Conner Brothers Excavating Company v. Long
We granted this motion for a full court review of the Special Workers' Compensation Panel decision to determine whether the appellant, Clyde L. Long, proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his injury occurred as a result of a work-related incident as required in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-103(a). After a careful review of the record, we hold that the evidence preponderates against the holding of the trial court and Special Workers' Compensation Panel, and that the appellant's injury did arise out of and within the scope of his employment. The judgment of the trial court and the Special Workers' Compensation Panel is reversed. Because the trial court made no other factual findings, the case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to make factual findings regarding: (1) the compensable medical benefits due to the appellant; (2) the temporary disability benefits to which Mr. Long is entitled, and; (3) the proper permanent disability award to which Mr. Long is entitled. Additionally, in the interest of expediting the payment of Mr. Long's medical expenses and the receipt of disability benefits, we direct the trial court to hold such hearing within sixty days of the date of this Court's order. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Rick Kyle v. Earl Williams & Michelle Williams
We granted the plaintiff's application for permission to appeal to determine whether the Chancellor erred in holding that a contractor is unlicensed for purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 62-6-103(b), and therefore is limited to a recovery of documented expenses proven by clear and convincing evidence, where the contractor possessed a valid contractor's license when the contract was formed but did not maintain a valid license throughout the entire time contracting services were performed under the contract. After carefully considering the relevant statutes, we conclude that the Chancellor properly held that a contractor who does not maintain a valid license throughout the entire contract period is unlicensed for purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 62-6-103(b) and limited to a recovery of documented expenses proven by clear and convincing evidence. |
Monroe | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Wayne Pointer
The defendant, Jerry Wayne Pointer, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced as a violent offender to life imprisonment without parole. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence seized from his person and his home, in ruling that his prior convictions were admissible for impeachment purposes, in allowing testimony of a prior violent incident between him and the victim, and, additionally, that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tony S. Walker v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree felony murder, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He argues that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) the post-conviction court erred in finding that his statement taken by law enforcement officers did not violate his constitutional rights. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tommy William Davis
The defendant, Tommy William Davis, was convicted of Class D theft of property over $1,000 and was sentenced to a term of six years incarceration, as a Range II offender. On appeal, he argues that the trial court should have granted a judgment of acquittal at the close of the state’s proof, and he challenges the length of his sentence as premised on an invalid enhancement factor. Our review convinces us that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction and that, although improper enhancement factors were applied, a sentence of six years is appropriate. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tommy William Davis - Concurring
While I concur with the majority that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for theft of property over $1,000, I reach that result from a somewhat different approach than that taken in the principal opinion. The majority concludes that the defendant’s presence in and operation of a borrowed vehicle is sufficient proof to support a finding of constructive possession of contraband contained therein. Concededly, this has been the conclusion reached by this Court in a number of its decisions. See, e.g., State v. Gonzalo Moran Garcia, No. M2000-01760-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 146, at *111 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nashville, Feb. 20, 2002); State v. Brown, 915 S.W.2d 3, 7-8 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). However, having re-read the opinion of the Tennessee Supreme Court in State v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 900 (Tenn. 2001), I am convinced that mere presence in and operation of a vehicle containing contraband is, without other proof of a power or intention on the part of the defendant to exercise dominion and control over the contraband, insufficient to establish “constructive possession.” Nevertheless, I believe that the record of the instant case provides sufficient other proof that, when coupled with the proof of the defendant’s presence in and operation of the vehicle containing contraband, establishes the constructive possession necessary in this case to sustain a theft conviction. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald P. Wilcox
The defendant, Donald P. Wilcox, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court's denial of his request for probation for his guilty pleas to violating a habitual traffic offender order, a Class E felony; violating the registration law, a Class C misdemeanor; and possession of alprazolam pills, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia, Class A misdemeanors. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michelle Devers v. Aqua Glass Corporation,
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McNairy | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher K. Knight
A Hardin County jury convicted the defendant of two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, he contends: (1) the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial during jury voir dire; (2) the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for new trial based on alleged juror misconduct; and (3) the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rebecca McMurry v. Metro Government of Nashville
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Ray Dunnagan v. Foamex
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Madison | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Deborah Griffin v. Ace USA
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Madison | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Darrell Lamar Fritts v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Darrell Lamar Fritts, filed in the Davidson County Criminal Court a petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging that the plea bargain process employed by the State of Tennessee is unconstitutional per se, thus rendering two of his convictions, which resulted from guilty pleas, void. The trial court denied the petition and the petitioner timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry Wayne Luna
The Defendant, Terry Wayne Luna, was convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual battery. He was sentenced to twenty years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a mistrial because the Defendant was unduly prejudiced by a non-responsive answer to a question asked by defense counsel on cross-examination. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Harrington v. Grant Smith
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Martin
The Defendant, Kevin Martin, pled guilty to one count of obtaining prescription drugs by fraud, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, two counts of forgery, one count of telephone harassment, one count of reckless endangerment, and one count of assault. The negotiated plea agreement resulted in an effective sentence of five years and six months. Pursuant to the agreement, service of two of the years was suspended, and the manner of service for the remaining three and one-half years was to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve the sentences totaling three and one-half years in confinement. It is from this order that the Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wilmore Hatfield
The Appellant, Wilmore Hatfield, was indicted for attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, felony possession of a weapon, and driving under the influence (DUI). Following a jury trial, Hatfield was found guilty of felony reckless endangerment, as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault, and DUI. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of two years for the felony reckless endangerment conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the DUI conviction. On appeal, Hatfield raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether felony reckless endangerment is a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault as charged in the indictment; (2) whether the trial court's DUI instruction was proper; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts; and (4) whether his sentences were excessive. We hold that felony reckless endangerment is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault committed by intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury to another by use or display of a deadly weapon. Therefore, the felony reckless endangerment conviction must be reversed and remanded for a new trial on the lesser charge of misdemeanor assault. Regarding Hatfield's DUI conviction, we conclude that the trial court properly charged the jury and the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. However, we find that the trial court erred by ordering Hatfield to serve his entire eleven-month and twenty-nine-day sentence in the county jail. Accordingly, his DUI conviction is affirmed; however, his sentence is modified to reflect a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with all time suspended except forty-eight hours to be served in the county jail. |
Fentress | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Billy Joe Porterfield
The Appellant, Billy Joe Porterfield, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnaping, especially aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, and two counts of aggravated rape, all arising from a single criminal episode. As a result of these convictions, Porterfield received an effective sentence of one-hundred-fifteen years imprisonment. On appeal, Porterfield argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, and (2) the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors in determining the appropriate sentences. Finding no merit to these issues, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Renne Efren Arellano
The Appellant, Renne Efren Arellano, was indicted by a Maury County grand jury for one count of aggravated arson, a class A felony, eight counts of attempted first degree murder, class A felonies, and one count of felony possession of a weapon, a class E felony. A negotiated plea agreement allowed the Appellant to plead to one count of arson, eight counts of aggravated assault, and one count of felony possession of a weapon in exchange for an effective twelve-year sentence. The manner of service of the twelve-year sentence was to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the twelve-year sentence be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Arellano contends that the trial court erred in not sentencing him to any form of alternative incarceration. However, plain error dictates that the convictions be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings because aggravated assault is not a lesser included offense of attempted first degree murder. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Thomas Dougherty v. Joyce Parry
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Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Earl Ferrell, Jr.
The defendant, Bobby Earl Ferrell, Jr., appeals as of right the sentences imposed by the Bedford County Circuit Court following the defendant's guilty pleas to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000, a Class D felony. He contends that the trial court should not have ordered him to serve his effective four-year sentence consecutively to a prior Rutherford County sentence. We affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Smith County v. Dave Enoch
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Smith | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Rector v. Elizabeth Halliburton
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Daryl Adrian Benjamin Ingram
The defendant entered "open" guilty pleas to eight counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed an effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) his sentences are excessive; and (2) the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jesse Wayne Baker
The defendant, Jesse Wayne Baker, pled guilty to introduction of a controlled substance into a penal institution, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to four years to be served consecutively with a previous sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that his sentence is excessive and the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing and in imposing consecutive sentencing. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals |