Mimi Hiatt v. Kevin L. Hiatt
This appeal concerns post-divorce matters. Mimi Hiatt (“Wife”) and Kevin L. Hiatt (“Husband”) divorced. Wife some years later filed a motion to modify the final decree of divorce in the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to increase Husband’s child support and alimony obligations. Husband, in turn, filed a motion to recover claimed overpayments he made on the marital residence because Wife had transferred it to a trust. The Trial Court found, among other things, that Wife was voluntarily underemployed and declined to increase her spousal support for that reason. The Trial Court also ruled that Wife’s divestment of the marital residence constituted a “sale” under the Marital Dissolution Agreement (“the MDA”) and awarded a judgment to Husband for payments he made on the mortgage after Wife’s transfer of the marital residence to the trust. Wife appeals to this Court. We hold that Wife’s transfer of the marital residence to a trust constituted a sale per the MDA, and we affirm the Trial Court in its award to Husband for overpayment. However, we find that Wife proved a substantial and material change in circumstances, and we remand for the Trial Court to determine an increase in Wife’s alimony in light of this change and all relevant factors. We find further that the Trial Court erred in declining to award Wife her attorney’s fees relative to alimony. As a final matter, we award Wife her attorney’s fees incurred on appeal related to the alimony issue, and remand for the Trial Court to determine Wife’s reasonable attorney’s fees related to the alimony issue on appeal. The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed, in part, and, reversed, in part. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenny Thomason
A Rutherford County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Kenny Thomason, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction, claiming that the State failed to prove premeditation or that he possessed the weapon that killed the victim; instead, he asserts that the victim possessed the weapon and that she was killed during a struggle. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Chauquinn Bernard v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Chauquinn Bernard, pleaded guilty to felony possession of marijuana pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-418(e) and received the agreed-upon sentence of four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served concurrently with a ten-year sentence for aggravated burglary that he was already serving. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and involuntariness of his guilty plea. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Chalmers G. Brown
The defendant, Chalmers G. Brown, appeals the trial court’s order granting his motion to correct an illegal sentence and entering corrected judgments, arguing that his convictions should have been vacated not merely corrected. After review, we reverse the trial court’s correction of the judgments against the defendant and reinstate the original judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Douglas Kincaid
Appellant stands convicted of possession with the intent to sell not less than one-half ounce but not more than ten pounds of marijuana, a Class E felony; possession with intent to sell a schedule IV controlled substance, a Class D felony; possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court imposed partially consecutive sentences, for an effective sentence of five years. On appeal, appellant argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his possession of tramadol conviction and his firearm conviction; (2) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the photographs and text messages from appellant's cellular telephone; and (3) the trial court erred in allowing witnesses to testify regarding appellant's oral statement to police. Following our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenny Thomason - dissent
I respectfully dissent from the majority view that the evidence supports a verdict of first degree premeditated murder. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Clifford Eric Marsh
The Defendant, Clifford Eric Marsh, pleaded guilty to fourth offense driving on a revoked license, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-50-504 (2012). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days’ confinement at 75% service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Spencer
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Robert Spencer, was convicted of one count of possession with intent to sell twenty-six grams or more of a substance containing cocaine and one count of possession with intent to deliver twenty-six grams or more of a substance containing cocaine, both Class B felonies. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(4), (c)(1), (i)(5). The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of fourteen years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred by allowing an investigator to testify about statements made by a “cooperating source”; and (3) that the trial court erred by failing to merge his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the Defendant's convictions. However, we merge the Defendant's convictions and remand the case to the trial court for entry of corrected judgment forms reflecting said merger. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Lee Morris
The Defendant-Appellant, Richard Lee Morris, was indicted by a Madison County Grand Jury for attempted rape and misdemeanor assault. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of the lesser included offense of sexual battery and the charged offense of assault. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-505, -101(a)(1) (Supp. 2013). The trial court sentenced Morris as a Range II, multiple offender to four years for the sexual battery conviction and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the assault conviction and ordered the sentences served consecutively. On appeal, Morris argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his assault conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerome Sanders
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Jerome Sanders, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to eighteen years to be served at eighty-five percent. On appeal, the appellant contends that the the trial court erred by refusing to suppress pretrial identifications of him made by the victim; that the trial court erred by failing to suppress his statement to police; that the trial court improperly questioned the victim, which commented on the evidence and bolstered the victim's credibility; that the trial court should have recused itself because the court's conduct and demeanor created judicial bias; that the trial court admitted evidence in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); that the trial court erred by admitting the co-defendant's statement into evidence; that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments; and that cumulative error warrants a new trial. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties' briefs, we conclude that trial court committed reversible error by potentially allowing the jury to hear improper propensity evidence in violation of Rule 404(b), Tennessee Rules of Evidence. Therefore, the appellant's conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial, at which another judge shall preside. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Juan E. Henderson
The Defendant, Juan E. Henderson, appeals as of right from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's revocation of probation and order that he serve the balance of his seven-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, he asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dr. Robin M. Stevenson v. American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania
This appeal involves a lawsuit filed by an insured against his insurer due to the insurer's failure to pay a claim for a theft loss. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding no coverage under the policy. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Church of God in Christ, Inc., et al v. L.M. Haley Ministries, Inc., et al. - DISSENT
ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., Dissenting. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
In re Makendra E.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The child at issue in this case was placed in foster care at age two. When the child was ten years old, the child‘s foster parents filed a petition in Dyer County Chancery Court seeking to terminate the parental rights of the child‘s parents and to adopt the child. The trial court entered an order terminating the parental rights of the child‘s mother and father and granting the foster parents‘ petition to adopt the child. The mother has appealed the termination of her parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit in the four months prior to the filing of the petition to terminate her parental rights. The mother also appeals the trial court‘s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the child‘s best interest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Church of God in Christ, Inc., et al v. L.M. Haley Ministries, Inc., et al.
