The appellant, Angela E. Isabell, was convicted by a jury in the Lewis County Circuit Court of three counts of the sale or delivery of controlled substances. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contests her convictions for the "sale or delivery" of controlled substances and further complains about statements made during trial by the State and the State's witnesses. The State concedes that there is reversible error. Finding the appellant's argument to have merit, we reverse all three of the appellant's convictions and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
The petitioner, Earl Junior Pike, appeals from the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which alleged that his appointed trial counsel was ineffective for not allowing him to testify at trial. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and we affirm.
The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for attempted first degree murder and three counts of aggravated assault, one of which was merged with the attempted murder conviction. He argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to try the juvenile petitioner as an adult and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.
The defendant, Kerry L. Dowell, was convicted by a jury of kidnapping, car jacking, robbery, felony evasion of arrest, and misdemeanor evading arrest, and was sentenced to an effective twenty-four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for kidnapping, car jacking, and Class D felony evading arrest; the trial court erred in failing to suppress a statement he made to the police; the trial court erred in failing to give a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the defendant's prior convictions; the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses; and the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant consecutively on one of the counts. The Class D felony evading arrest conviction is reversed. We affirm all other judgments of the trial court.
The defendant, Michael Joseph Cook, was convicted of manufacturing a Schedule II controlled substance and conspiracy to manufacture a Schedule II controlled substance, Class C and D felonies. The trial court merged the conspiracy conviction into the Class C felony and imposed a four-year community based alternative sentence. As a part of the sentence, the defendant was ordered to serve one year in jail. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient and that his sentence is excessive. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
The Defendants, Irvin Lee Franklin and Jerry Lorenze Sandridge, were each convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated robbery. In this direct appeal, both Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Defendant Franklin further contends that double jeopardy principles require the reversal and dismissal of one of the convictions. We find the evidence sufficient to support the jury's determination that each of these Defendants committed an aggravated robbery. However, because the facts and circumstances of this offense support only one conviction for aggravated robbery as to each Defendant, we modify the other aggravated robbery convictions to aggravated assault and remand for resentencing on that offense. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. The Defendant, Grover Donnell Cowart, was originally convicted by a jury of attempted first degree premeditated murder and especially aggravated robbery; the jury acquitted the Defendant of additional charges of aggravated rape. On direct appeal, this Court reversed and remanded for retrial the Defendant’s conviction of attempted first degree murder. See State v. Grover Donnell Cowart, No. 03C01-9512-CR-00402, 1999 WL 5174, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Jan. 8, 1999). The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief with respect to the judgment of especially aggravated robbery, alleging that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Knox
Court of Criminal Appeals
James Donald Lattimore v. Cna Insurance Company, M2002-01718-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Clara Byrd, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the Second Injury Fund insists the trial court erred in awarding disability benefits in excess of the limitation provided by law where the injured worker was more than sixty years old at the time of the injury. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the Second Injury Fund is not entitled to credit for overpayment made by the employer. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (22 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C. J., and JAMES L. WEATHERFORD, SR. J., joined. Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, and E. Blaine Sprouse, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Second Injury Fund William Joseph Butler and E. Guy Holliman, Farrar, Holliman & Butler, Lafayette, Tennessee, for the appellee, James Donald Lattimore Daniel H. Rader, III and Lane Moore, Moore, Rader, Clift & Fitzpatrick, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the appellees, CNA Insurance Company and TRW Steering Systems, Inc. MEMORANDUM OPINION The employee or claimant, Mr. Lattimore, initiated this civil action to recover workers' compensation benefits for alleged injuries to his back, left leg and right leg resulting from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with the employer, TRW Steering Systems, in December 1999. He demanded, among other things, permanent partial disability benefits. The claim was settled on October 6, 22. The settlement order recites that the accident occurred on December 15, 1999 and provided for an award based on 19 weeks of benefits at the employee's agreed compensation rate. On March 8, 21, the claimant applied for reconsideration of the above award pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-241(a)(2), averring that he was no longer working for the employer. Because the claimant was seeking permanent total disability benefits and had disability pre-existing the December 1999 accident, the Second Injury Fund was added as an additional defendant. Both defendants denied liability. After a trial on the merits, the trial court found the employee to be permanently and totally disabled as a result of the combined effects of his pre-existing disabilities and those resulting from his work related accident of December 1999. The trial court found his disability from the work related accident to be 27 percent to the body as a whole and apportioned the award 27 percent to the employer and 73 percent to the Second Injury Fund. Because the employee was more than sixty years old at the time of his work related accident, the percentages were applied to 26 weeks, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-27(4)(A)(I).1 The employer was given credit for benefits already paid as a result of the earlier settlement, but the Fund was not given credit for payments made by the employer in excess of its ultimate liability. As a result of the award, the employee will actually receive, when combined with the benefits already paid by the employer, 298.8 weeks of benefits or benefits for 38.8 weeks more than the maximum allowed by the above statute for workers more than sixty years old at the time of their compensable injuries. The Second Injury Fund contends its liability should be reduced, therefore, by 38.8 weeks. Put another way, the Fund seeks credit against its liability for benefits paid by the employer in excess of the employer's ultimate liability. The fund does not take issue with the factual findings of the trial court, including the apportionment of liability between it and the employer. 1. (4)(A)(i) PERM ANE NT TO TAL DISAB ILITY . For permanent total disability as defined in subdivision (4)(B), sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66 2/3 %) of the wages received at the time of the injury, subject to the maximum weekly benefit and minimum weekly benefit; provided, that if the employee's average weekly wages are equal to or greate r than the minim um weekly b enefit, the e mplo yee sha ll receive not less tha n the m inimum week ly bene fit; provided further, that if the employee's average weekly wages are less than the minimum weekly benefit, the employee shall receive the full amount of the employee's average weekly wages, but in no event shall the compensation paid be less than the minimum weekly benefit. This compensation shall be paid during the period of the pe rman ent total d isability until the e mplo yee is, by a ge, eligib le for full be nefits in the O ld Ag e Insur ance Be nefit Program under the Social Security Act; provided, that with respect to disabilities resulting from injuries which occur after 6 years of age, regardless of the age of the employee, permanent total disability benefits are payable for a perio d of two hund red six ty (26 ) week s. Such com pensation p ayme nts shall b e red uced by the a mou nt of any o ld age insurance benefit payments attributable to employer contributions which the employee may receive under the Social Security Act, U.S.C., title 42, chapter 7, subchapter II, as amended. -2-
Wilson
Workers Compensation Panel
Ralph Laverne Gholston v. Brown Chain Link Fence M2002-02038-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Jeffrey F. Stewart, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer insists (1) the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding of permanent and total disability and (2) the trial court erred by ordering the non-commuted benefits to be paid over a shortened period of time. As discussed below, the panel finds no reversible error in the record, but modifies the judgment with respect to the second issue, there being no objection to it. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (22 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed as Modified JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C. J., and JAMES L. WEATHERFORD, SR. J., joined. Randolph A. Veazey, Glasgow & Veazey, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Brown Chain Link Fence Construction Co., Inc. and Westfield Companies Edwin Z. Kelly, Jr., Kelly & Kelly, Jasper, Tennessee, for the appellee, Ralph Laverne Gholston Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, and E. Blaine Sprouse, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Second Injury Fund MEMORANDUM OPINION The employee or claimant, Mr. Gholston, initiated this civil action to recover workers' compensation benefits for an injury by accident arising out of his employment. His amended complaint named the employer, Brown Chain Link Fence Construction Co., Inc., the employer's insurer, Westfield, and the Second Injury Fund as defendants. After a trial, the trial court found the employee to be permanently and totally disabled and apportioned the award between the employer and the Second Injury Fund. The employer and its insurer have appealed. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2) (22 Supp.). The reviewing court is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Marion
Workers Compensation Panel
Richard Hughey v.Metro Gov' t Nashville and Davidson County M2002-02240-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
Richard Hughey, a former Metropolitan Nashville police officer, appeals the action of the Chancery Court of Davidson County in affirming the adverse decision of the Metropolitan Civil Service Commission, which had rejected his application for police department employment. We affirm the action of the Chancellor.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Mark Gore v. Department of Correction M2002-02640-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
