State of Tennessee v. Danny Williamson
E2003-01856-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ben W. Hooper, II

The defendant, Danny Williamson, pled guilty in the Cocke County Criminal Court to possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance with intent to sell, a Class D felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant received a two-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court held that the need for deterrence warranted the defendant's serving his entire sentence in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his request for full probation. We affirm the defendant's sentence but remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment.

James Ray Bartlett v. Gail Corder, et al.
M2003-00863-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge L. Craig Johnson

An inmate who was convicted and sentenced for passing worthless checks filed suit against six officers of the court for conspiracy, violation of his constitutional rights, and various derelictions of duty. The plaintiff asked the trial court to sanction the defendants by impeachment and/or disbarment. He also asked for $33 million in monetary damages. The trial court dismissed the Complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. We affirm.

Lani Thomas Arnold and James Davis, Administrator of the Estate of Mary Reeves Davis v. W. Terry Davis
M2003-00620-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.

This case involves the interpretation of certain provisions of a Trust Instrument. The trial court found a latent ambiguity in the Instrument, allowed extrinsic evidence, and granted Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellant appeals. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Joe King
M2003-01869-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Buddy D. Perry

The defendant, Joe King, appeals the sufficiency of evidence to support his conviction for theft and the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court. After review of the entire record in this cause, we conclude that the evidence amply supported the defendant's conviction. The issue of restitution is waived pursuant to Rule 10(b) of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Joseph and Jean Gonzalez v. State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services; In the Matter of A.J.H.
M2003-02405-SC-S09-JV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Betty Adams Green

In this interlocutory appeal, we consider whether and under what circumstances grandparents may intervene in proceedings brought to terminate the parent-child relationship. In this case, the grandparents filed a motion in the juvenile court to intervene in a termination of parental rights proceeding. The juvenile court denied the motion, and the grandparents moved for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. The trial court granted the motion. Following the Court of Appeals' denial of the grandparents' application for permission to appeal, they filed an application for permission to appeal to this Court; we granted the application. After a thorough review of the record and relevant legal authority, we conclude that the motion filed in juvenile court seeking intervention in the termination of parental rights case is to be analyzed under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24. Using this analysis, we find no error and affirm the denial of the motion to intervene.

State of Tennessee v. Hubert Nard
M2003-02294-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Curtis Smith

The defendant, in this appeal of right, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for driving under the influence (DUI) and disorderly conduct. After a careful review of the record, we affirm both convictions. The disorderly conduct conviction is remanded for modification of judgment to conform to the statutory maximum sentence.

In the Matter of T.S.R.
W2003-01321-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kenneth A. Turner

The juvenile court entered an order declaring Appellant the father of T.S.R. and ordered child support. Appellant failed to pay child support and incurred an arrearage of $27,051.68. Appellant petitioned the court for Rule 60.02 relief from the final order and requested a blood paternity test. The DNA test indicated that Appellant was not the father. The trial court relieved Appellant of his ongoing child support but required him to pay the child support arrearage. For the following reasons, we affirm

In re: DMD & JLA
W2003-00987-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Walter L. Evans

The trial court denied Appellants’ petition for termination of Mother’s parental rights and returned physical custody of children to Mother. We reverse and remand for determination of whether termination is in the best interests of the children. We vacate the order returning physical custody to Mother.

State of Tennessee v. John Lemont Pierce,a.k.a. James Owens, a.k.a. John Lamonte Pierce
M2002-02979-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

The defendant, John Lemont Pierce, indicted for two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated assault, and simple assault, entered a guilty plea to one count of aggravated assault. The trial court imposed a fifteen-year sentence to be served consecutively to a prior six-year sentence. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering a maximum sentence of 15 years and requiring consecutive service. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. James Ray Bartlett
M2002-01868-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge William Charles Lee

The defendant, James Ray Bartlett, appeals the trial court's denial of his request for credit for time served in community corrections. Because the defendant has no appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b), the cause is dismissed.

William Houston v. State of Tennessee
M2003-00304-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway

Petitioner was convicted by a Giles County jury for several drug-related offenses and was given an effective sentence of 72 years. In his direct appeal to this Court, his conviction was affirmed, and his sentence was reduced to 46 years. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Post-conviction Relief. The post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner appeals the decision of the post-conviction court and argues three issues on appeal: (1) Whether the post-conviction court erred in finding that trial counsel was effective; (2) whether the post-conviction court erred in its decision with respect to the trial judge's presence in the jury room; and (3) whether newly-discovered evidence of officer/witness's wrong doing and character mandates a new trial. We affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

Arthur M. Bohanan v. City of Knoxville
E2003-01306-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Daryl R. Fansler

The employee, a retired police officer, filed suit seeking workers' compensation benefits. He alleged that his job duties caused him to develop hypertension resulting in permanent partial disability. The employee relies on the statutory presumption of causation for law enforcement officers found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 7-51-201(a)(1), and concedes that if the employer has rebutted the presumption, there is insufficient evidence establishing a causal relationship between his hypertension and his employment. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable legal principles, we conclude that the City of Knoxville has rebutted the statutory presumption of causation, and we therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Richard Dewayne Jordan
E2003-02351-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Curtis Smith

A Rhea County jury convicted the defendant, Richard Dewayne Jordan, of two counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of incest, for which he received an effective twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the trial court improperly allowed the state to amend the indictment to charge a different date of commission of the offenses; and (2) the indictment failed to inform him of the charges with sufficient particularity. We remand for correction of a clerical error in the judgment but otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Barry Ray Long
W2003-01198-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge William B. Acree

The Weakley County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for manufacturing not less than .5 ounce or more than 10 pounds of marijuana. The Weakley County Sheriff’s Department found the marijuana pursuant to a search of the defendant’s home based on a search warrant. The sheriff’s department received the search warrant based on information garnered in a non-consensual warrantless search of a portable shed behind the defendant’s home. Due to previous drug-related charges which were later dismissed, the portable shed had been the subject of forfeiture proceedings in 2000. The defendant made no efforts to contest the forfeiture, but the sheriff’s department also made no efforts to remove the portable shed. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of the search of the portable shed. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The defendant then entered a plea of guilty and purported to reserve this certified question for appeal: Whether or not the search of the storage shed predicated on a search warrant was preceded and based upon a prior warrantless search. Because of the ambiguity of the certified question as presented, we dismiss the appeal.

David Sharp v. State of Tennessee
W2004-00044-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Nancy Herron-Miller, Commissioner

An inmate filed a claim with the Claims Commission contending negligence on the part of the Tennessee Department of Correction in miscalculating his sentence credits. The Commission dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the inmate appealed, and we affirm.

Judith Mae Harber as Trustee of Trust B for the Estate of Edwin Erwin v. Leader Federal Bank For Savings
W2003-01523-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert A. Lanier

This case involves the wrongful payment of funds by Defendant over Plaintiff’s forged signature. The lower court found that the majority of Plaintiff’s claims are barred by former Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-4-406, which places a one-year limit on certain claims by bank customers seeking to recover losses occasioned by unauthorized signatures. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
 

Raymon Haymon v. State of Tennessee
W2003-02535-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee Moore

The petitioner, Raymon Haymon, was convicted by a jury in the Dyer County Circuit Court of first degree premeditated murder. Upon conviction, the petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that one of the witnesses at his trial had recanted his testimony. The trial court denied the petition, finding that the petitioner failed to produce newly discovered evidence. The petitioner appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Tracy Lorenzo Goodwin, alias Lawanda Carter
E2001-01978-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Honorable Stephen M. Bevil

This is an appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County which convicted the defendant, Tracy Goodwin, of two counts of reckless aggravated assault, one count of felony reckless endangerment, and one count of criminally negligent homicide. The issues before us are whether the evidence is sufficient to uphold the convictions, whether the trial court erred in failing to sever the aggravated assault charges from the reckless endangerment and criminally negligent homicide charges, whether the separate convictions for felony reckless endangerment and criminally negligent homicide violate the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, and whether the sentences were excessive. We find that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for reckless aggravated assault because as defined by the statute, reckless aggravated assault requires proof of bodily injury, and no such proof was offered at trial. We find sufficient evidence to support the remaining convictions of felony reckless endangerment and criminally negligent homicide. We further find, with respect to the remaining convictions, that the trial court did not err in failing to sever the trials, the separate convictions do not violate double jeopardy protections, and the sentencing was not excessive. Therefore, the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed in part and affirmed in part. We remand the case for a new trial on charges of assault as lesserincluded offenses of aggravated assault.

In Re: Petition for Change of Name, Charles Grannis
M2003-01242-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Special Judge Mary Ashley Nichols

The trial court denied a Petition for Name Change. Among the allegations the Petitioner raises on appeal are that the master or special judge who denied his Petition was biased against him and that she was not authorized to act as a judge. We do not find sufficient evidence of bias in the record to justify reversal on that ground. We do find that the record is devoid of proper documentation of the basis of the master's authority to sit as a substitute judge. However, we need not determine whether reversal is required because of that deficiency, because we find that the trial court failed to articulate and the record fails to demonstrate any legally sufficient reason for denying the Petition. Therefore, the denial and dismissal of the Petition must be vacated.

State of Tennessee v. George Ratliff
E2003-00830-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lynn W. Brown

In 1998, the defendant, George E. Ratliff, was convicted of rape of a child, a Class A felony, for raping his six-year-old daughter and was sentenced to twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. He subsequently filed a direct appeal and a petition for writ of error coram nobis based on the victim's recantation of her testimony. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely, and the defendant appealed. The direct appeal and the error coram nobis appeal were consolidated, and this court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the petition, remanded the matter for a hearing, and stayed the direct appeal pending the trial court's ruling on the error coram nobis petition. See State v. Ratliff, 71 S.W.3d 291, 293 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 2002). On remand, the trial court denied the petition, and the defendant appeals. In his direct appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence, in denying his request for individual voir dire of two prospective jurors, and in ruling that the amount of time that lapsed between the victim's complaint and his arrest was irrelevant. Additionally, he argues that his sentence is excessive. Following our review, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence and affirm the trial court's denial of the petition for writ of error coram nobis.

State of Tennessee v. Michael Laster
E2003-01412-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phyllis H. Miller

The appellant, Michael B. Laster, entered pleas of no contest in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to theft of property over $1,000, operating a motor vehicle in violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act, resisting arrest, and felony failure to appear. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the appellant received an effective four year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the appellant's request for alternative sentencing in the form of community corrections, and the appellant timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Stephanie Hartman v. Daryl Hartman
E2003-02380-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Judge James W. McKenzie

The divorce judgment approved a MDA which provided that the minor children would reside with their father in Rhea County while mother was working in Atlanta. When not working, mother had custody. Two years after the divorce, father petitioned for custody, alleging that at the time of the divorce it was contemplated that mother would return to Tennessee and share equal parenting time. Mother counter-claimed for custody. Father was awarded primary custody. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for a hearing on the comparative fitness of each parent.

State of Tennessee v. Travis Lamont Williams
E2004-00009-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Baumgartner

The defendant, Travis Lamont Williams, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to attempted carjacking, a Class C felony; burglary of a vehicle, a Class E felony; and felony vandalism, also a Class E felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant received consecutive sentences of six years for the attempted carjacking, two years for the burglary, and one year for the vandalism, for an effective nine-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for enhanced probation and ordered that he serve his sentences in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by sentencing him to confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Western Express, Inc. v. Giovanni Orlando
M2003-01533-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Roger A. Page, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Buddy D. Perry, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 5- 6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of the findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred in adopting the medical opinion of Dr. Richard Fishbein over the opinion of Dr. Todd Bonvallet with respect to permanent medical impairment. The employer also contends that the trial court erred in awarding 26% permanent partial disability. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (23 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed ROGER A. PAGE, SP. J., in which ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., J. and RITA STOTTS, SP. J., joined. J. Bartlett Quinn, Chattanooga, Tennessee for appellant, Western Express, Inc. James S. Stephens, Manchester, Tennessee, for appellee, Giovanni Orlando. MEMORANDUM OPINION STANDARD OF REVIEW The review of the findings of the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225 (e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W. 2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). This Court is not bound by the trial court's findings, but instead conducts its own independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance lies. Galloway v. Memphis Drum Serv., 822 S.W. 2d 584, 586 (Tenn. 1981). FACTUAL BACKGROUND At the time of trial, Giovanni Orlando was thirty-four years old. He grew up and graduated from high school in Italy. After high school, he served in the Italian Army and received an honorable discharge. He then immigrated to the United States. Since coming to the United States, he has worked primarily as a truck driver. The injury in the instant case occurred in March 21. Orlando had been unloading water heaters and awakened the following morning with pain in his back. He had suffered a previous work-related injury to the same area of his back. The previous injury required surgery and Orlando received a court-approved award for permanent partial disability and future medical benefits. OPINIONS OF THE MEDICAL EXPERTS Dr. Todd Bonvallet treated Orlando for his March, 21 back injury. Following a period of conservative treatment, Dr. Bonvallet performed a surgical procedure on Orlando's back. Dr. Bonvallet, in his first deposition taken on September 6, 22, opined that at the time the employee returned to work in April, 22, he had suffered a 12% permanent partial disability to the whole person. Dr. Bonvallet gave a second deposition on December 13, 22 in which he opined that Orlando should receive a 2% permanent partial impairment rating for the second injury since he had already received 1% for the first injury to the same area. Upon cross- examination, Dr. Bonvallet agreed that an additional 1% impairment rating was appropriate and opined that Orlando had a 3% permanent partial impairment to the body as a whole as a result of the second back injury. Dr. Richard Fishbein examined Orlando and opined that Orlando retained a 2% permanent partial impairment rating after the second back injury with 5% to 8% attributed to the first injury. Dr. Fishbein then arrived at a rating of 13% permanent partial impairment to the body as a whole as a result of the second back injury. The trial court gave more weight to the medical opinion of Dr. Fishbein than to the opinion of Dr. Bonvallet. In its memorandum opinion, the trial court stated that, "[i]n this case the treating physician, for whatever reason, followed his own methods as to the evaluation. In a supplemental deposition, he reluctantly added an additional 1% to his original 2% medical impairment rating. On the other hand, Dr. Fishbein in considerable detail explained his conclusions regarding a 13% medical impairment rating. When comparing the explanation given by the two physicians, I conclude that

Roadway Express, Inc. v. Baron Jenkins
M2003-00974-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Roger A. Page, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr., Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 5- 6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of the findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred in holding that the employee proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the aggravation of his pre- existing back condition was caused by a June 23, 1999 work-related accident. The employer also argues that the trial court erred in holding that the employee had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered a 4% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole as a result of the same work-related accident. The employer has filed a motion requesting that this Court consider post-judgment facts. Specifically, the employer requests that this Court consider the fact that the employee returned to work for the employer during the pendency of this appeal. Under the unique circumstances of this case, we decline to consider the post- judgment facts. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (23 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed ROGER A. PAGE, SP. J., in which ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., J. and RITA STOTTS, SP. J., joined. David T. Hooper, Brentwood, Tennessee for appellant, Roadway Express, Inc. Peter M. Olson, Clarksville, Tennessee, for appellee, Baron Jenkins. MEMORANDUM OPINION STANDARD OF REVIEW The review of the findings of the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code. Ann. _ 5-6-225 (e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W. 2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). This Court is not bound by the trial court's findings, but instead conducts its own independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance lies. Galloway v. Memphis Drum Serv., 822 S.W. 2d 584, 586 (Tenn. 1981). FACTUAL BACKGROUND At the time of the final proceeding in the trial court, Baron Jenkins was thirty-eight years old and had a high school education. He served in the United States Marine Corps and received an honorable discharge. Since his discharge from service, his employment has consisted of working in a janitorial service, in a tile manufacturing plant, as a landscaper, as a truck delivery person, or in other labor intensive employment. Almost all of his previous employment involved heavy lifting. In June 1999, Jenkins was a "dock checker" at Roadway Express. This job required him to unload freight from trailers and load the freight onto other trailers. On June 23, 1999, Jenkins was lifting a heavy dock plate and injured himself. That evening, he complained of shortness of breath and pain in his rib cage. Jenkins expressed a fear that he might be having a heart attack. He was transported by ambulance to Southern Hills Medical Center where he was treated by Dr. David Schroeder, a board-certified emergency room physician. Dr. Schroeder's examination revealed pain in the chest wall that was treated by an injection of Demerol. Dr. Schroeder opined that Jenkins had pulled a muscle. Jenkins returned to work that evening and indicated on the Employee's Notice of Injury or Recurrence that he had chest pains and back muscle strains around his right rib cage related to pulling up a dock plate at work. On June 24, 1999, the very next day, Roadway Express denied workers' compensation benefits after determining that Jenkins had not suffered a heart attack. Approximately four days after the injury, Jenkins sought emergency treatment at Gateway Medical Center in Clarksville, complaining of a low back injury and pain in his right leg. He was treated by Dr. Stephen Kent. Dr. Kent had previously treated Jenkins on December 13, 1998 for a back injury unrelated to his employment. Jenkins was subsequently referred to Dr. Lloyd Walwyn, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, for an independent medical evaluation. Dr. Walwyn completed a Form C- 32 on