A hierarchical church filed a complaint against one of its local churches, seeking an order establishing the hierarchical church's control over the local church's real and personal property. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the basis of the doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
In re Saliace P., et al.
This case involves the termination of a mother's parental rights to her three daughters. The children were previously adjudicated dependent and neglected due to physical abuse of the children by the mother's boyfriend. After the children were in foster care for about a year, the Department of Children's Services filed a petition to terminate the mother's parental rights on several grounds. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that three grounds for termination were proven and that termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the termination of the mother's parental rights. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
In re Aaliyah E
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Aaliyah E., the minor child (“the Child”) of Wanda M. (“Mother”) and Christopher E. (“Father”). The Child was taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on November 19, 2013, upon investigation of the Child’s lack of legal guardianship while the parents were incarcerated. On October 30, 2014, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate the parental rights of both parents upon its finding by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the parents abandoned the Child by failing to provide a suitable home, (2) the parents failed to substantially comply with the reasonable responsibilities and requirements of the permanency plans, and (3) the conditions leading to the Child’s removal from the home persisted. As to Father, the court also found by clear and convincing evidence that prior to incarceration, he had abandoned the Child by showing wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare. The court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Mother and Father have each appealed. Having determined that, as DCS concedes, Mother was incarcerated during the entire applicable four-month statutory period following the Child’s removal into protective custody, we reverse the trial court’s finding regarding the ground of abandonment through failure to provide a suitable home as to Mother only. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dondrinkus T. Dickerson
A Robertson County jury convicted the Defendant, Dondrinkus T. Dickerson, of rape, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction to be served consecutively to his prior sentences. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven Bernard Syndor v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Steven Bernard Sydnor, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his Davidson County Criminal Court convictions for second degree murder and theft of property valued over $1000. Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in that trial counsel failed to discuss trial strategy with him and failed to present assisted suicide to the jury as a defense theory. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Wayne Johnson
Defendant, Timothy Wayne Johnson, sought relief in Warren County under a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The motion was summarily denied, and Defendant timely appealed the ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Maria Delaluz Urbano-Uriostegui v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Maria Delaluz Urbano-Uriostegui, filed in the Davidson County Criminal Court a petition for post-conviction relief from her conviction of aggravated child abuse, citing multiple issues, including ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, holding that the issues raised by the Petitioner were previously determined on direct appeal. On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the post-conviction court’s ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Gary Mosley
The appellant, William Gary Mosley, pled guilty in the Marion County Circuit Court to initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and reserved a certified question of law concerning the sufficiency of the affidavit underlying the search warrant issued in this case. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause for the search warrant. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, the appellant’s convictions are vacated, and the charges are dismissed. |
Marion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Nancy F. Brown v. Nancy Mercer-Defriese et al.
Nancy F. Brown (Plaintiff) was walking through and contemplating the rental of a house owned by Nancy Mercer-Defriese and Spencer Defriese (Defendants) when she tripped over a three-inch threshold or step in the doorway between two rooms. She brought this premises liability action, alleging the step was an unreasonably dangerous and defective condition that caused her fall and resulting injuries. During the jury trial that followed, Plaintiff and Defendants presented the testimony of experts. Plaintiff's expert opined that the step was a “trip hazard.” One of the Defendants' experts agreed that the step was a trip hazard, while the other stated that “all stairs are trip hazards.” Plaintiff and Defendants each presented photographs of the doorway showing that the step and the floors on either side of the three-inch change in elevation are in a very similar color. The trial court granted Defendants' motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion of all of the proof, finding that it was not reasonably foreseeable that Plaintiff would trip over the step; that the step was open and obvious; and that Defendants did not owe Plaintiff a duty to warn her of the condition of the step. We hold that the evidence before the trial court and now before us establishes a genuine issue of material facts as to the Defendants' negligence. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Kathleen Barrett et al v. Ocoee Land Holdings, LLC et al.
The issues in this case bring into sharp focus the question of whether or not the successful litigants below are entitled contractually to an award of attorney's fees and expenses against the losing side, i.e. the plaintiffs. This litigation began in 2010 when Kathleen Barrett and her husband, Gerald Barrett, filed suit against three LLCs and three individuals. The gravamen of the complaint is related to the purchase of, and the planned construction of a house on, a lot in a subdivision. Following a jury trial, the defendants now before us on appeal won a favorable verdict on all allegations and theories of the plaintiffs. Despite this outcome, the trial court denied their request for an award of attorney's fees and expenses. The defendants now appeal. The defendants contend that two of the LLC defendants are entitled to an award of fees and expenses based upon contracts in the record. Furthermore, they argue that the individual defendants also are entitled to attorney's fees and expenses (1) based upon a theory of judicial estoppel and (2) pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-249-115(c) (2012). The Barretts filed a motion in this Court seeking a dismissal of this appeal. They based their motion primarily on a lack of standing. We hold that the motion is without merit. On the issue of attorney's fees and expenses, we reverse the trial court's decision in part and affirm it in part. This case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
Dorothy Harris v. Yolanda Chaffen, et al.
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |