Rena Thompson vs. Charles Hensley
E2003-00456-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Jerri S. Bryant
Rena Thompson ("Plaintiff") filed this lawsuit claiming her grandson, Charles Hensley, and his wife, Karen Hensley (collectively "Defendants"), breached an oral contract. Specifically, Plaintiff claims she conveyed her house and real property to Defendants in exchange for their oral promise to take care of her and allow her to remain living in the house with them. Plaintiff suffered a stroke and went to live with her son, Perrian Hensley ("Plaintiff's son" or "her son"). After living with her son for approximately one year, Plaintiff wanted to return to her house. When she was not allowed to return to her house, Plaintiff sued Defendants for specific performance. The Trial Court found there was no contract. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

W2003-00001-COA-R3-CV
W2003-00001-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Daniel L. Smith

State of Tennessee v. Donald Franks
W2003-00003-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

A Hardin County jury convicted the defendant, Donald Franks, of rape of a child. The trial court sentenced the defendant to thirty-seven years as a Range II multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on flight; and (3) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Based upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Brian & Candy Chadwick v. Chad Spence
W2003-00931-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Kay S. Robilio

W2003-00334-COA-R3-CV
W2003-00334-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown

Nancy Gail (Paulk) Doran v. Oather Paul Doran
W2003-00170-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Steve Beal

Russell A. Siegfried v. The Grand Krewe of Sphinx,
CH-00-0307-3
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos

State of Tennessee v. Paul Regan, Alias
E2003-00014-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge John K. Byers

The defendant appeals the trial court's denial of judicial diversion contending that the court abused its discretion by not articulating specific reasons on the record for the denial. We agree with the defendant and remand for a new sentencing hearing in order for the trial court to place its reasoning upon the record.

Kasey Dunn-Lindsey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., d/b/a Sam's
W2002-02742-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Loser, J., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Allisandratos, Chancellor
In this appeal, the employer and its insurer insist the trial court erred in assessing a bad faith penalty, awarding attorney's fees and costs and ordering medical expenses paid directly to the injured employee. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed as to the bad faith penalty and award of fees and costs, and remanded to the trial court for further consideration.

State of Tennessee v. James H. Thompson
M2002-02137-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Curtis Smith

Following a conviction for DUI, third offense, after entering a guilty plea, Defendant James H. Thompson appeals, asserting that he has presented a certified question of law for review. Because we conclude that the question of law, even if properly reserved at the guilty plea hearing, is not dispositive of the case, we dismiss the appeal.

State of Tennessee v. Michael S. Stacy
E2003-01062-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phyllis H. Miller

The defendant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his motion for correction of an illegal sentence. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant entered a nolo contendere plea to a Class B felony and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to ten years, two years above the presumptive minimum sentence in the range. Subsequently, the defendant filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the trial court violated the requirements of the 1989 Sentencing Reform Act by failing to state enhancement factors to support the increase in his sentence from the presumptive minimum eight-year sentence. The trial court dismissed the motion, and the defendant appealed to this court. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the defendant's motion to correct illegal sentence.

State of Tennessee v. Woodrow Gifford, Jr. and Carl Monk
E2002-01233-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phyllis H. Miller

The Sullivan County grand jury indicted Defendant Woodrow Gifford, Jr. for possession of over 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Schedule II drug, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The Sullivan County grand jury indicted Defendant Carl Monk for possession of over 26 grams of cocaine, a Schedule II drug, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. Following the trial court's denial of the Defendants Motions to Suppress evidence, the Defendants both pled nolo contendere to possession with intent to sell drugs, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-17-417, and possession of drug paraphernalia, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-17-425. Both Defendants reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law regarding the trial court's denial of their Motions to Suppress. Finding no error in the trial court's judgment, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Christopher Hwang
E2002-03034-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Douglas A. Meyer

The defendant appeals the trial court's revocation of his probation, arguing that his due process rights were violated because (1) the trial court allowed the State to amend the revocation petition to include as additional grounds his subsequent convictions for theft and criminal impersonation, without providing him prior written notice; and (2) the trial court failed to issue adequate findings of fact in support of its decision. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Sidney Joseph Ogle
E2002-03112-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Baumgartner

The appellant, Sidney Joseph Ogle, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range I standard offender to three years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court denied the appellant's request for probation and the appellant timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Derrek Harper v. Gulf Insurance Company
W2002-02230-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Rita L. Stotts, Judge
In this appeal, the injured employee insists the award of permanent partial disability benefits, limited to the medical impairment rating offered by the treating physician, is inadequate and that the trial court erred in failing to award temporary total disability and future medical benefits. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be modified by increasing the award of permanent partial disability benefits to one based on all relevant factors established by the proof and by including temporary total and future medical benefits.

Tommy Dickerson v. State of Tennessee
M2002-1854-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Curtis Smith

Appellant, Tommy Dickerson, appeals from the trial court's summary dismissal of Appellant's second petition for post-conviction relief. After a review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Kena Hodges v. State of Tennessee
M2002-01334-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

Petitioner, Kena Hodges, appeals from the dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. After a review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Estate of Alonzo Donald Tucker, Deceased v. Lee M.
W2003-00912-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Lee Moore

W2003-01783-COA-R3-CV
W2003-01783-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Clayburn L. Peeples

W2003-00640-COA-R3-CV
W2003-00640-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Dewey C. Whitenton

Lee Roy Gass v. State of Tennessee
E2002-02146-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Beckner

The petitioner appeals from the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After careful review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief.

Katherine Elaine Sons v. Zurich American Group
2002-02244-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Loser, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Martha B. Brasfield, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee insists the trial court erred in its application of the successive injury rule and by applying the caps contained in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-241(a) to the medical impairment resulting only from her most recent injury. The employer's insurer insists the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the employee is permanently disabled to any extent. As discussed below, the panel concludes the successive injury rule is inapplicable and the extent of the employee's permanent disabilitymust be determined in accordance with established rules relating to pre-existing conditions. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (22 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Vacated; Cause Remanded LOSER, SP. J., in which HOLDER, J., and GOLDIN, SP. J., joined. Joseph H. Crabtree, Jr., Stewart & Wilkinson, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Katherine Elaine Sons Ronald L. Harper and R. Scott Vincent, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Zurich American Group MEMORANDUM OPINION The employee or claimant, Ms. Sons, initiated this civil action to recover workers' compensation benefits for a work related back injury. The employer's insurer, Zurich American, denied liability. After a trial on the merits, the trial court awarded the employee, among other things, permanent partial disability benefits based on 1 percent to the body as a whole. The employee has appealed contending the award is inadequate. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225 (e)(2). This tribunal is not bound by the trial court's findings but instead conducts an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance lies. Galloway v. Memphis Drum Serv., 822 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tenn. 1991). Where the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses, especially if issues of credibility and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded those circumstances on review, because it is the trial court which had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and to hear the in- court testimony. Long v. Tri-Con Ind., Ltd., 996 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Tenn. 1999). The appellate tribunal, however, is as well situated to gauge the weight, worth and significance of deposition testimony as the trial judge. Walker v. Saturn Corp., 986 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Tenn. 1998). Extent of vocational disability is a question of fact. Story v. Legion Ins. Co., 3 S.W.3d 45, 456 (Tenn. 1999). Conclusions of law are subject to de novo review on appeal without any presumption of correctness. Nutt v. Champion Intern. Corp., 98 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tenn. 1998). The claimant is sixty years old and has a tenth grade education. She obtained a GED certificate in about 1973, but has no other formal education. She began working in 1979 at a nuclear power station. Her job was to wash protective clothing. Later in the same year, she began working as a labor foreman in construction work. Her work through 199 consisted of very strenuous, very heavy labor. Her duties included, but were not limited to running conduit and wiring in buildings. She returned to Covington in 199 and tended a bar. In 1994, she was hired by Dyncorp, a general maintenance company which performed general maintenance at the old navy base in Millington. Around June 1, 1998, the maintenance contract was awarded to J. A. Jones Management, at which time the claimant went to work for the employer, J. A. Jones. She worked mostly with electrical lines and performed many of the duties that an electrical worker with Memphis Light, Gas & Water would perform. She would roll and unroll lines, replace poles, replace lights and fixtures inside buildings and install new wiring. She also worked with air conditioners, replacing filters and cleaning ducts. All of the tasks were heavy and strenuous work requiring lifting, bending, twisting, turning, etc. In May 1998, the claimant developed foot problems and underwent a surgical procedure on her feet. After this surgical procedure, she began experiencing back pain. A diagnostic test revealed a ruptured disc. At the time, neither the foot problems nor the back problems were work related. On May 18, 1998, Dr. Dowen E. Snyder performed corrective surgery on her lower back, removing large fragments of disc at two levels. She returned to work in July of the same year. However, she experienced pain both during and after work. On September 15, 1998, the claimant returned to Dr. Snyder with complaints of recurrent pain in her back and left hip and leg. She also described an incident involving a fall from a treadmill, in which she landed on her lower back. The treadmill event caused no additional pain. The doctor prescribed an epidural block, medication, rest and therapy. When the pain didn't wane, Dr. Snyder ordered a second magnetic imaging resonance test. On September 3, 1998, the claimant stepped in a hole at work and suffered immediate and -2-

Dale Supply Company, v. York International Corp, et al.
M2002-01408-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Russ Heldman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carol L. Soloman

The sole determinative issue on appeal is whether an agreement which mandates arbitration in the event of claims or disputes "arising out of or relating in any way to the relationship of the parties or this Agreement, or the breach thereof," requires arbitration of tort claims including acts arising after the parties' contractual relationship ended. We hold that arbitration of claims of tortious interference with contracts or business relations is required under the terms of the parties' agreement and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Travis Bronson a/k/a Terry Crusenberry
E2003-00385-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phyllis H. Miller

The defendant pled guilty to theft under $500 and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail at zero percent work release eligibility, to be served consecutively to a two-year sentence in a separate case. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying him probation. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Kevin L. Lawrence
W2001-02638-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris B. Craft

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant of first degree felony murder, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to imprisonment for life with the possibility of parole. The Defendant now appeals, contending the following: (1) that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his statement to police; (2) that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for mistrial based upon a witness's non-responsive statement; (3) that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to assert matters not in evidence during closing arguments; and (4) that the trial court committed plain error by incorrectly instructing the jury with respect to the culpable mental state of "knowingly." Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.