Mark B. Gore, an inmate in the Department of Corrections, appeals the action of the Chancery Court of Davidson County in granting a T.R.C.P. rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss his Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. We affirm the action of the trial court.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Elizabeth Oliver v. Marc Oliver M2002-02880-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Muriel Robinson
This appeal involves a father's effort to obtain primary physical custody of his now twelve-year-old daughter. Approximately three months after the parties' divorce, the father filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking to hold the mother in criminal contempt for interfering with his visitation and for alienating their daughter. He later amended his petition to seek primary physical custody. Following a bench trial, the trial court held the mother in contempt but declined to change custody from the mother to the father. The father has appealed. We have determined that the trial court did not err by denying the father's petition to change custody.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Sierra Summerall v. Department of Correction M2002-02033-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
This appeal arises from a prisoner disciplinary proceeding at the West Tennessee State Penitentiary. After a disciplinary board punished him for possession of marijuana, the prisoner filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County asserting that the Department of Correction had deprived him of due process by substantially departing from its Uniform Disciplinary Policies. The trial court dismissed the petition because it was not timely filed. The prisoner has appealed. We affirm the trial court.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Jennifer Skerrett v. The Association for Guidance M2002-00218-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Betty Adams Green
This appeal involves a paternal grandmother's efforts to obtain permanent custody of her grandson. After the child's mother surrendered him to a licensed child-placing agency, the grandmother intervened in the proceeding commenced in the Davidson County Juvenile Court to terminate her son's parental rights. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated the father's parental rights and denied the grandmother's request for custody. While the grandmother does not contest the termination of her son's parental rights, she asserts on this appeal that the juvenile court erred by awarding custody of the child to the child-placing agency rather than to her. We have determined that, under the facts of this case, the grandmother lacked standing to intervene in the proceeding to terminate her son's parental rights. Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of her custody petition.
The defendant, Demond Gardner, appeals as of right from his conviction by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of first degree, premeditated murder. He received a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. He contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erroneously ruled that the state could question him about the significance of his tattoo, (3) the trial court erred in admitting inflammatory and prejudicial photographs of the victim, and (4) the trial court erred in allowing improper and prejudicial argument by the prosecutor. We affirm the trial court=s judgment of conviction.
Shelby
Court of Criminal Appeals
Gary Wallace v. State of Tennessee W2002-01832-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.
The Appellant, Gary Wallace, seeks review of the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, pursuant to the Tennessee Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 and the court’s refusal to permit him to reopen his 1994 petition for post-conviction relief. After review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in both respects.
The appellant, Leslie Darrell Debord, pled guilty in the Cumberland County Criminal Court to two counts theft of property over one thousand dollars ($1000), Class D felonies, and three counts of theft of property over ten thousand dollars ($10,000), Class C felonies. The trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court suspended the appellant's sentence, ordering the appellant to serve 104 days in the Cumberland County Jail on consecutive weekends and the remainder in a community corrections program. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the appellant reserved the right to appeal certified questions of law challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
The appellant, Frankie Lee Woodard, was indicted on October 29, 1999, by the Robertson County Grand Jury on one count of theft of property over $500. The appellant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The appellant now appeals contending that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction for theft of property over five hundred dollars and that the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding the value of the stolen item. After a review of the record before this Court we find these issues have no merit and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Robertson
Court of Criminal Appeals
Kathy Parker v. Bobby Parker, Jr. M2001-01453-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: J. B. Cox
The trial court granted the parties a divorce, and awarded them joint custody of the three children of their marriage, with the mother to exercise primary custody. The court's order included a detailed visitation schedule, which did not mention Mother's Day. After the children spent their first post-divorce Mother's Day with the father, the mother moved the court to be granted Mother's Day visitation. The court granted the motion, and assessed attorney fees against the father. The father appeals the award of attorney fees. We affirm the trial court.
Johann Wolmarans vs. Lifestyle Furnishings E2002-01783-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: John K. Wilson
Johann Roshe Wolmarans sues Lifestyle Furnishings, a/k/a Universal Furniture Limited, Inc., for an injury he received on its premises. The complaint as amended seeks damages under the theory of premises liability and also under the Worker's Compensation Statute. The Trial Court found that the Plaintiff was an independent contractor and dismissed his worker's compensation claim. Thereafter, a jury trial was held as to the premises liability claims and the jury found that the injury received by the Plaintiff was due entirely to his own fault. The Plaintiff appeals, raising a host of issues which we find are without merit and affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
Hamblen
Court of Appeals
Shirley K. Hensley v. England/Corsair Upholstery E2002-01763-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Thayer, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Billy Joe White, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann._ 5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded 5 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer has appealed insisting the expert medical testimony is not sufficient to support the award. The judgment is affirmed. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court is Affirmed. THAYER, SP. J., in which ANDERSON, J., and, BYERS, SR., J., joined. J. Steven Collins, of Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellants, England/Corsair Upholstery Manufacturing Company, Inc., and Lumbermen's Underwriting Alliance. Edwin A. Anderson, of Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee, Shirley K. Hensley. MEMORANDUM OPINION The trial court awarded the employee, Shirley K. Hensley, 5 percent permanent partial disability as a result of sustaining an occupational disease. The employer and insurance carrier have appealed insisting the evidence is not sufficient to support the award. Facts The employee had been working as a seamstress or sewing operator for about thirty years. At the time of the trial, she was fifty-five years of age and had completed the ninth grade in school. In August 1993 she started working for the defendant furniture manufacturing company. She testified she worked with fabric material most of the time and that in handling fabric, her hands became very dry. She and other sewing operators kept lotion for use on their dry hands. She said that about one year prior to stopping work in November 1998, she began to work with leather. Her hands started swelling and cracking. It got so bad that they would bleed. She stated the green dye would actually rub off on her hands and she tried wrapping her hands with gauze and masking tape. Sometime later, she testified her "feet broke open." She worked with leather for about a year before going to the doctor. She eventually saw Dr. Ellis who treated her for several years. He recommended she see Dr. Alexander, a dermatologist. She stated she went to see him and his treatment was the same as Dr. Ellis and more expensive so she quit going to Dr. Alexander and returned for treatment with Dr. Ellis. After being off from work for about six months, she was terminated. The employee testified she had tried to find work with Wal-Mart as a greeter but when they saw the condition of her hands and asked what had caused the problem, Wal-Mart officials advised her they did not have a job available. She said her hands and feet have healed to some extent but she has not found any employment. Dr. Roy C. Ellis, a family physician, testified by deposition, and said he first saw Ms. Hensley on August 22, 1998 and she had severe hand dermatitis; that he prescribed several medications; she returned to work on September 8; she came back to see him on September 28 showing signs of severe rash and allergic dermatitis which he felt was definitely due to the fabric, either leather or vinyl, or both. He stated that over a period of time when she was off work, she would get better and when she returned to work, she got worse. He opined her "work conditions led up to and caused the allergic dermatitis." The doctor stated the medical impairment would fall into class three in the range of 25 to 54 percent and he gave her a 5 percent impairment. Dr. Jay Hammett, a family practice physician testifying by deposition, performed an independent medical examination on October 8, 1999 and examined the records of several other doctors. He learned she was also being treated for a thyroid condition and hypertension and thought her problems could be related to her medications for these problems. He said he thought the opinion of Dr. Ellis on causation was speculation since a skin biopsy or patch test had not been conducted. He was of the opinion she could resume her sewing work. Also, if her work conditions did cause her problems, he felt her impairment would be in the class two range of 1 to 24 percent and he fixed her impairment rating at 2 percent. Defendant's plant manager and company nurse both testified Ms. Hensley told them during July 1998 her problem was not work-related. However, these conversations were prior to the August 1998 visit to Dr. Ellis. The plant nurse admitted that during November 1998 she advised her doctor had said her condition was work-related. The nurse also testified no other employee had complained of the same problem. -2-
The Defendant was charged with and convicted of burglary. The trial court sentenced him to three years' incarceration. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and (2) that the State did not establish a proper chain of custody concerning the stolen property in this case. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that legally sufficient evidence was presented at the Defendant's trial to support his conviction and thus that the trial court did not err by denying the Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. We also conclude that a proper chain of evidence was established for the recovered property in this case and thus that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the property into evidence. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
