Robert Keith Ward v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Robert Keith Ward, appeals pro se from the summary dismissal of his 2016 petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 2004 conviction of aggravated rape. Because the petition was filed well beyond the applicable statute of limitations and because the petitioner failed to prove a statutory exception to the timely filing or a due process tolling of the statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Valerie Israel, et al. v. Bryan York, et al.
The pro se appellants, Bryan York and Anna Eastwood, appeal from a final order entered on October 17, 2016. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until November 18, 2016, more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the final order. The appellees, Valerie Israel and Russ Israel, have filed a motion to dismiss this appeal arguing, among other things, that the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed. Because it appears from the attachments to the motion that the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal and grant the motion to dismiss. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Greer Craig et al. v. Peoples Community Bank
The plaintiffs, Greer Craig and Lana Kaye Craig, brought an action against Peoples Community Bank (the Bank). Their cause of action is essentially identical to Mr. Craig’s two prior actions, each of which previously had been dismissed with prejudice and not appealed. In the present action, the trial court applied the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel and granted the Bank summary judgment. We affirm. Furthermore, we find this appeal to be frivolous. Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court so it can award the Bank its reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses on appeal. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Edythe Christie
Defendant, Edythe Christie, appeals her conviction of tampering with evidence. The trial court denied judicial diversion, sentencing Defendant to four years and six months, with all but 150 days of the sentence to be served on probation. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the jury instruction on tampering with the evidence, and the denial of judicial diversion. Defendant also argues that juror bias violated her right to a fair trial and impartial jury. After a review of the issues, we determine that Defendant is not entitled to relief. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sonya Mae Stanley v. Colin Richard Stanley
This appeal arises from a father’s petition to relocate with his minor children. The father sought to relocate to Oklahoma in order to work on his family’s farm, which he hoped to eventually inherit. The father, as the parent spending the greater amount of time with the children, sent the children’s mother a notice of intent to move. The father then filed a petition to relocate with the minor children to Oklahoma. The trial court concluded that, because he was the petitioner, the father bore the burden of proof on whether the move was for a reasonable purpose. After both parents presented their proof, the trial court denied the request to relocate. The court found the father lacked a reasonable purpose for the proposed move. Because we conclude the burden of proof rested with the mother, we vacate and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Henry Pruitt
We granted this appeal to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals incorrectly held in State v. Hayes, No. M2012-01768-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 3378320, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 1, 2013), no perm. app. filed, that retroactive application of the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-6-108, would violate constitutional protections against ex post facto laws and to re-evaluate the ex post facto analysis in Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758 (Tenn. 1979), in light of Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990). Having concluded that Miller was wrongly decided, we overrule Miller and hold that the ex post facto clause of the Tennessee Constitution has the same definition and scope as the federal ex post facto clause. To be an ex post facto violation, a law must be retroactive in its application and must fall within one of the four categories set forth in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.). We conclude that the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act is not an ex post facto statute as applied in this case and that as a result, the Defendant‟s motion to suppress the evidence against him was not well-taken. In addition, we conclude that the Defendant's issues regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him and to sentence him to life without the possibility of parole do not entitle him to relief. Accordingly, the judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeals are affirmed on the separate grounds stated herein. |
Hickman | Supreme Court | |
Hyundai Motor America v. Tennessee Motor Vehicle Commission, et al.
This appeal arises from a proceeding initiated by two automobile dealers who challenged the location of a proposed dealership in a contested case proceeding before the Tennessee Motor Vehicle Commission (the “Commission”); the manufacturer contended that the dealers were not located in the “relevant market area,” as required by statute and moved to dismiss the proceeding for lack of standing. The administrative law judge overruled the manufacturer’s motion, and the manufacturer filed a petition in Chancery Court seeking interlocutory review. The trial court dismissed the petition, holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review the administrative judge’s ruling on the motion. The motor vehicle manufacturer appeals the dismissal of its petition for judicial review of the denial of its motion to dismiss the contested case proceeding. Concluding that the manufacturer did not meet the threshold requirement for immediate judicial review as set forth in the Administrative Procedures Act, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Renaldo M. Jr., et al.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of a Mother to her three children on the grounds of abandonment by engaging in conduct evidencing a wanton disregard for the children’s welfare and persistence of conditions. Mother appeals, contending that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the termination of her rights. Concluding that the evidence of Mother’s pre-incarceration conduct does not clearly and convincingly prove a wanton disregard for the children’s welfare, we reverse the trial court’s finding in that regard. There is clear and convincing evidence supporting holding that the conditions which led to the children’s removal from Mother’s custody persisted and that termination of her rights is in the best interest of the children; accordingly, we affirm the termination of Mother’s rights on that ground. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nicole Flowers
Nicole Flowers (“the defendant”) was convicted of the criminal offense of stalking, see Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-315, based, in part, on her posting disparaging signs about the victim on the victim's private property and on the property of his employer, which was a public place. We granted this appeal to consider whether the signs placed by the defendant amounted to an exercise of her right to free speech, as protected by the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. We also consider whether the evidence presented at the bench trial was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction. We conclude, based on the proof in the record on appeal, that the evidence underlying the defendant's conviction for stalking is insufficient to sustain her conviction and therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Having determined that the evidence is insufficient, the issue of the defendant's right to free speech is pretermitted. |
Maury | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Allen Glen Begley
The Defendant, Allen Glen Begley, appeals as of right from the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s revocation of the balance of his two-year probationary sentence for failure to appear. The Defendant submits that he was not afforded due process because the violation affidavits, which listed the wrong case number, were “fatally defective.” Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of the Defendant’s probation. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Cheyanna B.
John B. (“Father”) appeals the order of the Juvenile Court for Jefferson County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminating his parental rights to the minor child Cheyanna B. (“the Child”) after finding and holding that grounds for termination for abandonment by wanton disregard pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) were proven by clear and convincing evidence and that it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the Child’s best interest. We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s findings made by clear and convincing evidence, and we affirm. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Yariel S., et al.
This appeal arises from a termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Yaron L. (“Father”) to his four minor children Yariel, Yaron, Yariyana, and YariAsia (“the Children”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of persistent conditions and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. The Juvenile Court also found that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Father appeals to this Court. Father argues that he was not properly notified of the trial, that counsel should have been appointed, and that termination of his parental rights is not in the Children’s best interest. We hold that that the evidence in the record on appeal shows, as found by the Juvenile Court, that Father was notified of trial, that Father failed to appear at trial, and that the Juvenile Court did not err in declining to appoint Father counsel when he failed to appear. We also find and hold that the Juvenile Court’s determinations regarding grounds for termination and the Children’s best interest are supported by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Ken Buckner, et al. v. Mike Goodman, et al.
This case involves a contract to purchase a home on the sellers‟ condition that the home be removed from the sellers‟ real property at the buyers‟ expense. The sellers and the buyers entered into a written contract on January 25, 2013, at which time the buyers paid a $2,500 deposit toward an agreed price of $5,000 for the home. The contract did not set forth a deadline for the home to be removed from the sellers‟ property, although the sellers were required to demonstrate to the lender financing their new construction loan that the home had been removed. The buyers contacted several potential house movers to transport the home but did not execute a final written contract with any of them. The sellers subsequently entered into a written agreement with movers who had originally been contacted by the buyers, retaining the movers to “take possession” of the home and transport it but providing the original buyers a first option to purchase. After learning of the agreement between the sellers and the movers, the buyers contacted the movers, “firing” them. The sellers then had the home demolished. The buyers filed a complaint against the sellers, alleging breach of a home sales contract. The sellers filed a counter-complaint, alleging that the buyers had materially breached the contract first by failing to timely remove the home. The buyers subsequently filed a second complaint against the movers, alleging intentional interference with contractual relations. The trial court consolidated the two actions. Following presentation of the buyers‟ proof during a bench trial, the trial court found that the buyers had materially breached the contract. The court granted the sellers‟ and the movers‟ respective motions for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02. Upon hearing the sellers‟ evidence regarding damages, the court entered a judgment in favor of the sellers in the amount of $5,200, comprised of $7,700 in total damages offset by the $2,500 previously paid by the buyers. The buyers timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Bennie Osby v. State of Tennessee
Bennie Osby (“the Petitioner”) was convicted after a jury trial of especially aggravated kidnapping, attempted second degree murder, aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm during the commission of a felony. He sought post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Elizabeth Gardenhire
Following a jury trial, the defendant, Elizabeth Gardenhire, was convicted of theft of property valuedat $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a career offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the State failed to establish that she acted knowingly or that the value of the property was $1000 or more. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
White | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard L. Vowell v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Richard L. Vowell, appeals from the Anderson County Circuit Court’s summary denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding that his petition was untimely filed because the statute of limitations should have been tolled on due process grounds. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Neylan H.
Terri W.H. (“Mother”) and Justin H. (“Stepfather”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of James P. (“Father”) to the minor child Neylan H. (“the Child”) in order to allow Stepfather to adopt the Child. After a trial, the Circuit Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”) entered its order denying the petition after finding and holding, inter alia, that Mother and Stepfather had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned the Child by willful failure to provide support. Mother appeals to this Court. We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings made by the Trial Court, and we affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
William Stuart Davis v. Cathy Denise Davis
This is an appeal from the divorce in a 26-year marriage. The court awarded the divorce to Wife on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct and awarded Wife approximately 62 percent of the marital estate. The court ordered Husband to pay alimony in futuro and Wife’s attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. Husband appeals the court’s division of the marital estate, the award of alimony in solido, and the amount of alimony in futuro awarded. We have determined that the division of the marital estate, under the circumstances presented, was equitable and that the record supports the determination to award alimony in futuro and alimony in solido; we vacate the amount awarded as alimony in futuro and remand the case for further reconsideration of the amount awarded. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
WM Capital Partners, LLC v. Anthony W. Thornton, et al.
A secured creditor filed suit against a trucking company and two guarantors seeking a deficiency judgment after disposition of the collateral securing payment of the debt. The trial court granted the secured creditor summary judgment in the amount of the deficiency. On appeal, the trucking company and the guarantors argue that (1) the delay in repossessing the collateral rendered its disposition commercially unreasonable and (2) the secured creditor failed to present sufficient evidence of the amount of its damages. We conclude that the requirement of a commercially reasonable disposition found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-9-610 only applies once the secured party has actual or constructive possession of the collateral. The secured creditor’s refusal to repossess the collateral at the trucking company’s request did not amount to actual or constructive possession. Nonetheless, in light of the challenge to the time aspect of the disposition, the secured creditor failed to meet its burden of production on summary judgment. Therefore, we reverse the grant of summary judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ashanti Glass
The defendant, Ashanti Glass, was sentenced to fifteen years in confinement after a jury found her guilty of aggravated child neglect pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-402. On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Demquarter Healthcare Investors, L.P. v. OP Chattanooga, LLC, et al.
This case involves the lease of a skilled nursing facility. The lessee assigned the lease, and the assignee then subleased the nursing facility. While the appeal raises multiple issues, we have determined that the lessor prevails and that the judgment of the trial court must be reversed and the case remanded. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby D. Murray, et al.. v. Michael Murphy, et al.
The pro se appellants, Bobby Murray and Loretta Murray, appeal from an order of the Trial Court which does not resolve all the issues and claims raised in the consolidated proceedings below. The appellees, Michael Murphy and Vicki Murphy, have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal arguing that the lack of a final order deprives this Court of jurisdiction. Because the appellants concede in their response to the motion to dismiss that “the case is not over and the Final Order is not yet made,” it appears that the motion to dismiss is well-taken and this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
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Roane | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jill Alyse Patrick
Defendant, Jill Alyse Patrick, appeals her conviction for facilitation of a violation of the sex offender registry as well as her resulting sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served on probation after the service of thirty days in incarceration. After a review of the evidence, we determine Defendant is not entitled to relief. However, a clerical error in the judgment requires our remand to the trial court for correction of the error. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed and remanded. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Johnson
The defendant, Joshua Johnson, appeals his Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convictions of 34 counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, see T.C.A. § 39-17-1003, claiming that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the defendant's pretrial statement to the police, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the four-year effective sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rainbow Ridge Resort, LLC, et al. v. Branch Banking And Trust Co.
The facts in this case implicate the doctrine of res judicata. In 2012, a real estate development limited liability company and its members filed suit in the Sevier County Circuit Court against their mortgage lender, Branch Banking and Trust Company (the bank). In that action, the developers alleged, inter alia, that the bank was guilty of fraud, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. That suit involved four separate parcels of real property. While the case in circuit court was pending, the bank sued three individuals in the Sevier County Chancery Court, seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the priority of a security interest in one of the parcels of property at issue in the circuit court case. In the chancery court action, the bank joined the developers as parties. In response, the developers filed a counterclaim in which they repeated allegations included in the circuit court case and asserted other claims derived from the same set of facts. The two cases were later consolidated. In each case, the bank filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court heard both motions at a single hearing. On June 8, 2015, the trial court filed two orders – one in the circuit court suit and one by interchange in the chancery court action – granting the bank's motions. The developers appealed only the circuit court order. Unchallenged, the chancery court order became final. The bank later moved to dismiss this appeal, arguing that the doctrine of res judicata barred further litigation. We deferred a ruling on the bank's motion. We now hold that the motion has merit. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment dismissing this case. We do so based upon the doctrine of res judicata. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals |