Tom Slagle, et al v. The Church Of The First Born Of Tennessee, et al
A dispute among members of a church arose over control of the church. One group of church members incorporated, and then individual members of the church filed suit against the corporation and a second entity that operated a school on church property. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court determined that the organizational structure of the church was “connectional” or “hierarchical” in nature and that all property of the church was under the control of the church’s board of deacons. Because we conclude that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude entry of summary judgment, we affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Kirkwood v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Kenneth Kirkwood, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying him a full hearing and concluding that he waived all his ineffective assistance of counsel claims by raising an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel in his motion for new trial and on direct appeal. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition on the basis that the Petitioner has already been afforded an opportunity to litigate his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lawrence A. Gray
The Defendant, Lawrence A. Gray, entered a guilty plea to three counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery with the trial court to determine sentencing. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly imposed a twelve-year sentence. We affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher A. Williams v. State of Tennessee
After three trials, the Petitioner was convicted of attempted aggravated robbery and felony first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. The Petitioner appealed his convictions, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and filed multiple petitions for writs of habeas corpus relief. No relief was granted. In 2015, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, alleging an anonymous informant’s statement was newly discovered evidence. The Petitioner conceded that his petition was untimely but asked the coram nobis court to toll the statute of limitations because, he asserted, the State withheld the statement. The coram nobis court declined to toll the statute of limitations, and it dismissed the petition as time-barred. We affirm the coram nobis court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donnell V. Booker v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Donnell V. Booker, appeals the denial of his second petition for habeas corpus relief in which he argues that his guilty plea to an “out of range” sentence was illegal. Because Petitioner’s claim has been previously determined and he fails to state a cognizable claim, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher M. Heath v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Christopher M. Heath, was convicted of driving under the influence (“DUI”), fifth offense, and second offense driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked driver’s license. He received an effective sentence of fifteen months. There was no direct appeal. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief. After a hearing at which Petitioner did not appear and did not present any proof, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. Petitioner appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief. After a review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven Bell v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company
Steven Bell (“Employee”) worked for Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (“Employer”) for thirty-seven years. He retired when Employer’s plant closed in 2011. Shortly thereafter, he filed a request for benefit review conference, contending that he had sustained hearing loss as a result of noise exposure in the course of his work for Employer. He filed this civil action on May 4, 2012. Hearing screens taken by Employer from 1974 through 2010 showed that Employee had moderate to severe hearing loss when he was hired. Employer, therefore, denied the claim. The trial court awarded permanent partial disability benefits of 40% to the hearing of both ears. Employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Obion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Jason Baker v. Total Air Group LLC f/k/a Tunica Group LLC, ET AL.
Jason Baker (“Employee”) was first employed by Total Air Group, LLC (“Employer”) on June 17, 2010. On February 11, 2011, Employee sustained an injury to his back while working for Employer in Memphis, Tennessee. Employee’s treating physician determined that Employee had achieved maximum medical improvement on June 13, 2011. Employer’s workers’ compensation insurer made its final voluntary payment of Employee’s medical expenses on December 31, 2012. Employee returned to work but was terminated by Employer on July 29, 2014. Employee alleged that he requested and received from Employer’s workers’ compensation insurer authorization for additional medical treatment in February 2015. Employee requested a benefit review conference, which was held on April 30, 2015. Employee filed this workers’ compensation case on May 1, 2015. Employer answered, asserting as an affirmative defense that Employee’s claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Tenn. Code Ann. |
Shelby | Workers Compensation Panel | |
In Re: Paul Julius Walwyn, BPR #18263
The Board of Professional Responsibility (“Board”) initiated disciplinary proceedings against attorney Paul Julius Walwyn based on a client’s complaint of professional misconduct. A hearing panel (“Panel”) determined that Mr. Walwyn had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct (“RPC”) and ultimately entered “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Amended Judgment of the Hearing Panel” (“Amended Judgment”) imposing a public censure with a practice monitor for one year and six additional hours of continuing legal education (“CLE”) on subjects related to the management of a law practice and/or client communication. Mr. Walwyn did not appeal the Amended Judgment to the trial court. The Board petitioned this Court for an order enforcing the Panel’s Amended Judgment. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 15.4(b) and (c), we determined that the punishment imposed by the Panel appeared inadequate and proposed that it be increased. Mr. Walwyn subsequently requested oral argument, which we granted. We now consider whether the punishment imposed by the Panel is appropriate under the circumstances of this case and is in uniformity with prior disciplinary decisions in this state. Following a thorough review of the record and the law, we conclude that it is not. Therefore, we modify the Panel’s Amended Judgment to impose a one-year suspension from the practice of law, with six months to be served on active suspension and six months to be served on probation with a practice monitor. The duties and obligations in relation to the practice monitor shall be enforced in accordance with the Panel’s Amended Judgment. We also impose six additional hours of CLE on subjects related to the management of a law practice and/or client communication. |
Supreme Court | ||
Shira Jean Stafford, et al. v. Jackson County, Tennessee, et al.
An arrestee sued the arresting sheriff’s deputy, the sheriff, and the county for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court dismissed the case on summary judgment. We affirm as to the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress but find that there are genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment on the claim for assault and battery. |
Jackson | Court of Appeals | |
Jenny Craig Operations, Inc. v. Lori Reel
Lori Reel (“Employee”) was employed by Jenny Craig Operations, Inc. (“Employer”) as a Jenny Craig consultant. On January 8, 2010, Employee fell while at work and struck her right knee on the floor. Suit was filed. Employee alleged that she sustained a work-related injury to her right knee that aggravated pre-existing arthritis in that knee and ultimately necessitated a total knee replacement. While conceding that Employee sustained a temporary injury to her knee from the fall, Employer denied liability for the total knee replacement and for any permanent impairment. The trial court found that Employee’s work-related fall caused an acceleration, advancement, or progression of her osteoarthritis, such that she required a total knee replacement, that Employee’s January 8, 2010 injury was compensable, and that Employee retained a permanent partial disability of 46.5% to her right lower extremity. Employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Charles Phillip Maxwell v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Charles Phillip Maxwell, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis from his driving with a suspended license conviction and his thirty-day sentence, which was suspended to probation after twenty-four hours in confinement. The Petitioner contends that the court erred by denying relief and improperly ordered him to pay court costs associated with his petition. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Phillip M. Mullins v. Cherry Lindamood, Warden
The Petitioner, Phillip M. Mullins, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 2001 convictions and his effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole plus twenty-five years. He contends that his convictions violate double jeopardy principles on several grounds. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Latoya Britton
Defendant, Latoya Britton, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her community corrections sentence and the imposition of additional consecutive sentencing and confinement upon resentencing. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Dwight Hester v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, David Dwight Hester, pleaded guilty to initiation of methamphetamine manufacture, and two counts of aggravated child neglect. He received an agreed effective sentence of twenty-five years at thirty percent as a Range I offender. Petitioner subsequently filed a post-conviction petition that was denied by the post-conviction court. On appeal, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the indictments charging him with aggravated child abuse or neglect because each indictment charged him with “two distinct offenses.” He also argues that trial counsel told him that he was required to receive the same sentence as his co-defendant and that Petitioner risked serving his sentence at one-hundred percent eligibility if the case went to trial. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joseph Kolby Willis v. All Staff, et al
Joseph Kolby Willis (“Employee”) alleges that he sustained a compensable injury to his left knee while working for All Staff (“Employer”). After his petition for interlocutory relief was denied, discovery was taken, and a compensation hearing was held. The court of workers’ compensation claims (“trial court”) bifurcated the issues of compensability and relief. After the hearing, the trial court issued a compensation order finding the injury was compensable. Employer appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (“Board”) pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-217 (2014). The Board reversed the trial court’s order, finding that Employee had failed to establish causation, and remanded the case to the trial court for entry of an order dismissing the claim. After the order was entered, Employee appealed to the Supreme Court. Employee’s appeal has been referred to this Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of dismissal. |
Workers Compensation Panel | ||
In Re Demarkus T., et al
This appeal arises from the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights with respect to their two minor children. The children were removed from the parents’ custody by the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) in July 2013 after investigators responded to a call where the children’s sibling was found deceased at home. DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father on the grounds of severe abuse and best interests. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of grounds supporting termination and that termination of their parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Mother and Father separately appealed. After review, we affirm the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Javonta Marquis Perkins
Defendant, Javonta Marquis Perkins, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for aggravated robbery, carjacking, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a dangerous felony. Defendant was convicted as charged by a jury and sentenced by the trial court to ten years each for his aggravated robbery and carjacking convictions and six years for the possession of a weapon conviction. By operation of law, the trial court ordered Defendant’s six-year sentence consecutive to his concurrent ten-year sentences, for an effective sentence of 16 years. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that: 1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the victim’s pretrial identification; 2) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on criminal responsibility; 3) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and 4) his sentences are excessive. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alexander R. Carino v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Alexander R. Carino, appeals the Trousdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 2010 convictions for two counts of second degree murder and his effective forty-three-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred by summarily denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Trousdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Clifford Barker v. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company
Clifford Barker (“Employee”) worked for The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (“Employer”) from 1969 until 1999, when he retired. He filed this action seeking benefits for alleged work-related hearing loss on March 18, 2014. Employer disputed that Employee’s hearing loss was work-related. The trial court awarded benefits for 30% permanent partial disability to both ears. Employer has appealed from that award, contending the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding of causation. In the alternative, Employer argues that Employee sustained no vocational disability as a result of his hearing loss. The appeal has been referred to a Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment in part, modify in part, and remand to the trial court for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion. |
Obion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Jose Holmes v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jose Holmes, appeals the habeas corpus court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief in which he challenged his conviction for especially aggravated robbery and his sixty-year sentence as a career offender. Because the Petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal and the interest of justice does not support waiver of the timely filing requirement in this case, this appeal is dismissed. |
Trousdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Zynia Pua-Vines v. Michael Blane Vines
This case involves a post-divorce modification of a parenting plan. Appellee/Mother filed a petition to modify the parties’ parenting plan, alleging that: (1) Father had moved, requiring a modification in the transportation arrangements; (2) Father had preemptively refused to pay the oldest child’s private school tuition at Girl’s Preparatory School (“GPS”); and (3) Father should be found in contempt for failing to pay the children’s extracurricular expenses, in violation of a prior court order. Father counter-claimed for contempt, stating that, without his consent, Mother had enrolled the older child in a private school. The trial court found Father in civil contempt, entered two monetary judgments against Father, and modified Father’s child support and the parties’ transportation schedule. Determining that the parties agreed to Catholic education for the children, and Father is not liable for private school tuition costs when the parties did not agree on the private school, we reverse the ruling regarding Father’s share of the tuition for the older child. We also reverse the trial court’s judgments against Father for $6,209.40 in extracurricular expenses, $787.59 for out-of-network dental expenses, and its finding of contempt, and its assessment of $150.00 per month prospective piano and dance lesson fees against Father. Finally, we affirm the trial court’s entry of Mother’s child support worksheet and modification of the parties’ transportation arrangements. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Braden
Petitioner, Antonio Braden, appeals from the denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion alleging that his sentence is illegal because the trial court erred by applying enhancement factors and sentencing him four years “beyond the statutory minimum.” Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher D. Hodge v. Debra Johnson, Warden
Petitioner, Christopher D. Hodge, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that the trial court was without jurisdiction to convict him because the grand jurors were not picked from more than one county in the district; and that the trial court illegally amended his judgment 60 days after entry of the judgment to change his release eligibility from 35 percent to 100 percent. Upon review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John O. Threadgill v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
At an earlier time, in 2011, John O. Threadgill brought an action against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. In doing so, he was acting as the trustee for the owner of real property, upon which mortgagee Wells Fargo intended to foreclose. That case ended in summary judgment against the trustee. When the decision became final following an appeal to this Court and an unsuccessful request for Supreme Court review, Threadgill almost immediately filed this action. For the purpose of the second suit, he admits that the current complaint asserts the same claims and involves the same parties as in the earlier suit. In the second suit, Wells Fargo again moved for summary judgment upon the ground of res judicata. Threadgill acknowledges that res judicata applies to bar his claim. He argues, however, that he is entitled to a judgment declaring that Wells Fargo is estopped from asserting any claim that is based upon the note and deed of trust, because Wells Fargo failed to assert such a claim in the first lawsuit. Threadgill argues that a claim based on the note and deed of trust is a compulsory counterclaim under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 13.01. The trial court disagreed, ruling that Wells Fargo’s “nonjudicial foreclosure is, by definition, nonjudicial and was not required to be raised in the [earlier case] as a counterclaim.” Threadgill appeals. We affirm |
Knox | Court of Appeals |