entering a "best interest"guilty plea, the Defendant, Jeremy Miller, was convicted of attempted aggravated child abuse, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant raises the issue of whether the trial court erred in ordering an excessive sentence by: (1) improperly weighing enhancement and mitigating factors; and (2) denying alternative sentencing. We modify the sentence of the trial court to comply with the dictates of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ____, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We remand for the trial court to consider the Defendant's suitability for probation. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Daniel W. Livingston
This is a direct appeal as of right from a conviction on a jury verdict of evading arrest by motor vehicle with risk of death or injury. The trial court determined that the Defendant, Daniel Livingston, was a career offender and sentenced him to twelve years for the felony evading arrest conviction and time served for a misdemeanor resisting arrest conviction. On appeal, the Defendant argues five issues: (1) the evading arrest statute is unconstitutional because it violates the "Caption Clause" of the Tennessee Constitution; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction for felony evading arrest with risk of death or injury; (3) the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant as a career offender because the State's notice of enhanced punishment was defective; (4) the Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; and (5) the Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated because the trial court made findings of fact for sentencing purposes. We affirm the Defendant's conviction, but modify the sentence to four years to be served as a Range I standard offender. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randy L. Johnson
The appellant, Randy L. Johnson, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to two counts of aggravated assault and one count of theft of property valued over $1,000. He received a total effective sentence of nine years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court granted the appellant probation. Subsequently, his probation was revoked because of new offenses and a positive drug screen. The trial court ordered the petitioner to serve his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the revocation of his probation. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rebecca G. Ratliff
The defendant, Rebecca G. Ratliff, appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's revocation of her probation. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in ordering her to serve her original two-year sentence in the Department of Correction. Because the record supports the trial court in its discretionary determination to order incarceration, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Gene Skipper v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, David Gene Skipper, pled guilty to two counts of rape of a child and one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirty-one years in prison. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, contending that: (1) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel; (2) his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered; and (3) there was not a sufficient factual basis to support the guilty pleas. Finding no error in the judgment of the post-conviction court, we affirm the dismissal of the Petitioner's petition. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shirley Mason v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Shirley Mason, appeals as of right the dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief by the Bedford County Circuit Court. She seeks relief from her conviction for delivering less than one-half gram of cocaine and resulting sentence of eight years in confinement. The petitioner contends that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel which caused her to enter an involuntary guilty plea. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Wayne Young
The defendant, Gary Wayne Young, appeals as of right the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to two Class B felony drug offenses and its imposition of concurrent sentences of twenty-one years as a Range II, multiple offender. He contends that his guilty pleas were involuntary and unknowing because he was under the influence of narcotics when he entered them and that the sentences are illegal because they are outside of the range for a multiple offender convicted of a Class B felony. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Wayne Smithson
The defendant appeals the revocation of his probation after he left the state to participate in a religious activity, failed to complete the required psychosexual evaluation, and failed to obtain employment. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in (1) basing his revocation on an order that violated his right to free exercise of his religion, and (2) determining that he had failed to complete the psychosexual evaluation and obtain employment because his arrest in Texas prevented him from having an opportunity to comply with those conditions. Following our review, we affirm the trial court's revocation of probation. |
Cannon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stacy Johnson
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Stacy Johnson, of two counts of burglary of a building, two counts of theft of property over $1,000, and eight counts of burglary of a motor vehicle. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of thirty years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the consolidation of the Defendant’s indictments deprived him of a fair trial; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (3) the State improperly used specific theft locations without proper foundation; and (4) the trial court improperly allowed security videotape recordings to be admitted into evidence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kim Jones, d/b/a Kim's Kiddie Korner vs. State of Tennessee
Claimant sought reimbursement for child care under the Child Care Certificate Program. The Commissioner granted the State summary judgment on the grounds that the State was not contractually bound to reimburse claimant under the governmental immunity statutory scheme. On appeal, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Alden Bowers
The appellant, Gary Alden Bowers, pled guilty in the Carter County Criminal Court to three counts of aggravated burglary, one count of burglary, two counts of theft of property over $500, two counts of theft of property under $500, and one count of felony failure to appear. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of twenty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sentences imposed by the trial court in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Carter | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nona Pilgrim
A Bledsoe County grand jury indicted the defendant, Nona Pilgram, for assault and vandalism resulting in $1,000 to $10,000 in damages to the vehicle of the victim, Molly Myers. A jury acquitted the defendant of assault but convicted her of vandalism resulting in $500 to $1,000 in damages. For this conviction, the court ordered the defendant to serve a six-year probationary sentence. The defendant now appeals her conviction and sentence, arguing that she is entitled to a new trial or resentencing on the following grounds: (1) The trial court erred by refusing to allow testimony regarding the victim's prejudice towards the defendant; (2) the trial court erred by allowing hearsay evidence regarding the fair market value of the victim's vehicle; (3) the trial court erred by refusing to allow the introduction of an internet-based estimate of the victim's vehicle; and (4) the trial court erred by failing to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-102 through 121 when determining whether the defendant was a viable candidate for judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Patsy Smith, as next of kind and mother of Shawn Smith, v. State of Tennessee
Shawn Smith died of aspiration of gastric contents while a patient at the University of Tennessee Medical Center. Shawn Smith’s mother, Patsy Smith (“Plaintiff”), sued the State of Tennessee (“the State”). The case was transferred to the Claims Commission (“the Commission”). After trial, the Commission entered a judgment for the State holding, inter alia, that there was no breach of the standard of care. Plaintiff appeals claiming that the Commission erred in holding there was no breach of the standard of care, that the Commission erred in making certain factual findings, and that the Commission erred in refusing to find that the integrity of the medical record had been compromised. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals |