In Re: P.M.
Father appeals termination of his parental rights. Father conceded and the juvenile court found that grounds exist for termination of Father's parental rights. The juvenile court also found that termination of Father's parental rights was in the child's best interest. Father appeals the finding that termination was in the child's best interest. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
James Thomas v. David Mills, Warden
This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by order pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner appeals the trial court’s denial of habeas corpus relief. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable ground for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony Rainer v. David Mills, Warden
This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by order pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner appeals the trial court’s denial of habeas corpus relief. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable ground for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Seanise Shaw v. State of Tennessee
Seanise Shaw, the petitioner, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robin McNeal Vanhoose v. State of Tennessee
The defendant, Robin McNeal Vanhoose, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his motion to correct illegal sentence. The State filed a motion to dismiss the appeal or, in the alternative, to affirm the dismissal by the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon reviewing the record, the defendant’s brief, and the State’s motion and brief, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s motion to correct illegal sentence. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donna Denton, et al., v. John Hahn, et al. - Concurring
I agree with the analysis and conclusion of the majority on the issue of responsibility for the threshold. I also concur in the result reached in this case because the tenants, the Dentons, unquestionably had knowledge of the defective condition of the threshold that was superior to that of the association. I write separately, however, because I cannot agree with the majority’s analysis of the appropriateness of summary judgment on the notice issue.1 |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Denton, et al., v. John Hahn, et al.
This appeal involves a tenant who was injured when she slipped on the metal threshold of a rented condominium unit. The tenant and her husband filed a negligence action in the Circuit Court for Davidson County against both the owner of the condominium unit and the homeowners’ association. The trial court granted the condominium owner’s and the homeowners’ association’s motions for summary judgment, and the tenant and her husband have appealed. We have determined that the owner of the condominium unit was not responsible for the maintenance and repair of the metal threshold because it was part of the condominium’s common elements. While the homeowners’ association had a duty to maintain the threshold in a reasonably safe condition, we have determined that the association is not liable to the tenant and her husband as a matter of law because they failed to present evidence that the association had actual or constructive notice of the condition that caused the tenant’s fall. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Waggoner Motors, Inc., v. Waverly Church of Christ
This appeal involves an automobile dealer whose vehicles were damaged by paint overspray from a church's construction project on adjacent property. The dealer filed suit against the church in the Circuit Court for Humphreys County seeking damages for the cost of cleaning the vehicles and lost profits. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the church had not properly supervised the painting and that the paint overspray had damaged the automobile dealer. Accordingly, the trial court awarded the dealership $344,778 in damages and $11,170 in discretionary costs. On appeal, the church takes issue with the trial court's decisions regarding liability, damages, and discretionary costs. The dealer also takes issue with the damages award. The dealer's evidence regarding its lost profits is too speculative to support the trial court's judgment. However, we have determined that the evidence supports a judgment for $85,692. We have also determined that the trial court erred with regard to a portion of the discretionary costs. Accordingly, we reduce the dealer's damages to $85,692.00 and modify the award for discretionary costs to $8,501.25. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Cora Veal
The Monroe County Senior Citizens Center (“the Center”) – a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation – filed a claim against the Estate of Cora Veal (“the Estate”). The Center alleges that Cora Veal (“Mrs. Veal”) personally promised to pay for repairs to the Center’s roof, but that she failed to completely honor her promise prior to her death at the age of 92 on September 16, 2002. The trial court denied the Center’s claim. The Center appeals, claiming the trial court erred in its interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-203 (2000), the so-called Tennessee Dead Man’s Statute (“the Statute”). We affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Cora Veal - Dissenting
I disagree with the majority’s treatment of the deceased’s statements reflected in the minutes of the corporation. As the majority’s reasoning goes the statements of the deceased contained in the minutes were to the corporation, i.e., she was talking to the corporation. Therefore “the corporation is barred from testifying regarding Ms. Veal’s statements.”1 |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Louise Moor Weissfeld v. Steven Curtis Weissfeld
This appeal arises from a post-divorce case in which the trial court found the Appellant to be in both criminal and civil contempt for her failure to comply with the court's order respecting co-parenting time and division of property. The Appellant contends that the trial court erred in its finding of criminal contempt because she was not provided adequate notice under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42(b). The Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in its award of attorney's fees to opposing counsel. We reverse the trial court's order to the extent that it decrees the Appellant to be in criminal contempt and we modify the trial court's order which awards attorney's fees to opposing counsel. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. L.H. Cutshall
On November 13, 2002, the defendant, Leonard H. Cutshall, was indicted by the Sullivan County Grand Jury for (1) transportation of untaxed beer in excess of 100 cases and (2) depriving the State of lawful revenue, both Class E felonies. The defendant pled guilty to these charges at a hearing held on April 21, 2003. As part of the plea agreement, the defendant was to be sentenced to two years as a Range II offender for each count and pay a fine of $2,000 for each count. In addition, the defendant was ordered to pay the State $511.27 in lost revenue. At a hearing held on September 15, 2003, the trial court denied the defendant alternative sentencing and probation. The defendant has appealed that decision to this Court. We have found no error on the part of the trial court. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Kirkendall
The defendant, Christopher Kirkendall, indicted for one count of attempted first degree murder and two counts of aggravated robbery, was convicted of facilitation of attempted second degree murder and two counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery, all Class C felonies. The trial court imposed a sentence of six years for facilitation of attempted second degree murder and, after merging the robbery convictions, imposed a five-year sentence for one count of facilitation of aggravated robbery. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to each other and consecutively to a previously imposed twelve-year sentence for an unrelated offense. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the identity evidence and argues that the sentences should be concurrently served. Since the filing of the briefs, the defendant has also asked to consider the impact of the ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ____ , 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), as to the lengths of the sentences. The judgments are affirmed as modified. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Kirkendall - Concurring and Dissenting
I agree that under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. _____, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), enhancement factors (3), (10), and (21) of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-114 cannot be applied in sentencing Defendant. However, instead of modifying the sentence, I would remand for a new sentencing hearing. In light of Blakely, I feel that the trial court should be given the opportunity to impose the appropriate punishment upon the only valid enhancement factor in this case: proof of a prior conviction(s) of defendant as an adult. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mary E. Fossett, et al., v. Dorothy Gray, et al.
Numerous heirs to property in Fayette County sought to sell two parcels of land for partition. Defendants/Appellees opposed the partition of one of the tracts. The trial court ordered that both tracts be sold for partition by auction, which was held on September 30, 2000. During the pendency of the partition suit, an investor bought the fractional interests in the property from numerous heirs, and intervened as a defendant in the case. The interest of the intervening defendant was foreclosed upon by the individual who had loaned him funds to purchase the fractional interests in the land. After the foreclosure, first intervening defendant brought a cross-claim against second intervening defendant/appellant. The trial court entered a judgment against second intervening defendant for the amount of overbid at foreclosure, $150,000. Second intervening defendant/appellant appeals and also appeals the final judgment in the partition case. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Franklin Darnell Brown, Jr.
The defendant, Franklin Darnell Brown, Jr., was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court ordered concurrent sentences of six years and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine and that the sentence was excessive. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Franklin Darnell Brown, Jr. - Concurring and Dissenting
I agree with the majority opinion that application of enhancement factor (14) violates the ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. _____, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004). However, I would remand for a new sentencing hearing for the trial court to use the only applicable enhancement factor, the Defendant’s prior convictions. While the trial court did state that the prior convictions “should be considered very strongly as far as enhancement,” the trial court then immediately stated that Defendant had to be on probation at the time of the offense which is the subject of this appeal, and the trial court applied that enhancement factor also. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Victor D. McMiller, Sr. v. Warden Glenn Turner
The Petitioner, Victor D. McMiller, Sr., appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to allege a ground for relief which would render the judgment void, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Demetrius Lancaster v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Demetrius Lancaster, appeals as of right from the order of the Giles County Circuit Court holding that his petition for post-conviction relief was barred by the statute of limitations. The petitioner contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for being filed outside the one-year statute of limitations for filing post-conviction relief. We affirm the trial court. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Monqueze L. Summers
The case before us concerns the untimely death of Montrell Mason and the aggravated robbery of Clinton Anderson and Christopher Fears. The defendant stands convicted of Mason's felony murder in the perpetration of robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, and weapon possession. We affirm the convictions and sentences. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lilly Bell Gifford
The appellant, Lilly Bell Gifford, pled guilty in the Sumner County Criminal Court to the sale of cocaine, and the trial court sentenced her to six years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. However, the appellant was permitted to serve the bulk of her sentence on probation. Thereafter, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation and ordered her to serve the balance of her sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the revocation of her probationary sentence. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert McChristian v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Robert McChristian, appeals from a summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. We affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert McChristian v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
I concur in the majority opinion, but I question its reliance upon the fact that our supreme court denied permission to appeal in Bland v. Dukes to validate Bland’s holding. Our supreme court has advised us not to attach significance to such a denial. See Meadows v. State, 849 S.W.2d 748, 752 (Tenn. 1993). |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrell Deberry and Damien LaShawn Nixon, A/K/A "Skinny"
The defendant Terrell Deberry was indicted for possession with intent to deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine. The defendant Damien Nixon was also indicted for possession with intent to deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine and for driving on a revoked license. After granting a motion to suppress the cocaine found in the possession of defendant Deberry, the trial court permitted the state an application for a discretionary appeal under Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Later, the state determined that because the substantive effect of the trial court’s ruling resulted in dismissal of the charges against each defendant, the more appropriate appellate remedy was under Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. This court granted the motion to accept the appeal under Rule 3 and waived the timely filing of notice of appeal by the state. The issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress. Because the evidence was poperly suppressed, the judgment is affirmed |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Hatcher
The Defendant, Christopher Hatcher, was tried and convicted for first degree felony murder, second degree murder, attempted first degree murder and reckless endangerment for shooting three victims. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction with the felony murder conviction and then sentenced the Defendant to life with the possibility of parole for the felony murder conviction, twenty years for the attempted murder conviction, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the reckless endangerment conviction. The Defendant appeals, contending that: (1) the trial court erred by not granting his motion for new trial because the State failed to give the Defendant exculpatory evidence; (2) the trial court improperly allowed the State to refer to an alleged robbery previously committed by the Defendant; (3) the trial court erred when it allowed a witness to testify about the alleged robbery; (4) the trial court improperly allowed expert fingerprint testimony; (5) the trial court erred when it did not grant a mistrial based upon the State’s biblical references; (6) the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss a sleeping juror; (7) the trial court erred when it allowed hearsay testimony of a witness; and (8) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we conclude that there is no reversible error in the judgments of the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm its judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |